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Abstract 
Like many transitional democracies, Indonesia has experienced increased activity by 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), including those which focus on the prevention 
of corruption. Scholarly literature suggests that the democratising context favours such 
organisations and their anti-corruption initiatives. However, the reality may be more 
complex than the literature suggests. Based on an assumption that there is a negative 
correlation between accountability and corruption, this thesis brings the concept of 
accountability into the discussion of democratisation, NGOs and the combatting of 
corruption. Extending existing literature on social accountability, it focuses on several 
varieties of accountability activities initiated by Jakarta-based NGOs with the goal of 
combatting corruption. They include initiatives aimed at enforcing electoral 
accountability; influencing policy-making to strengthen accountability institutions; and 
mobilising stakeholders to utilise participatory accountability institutions. Through 
intensive interviews with NGO activists involved in these initiatives, this thesis offers in-
depth analysis of the struggle against corruption in Indonesia during the Reformasi era. 
It argues that the context of democratisation offered NGOs opportunities to strengthen 
accountability institutions while limiting space for the enforcement of electoral 
accountability and participatory accountability. It also finds that NGOs endeavoured to 
overcome the limitations or challenges that they encountered, suggesting that 
  
 
contextual conditions may improve in the near future. These findings not only extend 
scholarly discussions on the enforcement of accountability in transitional democracies, 
but also help explain why corruption remains pervasive in democratising Indonesia.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Objectives 
Indonesia entered the Reformasi era after Suharto resigned in 1998. Since that year, 
Indonesia has been a transitional democracy. Many expect to witness the completion of 
democratisation in this country, but, as Rose and Shin (2001) warn, there are always 
possibilities that transitional democracies turn to an undemocratic alternative or fall into 
a trap in which “the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and 
expectation”(p. 331). Corruption is a problem that very probably directs Indonesia away 
from the track toward democratic consolidation, because it contradicts democratic 
values like openness and equality and ruins public trust in democratic institutions. In the 
early decade of this period, various reform measures were initiated by the Indonesian 
government to enhance the system of checks and balances, nurture democratic norms 
and raise public anti-corruption awareness. Indonesia continued to be frequently 
labelled as one of the corrupt countries in the world, however. Why did corruption 
persist in Indonesia? Answering this question is an objective of this research. 
This thesis chooses to seek answers by exploring Jakarta-based NGOs’ experiences in 
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preventing corruption. This focus is based on the belief that all holders of public office 
in a democracy should be accountable to the public, and also on the assumption that 
NGOs are more able than individuals to initiate accountability activities and exercise 
control. As organisations formed by citizens voluntarily for specific purposes, NGOs may 
claim to demand accountability on behalf of the public. Data collected from fieldwork 
show that several Jakarta-based NGOs were quite active in campaigns against corruption 
in the Reformasi era. Not only were they proficient in exposing graft in government 
institutions but they were also able to push the government to initiate anti-corruption 
measures. This thesis focuses on these NGO’s efforts to prevent corruption, believing 
that prevention is better than cure, and also knowing that scholarly attention has been 
excessively directed at NGO activities aimed to disclose graft and punish wrongdoers. 
Data collected for this thesis show various efforts by Jakarta-based NGOs to prevent 
corruption. By analysing their experiences, this thesis explains why corruption persisted 
in the early decade of the Reformasi era.   
This research frequently mentions the concept of accountability in its discussion of anti-
corruption activities. Accountability refers to the relation between those who have the 
duty to perform a particular task and those with the legal or moral capacity to oversee 
the performance of the task and to seek answers or impose punishment if the 
performance of the task is inadequate, incompetent, or in some way improper. There 
are two reasons for making this concept central to the discussion of anti-corruption 
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activities. One is a tight relationship between accountability and corruption. The 
correlation between the level of accountability and that of corruption is negative, as 
Klitgaard (1988) suggests. The less accountability there is in a system, the more likely it 
will be affected by corruption. A second reason is that this research requires a concept 
that can help to explain the anti-corruption activities of NGOs. The literature on 
accountability offers many insights and relevant findings that can provide useful 
guidance in understanding the anti-corruption activities of NGOs. 
The next section elucidates accountability and corruption, two terms that appear quite 
frequently in the text of this thesis and are closely related to each other, as the literature 
suggests. It is followed by sections that put forward research questions and explain 
research methods, limitations, and contributions.   
1.2 Core Concepts 
1.2.1 Accountability 
The adjective “accountable” describes people or institutions responsible for decisions or 
actions and expected to give explanations when asked. There are many ways in which 
people or institutions can take responsibility for their actions, including by apologising 
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for their wrongdoings. Few arguments arise over such an explanation. Scholars, however, 
differ in their understanding of the concept of accountability. Mainwaring (2003, p. 6) 
states that accountability “is a far-from-consensual concept,” suggesting sharp 
differences in usage among scholars. Mulgan (2000) argues that accountability is an 
ever-expanding concept because scholars combine it with responsibility, control, 
responsiveness, and several other concepts. Bovens (2010) finds that some scholars 
regard accountability as a virtue, while others treat it as a mechanism. Such a difference 
leads to “different research agendas and different types of studies” (Bovens, 2010, p. 
956). 
This thesis follows Christopher Pollitt’s useful definition. He understands accountability 
as a relation in which one party “recognizes an obligation to explain and justify their 
conduct to another” (Pollitt, 2003, p. 89). In other words, accountability refers to 
relations between those who have the obligation to explain their actions and those who 
have the right to demand the fulfilment of such obligations. With regard to such relations 
of accountability, three aspects deserve further discussion. 
The first aspect relates to why a relationship of accountability might arise. According to 
scholars of delegation, accountability exists when a delegation of power takes place. 
Delegation is the process in which one person authorizes another to use power on their 
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behalf. Delegation is inevitable in human societies because people usually lack either the 
willingness or the capacity to deal with all affairs in person (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Lupia 
& McCubbins, 2000). People who authorize power are principals, and those who exercise 
such power are agents (Banfield, 1975, p. 587). Scholars argue that the principals have 
the legitimate right to ask agents to explain their decisions, and may impose sanctions 
in cases of wrongdoing; agents also have the obligation to inform principals of their 
decisions, to explain their actions, and to accept punishment for wrongdoings (Schedler, 
1999, p. 20; Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 76; Strøm, 2000, p. 267). In this regard, it is the 
agents who are accountable; principals demand accountability.  
A variety of delegation relations exist in human societies. In the field of politics, 
specifically in democracies, chains of delegation are illustrated in Figure 1.1. Citizens 
form the beginning of the chain, because “a fundamental principle of democracy is that 
citizens have the right to demand accountability and public actors have an obligation to 
account” (Malena, Forster, & Singh, 2004, p. 2). Citizens are nationals who are legally 
empowered, after they reach the legal age, to participate in politics by means of casting 
ballots, running for elections and other methods. Generally, citizens delegate power over 
budgeting, decision making, and other matters to elected representatives through 
elections, and also allow those elected to have some discretion in exercising that power. 
In a broad sense, by winning elections, elected representatives gain the political 
mandate to act on the people’s behalf. Elected representatives are usually members of 
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parliaments but also include the heads of both central and regional governments in 
some countries.  
As the number of agents increases, the originally simple relationship of delegation 
becomes complicated. In order to run governments, elected representatives 
consequentially appoint or select certain individuals to lead government agencies and 
share with them some power in policymaking and implementation. Usually these 
government officials, termed non-elected officials in this thesis, share ideas and interests 
with the elected representatives. Non-elected officials head agencies staffed by career 
civil servants who have technical expertise and whose main tasks are to carry out policies 
and offer public service. In order to reach desired policy goals, non-elected officials 
delegate policy formulation and implementation responsibilities to civil servants and 
also call them to account through various institutions and mechanisms (Huber, 2000). In 
a broad sense, non-elected officials and civil servants are also citizens’ agents, because 
the power they hold is derived from citizens.   
A second aspect requiring consideration concerns the identification of the two parties in 
a relationship of accountability. The names given to these two parties vary. For example, 
Pollitt (2003, p. 89) calls the party with the obligation to make explanations the 
accountor; the party demanding the fulfilment of those obligations is the accountee. 
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Bovens (2006, p. 9) calls the former the actor; the latter the forum. Behn (2001) calls the 
former accountability holdee; the latter accountability holder. The two parties can be 
individuals or organisations. 
 
Figure 1.1 
Chain of Accountability in A Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
The chain of delegation (Figure 1.1) demonstrates three direct accountability relations 
in a democracy. Electoral accountability refers to the relations between citizens and 
elected representatives, because the former delegate power to the latter through 
elections. Political accountability, in contrast, refers to a “relationship that links those in 
the high position of the administrative structure … [and] those officials who are 
appointed and removed freely” (Cendon, 1999, p. 28). Finally, administrative 
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accountability “is a relationship that links inferior administrative positions with 
superior—political or administrative—ones” (Cendon, 1999, p. 34). In addition, two 
indirect accountability relations also exist. One concerns citizens’ relations with non-
elected officials; another with civil servants. Academic discussions of these two indirect 
accountability relations are relatively rare. However, literature on them has gradually 
increased after several international financial institutions and scholars began to 
advocate strengthening the voice of recipients of public services in early 2000 (Bowman, 
West, Berman, & Wart, 2004; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).  
The third and critical aspect concerns why accountability fails and how accountability 
may be strengthened. Ideally, agents will always take the principals’ interests into 
account when they exercise the power delegated to them. The possibility of the opposite, 
however, always exists. “Agency loss” refers to the loss that the principal may suffer if 
the power entrusted to the agent is abused. In this regard, agency loss is a symptom of 
accountability failure. Agency loss is likely to occur when an agent possesses more 
information than the principal does, or when there is a conflict of interests between the 
two parties (Groenendijk, 1997).  
Various institutions and mechanisms can be established in order to maintain 
accountability relations under democracies. Elections are an accountability tool which 
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citizens can use, because candidates depend on citizens’ votes for their electoral success, 
and for that reason they are expected to respond to citizens’ demands to explain their 
track record. In democracies like Taiwan, citizens are even entitled to initiate a recall vote 
when dissatisfied with their representatives’ performance (Zhu, Diamond, & Sin, 2001). 
Most countries’ constitutions or institutions entitle elected representatives to summon 
non-elected government officials to explain their decisions or conduct. In Indonesia, for 
example, before the introduction of direct election in 2005, heads of local governments 
were selected by elected representatives in local parliaments and thus were obliged to 
submit formal reports periodically to them (Choi, 2004). Local parliaments could also 
relieve heads of local governments of their duties by rejecting their reports. Non-elected 
officials, meanwhile, usually have the power to monitor their subordinates and punish 
abuses through the hierarchical control system. That is normally a part of every 
bureaucracy.  
Scholars often use the term “accountability institutions” to describe state agencies that 
monitor other government agencies and impose punishments on them for failing to 
perform in accordance with expectations. O’Donnell (1999a) distinguishes between two 
types: balancing and appointed accountability institutions. Balancing accountability 
institutions are the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government that 
operate on a permanent basis. These institutions have several functions, and 
maintaining accountability relations is only one of them (Mulgan, 2000, p. 565). 
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Appointed accountability institutions are usually formed to address problems that 
balancing accountability institutions fail to solve. Examples of such institutions include 
the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, and the National 
Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM), Indonesia. Office holders will be unlikely or 
unwilling to commit corruption if well-designed accountability institutions are 
functioning optimally (Schmitter, 1999). Of course, independence, power and resources 
are all crucial to the capacity of accountability institutions to address the agency loss 
problem (Heilbrunn, 2004; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Pope & Vogl, 2000).  
Several factors influence the performance of these institutions, mechanisms, and tools. 
Accountability institutions may not function, due to external intervention or because 
they lack resources required to carry out their tasks. Elections may not work as an 
effective accountability tool because of the electoral system and the lack of information 
readily available to voters. Hierarchical control mechanisms within government agencies 
may stop operating because of collusion between superiors and their subordinates. 
These and other factors may cause accountability failure.  
Ensuring accountability relies on the people when accountability mechanisms or 
institutions fail to function optimally. According to the concept of popular sovereignty, 
the people in a democracy have the legitimate right to call all office holders to account. 
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There are three kinds of accountability activities that ordinary people may engage in, 
defined by how the activity is undertaken. The first is the kind of accountability activity 
that an individual carries out alone. Examples can be found in Latin American 
democracies where journalists expose scandals through their own investigative efforts 
(Waisbord, 2000). The second is where several individuals carry out accountability 
activities simultaneously. For instance, thousands of bank depositors in Argentina in 
2001 sued the central government for unconstitutional policies (Smulovitz, 2006). The 
last is where NGOs carry out accountability activities in the name of the people. Such 
accountability activities are more systemic than the first two kinds. Depending on 
context, legislation or institutional structures may be conducive to such accountability 
activities. In India, Mexico and several other countries, for example, the people possess 
the legal right to call on public agencies or office holders to publicize documents relevant 
to budgets, subsidies, official projects, and other aspects of government (Fox, 2007; 
Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Rodrigues & Slough, 2005). Even without these legal rights, the 
people can still employ other strategies to call office holders to account. These strategies 
include activating accountability institutions, utilising the media and mobilising 
stakeholders.  
1.2.2 Corruption 
The widely-accepted definition of corruption is “abuse of public power for private profit” 
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(Eigen, 1998, p. 83), suggesting that corruption in a democracy is an agency loss problem, 
similar to indolence or inefficiency. Corrupt conduct includes accepting bribes, 
misappropriating public funds, and giving inflated figures on expenditure accounts in 
order to skim away funds. Corruption can be categorised into three types—grand 
corruption, bureaucratic corruption, and legislative corruption—and each differs from 
the other two “in terms of the types of decisions that are influenced by corruption [and] 
by the source of (misused) power of the decision maker” (Jain, 2001, p. 73). Though Nye 
(1967), Leff (1964), and other scholars claim that in certain conditions corruption may 
have positive effects, conventional wisdom is that corruption is wrong. A rich body of 
literature demonstrates the negative impacts which corruption can generate (Gray & 
Kaufmann, 1998; Kaufmann, 2005; Mauro, 1995; Meon & Sekkat, 2005).  
Since the 1990s, corruption has attracted wide academic discussion and attention. 
Scholars attribute such enthusiasm to several factors. Several critical changes took place 
in the 1990s. For instance, political and economic liberalism spread; the level of 
economic globalization increased; and a good governance agenda emerged 
internationally (Brown & Cloke, 2004, pp. 277-280; Harriss-White & White, 1996). Each 
of these changes has the potential to reduce, or at least problematize corruption. For 
example, the main objective of economic liberalism with its emphases on deregulation 
and privatization was to reduce monopolies, and thereby limit opportunities for 
engaging in corruption. At the same time, several countries and international financial 
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institutions showed less inclination to put up with corruption than in the past. Some 
scholars attribute this change to the end of the Cold War which meant that powerful 
western countries and international institutions no longer needed to tolerate corruption 
in client countries because of geopolitical considerations (Adams, 1991; Brown & Cloke, 
2005; Ivanov, 2007; Tanzi, 1998). In the same period, it appeared that the level and 
pervasiveness of corruption was increasingly popular, further drawing academic 
attention (Harriss-White & White, 1996, p. 1). This perception emerged in part because 
NGOs (such as Transparency International) and international financial institutions (such 
as World Bank) expended considerable efforts to make corruption and its impact visible 
(Bedirhanoglu, 2007, p. 1241).  
Several scholars believe that corruption is closely related to the concept of accountability. 
Klitgaard (1988), for example, has famously argued in favour of the equation that 
“corruption＝monopoly＋discretion－accountability”. In his view, an individual is likely 
to engage in corruption when he or she not only monopolises goods or services and has 
substantial discretion in deciding who can receive that good or service, but can also 
evade accountability to others for the decisions he or she makes. In short, the correlation 
between corruption and accountability is negative.  
Researchers frequently refer to this “corruption equation” in case studies or theoretical 
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analyses. However, it is difficult to prove the correlation. One reason is that the actual 
level of corruption is difficult to measure. Scholars often cite either surveys or the 
number of corruption cases brought to trial to demonstrate the level of corruption. The 
former, however, mostly shows respondents’ perception of the level of corruption. The 
latter may not indicate the actual number of corruption incidents, because few office 
holders commit corruption publicly and not all incidents of corruption are exposed and 
brought to trial. In other words, no data so far are able to show objectively or faithfully 
the actual level of corruption in a given country. Another reason for doubting the 
corruption equation is that people are not always rational. People may still commit 
crimes, no matter how severe the punishment or how detrimental to society their 
wrongdoings may be. Accordingly, it is difficult to know the extent to which 
accountability enforcement can reduce the level of corruption.  
Nevertheless, many scholars believe that enhancing accountability will lead to a 
reduction in corruption. Ackerman (2005a), for example, argues that “accountability is 
one of the most effective ways to combat corruption, clientelism and capture and 
thereby assure good governance” (p. 8). One reason is that having the agents fulfil the 
obligation of explaining their decisions renders visible the exercise of power entrusted 
to them; another reason is that the likelihood of sanctions may deter some office holders 
from committing corruption. Logically, agents will be unwilling to commit corruption if 
the probability of being caught is high and the resulting penalties are severe. 
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Overall, therefore, the occurrence of corruption in a given society suggests problems in 
the mechanisms, institutions or forces that should act to ensure accountability. The 
occurrence of corruption among legislators, for instance, gives rise to the question of 
how elected representatives evade accountability to constituents. By the same token, 
administrative corruption cases suggest the failure of oversight mechanisms intended to 
hold civil servants accountable to their superiors or to the end-users of a public service. 
Graft scandals involving politicians or high-ranking government officials likewise imply 
the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies.  
1.3 Research Questions, Methodology and Argument 
One research question guides this study: did the Reformasi context favour NGO-led 
accountability actions aimed at preventing corruption? This research question can be 
linked to the literature in three areas, namely curbing corruption in transitional 
democracies, social accountability, and NGOs’ anti-corruption activism. A review of 
relevant literature suggests that answering this research question can be a significant 
contribution to knowledge.  
NGOs here refer to organisations “that are officially established, run by employed staff 
(often urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more 
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often the case, international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-
resourced” (Mercer, 2002, p. 6). Formed by citizens voluntarily for specific purposes, 
they are able, financially and technically, to initiate social mobilisation and other 
accountability activities. Their contribution to democracy has given rise to fierce debate 
(Chandhoke, 2001, p. 20; Diamond, 1994, pp. 7-11; 1999, p. 221; Kopecký & Mudde, 
2003, p. 11; Mercer, 2002, p. 20; Putnam, 1995, p. 67). By comparison, discussions on 
NGO activities aimed at combatting corruption and enforcing accountability are still 
relatively rare.  
This thesis focuses on NGOs’ accountability activities that are aimed at preventing 
corruption from happening. The topic—NGOs’ preventive function—has received little 
attention from academics. Most literature on NGOs’ anti-corruption activities, reviewed 
in the next chapter, discusses their efforts to expose scandals, to demand corruption 
suspects’ responses to accusation, to humiliate corrupt office holders and the like—in 
other words, to respond to corruption that has already happened. The literature on 
NGOs’ activities aimed at enforcing accountability, also reviewed in the following chapter, 
is similar. Most of it focuses on NGOs’ activities aimed at holding state institutions or 
office holders accountable for decisions or acts already made. Such activities belong to 
ex-post accountability enforcement. 
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Ex-post accountability activities attract wide discussion in the literature. In contrast, the 
other two types—ex-ante and simultaneous accountability—draw lesser attention. Ex-
ante accountability refers to activities initiated “before the process of taking the 
decision/action” (Lastra & Shams, 2000, p. 6); simultaneous accountability refers to 
activities aimed at asking office holders to explain the rationale of future decisions that 
they are about to make. Various mechanisms can allow or facilitate ex-ante and 
simultaneous accountability. Ackerman (2005b, p. 6), for example, argues that 
regulations obliging officials to offer sufficient information, to justify decisions and to 
answer questions before they put new regulations into effect are conducive to ex-ante 
accountability activities.1 Elections can be a mechanism through which to hold elected 
representatives who seek re-election accountable ex-ante, if constituents cast ballots in 
accordance with their assessment of candidates’ past performance. The Blackballing 
Movement initiated during the 2000 Parliamentary election period exemplifies South 
Korean NGOs’ efforts to hold politicians accountable ex-ante. As to simultaneous 
accountability, local school councils in Chicago in the United States had the power to 
demand school staff explain the rationale behind decisions relating to budgets and other 
school affairs. Institutional environment obliging office holders to explain their decisions 
                                                     
1 Example that he mentions include the Administrative Procedures Act and National Environmental Policy 
Act in the United States. 
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and to make documents accessible left little room for committing corruption (Fung, 2001, 
2003).  
This thesis argues that the enforcement of ex-ante and simultaneous accountability is 
essential for preventing corruption and that NGOs can play an important role in 
promoting these kinds of accountability activities. However, only works by Ackerman 
(2005b), Lastra and Shams (2000), and a few others discuss ex-ante and simultaneous 
accountability, and none of them give in-depth analyses of NGOs’ efforts to enforce them. 
There is thus insufficient understanding of the opportunities available to, and the 
obstacles that impede, NGOs from enforcing ex-ante and simultaneous accountability. In 
1998, a noted scholar (Kaufmann 1998, p. 63) warned against excessive emphasis on ex-
post measures and advocated putting focus on preventive approaches when developing 
anti-corruption strategies. The present research echoes his ideas and enriches scholarly 
understanding of the enforcement of ex-ante and simultaneous accountability through 
exploring Jakarta-based NGOs’ experiences in the Reformasi era. 
Several factors may influence NGOs activities in this regard. They include legal 
stipulations, office holders’ attitudes toward NGOs’ demands, and the public’s responses 
to NGOs’ claims. Given that the enforcement of ex-ante and simultaneous accountability 
is subject to such factors, this thesis addresses the question of whether the Indonesian 
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context in the Reformasi era was favourable to NGOs’ demands for ex-ante and 
simultaneous accountability. Answers to the above questions reflect Indonesian NGOs’ 
experiences in promoting the prevention of corruption, explaining why reform measures 
initiated by the Indonesian government failed to reduce corruption to a minimum in the 
early decade of the Reformasi era.  
Much of the data for this research came from interviews. I carried out fieldwork from 
August 2007 until March 2008. The purpose of a second round of fieldwork in September 
2009 was to interview several key figures (such as Adnan Buyung Nasution) who were 
previously unavailable. My primary research area was DKI Jakarta (Daerah Khusus 
Ibukota Jakarta), the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia, but I also observed and 
researched the activities of several NGOs in Tangerang City, Banten Province, and 
Denpasar City, Bali Province.  
This research selects cases which received media attention. The first case is the Anti-
Rotten-Politician Movement (Gerakan Jangan Pilih Politisi Busuk) which is an example of 
Indonesian NGOs’ efforts to punish corrupt politicians and to hold elected 
representatives accountable ex-ante. In order to explore NGO activists’ efforts to enforce 
simultaneous accountability on decision makers in building anti-corruption institutions, 
this thesis also discusses a second group of cases that are relevant to the Corruption 
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Eradication Commission, the Corruption Court and the Supreme Court. The third and 
final case study concerns school committees, and shows NGOs’ efforts to mobilise 
education stakeholders (such as pupil’s parents) to enforce simultaneous accountability 
of civil servants in schools. My focuses in all three cases are the NGOs involved. Below is 
the summary of NGOs I visited.  
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)  
Established in June 1998, ICW is the most noted anti-corruption NGO of the Reformasi 
era. Most activists who work for this organisation hold a bachelor degree; some of them 
have even studied abroad. ICW is representative of advocacy NGOs and its success in 
disclosing several high-profile corruption cases, including the Bank Bali scandal, the 
Texmaco fraud case, and the bribery scandal involving former Attorney General Andy 
Ghalib, helped to build its reputation. ICW has a close relationship with media firms. 
Widely known newspapers and magazines like Kompas and Tempo frequently quote its 
activists’ comments on corruption cases. At the same time, ICW activists are proficient 
at utilising the media to distribute data and information relating to graft. This 
interdependent relation between ICW and the media is well known, so much so that ICW 
members sometimes joke that many journalists practically live in the ICW office. 
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ICW’s founding coordinator was Teten Masduki, a famous labour movement leader 
during the New Order era. He is one of the main promoters of the anti-corruption 
movement in Indonesia and has an in-depth knowledge of the movement’s progress and 
the obstacles in its path. He was the coordinator of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
in 2004, and the Indonesian government frequently consulted him regarding the fight 
against corruption. The second coordinator is Danang Widoyoko. He was Masduki’s 
right-hand man and was therefore also familiar with the anti-corruption picture in 
Indonesia. Thanks to Masduki and Danang’s help, Bambang Widjojanto, Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, and Dadang Trisasongko also accepted invitations to be interviewed for this 
research. They are all members of ICW’s Ethics Council. Bambang participated in the 
selection of the commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission several times 
before he finally passed the selection process in 2011; Adnan once chaired the first 
Selection Committee for the Corruption Eradication Commission; Dadang is the anti-
corruption advisor to the Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan), an institution 
established in 2000 by the Indonesian government and three multilateral organisations 
(Crawford & Hermawan, 2002, p. 204). In addition to these leaders, I also interviewed 
Adnan Topan Hosodo, Ade Irawan, Fahmy Badoh Ibrahim, and Febri Diansyah, who were 
in charge of divisions of ICW.   
Transparency International Indonesia (TII) 
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A research NGO, TII has been financially independent since it was established in 2001, 
though it is a branch of Transparency International. Its non-periodical publication, the 
Indonesian Corruption Perception Index (Indeks Persepsi Korupsi Indonesia) report, 
gives a regular account of the perceived level of corruption in each local administrative 
area across Indonesia. Its activists participated in the selection of commissioners to the 
Corruption Eradication Commission. Its former chairman Erry Ryana Hardjapamekas was 
one of the first four deputy commissioners of the Corruption Eradication Commission. 
For this research, I interviewed Erry Ryana Hardjapamekas, Todung Mulya Lubis (the 
former chairman), Rezki Sri Wibowo (the former vice chairman), and Anung Karyadi (the 
research division director). They talked about their experience of participating in the 
selection of commissioners for the Corruption Eradication Commission, among other 
topics. 
Masyarakat Transparensi Indonesia (MTI, Indonesia Transparency Society) 
Established in 1998, MTI is a research NGO, and its activists conduct data collection and 
analyses. From the beginning, MTI activists have paid close attention to issues relevant 
to local autonomy, bureaucratic reforms, and the fight against corruption. These activists 
offer suggestions to the Indonesian government on several statutes relating to 
combatting corruption. MTI has a close relation with government bodies, as the list of 
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its members reveals. For example, two former Ministers of Finance, Mari’e Muhammad 
and Sri Mulyani Indrawati, and former Vice President Boediono once belonged to its 
Board of Trustees. Its Executive Board once included the two former deputy 
commissioners of the Corruption Eradication Commission, Amien Sunaryadi and 
Chandra M. Hamzah. Interviewees for this research include Amien Sunaryadi and MTI 
researcher Jamil Mubarok. They provide insights into the development of research NGOs 
in Indonesia, and NGO activists’ experience of participation in accountability institutions.  
Pusat Studi Hukum Indonesia (PSHK, Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies)  
Established in 1998, PSHK was a research NGO specialising in analyses of government 
policies and laws. Legal scholars Daniel S. Lev and Mardjono Reksodiputro were its 
founders, and most of its activists are alumni from the Faculty of Law, University of 
Indonesia. Former Corruption Eradication Commission commissioner Chandra M. 
Hamzah was at one time one of its activists. Programmes of PSHK are relevant to good 
governance, fighting against corruption, and democracy. Its main publication is the legal 
journal Jentera which has been running since 2002. PSHK activists once participated in 
the committee working on the institutional design of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission and the formulation of the Blueprint of the Supreme Court. Bivitri Susanti, 
former PSHK director, and Aria Suyudi, who works for the Supreme Court reform team, 
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were interviewees for this research. They shared their experience of working with non-
elected officials. 
Lembaga Independensi Peradilan (LeiP, Institute for Judicial Independence) 
Founded in 1999, LeiP is very similar to PSHK. It is a research NGO that consists of alumni 
from the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia. The tight connection between LeiP and 
PSHK is reflected in the fact that they share the same office and use the same resources. 
LeiP, however, pays much more attention to issues relevant to judicial independence, 
while PSHK focuses on statutes. LeiP activists were originally critics of judicial institutions. 
They co-operated with the Supreme Court and other state institutions after those 
agencies came under the leadership of reform-minded figures. Therefore, they were 
promoters of internal reforms of several accountability institutions. LeiP activists 
participated in the drafting of the Law on the Supreme Court, the selection of justices, 
and the formulation of the Blueprint for the Supreme Court. The main interviewee for 
this part of the research was the incumbent director, Dian Rositawati, and she shared 
the experience of LeiP activists’ participation in the internal reform of the Supreme Court.  
Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia (MaPPI, Judicial Watch Society) 
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MaPPI is a research NGO established by the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, in 
2000. MaPPI also expresses concerns about legal problems but, unlike PSHK and LeiP, It 
pays great attention to the judicial process, where corruption is widespread. MaPPI 
activists not only monitor the process of law enforcement but also analyse controversial 
court judgments. News media frequently quote their comments on corruption scandals 
involving law enforcers and court judgments in such cases. Like activists in PSHK and LeiP, 
MaPPI activists also have experience of participation in judicial institutions’ internal 
reform programmes. Meissy Sabardiah, for example, is one of the members of the 
Supreme Court’s reform team. Another interviewee for this research was the incumbent 
MaPPI director, Hasril Hertanto; he shared his observations on corruption problems in 
Indonesian judicial institutions.  
Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Rakyat (JPPR, People’s Voter Education Network) 
JPPR is a network composed of dozens of affiliated organisations from the two biggest 
religious organisations—Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah—and other civil 
society organisations. Its mission is to raise the Indonesian people’s awareness and 
knowledge of popular sovereignty and to assist the realisation of popular sovereignty 
through citizen participation. JPPR is an advocacy NGO whose activists engage in election 
monitoring and voter education. It succeeded in recruiting more than 100,000 
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volunteers to monitor the process of casting and counting ballots in the 2004 general 
election. In order to enhance electoral accountability, JPPR and several NGOs jointly 
launched the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement in 2004 and 2009 with the aim of 
preventing unfit candidates from winning parliament seats. An interviewee for this 
research was the former coordinator of the JPPR, Jeirry Sumampow. He was the 
coordinator of the 2009 Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, and he shared much firsthand 
information about the movement with me.  
Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO) 
The establishment of CETRO in 1999 aimed to continue efforts by the University Network 
for Free and Fair Elections (UNFREL), and this NGO is now a research NGO specialising in 
analyses of the electoral system. On several occasions, its then director Hadar N Gumay 
received invitations from the government to comment on electoral reforms and disputes. 
CETRO also participated in the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, and its activist Erika 
Widyaningsih joined the discussions on the campaign’s design and coordination on 
several occasions. She provided information about internal debates on strategies and on 
the challenges that anti-corruption activists faced.  
Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA, Indonesia Forum for Budget 
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Transparency) 
Established in 1999, FITRA is a NGO that monitors the allocation of state budgets. It 
analyses the national budget (APBN) every year, and its purpose is to examine whether 
the allocation of the budget contradicts the 1945 Constitution. On several occasions, 
FITRA even asked the Constitutional Court to review laws on national budgets. FITRA has 
been a partner of ICW in combatting corruption in the education sector. Its former 
secretary general, Arif Nur Alam, is a key figure, and he offered valuable observations in 
the course of this research on Indonesian “rights consciousness,” among other matters.   
In addition, interviewees for this research also included activists from the Aliansi Jurnalis 
Independen (Independent Journalist Alliance, AJI), Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum 
Nasional (National Consortium for Legal Reform, KRHN), Pusat Telaah dan Informasi 
Regional (Centre for Regional Studies and Information, Pattiro), Yayasan Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal aid Foundation, YLBHI), Legal Aid 
Institution (LBH Jakarta) and several other organisations. However, because those 
activists did not have a deep participation in the cases analysed in this thesis, their 
remarks are not quoted.  
This thesis argues that several Jakarta-based NGOs endeavoured to combat corruption 
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in a proactive fashion, but not all aspects of the Reformasi context were in their favour. 
The Reformasi context favoured their actions aimed at strengthening the accountability 
of non-elected officials for decisions concerning accountability institutions, partly 
explaining why some anti-corruption agencies (such as the Corruption Eradication 
Commission) were powerful and enjoyed strong public support. At the same time, 
however, the context did not favour NGO actions aimed at enhancing accountability of 
elected representatives and civil servants, reflecting the shortcomings of government 
reform measures and Indonesian citizens’ lack of willingness to demand accountability 
from politicians and the civil service. As a result, power holders within the Indonesian 
government expressed worries about investigation by some accountability institutions, 
as opposed to public demands for accountability for decisions or actions which they are 
about to take. In other words, Indonesian power holders’ behaviours were not subjected 
to comprehensive scrutiny in the first decade of the Reformasi era, which was one reason 
that corruption persisted at that time. NGO activists now endeavour to address obstacles 
to their anti-corruption efforts, and what changes they can bring about will affect how 
pervasive corruption continues to be.   
1.4 Research Limitations and Contributions  
Three important aspects of this research require clarification. First, this thesis focuses 
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only on Jakarta-located NGOs. More than 300 NGOs operated in that metropolitan area 
in 2000, and that number may have increased since then (Tumanggor, Aripin, & Ridho, 
2005, p. 2). This thesis focuses on NGOs that are widely known, with a high level of 
professionalism and sufficient financial resources. The “celebrity status” of such NGOs 
facilitates the distribution of their ideas and campaigns, while their professionalism 
enables them to put forward feasible suggestions, investigate effectively, and conduct 
activities other than demonstrations. Funds are crucial to NGOs’ operation and 
development, and the lack of sufficient funding is likely to cause NGOs to deviate from 
their goals (Johnston & Kpundeh, 2005). This research selected NGOs that were suitable 
for study through reviewing newspapers, analysing activists’ educational backgrounds, 
and conducting interviews.  
Second, this research focuses on Jakarta-located NGOs striving to solve corruption 
problems at the national level. There are two reasons. One is that most other literature 
focuses on anti-corruption activities by local NGOs. Those NGOs mostly pay close 
attention to corruption problems at local levels and carry out their activities in nearby 
administrative areas (Lindsey, 2002, p. 47). The other reason is that few NGOs focus on 
corruption problems in the DKI Jakarta government. During my fieldwork, I met only one 
activist who had once run a NGO with such a focus. That NGO’s operation ceased due to 
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the lack of financial support from donor organisations.2 For these two reasons, I studied 
NGOs that focused on corruption problems within state institutions and attempted to 
co-ordinate nationwide movements against corruption. Lindsey (2002, p. 45) categorises 
NGOs into three groups, and the NGOs discussed in this research are either advocacy 
NGOs or research NGOs. Advocacy NGOs’ activities include monitoring government 
agencies and officials; exposing fraud; putting pressure on officials; and lobbying for 
strong accountability institutions. They typically maintain close relations with the media 
and their criticisms of the government are usually direct and severe. Research NGOs 
mainly conduct analyses of government policies and systems. Their relation with the 
media is not as close, and their criticisms of government policies are also less direct and 
explicit.  
Third, this research focuses on Jakarta-located NGOs’ accountability activities in the first 
ten years of the Reformasi era, that is, the period 1998–2008. During the first five years 
of that period, the NGOs analysed and discussed here experienced difficulties caused by 
shortages of funds, lack of publicity, and other problems. To overcome such challenges, 
                                                     
2 The name of the NGO was berantaS and its secretary general was Donny Ardyanto. The article entitled 
“Sembilan Anggota ICW Deklarasikan ‘berantaS’,” (Kompas, September 20, 2001) gives an introduction. 
Donny Ardyanto, interview with author, Jakarta, September 3, 2007.   
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activists focused initially on major corruption scandals. They attracted news attention 
and donor organisations by exposing graft, and thereby gained publicity and 
opportunities to get financial support. In the last five years of that period, NGOs like ICW 
and TII were widely known and capable of initiating a wide range of accountability 
activities. At the same time, they were in a favourable environment because a series of 
institutional reform measures (such as the establishment of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission) offered them various accountability channels and tools. Rising public 
grievances against corruption also underpinned their accountability activities. In sum, 
the first ten years of the Reformasi era is a critical period suitable for exploring 
Indonesian NGOs’ accountability activities.   
1.4.1 Limitations 
The scope of this research is restricted by several factors, and some are suggested in 
preceding paragraphs. First, it shows only the experiences of some Jakarta-based NGOs. 
Indonesia is a country with a vast territory, and not all NGOs operate in Jakarta. Local 
NGOs differ from Jakarta-located NGOs in focus, organisational scale, sources of funding, 
and the difficulties they encounter, so these research findings cannot represent the 
experience of all NGOs in Indonesia.   
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Secondly, this thesis discusses only NGOs’ activities aimed at reducing corruption within 
state institutions. As noted above, delegation relations also exist in private enterprises, 
so corruption and other agency loss problems are also likely to take place there. Some 
NGOs like TII pay close attention to corruption within private enterprises and help them 
to develop anti-corruption mechanisms. Private enterprises differ from government 
bodies in several aspects, including operation, leadership. For that reason, NGOs may 
have different strategies and activities when dealing with private enterprises. Some of 
these strategies merit further exploration, but they are beyond the scope of this research.   
Thirdly, this research does not discuss the relations between NGOs and donor 
organisations. Most Indonesian NGOs must rely financially on donor organisations, and 
this dependence often causes them great problems. However, in my research only the 
activities focused on corruption in schools relied on funding from donor organisations.3 
Therefore, this thesis does not have an in-depth analysis of the interaction between 
NGOs and donors, though it is an important issue in the NGO world in Indonesia (Sinanu, 
2009).  
                                                     
3 See the Sixth Chapter. 
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Finally, this research does not discuss the problem of corruption and accountability 
within NGOs. As formal organisations, NGOs need to be responsible for their activities 
too. NGOs have an obligation to explain their decisions, activities, and expenses to 
individuals or organisations that sponsor their activities. Scholars such as Edwards and 
Hulme (1995) maintain that NGOs should also be accountable to the people, because 
activists usually declare themselves to be representatives of the general public or 
guardians of the public welfare. Thus, NGOs should be more responsible and transparent 
than the governments that activists criticise (Fachra, 2004, p. 73; Hermawan, 2004, p. 
113). As their number continues to grow in the Reformasi era, it is crucial to make 
Indonesian NGOs responsible and transparent. The issue of accountability in NGOs has 
given rise to wide debates and discussions within the Indonesian NGO community, 
causing some NGO activists to suggest developing mechanisms that would ensure the 
quality of their work. A discussion on the mechanisms for holding NGOs accountable, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis, so I will attempt no further analysis of it in 
the text. Nevertheless, I need to add that, based on comments by activists, forming 
coalitions among NGOs in fact helped to eliminate unqualified NGOs, because activists 
who value personal and institutional reputations usually refused to work with those who 
were suspected of corruption. At the same time, according to members of donor 
organisations and officers of accountability institutions that I interviewed for this 
research, most NGOs discussed in this thesis were, at least comparatively, trustworthy 
and accountable.  
 34 
 
1.4.2 Contribution 
One of the aims of this research is to enrich corruption studies. There are in general 
terms two strands of literature on corruption. One discusses the causes and effects of 
corruption. A substantial number of academic works have examined the causes of 
corruption with regard to issues such as culture, system, income, or power (Bardhan, 
1997; Dwivedi, 1967; Hamilton-Hart, 2001; Hanitzsch, 2005; Heywood, 1997; Holmes, 
2006; Karklins, 2005; McMullan, 1961; Tanzi, 1998). A second group explores anti-
corruption methods. Most of these scholarly works emphasize the role of institutions. 
They suggest combatting corruption through improving institutional arrangements or 
safeguarding the independence of judicial agencies (Joshi, 2008; Malena, Forster, & 
Singh, 2004). In contrast, not much of the existing literature discusses how civil society 
groups combat corruption. Jenkins and Goetz (1999) once complained, “[g]iven the high 
profile which the notion of civil society has been accorded in the literature on democratic 
accountability, it is somewhat surprising that it has been assigned such a low profile in 
official reports on how to restrain corrupt activity” (pp. 615-616).  
The number of scholarly works discussing efforts by civil society in combatting 
corruption seems to have increased in recent years. Civil society is one of the pillars that 
underpins the National Integrity System that Transparency International advocates 
(Pope, 2000; Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997). Scholars such as Johnston and Kpundeh 
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(2005) advocate forming social action coalitions for the purposes of combatting 
corruption. However, it is the activities undertaken by NGOs to call office holders to 
account for decisions or conduct already made that seem to receive the most attention. 
Discussions of NGOs’ efforts to prevent office holders from abusing power in exchange 
for personal gain are few by comparison. It is thus hoped that the findings of this 
research will make a significant contribution to corruption studies.   
This thesis also seeks to contribute to the existing literature on accountability. 
Traditionally, studies of accountability draw the attention of scholars of public 
administration whose focus is mainly on institutions and political elites. However, 
scholars like McCandless (2001), Bovens (2005), Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000a), and 
several others have begun to include NGOs and other societal actors in their discussion 
of accountability in recent years. This is because they noticed that traditional 
understandings of accountability “have largely ignored the contribution of civil society 
to the exercise of control” (Peruzzoti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 10). Their main focus is on 
the activities of NGOs that call office holders accountable for past conduct and decisions. 
However, as this thesis will demonstrate, NGOs may also carry out activities to prevent 
office holders from misusing power in exchange for personal gain. This research will 
examine the challenges and constraints facing NGOs as they carry out accountability and 
anti-corruption activities, through an analysis of Indonesian cases.  
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Like the literature on corruption and accountability, only a small body of academic works 
on corruption and anti-corruption movements in Indonesia discusses the roles, functions, 
and strategies of local NGOs. While many such works explain how Indonesian NGOs 
expose graft and push law enforcement agencies to start investigating scandals, this 
thesis provides Jakarta-based NGOs’ experiences in preventing public office holders from 
acting illicitly. Such experiences point to obstacles that have impeded NGOs from 
effectively preventing corruption, suggesting that some aspects of the Indonesian 
context (such as institutions and culture) are in need of further improvement. 
Meanwhile, they also enrich scholarly understanding of the difficulties in curbing 
corruption in transitional democracies.  
1.5 Chapter Plan  
This thesis contains seven chapters. Chapter Two is divided into three sections. The first 
section reviews the literature on the association between democracy and corruption. 
The second section first discusses the concept of accountability and reviews the 
literature on social accountability, followed by discussion of the concept of corruption 
and a review of relevant literature on NGO anti-corruption activities. The third section 
defines and discusses NGOs’ anti-corruption activities that have not received much 
scholarly attention to date.  
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Chapter Three also contains three sections. Given that “strong civil society… [is an] 
outcome…of broad-based political and social changes” (Johnston & Kpundeh, 2005, p. 
151), the first section thus introduces political, social, and economic development in the 
Reformasi era. Data such as the Corruption Perception Index reports will be used to 
demonstrate the severity of the problem of corruption in Indonesia. The second section 
discusses the development of NGOs and media firms in the Reformasi era, and reiterates 
the reasons that this thesis focuses only on NGOs and reviewing the literature on 
Indonesian NGOs’ anti-corruption activities. The third section introduces Indonesian 
elected representatives, non-elected officials, and civil servants, followed by discussions 
on accountability institutions and mechanisms applicable to them.  
Chapter Four provides discussion of Indonesian NGOs’ efforts to ensure electoral 
accountability. This chapter has four sections. The first section reviews the literature on 
electoral accountability, mentions the Blackballing Movement in South Korea, and 
discusses questions that relevant literature on the movement has yet to answer. The 
second section introduces Indonesian elected representatives in the Reformasi era, 
highlights their importance in Indonesia’s transition to democracy, mentions the 
problems they raised prior to 2004, and analyses the performance of accountability 
institutions applicable to them. The third section focuses on the Anti-Rotten-Politician 
Movement in Indonesia, and offers in-depth analyses of this movement and its follow-
up activities. The fourth section summarizes findings and discusses what they add to 
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relevant literature. 
Consisting of five sections, Chapter Five discusses NGO activists’ efforts to hold 
government officials to account for decisions concerning three accountability 
institutions in Indonesia. The first section talks about the significance of building and 
strengthening accountability institutions in reducing corruption, and introduces 
Indonesian accountability institutions in the Reformasi era and their performance. The 
subsequent sections examine cases relevant to the Corruption Eradication Commission, 
the Corruption Court, and the Supreme Court, in that order. Each of the three sections 
has two subsections. The first subsection focuses on one particular accountability 
institution, discussing its significance and the obstacles to its operation. The second 
subsection gives an analysis of the participation of NGOs in the formulation and 
implementation of decisions essential to the operation of the institution. The fifth 
section summarises findings and analyses the importance of these three cases to 
scholarship on Indonesian NGOs’ anti-corruption activities in the Reformasi era. 
Chapter Six focuses on school committees. As participatory accountability institutions, 
these were established to widen the involvement of stakeholders in school management 
and to facilitate their efforts to hold civil servants in schools to account. This chapter 
consists of four sections. The first section discusses the problems of administrative 
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corruption in Indonesia. The second section analyses statutory sources of school 
committees, followed by an analysis of activities initiated by several Jakarta-based NGOs 
for the purpose of mobilising education stakeholders to exert control over school staff 
through school committees. The fourth section summarises my findings, and what they 
add to studies of corruption and accountability.  
Chapter Seven presents the main findings of this thesis, and a summary of the issues 
raised in each of the preceding chapters. It also discusses the contribution of this 
research to corruption and social accountability studies in particular, and Indonesian 
studies in general. Finally, it recommends that further study be undertaken of NGOs and 
their promotion of accountability activities. 
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2 NGOs and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Transitional Democracies 
Democracy, corruption, accountability, and NGOs are key words in this thesis. This 
chapter begins by reviewing literature on the association between democracy and 
corruption, followed by a review of the literature on NGO activities intended to enforce 
accountability and combat corruption. The third section identifies several possible 
means by which NGOs can prevent corruption from happening.   
2.1 Democracy and Corruption 
Democracy, defined as a system of government with attributes such as “fully contested 
elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud” and “effective guarantees 
of civil liberties” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997, p. 434), is commonplace nowadays. However, 
democratic countries were in a minority three decades ago. Not until the start of the 
“third wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 1992) in the 1970s did the number of such 
countries increase remarkably. According to Freedom House, a noted NGO promoting 
liberty, human rights, and democracy, 63 percent (122 out of 195) of countries in the 
world were electoral democracies in 2014, rising from 41 percent (69 out of 167) in 
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1989.4 This rise means that many democracies are new and in the period of transition 
to consolidated democracies. New democracies differ from each other, and also from 
advanced democracies, in various aspects (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) and are mostly in 
danger of returning to authoritarianism. In the light of these risks and variations, 
ensuring that transitional democracies are on the right tracks moving toward democratic 
consolidation is as important as increasing the number of democracies in the world.   
Corruption, defined as abusing entrusted power for private gain, is a problem needing 
to be tackled in most newly democratised countries (Cohen, 1995; Harriss-White & 
White, 1996; Shleifer, 1997), because it weakens key components of democracy. Porta 
and Vannucci (1997, p. 537) and Warren (2004, pp. 332-333) believe that corruption 
contradicts democratic principles (such as, equality of citizens before institutions, and 
open decision making) because corrupt acts are by their nature secret and always benefit 
a few people. There are also arguments that corruption ruins democracy. One rationale 
is that corruption weakens checks and balances among government institutions, 
creating room for public office holders to overlook public expectations. Bailey (2006) 
                                                     
4 For more information, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U3LmbU 
b4LTz  
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found this phenomenon to persist in several Latin American countries, and argued that 
corruption is “a prominent cause of low quality democracy” (p. 22). In addition, 
corruption is likely to lessen public trust in democratic institutions. Empirical studies by 
Canache and Allison (2005) and Seligson (2006) confirm this negative correlation 
between the extent of public trust in democratic institutions and the level of corruption, 
implying that corruption may lead to political and social chaos in democracies. In newly 
democratised countries, low public trust in a democratic institution may give rise to 
demands for restoration of authoritarianism. In his study of Russian politics, Cohen (1995) 
blamed persistent corruption for the rise of nostalgia for the “good old days” of the 
Brezhnev era.  
Given the above negative impacts on democracy, reducing corruption should be a policy 
priority in newly democratised countries. With regard to ways to reduce corruption in a 
democratic context, there is a rising consensus: Democracy is “not invariably an antidote 
for corruption” (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998, p. 469). Even worse, under some 
conditions, democratic measures offer room for corruption to flourish. Rose and Shin 
(2001) note that corruption flourishes in new democracies while “corrupt practices are 
carried over from the old regime and there are new opportunities for corruption as new 
governors gain the power to re-allocate the assets of the old regime” (p. 341). Colazingari 
and Rose-Ackerman (1998) warn that “a country that democratises without also creating 
and enforcing laws governing conflict of interest, financial enrichment, and bribery risks 
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undermining its fragile new institutions through private wealth seeking” (p. 469). In his 
study of democratisation in Thailand and Philippines, John Sidel (1996) found that 
democratisation had not had the effect of reducing corruption, but had created 
opportunities for local brokers or politicians to commit illicit actions. Similar phenomena 
also occurred in Indonesia after administrative and financial decentralization began in 
2001 (Hadiz, 2004b). Given the above remarks and instances, Chalmers and Setiyono 
(2012) are right to claim: “Overcoming corruption in democratising developing 
countries…represents a complex and multidimensional challenge” (p. 85). This is 
supported by several quantitative studies showing the presence of a nonlinear 
relationship between corruption and democracy. In their cross-country study, Montinola 
and Jackman (2002) found that “corruption is likely to be slightly lower in dictatorships 
than in countries that have partially democratised” (p. 167). Using new data to reassess 
the link, Sung (2004) found the presence of curvilinear relationship, meaning that 
“democratisation generally, and eventually, decreases corruption… [though] temporary 
upsurges in government corruption are to be expected during the early stages of the 
process of political liberalization” (p. 187). 
Nevertheless, several scholars still advocate reducing corruption through democratic 
means. They deem persistent corruption in a democratic context to be a result of 
unfinished democratisation. For example, Harriss-White and White (1996) argue that 
persistent corruption is “particularly strong in fledgling democracies where a procedural 
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transition has not been accompanied and underpinned by a spread of ‘real’ or 
substantive democracy” (p. 3). Accordingly, they propose improving the quality of 
democracy and raising the degree of democratisation. For example, Girling (1997) 
suggests that the solution to corruption is “more democracy” (p. 173). Hill (2003) states: 
“Greater democratisation of political systems is widely expected to lead to lower political 
corruption” (p. 213). Saha and Campbell (2007) optimistically say: “[A] consolidated well-
functioning democracy is able to reduce [the] corruption level of a country” (p. 8). These 
remarks reflect a shared belief in an inverse relationship between the quality of 
democracy and the level of corruption. Such a belief is supported by findings of several 
quantitative studies. For example, in their study aimed at explaining variation in the 
perceived level of corruption across 50 countries, Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000, p. 47) 
found evidence affirming the existence of negative correlation between the level of 
corruption and the strength of democratic institutions and norms.  
Scholars vary in what they focus on and in the solutions that they propose. Some scholars 
argue that enhancing competition for economic or political resources helps reduce 
corruption. One basis for such an argument is that corrupt acts will not be tolerated in 
highly competitive context, suggesting a high probability that corrupt acts will be caught 
(Huntington, 1968; Johnston, 2007; Treisman, 2000). They thus advocate limiting 
monopolies and nullifying policies that favour particular groups of people.  
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Some scholars advocate instilling democratic norms and values into citizens instead, 
when discussing anti-corruption approaches. Democratic norms are standards of 
behaviours that conform to transparency, accountability, openness, equality, and other 
democratic principles; democratic values mean beliefs in the irreplaceable importance 
of democratic principles. In societies where such values and norms are deeply ingrained, 
corrupt acts will be deemed to be abhorrent, discouraging public office holders from 
committing corruption or encouraging ordinary people to exert control over politicians 
and government officials (Porta, Pizzorno, & Donaldson, 1996, p. 74; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 
2000, p. 42). Accordingly, they propose strengthening democratic education, for anti-
corruption purposes.  
Some scholars emphasise the effect of democratic institutions and freedoms in reducing 
corruption. Democratic institutions include free and fair elections and government 
agencies established to maintain checks and balances. Freedoms refer to the rights to 
express personal opinions, assemble in specific locations, or take other actions without 
being stopped. In their empirical study, Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000, p. 38) find: “The 
more extensive are democratic freedoms and the more effective are democratic 
institutions, the greater will be the deterrent to corruption”. Given this negative 
correlation, solutions proposed by them could include providing state accountability 
institutions with resources and power required to exercise oversight effectively and also 
legally empowering ordinary people to call office holders to account directly.   
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The above proposals suggest ways to combat corruption, but say little about the roles of 
citizens. In their proposals to eliminate corruption, some scholars thus emphasise 
citizens’ efforts. For example, in his study of corruption in Latin American countries, Little 
(1992) argues that the problem “will only begin to be tackled when this democracy 
becomes more accountable to the people” (p. 41) and also claims: “The real impetus for 
reform must come from the electorate” (p. 64). Of various anti-corruption actions that 
citizen can initiate, the ones that reduce incentives for public office holders to abuse 
discretion deserve attention. In his overview of contemporary anti-corruption strategies, 
Kaufmann (1998) criticized them for favouring “an excessive focus on institutional and 
legal enforcement approaches…at the expense of focusing on the role of systemic 
changes in ex-ante incentives to engage in corrupt activities” (p. 65) and thus advocated 
“better understanding and incorporation into anti-corruption strategies of the role of 
incentives, and further focus on systemic changes that alter ex-ante such incentives to 
engage in corrupt practices” (p. 80).  
These remarks suggest that citizen-led accountability actions aimed at reducing 
incentives that attract public office holders to act corruptly deserve further discussion. 
Some may follow Klitgaard (1989, p. 447-451) to claim that incentives arise because 
wages fall too low for public office holders to maintain basic living standards. This thesis 
argues that incentives arise when public office holders think that there is room for 
abusing discretion and evading oversight. Given this, citizen-led accountability actions 
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aimed at strengthening accountability institutions, building up culture of accountability, 
and driving public office holders to play and stay clean may have effects on the 
prevention of corruption, thereby affecting the persistence of corruption in a 
democratising context.  
The initiators of accountability actions can be individuals or organisations, and in this 
thesis I have chosen to focus on nongovernmental organisations (hereafter called NGOs). 
In addition to the purpose of narrowing study objects, this choice is based on the fact 
that NGOs are formed by citizens voluntarily for specific purposes and also on the 
assumption that they have greater capacity, in their skills and financially, than individual 
citizens to initiate various accountability activities. I hope that NGOs’ experience could 
help identify reasons that citizens in a democracy fail to prevent government office 
holders from engaging in corruption. Before identifying possibilities by which NGOs can 
prevent corruption, the following section offers a review of the literature on NGO 
activities aimed at enforcing accountability and combatting corruption.   
2.2 NGOs: Accountability Initiators and Anti-Corruption Warriors 
A rich body of literature on corruption and accountability has emerged since the 1990s. 
Only a small, though growing, literature discusses NGOs’ activities aimed at combatting 
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corruption or enforcing accountability, however. This section reviews relevant literature 
on such activities, beginning by discussing NGOs’ activities aimed at enforcing 
accountability. 
2.2.1 NGO activities aimed at enforcing accountability 
Accountability as a theme has attracted wide discussion since the 1990s, in part because 
of the introduction of democratic regimes and state reforms in several countries 
(Dowbor, Amâncio, & Serafim, 2010, p. 5; O’Donnell, 1999b). Formal institutions or 
mechanisms to exert control over state actors receive much attention in this literature 
(Beck, Mendel, & Thindwa, 2007; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 55). However, after 
several cases where social forces succeeded in calling office holders to account in Latin 
American democracies, the last decade has witnessed an increase in attention to the 
exercise of control by NGOs, the media, and other social actors (O’Donnell, 2006; 
Przeworski, 2006; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000a, 2003). Many scholars call such exercise 
of control the enforcement of social accountability. International financial institutions 
that express strong concerns about governance and development (such as the World 
Bank) also have developed an interest in social actors’ activities aimed at ensuring 
accountability, and they initiated or sponsored projects oriented towards searching for 
success stories in Asian and African countries (Arroyo & Sirker, 2005; McNeil & Malena, 
2010; McNeil & Mumvuma, 2006). Abundant success stories reveal that social 
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accountability has been not just a buzzword but a truly “new normal” in development, 
states a senior official of the World Bank.5  
Social actors’ accountability activities have two merits. One is that they can supplement 
existing accountability institutions. According to O’Donnell (1999a), each country has its 
own balancing accountability institutions that operate on a permanent basis, as well as 
appointed institutions which are established to address specific problems. The primary 
function of both these kinds of institutions is to maintain checks and balances, but 
experience shows that in practice they can only audit and inspect a limited number of 
governments’ activities. Such a gap creates room for the abuse of power. Narrowing this 
space relies on the exertion of control by ordinary people, and they, as Ackerman (2005a) 
claims, can do so by raising the alarm or by increasing the cost of abuse to push power 
holders to address problems. The second merit is that social actors’ accountability 
activities are flexible, because such activities can be “activated on demand…directed 
toward the control of single issues, policies, or functionaries…without the need for 
special majorities or constitutional entitlements” (Peruzzotti, 2006, pp. 10-11).  
                                                     
5  For more information, see http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/GPSA-awards-world-bank-social-
accountability-new-normal-achieving-development. accessed June 9, 2015.  
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Demands made by social actors are not legally enforceable, however. This is another 
feature of social actors’ accountability activities, and also a limitation. Social actors can 
only impose symbolic punishments (Joshi, 2008, p. 13; Mainwaring, 2003; Smulovitz & 
Peruzzotti, 2000a, p. 151). Therefore, public agencies, office holders or politicians whom 
NGOs and other social actors attempt to hold accountable are not compelled to respond 
to their demands for accountability. Social actors can push formal state accountability 
institutions to punish wrongdoers, but such punishment is not the direct outcome of 
social actors’ accountability activities (Grimes, 2008). 
Such features have prompted scholars to explore the questions of how, under what 
conditions, and to what extent social actors can enforce accountability on power holders 
within government. Social accountability has been a widely discussed term in scholarly 
works. However, it is “a contested concept, with no universally agreed definition of the 
range of actions that fall within its remit” (O’Meally, 2013, p. 1). Of the various 
definitions offered, this research finds the one that best fits the discussions in this thesis 
is the one that conceptualises accountability as a relationship. This research thus 
conceptualises social accountability as a form of relations between ordinary people and 
holders of public offices. Among various accountability relations discussed in academic 
writings, social accountability is distinct from political accountability and administrative 
accountability, but close to public accountability (Blair, 2000; Bovens, 2006). The 
literature on social accountability reiterates that people are on the demand side of such 
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relations, and in a democracy they can legitimately claim that they hold the right to 
request explanations and to punish wrongdoers or abusers of public power. Social 
accountability activities accordingly refer to actions or efforts by ordinary people or 
organisations that they form to realise this right. Office holders, politicians and civil 
servants in a democracy are on the supply side of the same relations and should be 
answerable and responsive to social actors’ demands.  
Although the focus of literature on social accountability is on the demand-side of the 
accountability relationship, scholars vary in several aspects. One difference relates to the 
objects of discussions. Some scholars focus on individual citizens and think that social 
accountability “refers to a range of mechanisms that citizens can use to hold public 
officials to account, and actions on the part of government, civil society, media, and 
other societal actors that promote these efforts” (Beck, Mendel, & Thindwa, 2007, p. vii). 
In contrast, Smulovitz and Peruzzotti focus on citizens’ organisations or collective actions. 
They maintain that “[s]ocietal accountability is a nonelectoral, yet vertical mechanism of 
control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens’ associations and 
movements and on the media, actions that aim at exposing governmental wrongdoing, 
bringing new issues onto the public agenda, or activating the operation of horizontal 
agencies” (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000a, p. 150).  
 52 
 
In the literature on social accountability, there is lack of consensus on the need for 
collaboration by social actors with office holders. One reason for this, as Houtzager and 
Joshi (2012) argue, “stems from two different ideological roots of the concept” (p. 151). 
They add:  
On the one hand, there are those who start from a distrust of public officials and 
focus on creating confrontation between poor performing public officials and 
service users through social accountability.…On the other hand, there are others 
who believe in a more trusting, collaborative approach to resolve issues of poor 
services through collective deliberation and joint problem solving. (Houtzager 
and Joshi, 2012, p. 151-152)  
This divergence is reflected in scholars’ selection of case studies of social accountability 
in action. Scholars who distrust public officials and see their relations with social actors 
as confrontational focus mostly on accountability activities that call wrongdoers to 
account for decisions or policies already made. In terms of their timing, such activities 
belong to the ex-post accountability type, and they are the focus of scholars like Enrique 
Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, who have explored a variety of accountability 
activities by NGOs, media firms, and individuals and presented their research findings at 
several workshops. The literature on social accountability includes publications such as 
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the volume edited by Smulovitz and Peruzzotti in 2006 that focuses on cases that have 
occurred in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 
Some other scholars value social actors’ collaboration with office holders, and focus 
accordingly on cases in which social actors have demanded that office holders explain 
the rationale behind their decisions or policies concerning public welfare and health care. 
Given that the objective in making such demands is to influence decisions that have not 
been made, such activities belong to the simultaneous accountability type. Released in 
2007, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin, Volume 38, Number 6 is a 
collection of articles discussing this kind of accountability activity. The papers analyse 
cases in India, Brazil and Mexico. This special edition of the IDS Bulletin reflects a growing 
interest among scholars in cases from outside Latin America, as well as their recognition 
of multiple forms of social accountability activities.  
The literature has enriched scholarly understanding of social accountability. Given that 
accountability activities vary in the timing of demands, and also noting factors that may 
affect the outcomes, this thesis separates the literature into two parts and reviews them 
separately. The following subsection reviews the literature on the ex- post accountability 
type of activities, focusing on four aspects.  
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2.2.1.1 Ex-post accountability 
Ex-post accountability activities refer to activities by ordinary people or social groups 
aimed to call office holders or state institutions to account for decisions or policies 
already made. The literature on them is grouped under four different themes, each of 
which is discussed below. 
2.2.1.1.1 Agents 
It is possible for individual citizens to undertake accountability activities on their own 
behalf. Since most countries nowadays are democratic, it is the basic right of the people 
to call state institutions and their personnel to account (Houtzager & Joshi, 2008; Malena, 
Forster, & Singh, 2004, p. 2). Individual citizens can utilise accountability institutions and 
the media to seek accountability. Individual citizens can sometimes impose great 
pressure on office holders if many of them adopt the same strategy at the same time. 
There was a case in Argentina in 2001 in which more than 20,000 bank depositors sued 
the central government one by one for limiting their rights of withdrawal, and succeeded 
in nullifying the policy (Smulovitz, 2006). As the purpose of their lawsuit against the 
government was only to protect their own interests, however, these bank depositors 
were not, strictly speaking, agents of accountability.  
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Agents of accountability are individuals or organisations that demand accountability on 
behalf of others. For example, muckrakers who expose scandals and lawyers for 
prisoners of conscience are both agents of accountability. The present literature on social 
accountability, however, mostly discusses NGOs and the media as the chief 
accountability agents (Ahmad, 2008, p. 12; Peruzzotti, 2006). Such organisations need to 
meet several requirements to be classified as agents of accountability. First, their 
members need to possess awareness of their own rights. Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 
(2000b) argue that the exercise of social accountability can only be carried out effectively 
by “organisations that recognise themselves as legitimate claimants of rights” (p. 310). 
Countries which value freedom and popular sovereignty are more likely to have citizens 
who deem themselves legitimate claimants of rights than are countries that lack 
democratic conditions. Peruzzotti (2006, p. 253) argues that the rise of watchdog 
journalism in Latin American countries can be attributed to local residents’ increasing 
awareness of rights. 
Second, accountability agents typically aim to protect public interest. Rivera (2006) and 
O’Donnell (2006) both claim that social accountability activities only include actions 
aimed at defending public interests. Such a claim excludes from the discussion of social 
accountability the activities of many sorts of exclusively self-interested groups that have 
also expanded in many post-authoritarian countries (Hogenboom & Jilberto, 2012). This 
is a problematic distinction, of course, and it is noteworthy that accountability activities 
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claimed by their initiators to promote the public interest may in fact benefit only a few. 
An example is the case in which some Indian NGOs in Delhi City objected to a policy that 
legalised the activities of unregistered street vendors (Chakrabarti, 2008), on the 
grounds of the maintenance of business fairness and order in residential areas. Though 
framed as protecting the public interest, their demands for banning unregistered street 
vendors had an enormous impact upon the poor.  
Third, social accountability agents need sufficient resources and abilities. Resources 
concern NGOs’ operational sustainability and their consequent capacity to succeed in 
shifting the public agenda or affecting policy making. As O’Donnell (2006) puts it, 
“[e]xercising social accountability requires…sufficient personal and organisational 
resources (some combination of time, information, media access, capacity of public 
and/or interpersonal communication, and at times money). The absence of any 
combination of these resources condemns many questions to the silent cemetery of 
non-issues” (p. 341).  
Two kinds of abilities are critical. One is the ability to engage in effective internal 
management (Naidoo, 2003). NGOs which fail to manage their own internal affairs are 
seldom able to exercise accountability effectively, argues Ahmad (2008, p. 16). NGOs’ 
demand for accountability enforcement vis-à-vis others will be subject to suspicion if 
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they themselves fail to be answerable to donors. The second is the ability to understand 
and use accountability mechanisms and tools effectively. As Rivera (2006) puts it:  
Reclaiming the application of rights in relevant instances involves an 
organisational and legal capacity…Criticizing public policies demands theoretical 
knowledge, which is not within reach of the majority of the population. 
Investigating corrupt practices means having financial, technical, and human 
resources. Media access demands having contacts, belonging to networks, and 
having the capacity to construct messages. These capacities are developed 
throughout the years, since they demand organisational and technical 
apprenticeship, as well as a level of professionalism that is not characteristic of 
all civil society actors. (p. 181) 
Finally, and obviously, such agents need to focus on accountability-related issues if they 
are to be considered agents of accountability. Not all NGOs and media express concerns 
about matters relating to accountability. They mostly choose topics favourable to them 
or conforming to their interests. Media firms are profit-oriented organisations and their 
activities are designed, above all, to generate income (Behrend, 2006; Waisbord, 2006). 
They may cover news involving political and business figures, especially when the 
conduct of those people flagrantly contradicts public expectations, but this is often 
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because such news is likely to attract the public’s attention, suggesting higher profits. 
Similarly, NGOs have selective concerns (Przeworski, 2006). NGOs paying close attention 
to the same topic may vary in the aspects that they emphasise. Fuentes (2006), for 
example, finds that many human rights NGOs in Chile focus more on cases during the 
authoritarian regime than on those that occurred during the transition to democracy. 
Differences in preference may block cooperation among agents of accountability. 
Activities aimed at holding low-ranking bureaucrats to account may hardly receive 
attention from the media or NGOs that focus on grand political corruption. 
In summary, not all NGOs or media firms are agents of accountability. Competent agents 
possess a consciousness of rights and the ability, resources, and the willingness to initiate 
accountability activities to protect public interests, but not all groups will share these 
attributes. Cooperation among agents may not be possible because they differ in their 
preferences and capacities.  
2.2.1.1.2 Context 
“Context” means the situation in which agents of accountability engage in accountability 
activities. Context matters because it provides or constrains the opportunities available 
for social actors who wish to promote accountability. Context consists of various 
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components, but many scholars focus on one of them. For example, Rivera (2006) argues 
that the nature of practices aimed at demanding accountability “is to a great extent 
determined by the type of political system in which they are produced” (p. 178) and 
social accountability “spreads out in the phase of democratisation” (p. 181). Such an 
emphasis on the political system is typical of the literature on social actors’ 
accountability activities. However, excessive focuses on one contextual factor risks 
overlooking others that may also much affect social accountability activities. For example, 
in countries which have recently struggled to break away from authoritarian rule, citizens 
may remain obedient because of their fear of government officials or retaliation. At the 
same time, the bureaucracy may be still self-contained, and thus most information and 
data relating to public service remains inaccessible. Citizens, therefore, may have no way 
to scrutinise government officials’ conduct and exercise effective control. In other words, 
the political system narrowly defined is not the only contextual factor that may affect 
social actors’ accountability activities.  
In recent years, several scholars have expressed strong interest in contextual factors and 
advocated taking them into consideration when discussing social accountability. For 
example, Peruzzotti (2011, pp. 56-57) argues that discussions of social accountability 
should consider four contextual factors: culture, society, the quality of the public sphere, 
and institutions. In his work, Peruzzotti gives an in-depth discussion of the effects of the 
four contextual factors on social actors’ accountability activities. In contrast, scholars like 
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Joshi (2013) explore not only how contextual factors shape the form and effectiveness 
of social accountability activities but also the ways in which social accountability 
activities influence the context. However, O’Meally (2013) argues that the current 
literature on social accountability offers a rich body of operational guidance, rather than 
a sufficient “knowledge base upon which to make strategic decisions in different 
contexts” (p. 3). Such a knowledge gap makes current literature unable to explain why 
social accountability initiatives may succeed in some contexts but fail in others.  
Scholars vary in identifying the contextual factors that may influence social 
accountability activities. Unlike Peruzzotti, O’Meally (2013) separates contextual factors 
into six distinct domains, each of which includes several subdimensions. The six domains 
are civil society, political society, inter-elite relations, state–society relations, intra-
society relations and global dimensions. Table 2.1 illustrates the contextual factors 
encompassed in each domain. O’Meally stresses the “macro” context, and suggests that 
practitioners should think politically, comprehensively, and globally when considering 
social accountability.  
Table 2.1 
Summary of the Key Contextual Domains and Subdimensions that Influence 
Social Accountability 
Domains Subdimensions 
Civil Society 
Technical and organisational capacity 
Capacity to build alliances across society 
Capacity to build alliances/networks with the state 
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Authority, legitimacy, and credibility of civil society with citizens and state actors 
Willingness of civil society to challenge accountability status quo 
Capacity and capability of citizens to engage in social accountability 
Willingness of citizens to engage in social accountability 
Political 
Society 
Willingness of political/elected elites to respond to and foster social accountability 
Willingness of state bureaucrats to respond to and foster social accountability 
State and political elite capacity to respond to social accountability 
democratisation and the civil society enabling environment 
The nature of the rule of law 
The capacity and willingness of political parties to support social accountability 
Inter–Elite 
Relations 
The developmental nature of the political settlement 
The inclusiveness of the settlement 
The organisational and political capabilities of the settlement 
Elite ideas/norms of accountability underpinning the settlement 
state–society 
Relations 
The character and form of the social contract 
History of state–citizen bargaining (long- and short-term) 
state–citizen accountability and bridging mechanisms (formal and informal) 
The nature and depth of state–citizen pro-accountability networks 
Intra-Society 
Relations 
Inequality 
Social exclusion and fragmentation 
Global 
Dimensions 
Donor-state relations 
International power-holder accountability 
International political and economic drivers 
Note. From Mapping Context for Social Accountability: A Resource Paper (p. xiii), by O’Meally, S. C., 
2013, Washington, DC: World Bank. Copyright 2013 by the World Bank. 
Though O’Meally identifies various contextual factors that practitioners or scholars 
should consider, his work helps little to show “which particular strategies are likely to 
work”, as Joshi argues (2013, p. 8). In order to answer that question, she suggested 
focusing on “micro” context, that is, “factors often identified in the macro strategy for 
their operation at the micro level” (Joshi, 2013, p. 10), such as media at the local level. 
The framework Joshi puts forward looks promising. However, because her ideas are new 
to the study of social accountability, there have not been case studies that analyse the 
effects of “micro” context on social accountability activities. As Joshi’s work is not directly 
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relevant to this research, however, this thesis does not draw on her approach.   
In summary, there is a growing literature exploring the relationship between contextual 
factors and social actors’ accountability activities. While scholarly works offer intriguing 
theoretical frameworks, case studies are required in order to test how useful their 
approaches are for analysing success and falling of social accountability efforts.  
2.2.1.1.3 Strategy 
Agents of accountability have several strategic options. Judicialisation, social 
mobilisation, and mediatisation are three tactics that are frequently mentioned in the 
literature (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006). 
Judicialisation 
“Judicialisation” refers to all activities aimed at activating accountability institutions 
through judicial procedures. Accountability institutions are state institutions that are 
legally empowered to oversee government officials and bureaucrats or to punish 
transgressors. As mentioned above, there are two types of accountability institutions: 
balancing and appointed. Countries vary in the problems they face and, accordingly, 
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differ in the appointed accountability institutions they establish and the power given to 
those institutions. Democratic systems are maintained when all accountability 
institutions operate and function effectively (Schmitter, 1999).  
The activation of such formal accountability institutions is a strategic option for social 
agents interested in promoting accountability. O’Donnell (2006) points out that “[t]he 
existence of at least some horizontal accountability agencies that are willing and able to 
carry out their responsibilities…is an important element of social accountability 
induction” (p. 339). This is because agents of accountability lack power to impose legal 
sanctions. Houtzager and Joshi (2008) state, “[agents of accountability] can force state 
officials to be ‘answerable’ for their action or inaction but, critics suggest, they have no 
ability to impose sanctions and force compliance… [and thus they need to rely on 
linkages] to other forms of accountability to produce enforcement” (p. 3). The utilization 
of accountability institutions helps social actors not only acquire “a legitimacy seal for 
the petitions [but also] force the state to take a stand on the advanced claims” 
(Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 20).  
Judicialisation is a common strategy. Several Brazilian NGOs, for example, utilised Public 
Prosecution, an accountability institution constitutionally entrusted to protect social 
rights, to compel office holders to deal with controversies over environmental protection 
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and corruption in the late 1990s (Calvancanti, 2006). More than 20,000 Argentine bank 
depositors sued the central government for making unconstitutional policies in 2001 
(Smulovitz, 2006). These are but a few examples. According to Peruzzotti and Smulavitz 
(2006, p. 20), the adoption of the judicialisation strategy is not specific to Latin America, 
but a global trend.  
The outcomes of the adoption of the judicialisation strategy greatly depend on the 
operation and functioning of state accountability institutions. Grau (2006) finds that 
many such accountability institutions in new democracies do not possess the power 
required to carry out their appointed tasks. Many of them even lack the resources 
required to support their daily operations. Accountability institutions that have access 
to power and resources may fail to carry out their tasks effectively, due to partiality of 
their leaders and external intervention. It is hard for agents of accountability to enhance 
accountability by activating such institutions.  
Social Mobilisation 
The second strategic option is social mobilization. Victims of offenders, victims’ relatives 
and friends, sympathisers, and others can be the targets of mobilisation. The more such 
people respond, the more influence agents of accountability will gain.  
 65 
 
The literature points us toward several factors that can influence the outcome of a social 
mobilisation strategy. The type of controversy is of significance. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 
(2006, p. 22) suggest that social agents tend to focus on accountability problems that are 
visible, likely to attract great public interest and likely to impact on office holders’ careers 
or reputations. They can raise the visibility of such problems by directly appealing to the 
populace (distributing leaflets, making announcements, organising awareness-raising 
activities), though such direct methods do not always produce the desired outcomes. 
The utilisation of mass media is a relatively more efficient method. The media, however, 
are much more inclined to cover incidents involving famous people or scandals with a 
great impact on public opinion, as noted in the preceding paragraphs. They are unlikely 
to pursue cases lacking these characteristics. 
Scholars also find that incidents sharing particular features are more likely to mobilise 
people. Some of these features include the presence of clearly distinguishable victims 
and the privileged status of the suspects (Lemos-Nelson & Zaverucha, 2006, p. 109; 
Waisbord, 2006).  
It is noteworthy, however, that people who are outraged by a scandal or identify with its 
victims do not always respond to appeals for mobilisation. They may choose to be 
passive onlookers because they are accustomed to such incidents. Waisbord (2006), for 
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example, finds that a large section of the population in many Latin American 
democracies are used to corruption. Although corruption scandals still make people feel 
indignant, only a small number will respond through political action. Another factor that 
may influence the outcome of a social mobilisation strategy is the opportunistic mindset. 
Fuentes (2006) points out that “when common goods are in dispute, individuals face 
strong incentives to ‘free-ride’ by passing the costs of protecting citizens’ rights to others, 
while enjoying the benefits of others' achievement” (p. 135).  
Factors related to the office holders targeted by social actors can also affect the 
outcomes of attempts at mobilisation. Among them, the vulnerability to public oversight 
is of significance. As Behrend (2006) puts it, “social accountability initiatives may have 
greater possibilities of succeeding when the institutions or agents to be held accountable 
are in a more vulnerable position” (p. 214). Elected representatives, politically appointed 
officials and civil servants differ in their sources of power, and thereby vary in the point 
at which they are vulnerable. For example, office holders or politicians who face 
elections are more likely to be responsive as the voting day approaches. Politically 
appointed officials are accountable to their leaders or political parties and thus are 
vulnerable when they lose political backing. Civil servants, as career government 
employees, are potentially vulnerable whenever their superiors face great social 
pressure to punish them.  
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The evaluation of vulnerability by those held to account is subjective. Those held to 
account will respond to demands for accountability when they find that they are likely 
to suffer serious consequences. More often than not, they will provide explanations or 
simply choose the easiest way out—resignation. More extreme responses like 
committing suicide are also a possibility. At the same time, office holders may 
underestimate the influence of agents of accountability, suggesting that even large-scale 
demonstrations receive no positive responses from objects of accountability. In such 
conditions, serious conflicts are likely to arise.  
Mediatisation 
The third strategic option is mediatisation, defined as utilising the media for 
accountability enforcement purposes. The purpose of this strategy is to make abuses of 
power visible to the public and to officials in accountability institutions. Negative media 
coverage may also embarrass corrupt officials who still value their own reputation. The 
fear of humiliation can compel them to respond.   
Media and public interest may be mutually reinforcing. Peruzzotti (2006, p. 253) argues 
that the number of people in Latin America who want to call government officials to 
account is increasing. That trend drives many local media firms to investigate 
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malfeasance. Many local media outlets in Latin America have become famous for 
disclosing scandals and publicly criticising wrongdoers. They hire professional 
investigative journalists and are willing to publish information or evidence provided by 
informants. Some media even have separate divisions in charge of receiving complaints. 
Accordingly, news relating to corruption scandals and human rights violation incidents is 
brought to the attention of the general public (Waisbord, 2000, pp. 51-53). In Brazil, Peru, 
and Argentina media took the initiative to expose scandals and succeeded in forcing 
high-ranking officials to resign from their jobs (Peruzzotti & Smulavitz, 2006, p. 24). The 
success of these cases seems to have spurred other media into similar accountability-
seeking actions (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 24).  
In recent years the mediatisation strategy has come under strong criticism by political 
observers for giving rise to the problem of media trial, such as making judgments before 
cases are even brought to trial (Lerbinger, 2012). In a democratic country, all citizens are 
innocent until proven guilty. Nevertheless, officials suspected of malfeasance are often 
labelled power abusers in media coverage of corruption scandals. Such a practice does 
not accord with fairness and justice. However, such criticisms have not stopped social 
groups in several democracies using the media for accountability enforcement purposes. 
One disadvantage of the mediatisation strategy is that media coverage and focus can 
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easily change and it may be influenced by considerations that have little to do with 
accountability. As Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) put it, "the investigative capacity of 
the media and the selection of cases investigated depend on the economic interests of 
media firms” (p. 25). Media firms rely on profits earned from the sale of newspapers and 
advertising. Coverage is thus likely to change once the coverage of scandals no longer 
attracts readers, or advertisers threaten to terminate their contracts. Media firms, 
therefore, may cut funding for investigation into scandals or discontinue further 
coverage. Several such cases have occurred in a number of Latin American countries. 
Waisbord (2000, pp. 64-69), for example, finds that the government is the main 
advertiser in much media in Latin America. Thus, many government officials are able to 
exert leverage against the media by threatening to discontinue advertisement contracts. 
Where media firms have absolutely no interest in accountability-related issues, 
mediatisation is not a very effective strategy for agents of accountability.  
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, p. 25) maintain that effective social accountability 
initiatives need to combine these three strategies, that is, judicialisation, social 
mobilisation and mediatisation. Lemos-Nelson and Zaverucha (2006) call such a 
combination the multiple activation strategy. In their study of two particular cases of 
human security and human rights violation in Brazil, Lemos-Nelson and Zaverucha show 
how the three strategies reinforced each other. In both cases media coverage of abuses 
gave rise to social grievances. Growing unrest forced elected representatives to establish 
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Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry. Investigations carried out by this accountability 
institution exposed further details of malfeasance. These details received wide media 
coverage and provoked indignation among the general population. Not surprisingly, the 
discontented masses supported the decision of the Parliamentary Commissions of 
Inquiry to impose sanctions against government officials guilty of misconduct. In the end, 
these abusers of power received legal punishment.  
At first glance, the multiple activation strategy looks universally feasible. Limitations in 
any of its component strategies, however, can lead to failure. Media firms, as mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs, prefer covering incidents and topics that attract public 
attention. Their willingness to carry out investigations of abuses can be subject to 
economic interests. Not all controversies receive wide media attention or are able to 
provoke outrage in the general public. People with grievances may yet refuse to take 
action. Not all accountability institutions can carry out their tasks effectively. Any of 
these factors can reduce the likelihood of agents of accountability adopting a multiple 
activation strategy effectively. 
2.2.1.1.4 Effects and Assessment  
The simplest way to assess social accountability activities is to examine the 
 71 
 
implementation of strategies and the achievement of goals. The ideal is that agents of 
accountability succeed on both counts. It is likely, however, that they often implement 
strategies effectively but do not reach their goals. The 2000 Senate scandal in Argentina 
is an example. Several senators received bribes in exchange for the passage of the Law 
on Labour. When the scandal was exposed by a local media firm, the Vice President paid 
close attention to it and, in his capacity as speaker, activated an investigation mechanism 
within the Senate. The Argentinian anti-corruption office also looked into the scandal. In 
this instance, the media firm clearly succeeded in activating accountability mechanisms. 
During the investigation several senators admitted to accepting bribes. None of the 
corrupt senators, however, suffered legal punishment in the end (Peruzzotti, 2006). The 
strategy had some effect, but the goal was not achieved.  
Another method of assessment is therefore to examine the achievement of desired 
outcomes. The dual purpose of accountability activities is to get responses from the 
public and to impose punishment on power abusers. Agents of accountability may select 
just one purpose, though they will often choose both.6 The ideal is that the responses 
by those held to account conform to the demands made by the agents of accountability. 
                                                     
6 The Indonesian demonstrators against the authoritarian regime in 1998, for example, did not demand 
Suharto’s explanations, but his resignation (Schedler 1999). 
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Any disparity will not be a positive outcome. The resignation of government officials 
whom agents of accountability asked only to provide explanations, for example, may be 
seen as a negative outcome, even if it exceeded the initial goal.  
Several scholars have suggested different methods for evaluation. For example, Behrend 
(2006) claims:  
Success may be measured by creating a scale, with the minimum end being the 
achievement of the specific objectives that the civil society group in question set 
itself and the maximum end being the resolution of not just one case in particular 
but a policy or institutional outcome that affects other cases and addresses the 
issue in general. Some of the points in the middle could include issues such as 
agenda setting. (p. 239)  
In other words, observers should explore whether the social accountability initiatives are 
discussed socially and politically, give rise to institutional changes, inspire emulation, and 
have other effects. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz put forward another view. They suggest that 
scholars not to quarrel about the effectiveness of social accountability activities, but 
explore “how long and what type of issues…they [can] control” (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 
2006, p. 26). These viewpoints do not contradict each other, but expand the scope of 
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discussions on social accountability.   
One positive effect that successful social accountability activities might bring about is to 
give rise to imitation. If, like successful pioneers, many agents of accountability initiate 
accountability activities, state institutions and their personnel will face strong 
supervision pressure from society. They are thus likely to be cautious about using the 
political power delegated to them (Maravall, 1999).  
2.2.1.2 Simultaneous accountability  
Unlike the authors mentioned in preceding paragraphs, some scholars are interested in 
social actors’ activities aimed at exerting control over public office holders at both the 
policy formulation and implementation stages. The IDS Bulletin, Volume 38, Number 6, 
contains several articles on such activities, including seven case studies, and several 
theoretical discussions. Three cases occurred in Delhi City, India, and two cases in St. 
Paul City, Brazil, and Mexico City, Mexico. These are case studies of government policies 
on medical care, education, and social assistance. Scholars explore how agents of 
accountability—NGOs, social organisations, and the like—negotiate with policy makers 
in the formulation of policy and hold civil servants accountable for public service delivery 
(Houtzager & Acharya, 2008, pp. 27-28). Below is a summary of their research findings.  
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2.2.1.2.1 Willingness  
Not all NGOs and similar agents of accountability are willing to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of government policies and programmes. Groups 
which take pride in their independence are often not willing to have an intimate 
interaction with the government (Hulme & Edwards, 1996). Other factors that may affect 
the willingness of agents of accountability to participate in the formulation and 
implementation of policies include groups’ expectations about the role of the state, their 
interests, personal considerations, and concerns about negative impact.  
Expectations about the role of the state affect NGO activists’ attitudes toward 
cooperation with state institutions and their personnel. As Ackerman (2005b) puts it,  
If one conceptualises the state as fundamentally an obstacle to development, as 
a predator that must be controlled...one will tend to grasp a more external, ex-
post, legal, hierarchical vision of government accountability. If one imagines the 
state as a possible facilitator of development, as a central actor in the provision 
of public goods and the stimulation of investment and citizen participation, one 
will lean towards a more ex-ante, performance based, proactive, horizontal 
concept of accountability. (p. 37) 
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Scholars also find interests to be essential to the participation of agents of accountability 
in policy making and implementation. In his study of the conditional cash transfer 
programme (Oportunidades), in Mexico, Jara (2008, p. 69) finds that local NGOs have no 
interest in it. One reason is that the programme did not benefit poor families financially 
as much as NGO activists expected. In other words, agents of accountability are more 
likely to express an interest in programmes that match their own social or political goals.  
Relations with programme hosts or executors may also influence the willingness of 
agents of accountability. Houtzager (2008, p. 60) finds that several Brazilian NGOs 
declined to join a social assistance programme because of activists’ hostility toward 
specific programme coordinators. There were cases in Mexico in which NGO activists 
participated in the formulation of women’s welfare policies largely due to personal 
friendship with government officials (Gómez-Jauregui, 2008, p. 82). Other Mexican 
NGOs were not willing to oversee the implementation of another programme because 
these activists were managing it (Jara, 2008, p. 70).  
Finally, many members of NGOs or similar groups may feel uneasy about the impact 
upon their stance to which their participation may give rise. As Mehtta (2008) puts it, 
“recent policy debates have tended to stress the importance of autonomy (from the 
state) of [NGOs]…[c]ollaborating with the state in shaping policy can be seen as co-
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optation, particularly when CSOs[civil society organisations] also participate in policy 
implementation”(p. 88). Accordingly, many NGOs shy away from policy engagement for 
ideological reasons.  
In summary, several factors can affect the decisions by NGOs to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of policies. Public welfare is not their sole consideration 
(Jara, 2008, p. 69). Thus, it is essential to consider the attitudes of agents of 
accountability when discussing their activities in seeking simultaneous accountability.  
2.2.1.2.2 Opportunity  
Agents of accountability do not always have the opportunity to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of government policies or programmes, which are 
essentially government tasks. Government officials thus are not obliged to invite NGOs 
to participate in the formulation and implementation of government policies. At the 
same time, many government officials treat policy content and implementation as state 
secrets. Such a mindset also influences their willingness to invite NGOs to participate. 
Under certain conditions, government officials even deliberately exclude NGOs from 
participation. The conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico is an example. 
Government officials insisted on direct interaction between the government and 
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programme beneficiaries, and thus deliberately excluded NGOs from participating in the 
programme (Jara, 2008). Such examples are commonplace (see, for example, Houtzager, 
2008, p. 56).  
Opportunities arise when the government needs the expertise or experience of NGOs. 
The Delhi Municipal Government, for example, invited NGOs to participate in the 
designing of primary school popularization programmes, in order to make use of their 
experience and knowledge (Mehtta, 2008, p. 91). Mexico City Government co-operated 
with NGOs to gain knowledge of their experiences in medical care (Gómez-Jauregui, 
2008, p. 84).In the 1970s, the military government in Brazil invited civilian professionals 
to join the new medical treatment division (Dowbor, 2008, p. 76). In addition, 
government officials may initiate cooperation in order to expand collaboration with civil 
society. The purpose of the Bhagidari programme by the Delhi Municipal Government, 
for example, was to institutionalise civic engagement in governance (Chakrabarti, 2008, 
p. 96-99).  
Political considerations sometimes create opportunities for participation. The minimum 
income guarantee programme in Brazil is an example. The main objective of the 
programme was to tackle intergenerational poverty. The opposition parties in Brazil 
proposed the programme and invited several NGOs to join discussions about it, and 
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incorporated many of their suggestions into their design (Houtzager, 2008, p. 61). As a 
response to challenges of opposition parties, the ruling party put pro-reform figures in 
influential positions and entrusted them with discretion in appointment of officials and 
decision making, favouring civil society.  
Laws and international protocols may also offer NGOs participation opportunities. 
Several countries have enacted laws to protect the people’s right to gain information on 
the progress of policy implementation. In India, for example, under the Right to 
Information Act, local residents have the right to request information about the 
operation of the Public Distribution System. Many poor people in India, with NGOs’ 
assistance, use the right to information to monitor rice provision, successfully reducing 
corruption (Pande, 2008). Similarly, some international protocols stress civic 
engagement. The Mexican government, for example, follows international conventions 
in its Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programme which emphasises the 
participation of NGOs (Gómez-Jauregui, 2008, p. 81).  
Authoritarian governments are unlikely to enact laws protecting the people’s rights to 
request policy-related information or to allow people to negotiate for policy content. 
However, under certain conditions, they may need NGO knowledge and experience. 
Authoritarian regimes have been known to co-operate with NGOs in non-sensitive fields 
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such as medical treatment, community development, and social assistance. The financial 
difficulties in the 1980s, for example, compelled Suharto’s administration to seek NGO 
assistance, and NGOs became executors of several community development plans 
(Hadiwinata, 2003, p. 42). The military government in Brazil is another case in point. In 
order to divert public attention from abuses of political rights, the Brazilian government 
accelerated reform in medical service delivery and established new medical institutions. 
The operation of the new medical service delivery system and medical institutions was 
delegated to civic and medical professionals (Dowbor, 2008, p. 78).  
Though there are a variety of opportunities for NGOs to participate in the formulation 
and implementation of policies, Ackerman (2005a, p. 22) adds that it is usually “well-
behaved” NGOs that have such opportunities. His remarks suggest quarrels over or 
competition for participation opportunities between NGOs.  
2.2.1.2.3 Effects  
Agents of accountability who grasp opportunities for participation in seeking 
simultaneous accountability can have positive effects. NGO can help improve the quality 
of policy content and public service delivery through such participation (Henderson, 
2002, p. 112). NGO activists mostly play the role of advisors in policy formulation, but 
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they can also be policy makers if they are appointed to lead state agencies. There are 
several examples in Brazil where NGO activists led the institutions making medical 
policies. The difference between these two roles lies in the fact that, unlike policy makers, 
advisors do not need to be accountable for their decisions. At the implementation phase, 
NGO activists can be service providers and trainers, as well as external overseers. Some 
Mexican NGOs, for example, signed contracts with the government to train personnel to 
offer teenagers medical services and advice on reproductive health (Gómez-Jauregui, 
2008, p. 85).  
NGO participation in the formulation of policies may ensure that policies are feasible and 
conform to the actual needs of the people (Gómez-Jauregui, 2008, p. 85; Mehtta, 2008, 
p. 88). Participants may have a sense of ownership due to that experience and, because 
of it, continue to offer assistance and oversee the progress at the implementation phase. 
Hence Malena et al. (2004, p. 3), Houtzager and Joshi (2008, p. 2), and others argue that 
there is an inextricable linkage between varied accountability relations. In addition, state 
institution may treat participating NGO activists as partners, rather than as external 
overseers who always find fault with or criticise them (Mehtta, 2008). Such shifts in 
attitude are conducive to the realisation of the visions of NGOs.  
Participation at the implementation phase enables agents of accountability to prevent 
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abuses from happening. NGOs, as mentioned in preceding paragraphs, can play several 
roles when they participate in the implementation of policies. Becoming service 
providers and assistants can give them detailed knowledge of the processes of policy 
implementation, making it harder for power holders to conceal information about 
implementation and commit corruption.  
It is noteworthy that NGO participation in the formulation and implementation of 
policies does not always give rise to positive effects on accountability enforcement. In 
their studies of NGOs, scholars like Eldridge (1989) and Pratap and Wallgren (2000) warn 
that NGO’s close cooperation with government officials or institutions may give rise to 
the problem of being co-opted. When such a problem occurs, it is impractical to expect 
NGOs to exercise effective control over public office holders.   
In summary, a growing body of literature on accountability discusses accountability 
activities initiated by private actors and aimed at holding power holders within the 
government accountable to the broad citizenry. Much of it focuses on activities aimed at 
enforcing accountability for decisions already made or misconduct already committed. 
Some of it notices efforts by social actors to enforce accountability through participation 
in the formulation and implementation of political decisions. This literature enriches 
scholarly understanding of who are agents of social accountability; why and when they 
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initiate accountability activities; what challenges they may encounter; how they 
overcome obstacles; and so on. However, because no cases relevant to ex-ante 
accountability have been analysed, the literature on social accountability provided little 
understanding of how NGOs sought ex-ante accountability.  
2.2.2 NGOs’ activities aimed at combatting corruption 
NGOs’ anti-corruption activities are quite new to several countries and they are also a 
new subject in the study of corruption. In order to demonstrate the link between the 
literature on NGOs’ anti-corruption activities with the wider study of corruption, this 
section starts by offering an overview of the latter.  
Corruption has been the focus of much scholarly attention since the 1990s. Most 
literature on it analyses the causes and impacts of corruption. Of the literature on causes 
of corruption, some emphasises individual office holders’ perspectives and discusses 
motives and opportunities (Klitgaard, 1988; Palmier, 1983, 1985); others focus on the 
context, including culture (Dalton, 2005; Frederickson, 2002; King, 2000; Larmour, 2008; 
Moreno, 2002; Morriss, 1997; Scott, 1972; Sylla, 2012), the political system (Colazingari 
& Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Heywood, 1997; LaPalombara, 1994; Moran, 2001), and the 
government structure (Heywood, 1997; Miller, 2000). With economists conducting 
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many empirical analyses of corruption and with independent organisations (such as the 
Transparency International) releasing corruption indexes, there has also been a rich 
body of literature on the impacts of corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Larmour 
& Wolanin, 2001). This is a topic addressed in many publications of international 
financial institutions (such as the World Bank) and donor organisations (such as the 
United States Agency for International Development) (see Dininio & Kpundeh, 1999, p. 
3; World Bank, 1997). Scholars argue that corruption slows economic growth (Drury, 
Krieckhaus, & Lusztig, 2006; Mauro, 1995; Meon & Sekkat, 2005), reduces foreign direct 
investment (Eggera & Winnerb, 2005; Macintyre, 2001; Sima-Eichler, 2009) and 
decreases government efficiency (Kauper, 2006). Given the huge impact, it is no surprise 
to see rising worldwide demands to reduce corruption. However, these demands to 
reduce corruption may lead to paradoxes. For example, Andersson and Heywood (2009) 
notice that increasing attention to corruption troubles several developing countries 
because “development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of 
reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid” (p. 743).  
Unlike this literature focusing on the causes and impact of corruption, a growing body of 
scholarly work explores ways to address corruption. This research categorises anti-
corruption efforts into two parts. One emphasises the role of the government in 
combatting corruption. LaPalombara (1994), for example, argues that to reduce 
corruption relies on “the state [that acts as] a credible enforcer of laws… [and efforts to 
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prevent] persons and organisations in the private sector…from [using] access to and 
influence over governments” (pp. 333-334). Scholars who take such a position give a 
variety of suggestions, and one of them is to build up a professional bureaucracy. 
Measures which they suggest include recruiting civil servants through competitive 
processes, filling positions through internal promotion, and reducing political 
appointments (Rauch & Evans, 2000, pp. 50-51). A series of empirical analyses show that 
there is a positive correlation between the extent of meritocratic recruitment and efforts 
to reduce level of corruption, argue Dahlström and Lapuente (2012) and Rauch and 
Evans (2000).  
Several scholars propose establishing state institutions exclusively addressing corruption. 
Proponents of such an idea often argue that corruption is a complicated problem, with 
regard to causes, impact and solutions, and thus only institutions exclusively established 
can combat it. In fact, the rationale behind the establishment of anti-corruption agencies 
in administrative areas (such as New South Wales, Australia) and countries (such as 
South Korea and Argentina) is the failure of conventional law enforcement agencies to 
reduce corruption (Johnston, 1999a; Kaufrann, 1999; R. P.-l. Lee & Cheung, 1981; 
Meagher, 2005; Pakdel, Damirchi, & Gholizadeh, 2012; Pope, 1999; Speville, 1999; World 
Bank, 2000). The establishment of anti-corruption agencies is by no means a panacea, 
however. Scholars like Fritzen (2005) and Heilbrunn (2004) note that factors like the 
commitment of political elites and the resources available may influence the 
 85 
 
performance of anti-corruption institutions, implying that not all anti-corruption 
agencies succeed. Nevertheless, establishing anti-corruption agencies has become a 
popular strategy, partly because doing so can appease public discontent with rampant 
corruption. However, if the politicians and office holders’ objectives are merely to 
“communicate a willingness to fight venality while postponing difficult acts”, their efforts 
to form new anti-corruption agencies will help little to reduce corruption, warns 
Heilbrunn (2004, p. 14). Accordingly, there is always the need for assessing the 
performance of anti-corruption institutions periodically.7 
Another suggestion that scholars put forward relates to political will, defined as the 
“commitment of [politicians or office holders] to undertake actions to achieve a set of 
anti-corruption objectives…and to sustain the costs of those actions over time” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 242). The rationale behind this suggestion is that elected 
representatives and appointed government officials possess the authority and resources 
essential to anti-corruption measures. Scholars like Kpundeh and Dininio (2006) 
accordingly expect them to demonstrate the will to “attack perceived causes or effects 
of corruption at a systemic level” (pp. 41-43). They also create indicators that can be 
                                                     
7 See Meagher (2005) for one set of criteria proposed to make such an assessment. 
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used to assess political will, including the dedication of resources; the level of 
participation in the reform process; the degree of rigor applied to understanding 
corruption; and the continuity of effort in pursuing reform (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Kpundeh 
& Dininio, 2006). 
In contrast to scholars who advocate strengthening the government in order to combat 
corruption, some scholars consider the government to be the source of corruption and 
believe in the “natural capacity of the free market to inhibit corrupt practices” (Hadiz, 
2006, p. 82). Accordingly, they propose policies like deregulation, economic liberalization, 
and financial decentralisation, and aim to limit the state’s functions “to secure law and 
order, ensure macroeconomic stability and provide the necessary physical infrastructure” 
(Öniş & Şenses, 2005, p. 263). Proponents believe that these policies help reduce 
corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2005). Scholars like Bedirhanoglu (2007) name such 
thinking neoliberal discourse on corruption; others, such as Manzetti and Blake (1996) 
and V. R. Hadiz (2006) term it a market-oriented approach to corruption. Whatever the 
term may be used, such thinking represents a counterrevolution against 
developmentalism that emphasises the role of the state in the development process 
(Öniş & Şenses, 2005).  
Neo-liberal discourse on corruption frequently appears in publications of international 
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financial institutions (Fischer, 2012; Stiglitz, 2002; Williamson, 2008). For example, a 
World Bank publication states:  
Markets generally discipline participants more effectively than the public sector 
can, and their power to do so is closely linked to sound economic policy. Enlarging 
the scope and improving the functioning of markets strengthens competitive 
forces in the economy and curtails rents, thereby eliminating the bribes public 
officials may be offered (or may extort) to secure them. (World Bank, 1997, p. 35)  
There are several reasons that international financial institutions advocate a market-
oriented approach (Kiely, 1998, pp. 64-66). The most practical is that such an approach 
enables them to evade criticisms of intervening in other countries’ internal affairs and 
politics. The World Bank, for example, is supposed to abide by the Articles of Agreement 
that prohibits its staff from interfering in the political affairs of member countries. The 
non-political mandate is its most distinctive feature, argues Marquette (2001, p. 398). 
Accordingly, treating corruption as a social and economic problem and proposing 
market-oriented solutions helps it to avoid accusations of politicization (Marquette, 
2004, p. 413). 
In addition, factors like the end of the Cold War and the third wave of democratisation 
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also contributed to the prevalence of the neoliberal discourse on corruption. The end of 
the Cold War matters because it affected many countries’ strategic status in world 
geopolitics. During the Cold War era, the world was divided into three camps. In order 
to strengthen the First World camp, the United State acquiesced in corruption, human 
rights abuses, and other problems in many Third World countries (Riley, 1998, p. 141). 
At the same time, international financial institutions also downplayed the impact of 
corruption. In such a context, it is no surprise that countries like Indonesia or 
Mozambique were immune to criticisms of rampant corruption (Dick, 2002, p. 71; 
Hanlon, 2002, p. 747; 2004; Wee, 2002, p. 6). Such strategic considerations and disregard 
waned after the end of the Cold War. Countries (such as the USA) and international 
financial institution (such as the World Bank) now criticise corruption problems in 
projects they financed and even tie lending closely to reform measures taken to reduce 
corruption (Riley, 1998, p. 137).  
Meanwhile, due to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the third wave of democratisation, 
the number of transitional countries increased. Such an increase gave rise to a new 
international consensus on development. The consensus, as Riley (1998) puts it,  
Involves an expectation of sustained efforts in developing and transitional 
countries towards the goals of market economies and liberal democratic political 
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systems. More recently, this has also involved the prioritising of the interests of 
the poor and marginalised in the context of an enabling state and higher ethical 
standards in donors...Progress towards these goals therefore means serious 
attempts to secure better governance and substantially less corruption in 
developing and transitional countries. (p. 135)  
The combination of these factors led to prevalence of neoliberal discourse on corruption. 
Sarah Bracking (2007) thus says that corruption “is largely understood in a neoliberal, 
economistic anti-state paradigm which emphasises politics as a source of rents” (p. 15). 
Though the neo-liberal discourse on corruption prevails, it still faces criticisms. Riley 
(1998), for example, criticises proponents of the neo-liberal discourse on corruption for 
providing “no ready means to deliver immediate targeted improvements in public 
integrity” (p. 150). Brown and Cloke (2005) criticise proponents of that discourse for 
obscuring “the rising possibilities for private sector corruption caused by market-led 
economic reforms and has little to say about the complex linkages between abuses in 
the private and public sectors (p. 9). Levent and Ilkim (2008) echo the remark and add, 
“[c]orrupt behaviour is not limited to state officials; idealizing private sector actions 
while attacking state sector is at best naïve” (p. 6). In addition, the neoliberal discourse 
on corruption also faces criticisms for assuming that such thinking is universally 
applicable to countries where corruption prevails (Bedirhanoglu, 2007; Brown & Cloke, 
2005; Riley, 1998, p. 155), and also for separating markets from existing constellations 
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of powers and interests that shape politics (Dick, 2002; Jayasuriya, 2002).  
In the light of these criticisms, a revised neoliberal discourse on corruption has arisen 
that recognises the importance of institutions and the state (Hadiz, 2006, p. 83). Even 
the World Bank shows attempts “to revise its commitment to neoliberal ideas… 
[because it] wrongly sees states as inherently inefficient economic actors” (Kiely, 1998, 
p. 63). This transformation of thinking is still in progress and its outcomes deserve 
thorough research in the future.  
Beyond the debates about the role of the government in combatting corruption, a new 
subject has arisen in recent decades. This new subject is the role of civil society in 
combatting corruption. Civil society refers to NGOs, religious organisations, civil 
associations and several others which belong to neither the state nor the private sector. 
The literature on anti-corruption activities initiated by civil society is still a minority in 
the broad corruption field, but it has increased gradually over the last decades, thanks 
to efforts by several scholars (such as Michael Johnston and Carmen Malena), 
international financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) and international NGOs (such as the 
Transparency International).  
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Several scholars and organisations advocate supporting NGOs in the fight against 
corruption. For example, Transparency International deems civil society essential to the 
reduction of corruption and thus advocates wide involvement of civil society in the 
government’s anti-corruption efforts (Langseth, Stapenhurst, & Pope, 1999; Pope, 2000). 
Proponents put forward several reasons for wide involvement of civil society in anti-
corruption efforts. For example, Langseth, Stapenhurst, and Pope (1997) argue,  
Civil society encompasses the expertise and networks needed to address issues 
of common concern, including corruption. And it has a vested interest in doing 
so: Most corruption involves two principal actors, the government and the 
private sector, with civil society as the major victim. Civil society organisations’ 
ability to monitor, detect and reverse the activities of the public officials in their 
midst is enhanced by their proximity and familiarity with local issues. (p. 18) 
Scholars such as Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004), Johnston (2005,) and Malena (2009) 
agree with these views. In addition to the inherent advantages, Chalmers and Setiyono 
believe that the challenging environment in a democratising context also requires NGOs 
to play an important role in combatting corruption. They argue: 
Democratisation usually creates political instability, making law enforcement and 
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accountability mechanisms more difficult. Also, governments in transition are 
generally inexperienced in the implementation of measures to combat 
corruption. Because of this lack of state capacity, civil society actors bear more 
responsibility for strengthening accountability mechanisms. Rather than 
ineffective politicians, bureaucrats, or business groups, CSOs must shoulder the 
responsibility for realising this vital element of the democratic consolidation. 
(Chalmers & Setiyono, 2012, p. 94)  
Proponents of the involvement of civil society in anti-corruption efforts represent a view 
that is currently prevalent: that is, “the better development of the civil society, the less 
serious corruption should [be]” (Sing, 2012, p. 91). Because of this view, several scholars 
and international financial institutions “have taken the active participation of civil society 
as a granted measure in anti-corruption policy” and claim “that the participation of civil 
society would promote good governance, and would certainly help corruption control” 
(Sing, 2012, p. 92). This remark shows that proponents of NGOs’ participation seemingly 
also consider government to be essential in reducing corruption, suggesting that the 
literature on NGOs’ anti-corruption activities should be included in the group that 
emphasises the role of the government in combatting corruption.   
The literature on civil society’s anti-corruption activities can be grouped into two 
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categories. One justifies the involvement of civil society in anti-corruption efforts and 
offers theoretical explanations. Works of Eigen (1998) and Johnston (2006) can be 
categorised into this type. They explain the legitimacy of civil society in the fight against 
corruption and suggest strategies to civil society. On the legitimacy of civil society, Eigen 
(1998) explains:  
What legitimises [civil society] is a concern about issues that are not being dealt 
with adequately in both the national and the international theatre, a concern 
about problems that often go beyond the limited reach of the nation-state…And 
the legitimacy of not-for-profit organisations is further fostered simply because 
they are what they are: Their concerns do not arise out of self-interest or profit-
orientation but from people who care about the public interest, the well-being 
of both the local and the global community.(pp. 84-85)  
Eigen suggests that civil society typically forms a coalition in which both government and 
the private sector are involved, and mobilises ordinary people to monitor the 
government. He states:  
Towards government, civil society will have to play the roles of critic, catalyst and 
advocate of those interests unrepresented or underrepresented. Where 
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government fails – because it is too weak or because problems cannot be solved 
through central planning or from above – civil society comes in. It can mobilise 
the people and it is needed to reach the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens 
who may find it hard to believe that their governments are making a genuine 
effort to tackle corruption. And, above all, it is essential to raise public awareness, 
to awaken society to the disastrous effects of corruption and to get across the 
message that fighting it is possible. (Eigen, 1998, p. 86).  
Johnston (2006) echoed Eigen’s remarks, but his works lay emphasis on reasons for the 
failure in sustainability of such coalitions, and put forward suggestions regarding 
solutions. 
The second category provides an overview of the development of anti-corruption 
activism. The works of Jenkins (2007), Holloway (2001), You (2003), and Horowitz and 
Kim (2002) can be categorised in this way. These scholars trace the origins of anti-
corruption activism in given countries, analyse critical events, list some civil society 
groups that lead local activism, summarise challenges and obstacles that civil society 
encounters, and assess achievements. Authors believe that continuous efforts by NGOs 
to expose scandals or threaten to impose punishment on wrongdoers can deter public 
office holders from engaging in corruption.  
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The literature on anti-corruption efforts by civil society is still developing and a need 
remains for more sophisticated research on the subject. Suggestions by scholars 
illuminate the research direction in the near future. For example, Khan (1998) warns 
against “conceptualizing civil society as a uniform collection of individuals who have a 
collective interest in making their society work” (p. 123) because in developing countries 
some civil society groups are likely to be part of local patron-client networks that lead to 
rampant corruption. Obviously, Khan questions the view that “a strong and active civil 
society helps reduce corruption”, implying a need to look into the link between civil 
society and corruption, instead of assuming that all civil society groups combat 
corruption.  
This thesis supports Khan’s remarks, but suggests that NGO activities aimed to prevent 
corruption from happening also deserve scholarly attention. As the above discussion 
shows, only a small part of the literature discusses anti-corruption activities by NGOs. 
Most of it analyses how NGOs expose graft and push state institutions to punish 
wrongdoers. Activities that NGOs initiate for such purposes can be categorised as ex-
post accountability because their primary aim is to call public office holders accountable 
for their own corrupt practices. Undeniably, effective ex-post accountability activities 
may set an example and deter office holders from acting illicitly in the future. However, 
such an effect is a by-product of activities aimed to punish wrongdoers and such 
activities are “not sufficient to prevent” corruption from happening, argued Acar and 
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Emek (2009, p. 164). Meanwhile, there are several possible means by which NGOs can 
prevent corruption from happening. Factors that influence NGO activities aimed at 
punishing wrongdoers may differ from those which affect their activities aimed at 
preventing corruption. Given that the present literature says little about NGO activities 
aimed at preventing corruption, it is necessary to have a detailed understanding of these 
activities.  
In summary, contemporary literature on corruption and accountability says little about 
NGO-led accountability actions aimed at preventing corruption from happening. Such 
actions are essential to reducing corruption in transitional democracies, as discussed in 
preceding paragraphs. Several successful instances in South Korea, the United States and 
other countries suggest a range of activities that NGOs can initiate for the purpose of 
preventing corruption. At the same time, they suggest the importance of analysing such 
activities in Indonesia. The next section discusses three accountability activities; each 
will be about a different object. 
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2.3 NGOs and Corruption Prevention 
2.3.1 Elected representatives 
The first accountability activity concerns elected representatives. Elected 
representatives are essential actors in democracies. Their political power is delegated to 
them by the people through elections. Once elected they are empowered to enact 
decrees, oversee the implementation of policies, call government agencies and officials 
to account, impose sanctions and so on. As the people’s agents, elected representatives 
have the obligation of making themselves accountable to the people. There are various 
accountability mechanisms set up to ensure accountability of elected representatives. 
Of these, elections are the most important: Candidates need the people’s votes to win 
elections. Accordingly, candidates at election times face demands to explain their track 
records or offer solutions to problems. Candidates who fail to justify their track records 
or offer voters a clear message on political, economic, and social change are likely to lose 
public trust, and, even worse, the election. For every candidate, losing an election is a 
severe punishment (Dunn, 1999, p. 299). 
Despite its importance there has been little discussion of the accountability function of 
elections. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, p. 10), for instance, exclude the aggregation 
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of ballots by social actors from their study of social accountability. Scholars like Malena, 
Forster, and Singh (2004, p. 3) maintain that several factors stop elections being effective 
accountability tools. They include the large number of candidates participating in an 
election; the lack of relevant information provided to voters; and the variety of topics 
that come under discussion during an election period. 
However, the Blackballing Movement in South Korea in 2000 is an excellent example of 
NGOs successfully using elections as an accountability tool. The movement was an 
initiative of an alliance consisting of hundreds of NGOs. Its goal was to block unfit 
candidates from winning elections. The alliance adopted several strategies including 
publicizing criteria for which to evaluate candidates’ fitness, releasing a blacklist of unfit 
candidates, and lobbying political parties not to nominate unfit candidates. The 
movement was a success because about 69 percent of blacklisted candidates lost the 
election. Many of them were suspected of corruption. Quantitative research by Horowitz 
and Kim (2002) shows strong correlation between the Blackballing Movement and the 
election outcome. In brief, NGOs can turn elections into an effective accountability tool. 
The Blackballing Movement was successful in two respects. One is that it imposed 
punishment by blocking incumbent elected representatives who performed poorly 
during their term of office from winning re-election. In this regard, the Blackballing 
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Movement was an activity enforcing ex-post facto accountability. The other is that it 
prevented unfit candidates from gaining political power. The Blackballing Movement, in 
a sense, reduced the likelihood of malfeasance while preventing candidates with poor 
track records from winning election. In other words, the Blackballing Movement could 
also be an activity seeking ex-ante accountability. 
The Blackballing Movement in South Korea has inspired similar accountability-seeking 
activities in Taiwan, India, Indonesia, and other countries. This learning wave implies the 
need to explore the question of how NGOs in different institutional contexts can turn 
elections into an effective accountability tool. The literature on the Blackballing 
Movement provides an important list of reference papers. However, it helps little to 
answer the question just raised, because most of it focuses on the correlation between 
election results and NGOs’ activities, rather than on the impact of the institutional 
context upon the NGOs’ efforts to enforce ex-ante accountability. This research gap 
implies the need to conduct case studies in other institutional settings.   
This thesis will analyse the “Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement” that Jakarta-based NGOs 
initiated in the period 2004–2009. This movement matters because it represents the first 
attempt of Indonesian NGOs to turn elections into a tool with which to enforce ex-ante 
accountability and to punish corrupt politicians. Chapter Four has an in-depth analysis 
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of it, offering NGOs’ reasons for launching that movement, activists’ understanding of 
the influence of electoral laws and mechanisms, the rationale behind publicizing 
blacklists, and so on. The findings of the chapter not only explain why Indonesian NGOs 
failed to hold elected representatives accountable ex-ante, but also show how they 
offered impetus for improvement in context concerning the enforcement of electoral 
accountability. 
2.3.2 Non-elected officials  
The second accountability activity involves non-elected government officials. Objects of 
this type of activity include senior civil servants, politically appointed heads of 
government agencies, and state institution chiefs selected by colleagues. Such people 
play an important role in the operation of the government because they are entrusted 
with significant tasks, such as making policies, drafting laws, or implementing reforms. 
Given their importance, it is crucial to hold them accountable for their actions or 
decisions. Theoretically, non-elected government officials are only accountable to their 
superiors and the authorities who appointed them. However, cases discussed in the 
review of the literature on social accountability show the conditions under which non-
elected officials need to work with, and even be accountable to, social actors who 
participate in the formulation or implementation of policies and projects. Scholars like 
Tu and Huang (2001, pp. 1-2) maintain that such co-operation benefits both parties. 
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Because the focus of this thesis is on corruption, it will discuss the interaction between 
NGO activists and non-elected officials in the formulation and implementation of 
decisions concerning accountability institutions.  
Accountability institutions are state institutions legally entitled to supervise and punish 
public office holders who abuse power. Key accountability institutions include the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. In addition to their 
importance for the maintenance of democracy (Schmitter, 1999), they are also essential 
to the prevention of corruption, because effective accountability institutions are likely to 
deter office holders from acting illicitly (Chalmers & Setiyono, 2012, p. 87). However, 
several factors may lead to ineffectiveness in accountability institutions, including a lack 
of resources or power required to carry out their tasks, or a low level of efficiency. 
Accountability institutions are subject to various factors leading to ineffectiveness, and 
thus differ in the challenges they face and assistance they need. For instance, 
accountability institutions with power and resources require leaders who are 
professional, upright, and neutral. While accountability institutions facing threats to 
their establishment require statutory sources to ensure their operation, those lacking 
efficiency and internal control mechanisms need reform guidelines and a team that can 
implement reform.  
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There is a rich body of literature on accountability institutions in the study of both 
corruption and accountability. Many authors focus on dimensions like structure, 
resources, and authority, because these affect the operation and performance of the 
institutions (O‘ Donnell, 1999a, 1999b; Schmitter, 1999). Some authors believe that 
sufficiency of resources or completeness of structure can be indicators of the willingness 
of office holders or politicians to combat corruption and enforce accountability. Some 
scholars note that interaction between social actors and accountability institutions is 
growing, and their works mostly focus on efforts of the former to utilise the latter to 
demand responsiveness and punish wrongdoers (Ackerman, 2004, p. 450; Grimes, 2008; 
O’Donnell, 2006; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, p. 10; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000b). 
Such activities belong to the ex-post accountability type, because social actors make 
demands after decisions have already been taken or malfeasance has already occurred.  
By comparison, scholarly works on social actors’ activities aimed at influencing the 
formulation and implementation of government policies or projects, particularly those 
relating to accountability institutions, are a minority. However, such activities are 
essential to the performance of accountability institutions because they are likely to be 
weakened by various factors, as discussed in preceding paragraphs. Through 
participation at each of the two stages, social actors can monitor office holders to 
prevent them from making decisions against accountability institutions. The literature 
shows factors that may influence the conditions under which social actors seek 
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simultaneous accountability, as well as ones that may affect their willingness to do so. 
However, few works have discussed the interaction between social actors who 
participate in the formulation and implementation of government policies and projects 
and those who do not. The relevant literature also often assumes the government–
society partnership to be positive, saying little about its negative side. As a result, there 
is insufficient understanding of how NGOs seek simultaneous accountability of non-
elected officials and what impacts that NGOs’ such activities may give rise to. There is 
thus a need for in-depth study of NGOs’ involvement in cases concerned with 
accountability institutions 
This thesis discusses cases concerned with the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana 
Korupsi), and Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung, MA). NGO activists allegedly had wide 
and deep involvement in the formulation or implementation of decisions concerning 
these institutions, and it is the prime reason that they are chosen here. Chapter Five 
presents in-depth analyses of each case, explaining what the opportunities were for 
NGOs; what NGO activists’ attitudes toward those opportunities were; which model of 
interaction NGOs activists developed; and what effects their efforts to demand 
simultaneous accountability had. Experience gained from the three cases not only 
reveals opportunities for and limitations on NGO-led accountability actions aimed at 
preventing corruption in a democratising context but also shows how activists overcome 
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challenges.   
2.3.3 Civil servants 
The third accountability activity concerns civil servants. Civil servants are government 
employees recruited to provide public service and execute government policies or 
projects. They possess only limited power, in contrast to elected representatives and 
non-elected government officials. However, as Lipsky (2010, p. 15) argues, various 
factors allow civil servants to have discretion when they carry out their tasks. 
Administrative corruption usually refers to civil servants’ behaviours that abuse 
discretion in exchange for personal profit, like demanding bribes and misappropriating 
subsidies.   
Administrative corruption has attracted less attention from scholars and international 
financial institutions than political corruption, particularly since the 1990s. The media 
rarely covers administrative corruption cases because they often do not involve famous 
people or large sums of money. The same reasons also hold for the low enthusiasm of 
law enforcement agencies for action against administrative corruption.  
However, the accumulated loss caused by administrative corruption can be enormous, 
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particularly when the acts of accepting bribes and embezzlement become normal. It 
follows that there is a need to prevent administrative corruption. The literature on public 
administration offers several solutions, suggesting guaranteeing lifelong careers, 
introducing strong legal protection for civil servants, and ensuring accountability of civil 
servants to their superiors in offices (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2012; Dahlström, Lapuente, 
& Teorell, 2012; Dahlström, Lindvall, & Rothstein, 2013). Scholars in the New Public 
Management School suggest reducing the opportunities and motives for committing 
corruption by increasing competition among public service providers. Methods include 
pluralizing public service providers (Turner, 2002).  
In addition, several international financial institutions suggest empowering stakeholders 
to hold civil servants to account in a direct fashion (Devarajan & Reinikka, 2003; World 
Bank, 2003b). The establishment of Local School Councils (LSCs) in the Chicago City, the 
United States, tried this kind of model. LSCs are mandatory governing bodies that feature 
public participation because they consist of six parents and two community residents 
other than teachers and the principal. They are powerful because power vested in them 
includes control over school budgets, evaluation of the principal’s performance, renewal 
of the principal’s contract, and the approval of school improvements (Gamage & Zajda, 
2009, p. 5). With this power, LSCs can oversee school staff at both the formulation and 
implementation stages of decision making. In other words, LSCs are facilitators of 
simultaneous accountability. Surveys show that they did hold civil servants in schools 
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accountable and thereby improved the quality of education service and local schools 
(Fung & Wright, 2001).  
Like LSCs in Chicago, the primary objective of the formation of School Committees in 
Indonesia was to ensure accountability of civil servants in public schools through public 
empowerment. School Committees were the by-products of education policies like 
School-Based Management that the Indonesian government established in the 
Reformasi era to improve the quality of education. Local NGO activists expected them to 
ensure accountability of school staff and thereby reduce corruption in schools. Such 
expectations were met in Flores (East Nusa Tenggara Province), where a survey by 
Bandur (2008) shows the success of School Committees in acting as effective oversight 
bodies at local schools.  
While success can be attributable to several factors, this thesis asks whether School 
Committees in other administrative areas are as effective as their counterparts in Flores, 
and focuses on the School Committees in DKI Jakarta. This administrative area was 
selected because several NGOs there tried to make School Committees effective 
accountability agencies in order to reduce corruption in schools. They attempted to form 
a social action alliance, a force that scholars like Jayal (2008, p. 107), and Johnston and 
Kpundeh (2005) deem essential for reducing corruption, and thus they frequently 
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interacted with parents and other education stakeholders. NGOs’ experience and survey 
findings reveal how School Committees performed in DKI Jakarta; which factors impeded 
them from functioning optimally; why stakeholders refused to exercise control directly 
over school staff; and, more importantly, why NGO-led accountability actions aimed at 
preventing bureaucratic corruption from happening failed. Chapter Six contains in-depth 
analyses of contextual factors (such as relevant regulations and customary interaction 
between school staff and pupils’ parents) and NGOs’ survey findings.  
2.4 Summary 
Few scholars emphasise NGOs and their accountability actions aimed at preventing 
corruption when discussing reducing corruption through democratic measures. Such 
accountability actions, however, are of significance because they not only promote 
democratisation but also reduce corruption. The current literature on corruption and 
accountability says little about such actions, but some of them could repay further study. 
This thesis chooses to discuss three of these. Each relates to a different object being held 
to account, and each also has relevance for a reduction in corruption. Indonesia during 
the Reformasi era is suitable for this research because it is a transitional democracy 
seriously troubled by corruption problems and also because local NGOs endeavour to 
combat that problem in a proactive fashion. Research findings on these topics can not 
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only enrich the study of both accountability and corruption, but also offer explanations 
for rampant corruption in transitional democracies. The next chapter included 
discussions of the research background, the development of Indonesian NGOs, and the 
objects that they call to account, followed by case studies. 
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3 Accountability Enforcement and the Struggle against Corruption 
in Indonesia: Context, Agents, and Objects 
This chapter puts attention back on Indonesia, particularly during the Reformasi era, and 
discusses the context, Indonesian agents of social accountability, and the objects of their 
accountability activities, in three sections. The first section begins with an overview of 
Indonesia’s history, followed by a discussion of the macro context in the Reformasi era. 
The second section analyses Indonesian NGOs and media in the Reformasi era, because 
they are the two social actors frequently mentioned in the literature on social 
accountability, and also because they have tried to create an accountable and clean 
government in Indonesia. The section explains why this thesis focuses on NGOs, and also 
why their activities in seeking ex-ante and simultaneous accountability are important for 
reducing corruption. A brief discussion of three objects of their anti-corruption 
campaigns—namely, elected representatives, non-elected officials, and civil servants—
constitutes the third section, and a summary of the chapter follows. 
3.1 Context 
As noted in Chapter Two, the importance of context, for the effectiveness and outcome 
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of social accountability activities has not received scholarly notice until recent years. In 
contrast to Joshi (2013) who emphasises the “micro” context, O’Meally (2013) and 
Peruzzotti (2011), though highlighting different factors, both offer in-depth discussions 
of “macro” contextual factors. This section follows suggestions by O’Meally and takes a 
deeper look at the “macro” context in which social actors in Indonesia initiated 
accountability for anti-corruption purpose.  
Before the Reformasi era started in 1998, Indonesia had been an independent country 
for more than five decades. Over this time, four periods can be discerned: the period of 
the Independence War (1945–1949); the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1949–
1957); the period of Guided Democracy (1957–1967) and the period of New Order 
(1967–1998). Among these, only the New Order Era under the late President Suharto’s 
rule enjoyed social, economic, and political stability. Such achievements, however, were 
at the expense of democracy and liberty.   
Suharto had controlled state institutions since the mid-1960s. He followed the idea of 
an “integralistic” state and established an authoritarian regime that belittled human 
rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Nasution, 2010, pp. 13-18). Suharto and cronies 
surrounding him dominated the executive branch of government by means of either 
threats or bribery, and most subordinates were coerced into compliance (Vatikiotis, 1993; 
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Walker & Tinker, 1975). Suharto and his cronies also exerted tight control over judicial 
agencies by either intimidation or bribery, and compelled judges and other law enforcers 
to serve only political power holders (Lindsey, 2002, pp. 54-55). Suharto was able to gain 
control of the parliaments through manipulation of elections. As a result, Golkar, the 
election machine engineered by the Suharto administration, occupied the majority of 
parliamentary seats. Thus, parliament at all levels was a rubber stamp that merely 
endorsed official policies (Ziegenhain, 2005).   
During the New Order era, the people of Indonesia lived under an increasingly 
oppressive system of governance. State institutions seldom took the initiative in 
explaining their decisions and policies. People were afraid to call government officials to 
account. This fear originated partly from memories of large-scale slaughter in the mid-
1960s. Meanwhile, office holders also attempted to silence critics by means of verbal or 
physical threats. As a result, most people avoided discussing sensitive issues like politics, 
corruption, human rights, and democracy. At the same time, the Suharto administration 
limited freedom of assembly and association. It forbade journalists to form organisations 
such as labour unions. The only option available for journalists was the Indonesian 
Journalists Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI), which the government 
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recognised.8 However, the association seldom worked to protect the rights and interests 
of journalists. It often sided with the Suharto administration against its own members 
(Hill, 1991). As a result, the rights and interests of journalists and press freedom came 
under threat. 
Under Suharto’ rule, NGOs also faced several limitations. The Suharto administration 
ordered all NGOs to register with the Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs, 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 15). It also frequently 
threatened NGOs for allegedly slandering the Indonesian government or disturbing the 
country’s political stability. Law No. 8 on Social Organisations of 1985 gave the 
government considerable power over NGOs.9 It stipulated that all social organisations 
should adhere to Pancasila (Article 2) and obtain the consent of the central government 
before they acquired foreign funding (Article 13). These clauses undermined civil society 
organisations and severely limited their sources of funding. The law thus came under 
criticism for helping Suharto’s authoritarian government maintain its strict control on 
                                                     
8 See Ministerial Decree No.2 of 1969 (Peraturan Menpen No. 02 tahun 1969).  
9  “Depdagri Dorong Revisi UU Ormas,” Retrieved on July 20, 2010, from 
http://yappika.or.id/index2.php?option=com_content&task=vi.  
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civil society.10 At the same time, to evade these restrictions many NGOs were officially 
registered as foundations (yayaysan) (Hadiwinata, 2003, p. 96). 
Media firms experienced similar restrictions under Suharto’s rule (Palguna, 2003; 
Schwarz, 1994). Law No. 21 of 1982 on Basic Press Regulation stipulated that all news 
firms required permits (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, SIUPP) to operate in Indonesia. 
Media firms were frequently warned against covering sensitive news. Ethnic conflicts, 
the holdings of Suharto’s family, corruption, and cronyism were all sensitive issues in the 
eyes of government officials. As a result, most media were extremely prudent (Romano 
& Seinor, 2005 ).  
The impact of such controls and limitations on social accountability activities for anti-
corruption purposes was huge. Due to strict limitations, information about office holders’ 
behaviour was inaccessible, and few people had the courage to question the Suharto 
administration about corruption, accountability deficits, and other problems. Indonesian 
NGOs and other social actors, though they existed, were weak and unable to form a 
monitoring force that could call power holders to account on a regular basis. There were 
                                                     
10 “Jangan Memberangus Ormas,”Republika, June 16, 2006.  
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some quarrels among political elites about interests or policies, but under Suharto’s tight 
control such quarrels never gave rise to a major crisis. Neither did they create an 
opportunity for reform-minded politicians to form an opposition camp strong enough to 
demand accountability. In short, the context under Suharto was not favourable for social 
accountability activities. 
In the absence of checks and controls, the misuse of power became prevalent. 
Misconduct, such as seeking bribes and misappropriating public funds, became the norm. 
Abusers of power were seldom brought to justice and rarely suffered punishment. The 
late Vice President Mohammad Hatta in the 1970s once remarked that corruption had 
become part of the Indonesian culture.11 The coexistence of authoritarian rule and 
corruption lasted a long time, until the financial crisis of 1997.  
The financial crisis severely damaged Indonesia (Davidsen, Juwono, & Timberman, 2006, 
p. 41). Problems such as the quick withdrawal of capital by foreign investors, the decline 
of confidence, stagnation of production, and currency depreciation arose in succession. 
As a consequence, Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 13.8 percent in 
                                                     
11  “Bung Hatta, sumber  inspirasi sosok anti korupsi,”  Retrieved on September 21, 2010, from 
http://bhaca.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=34.  
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1998 and prices of commodities increased by 58.0 percent in the same year (see Figure 
3.1). Soaring prices of commodities not only added to the financial burdens of ordinary 
families but also made life even more difficult for the poor and the unemployed. Large-
scale demonstrations took place in many cities. Some of them became riots. Political 
commentator Wimar Witoelar claims that the financial crisis and social chaos resulting 
from it resembled the “stroke of midnight”. Such a metaphor suggests how panic-
stricken Indonesian residents were and how unexpected were the problem they faced.12 
The social stability and economic prosperity that had accompanied Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule for so long suddenly disappeared (Abdullah, 2005). Grievances about 
government policies and the oppressive nature of the regime mounted. Suharto 
resigned in 1998, after losing the support of the political elite.  
                                                     
12 “Indonesia post-Suharto: Decade of Democracy or Cultivating Corruption?” ABC News, May 21, 2008.  
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Figure 3.1  
Economic Performance of Indonesia (GDP & CPI) 
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Note. GDP = gross domestic product; CPI = consumer price index. Retrieved on July 7, 2010, from 
https://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 
The Reformasi era started following the resignation of Suharto in 1998. The name derives 
from the numerous reform measures and frequent discussions of reform during this 
period of transition. The economic growth rate and other indexes showed that 
Indonesia’s economy was stabilising (see Figure 3.1). Political and social chaos erupted 
for a short time under the rule of B. J. Habibie (1998–1999) and Abdurrahman Wahid 
(1999–2001). The whole situation was relatively stable under the rule of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (2001–2004) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). This stability 
was partly attributable to a series of reform measures, including financial 
decentralization, deregulation, and several others. Despite these measures, Indonesia 
still encountered various problems which were needed to be addressed, including 
disorganised civil society and poor-quality law enforcement (Davidson, 2009; Heryanto 
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& Hadiz, 2005). Some problems were legacies of the past (such as poorly performing 
bureaucracy); others, by-products of new government policies (such as decentralised 
corruption). Indonesia’s future depends on whether or not these problems can be solved.   
Fortunately, democratic reform measures continued, and some of them were conducive 
to accountability enforcement. They included making elections free and fair; 
empowering parliaments to exert control over the executive; and establishing new 
accountability institutions. Apart from the political elites, international financial 
institutions (such as the World Bank) and local NGOs were also the driving forces behind 
these reform measures. Many international organisations contributed to the Indonesian 
government’s reform programmes through funding and technical assistance. The 
success of the general election in 1999, for example, was partly attributable to many 
international organisations’ assistance and participation. Many local NGOs not only 
monitored government performance but also proposed reform agendas. The 
establishment of the KPK and the Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK) were 
both the results of NGOs’ indefatigable advocacy.  
One objective of many reforms was to reduce corruption. Under Suharto’s rule, 
corruption had been a sensitive topic, and only a few journalists and law enforcers were 
willing to take the initiative in discussing corruption cases, especially ones relating to 
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Suharto, his family members, and friends. The sensitivity of corruption as an issue 
declined after Suharto resigned. In the Reformasi era, Indonesian scholars and 
journalists have expressed a strong interest in exploring corruption networks under 
Suharto’s rule. Their investigations helped to show the Indonesian people that 
corruption had exposed Indonesia to the Asian financial crisis (Handayani, Basyaib, Sinjal, 
& Makarim, 2004). 13  Large sections of the population now deem corruption as a 
negative legacy of Suharto’s 32-year-long rule, while they find that Suharto, his family, 
and friends were beneficiaries of those corruption networks (Permadi, Klinken, & 
Jackson, 2008).14 Given that corruption so harmed their country, since the start of the 
Reformasi era there has been a consensus within the society that reducing corruption 
should be a priority. Many local NGOs (such as ICW), religious organisations (such as NU) 
and reform-minded government officials (such as Sri Mulyani Indrawati) managed to 
initiate anti-corruption campaigns or mechanisms. Some of their efforts won financial 
support from international financial institutions like the World Bank.  
Reform measures have given rise to some changes. In the Reformasi era, the executive 
                                                     
13 “Ex-Indonesia Central Bank Chief Receives 2 Years,” Associated Press, June 11, 2009; “Soedradjat 
Named Suspect in BI Loan Abuse,” Jakarta Post, May 31, 2002; “Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto,” Koran 
Tempo, May 14, 2004. 
14 “Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto,” Koran Tempo, May 14, 2004.  
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branch of government has found it difficult to avoid being accountable to the legislative 
branch (Hadiwinata & Schuck, 2007). NGO activists, journalists, and ordinary people can 
demand accountability of public office holders or politicians for misbehaviour without 
the fear of suppression. The number of institutions established to enhance 
accountability and also the quantity of office holders and politicians tried for corruption 
has increased dramatically.15 At the same time, figures suggest progress in the reduction 
of corruption. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, a high percentage of 
Indonesians are optimistic that the level of corruption in Indonesia will decline in the 
near future.16 Indonesia in 2011 scored 3.0 in the Corruption Perception Index, the 
highest mark in the period between 1995 and 2011, and was perceived to be “cleaner” 
than around 45 percent of countries surveyed (see Table 3.1).17 In contrast to its score 
(1.94) and rank (41 out of 41) in 1995, Indonesia’s rank and score in 2011 are remarkable.  
 
                                                     
15 These institutions include the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Corruption Court, and  the 
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. Laws relevant to the fight against 
corruption include Law No. 14 of 2008 on Openness of Public Information, and Law No. 15 of 2002 on 
Money Laundering. 
16 In 2003, 55 percent of local respondents were optimistic about the decline in the extent of corruption 
in the following three years. That percentage rose to 81 percent in 2005. According to the 2009 Global 
Corruption Barometer report, 74 percent of local respondents in Indonesia perceived Indonesian 
governments’ anti-corruption measures as being effective.   
17 After 2012, countries were scored from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
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Table 3.1 
Perceived Level of Corruption (Indonesia) 
Year Rank (A) Number of Countries Compared (B) (A)/(B) Score 
1995 41 41 100.00% 1.94 
1996 45 54 83.33 % 2.65 
1997 46 52 88.46 % 2.72 
1998 80 85 94.12 % 2.0 
1999 96 99 96.97 % 1.7 
2000 85 90 94.44 % 1.7 
2001 88 91 96.70 % 1.9 
2002 96 102 94.12 % 1.9 
2003 122 133 91.73 % 1.9 
2004 133 145 91.72 % 2.0 
2005 137 158 86.71 % 2.2 
2006 134 163 82.21 % 2.4 
2007 143 180 79.44% 2.3 
2008 126 180 70.00% 2.6 
2009 111 180 61.67% 2.8 
2010 110 178 61.80% 2.8 
2011 100 183 54.64% 3.0 
2012 118 176 67.05% 32a 
2013 114 177 64.41% 32a 
Note. Retrieved on September 9, 2014, from https://www.transparency.org/.   
a Since 2012, scores have been assigned on a scale of 1–100 with 100 being the lowest level of 
corruption and 1 being the highest. 
In spite of these changes, there is still room for improvement, argue observers and 
scholars. Critics point out some problems relating to accountability. Most elected 
representatives are more accountable to political parties than to constituents (Haris, 
2005; Ziegenhain, 2008a); many new accountability institutions fail to act as effective 
monitoring agencies (Bolongaita, 2010; Chalid, 2001; Crouch, 2008; Komisi Ombudsman 
Nasional, 2005; Sherlock, 2002; Sujata, Masthuri, Winarso, Fernandes, & Widyawati, 
2002; Sujata, Surachman, Sampul, & Juwono, 2003); and civil servants’ attitudes towards 
serving the people have changed little (Dwiyanto et al., 2006; Legowo, 1999; McLeod, 
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2008). Meanwhile, critics also warn that corruption remains an insoluble problem in the 
Reformasi era. Indonesia continues to be frequently tagged as one of the most “corrupt” 
countries in the world, though data and indexes show that there has been an 
improvement. Several reasons lead to such an outcome. One is that people who benefit 
from corruption have successfully ensconced themselves in state institutions and have 
also developed sophisticated techniques to engage in corruption (Hadiz, 2006, p. 96).18 
Another, complain critics, is that officials have not taken sufficient effort and have paid 
only lip service to the problem (Kemitraan, 2002, p. 5). Yet another is that corruption has 
spread to all levels of government in Indonesia after administrative and financial 
decentralization started in 2001 (Hadiz, 2004a, p. 711; Rinaldi, Purnomo, & Damayanti, 
2007; Takeshi, 2006).19 As a consequence, to date the state treasury and public welfare 
still sustain enormous losses as a result of corruption.20 
                                                     
18 “Dirty Money Drawn to Financial Markets,” Jakarta Post, July 21, 2010.  
19 Based on data released by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, there were 1129 elected representatives 
involved in corruption in the period 2004–2006. Among them were seven governors, 60 mayors and 
district heads, 327 members of provincial parliaments, 735 members of municipal and district 
parliaments. According to Husodo (2010), a high percentage of the 145 elected representatives accused 
of corruption and prosecuted by the Corruption Eradication Commission in the period 2007–2008 were 
local politicians. Retrieved on July 20, 2010, from http://www.dagri.go.id/news/2006/03/24/mendagri-
ada-11.  
20 For example, Illegal logging reportedly costs the Indonesian government US$2 billion per year (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009). 
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In summary, in Indonesia there is still room for improvement in accountability 
enforcement and the reduction of corruption. Because a series of reform measures have 
been initiated by the government, the next step should be to have existing reform 
measures implemented optimally and also to address obstacles to such implementation. 
While works by Goodpaster (2002), Tambunan (2000) and King (2000b) on remedies to 
corruption in Indonesia mostly discuss efforts by political elites or donor organisations 
to promote reforms, this thesis focuses on initiatives by ordinary people for anti-
corruption purposes. The basic rationale is that Indonesia in the Reformasi era is a 
democracy, and thus individual citizens, NGOs, media firms, or other social actors have 
the right to demand accountable and “clean” governments and office holders. In 
addition, the Reformasi era offers them a favourable context in which to exercise such 
rights. The next section discusses Indonesian agents of social accountability in the 
Reformasi era.  
3.2 Agents of Social Accountability  
Everyone in a democracy has the right to demand accountability of state institutions and 
to hold government personnel accountable for their decisions or behaviour (Malena, 
Forster, & Singh, 2004). However, not all who make such demands are agents of social 
accountability, because to play that role requires them to meet certain requirements 
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(Behrend, 2006; O’Donnell, 2006; Rivera, 2006; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000a). The term 
“agents of social accountability” thus refers to people or groups who are capable of 
acting for the public in enforcing accountability of power holders for the purpose of 
protecting broad interests. Though there are cases in which individual persons can be 
agents of social accountability, they are typically less capable and effective than 
organisations formed by groups of individuals in order to pursue common goals. At the 
same time, despite the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, many Indonesians 
remain too apprehensive to call office holders to account. Accordingly, this thesis focuses 
on organisations that can initiate accountability activities for anti-corruption purposes. 
Of them, NGOs and the media have attracted the widest discussion in most literature on 
social accountability, and in Indonesia, particularly during the Reformasi era, many such 
organisations have endeavoured to promote accountability, and also to create 
governments free of corruption. The first subsection briefly discusses the development 
of Indonesian NGOs and media, followed by a deeper look at Indonesian NGOs in the 
Reformasi era and a review of the literature on their accountability activities for anti-
corruption purposes. 
3.2.1 Indonesian NGOs and media firms 
NGOs are organisations that are neither formed by nor affiliated with the government. 
To be more precise, this thesis follows Saidi (2004, p. 22) in defining NGOs as non-profit 
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organisations that ordinary people form voluntarily to serve the public. By using this 
definition, this thesis excludes profit-driven organisations and government-run 
associations from the discussion. Two local terms sometimes replace the term “NGO” in 
Indonesia. One is organisasi non pemerintah (Ornop), which is the literal term and 
appears in some local scholars’ works. The term lembaga swadaya masyarakat (LSM) is 
more popular; Eldridge (1995, pp. 12-13) translates this as “self-reliant community 
institutions”. In order to avoid confusion, this thesis uses the generally known term 
“NGOs”. 
NGOs are critical constituents of Indonesian civil society. A high percentage of them 
focus on issues relating to community development. Not until the Reformasi era started 
did the number of NGOs formed to address corruption, human rights, accountability, 
and other sensitive issues increase remarkably. This was partly because of the strict 
restrictions placed upon them under Suharto’s rule. However, there were still NGOs that 
bravely challenged the Suharto administration in the New Order era. The Legal Aid 
Institution established in 1971 is a good example. In the late 1980s, it attracted the 
attention of international organisations when it mobilised victims of the Kedung Ombo 
Dam incident to protest against government policies and helped them to obtain fair 
compensation for the loss of their land and property (Eldridge, 1995, pp. 122-124). This 
was just one case of Indonesian NGOs’ accountability initiatives at that time, and several 
did embarrass the Suharto administration greatly. The government, however, seldom 
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responded positively unless there was direct intervention by international organisations. 
Verbal warnings and threats were the most common responses received by NGOs 
seeking accountability.  
Indonesian NGOs in the Reformasi era have faced a more favourable context. 
Restrictions that once impeded NGOs have been either removed or not implemented. 
The Law on Social organisations is an instance. It was not revised in the first decade of 
the Reformasi era, but during that period the Ministry of Home Affairs no longer 
followed it and did not require NGOs to register.21 Nor did social organisations need the 
government’s consent before they could apply for foreign funding.22 Meanwhile, new 
laws do not have clauses excessively restricting NGO activities. An example is Law No. 16 
of 2001 on Foundations. That law applies to non-membership organisations that people 
form for social, economic, and humanitarian ends. As many NGOs in Indonesia are 
registered as foundations, this law also applies to them. The law still has a clause 
stipulating that foundations which disturb public order and contravene ethics can be 
dissolved (Article 62). However, it entitles the courts, not the executive, to make the 
                                                     
21 Retrieved on July 20, 2010, from http://www.depdagri.go.id/news/2010/04/20/ada-100-ribu-lebi. 
22“Revisi UU Ormas Untuk Cegah Terorisme dan Pencucian Uang,” Retrieved on July 20, 2010, from 
http://www.depdagri.go.id/news/2008/07/21/revisi-uu-ormas. 
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decision, removing one source of NGOs’ fears deriving from experience.  
The number of Indonesian NGOs in the Reformasi era increased remarkably, growing 
from 7,000 in the mid-1990s to around 13,500 in 2002, according to official data. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs estimated that the total number of NGOs in Indonesia by 2010, 
including unregistered ones, exceeds 100,000.23 That increase is attributable to several 
factors. Other than the removal of restrictions, an increase in sources of funding is also 
crucial. Since 1998, international financial institutions like the World Bank have funded 
numerous programmes to assist Indonesia in developing democracy, economic stability, 
and prosperity. These programmes require the participation of local NGOs, offering 
funding opportunities for existing NGOs and encouraging newcomers. 
The Indonesian media’s story is similar. Under Suharto’s rule, numerous restrictions 
impeded media organisations from being able to monitor government performance and 
behaviour effectively, but many of the restrictions were removed after Suharto resigned. 
Law No. 40 of 1999 on the press, which replaces laws enacted under Suharto, does not 
stipulate that the establishment of media firms requires permits (Palguna, 2003). As a 
                                                     
23 “Ada 100 Ribu Lebih Ormas di RI,” Antara, April 19, 2010.  
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result, the number of media firms has increased. For example, the number of 
newspapers and magazines rose from 289 to 2,000 in the 16 months after Suharto 
resigned (Romano & Seinor, 2005 p. 111).  
The growth of media implies an increase in the number of employees hired in the media 
industry. Of them, journalists are more representative of media firms than are 
administrative staff. They faced strict restrictions under Suharto’s rule but, under Law No. 
21 of 2000 on Trade Unions, the number of journalist-related associations reached 43 in 
2003 (Hanitzsch, 2005). These associations protect journalists against unfair treatment, 
physical attacks, and discriminatory policies. 24  Probably because of such support, 
Indonesian journalists in the Reformasi era have grown bolder in their coverage of 
corruption scandals. As Romano and Seinor (2005) put it, "[i]n such an environment, 
journalists adopted a brash style when reporting on weaknesses in public leaders and 
their policies. This contrasted markedly with the allusive style that Indonesian journalists 
used during the New Order period” (p. 111).  
                                                     
24 The Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI) is an association that promotes press freedom in Indonesia. 
Its establishment, in 1994, was a response to an order which the Suharto administration issued that 
banned three magazines. Now it is focused on the protection of journalists’ interests.  
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Nevertheless, increases in quantity and improvement in quality are two different things. 
Lindsey (2002) points out that the quality of Indonesian civil society in the Reformasi era 
remains uneven. The establishment of some NGOs was rushed, and the purpose was 
only to compete for funding (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 116). They have neither a complete 
organisational structure nor a clear vision of their mission. Some NGOs are allegedly 
manipulated by politicians wishing to humiliate their political rivals, to express support 
for their policies, or sometimes even to extort money from their victims (Abidin, 2004).25 
At the same time, there are some other NGOs that adopt radical means to pursue 
specific goals which may harm the public interest, and thus are deemed to be 
democracy’s troublemakers (Hadiwinata, 2008). Not surprisingly, such NGOs lack 
credibility and, therefore, are hardly competent agents of social accountability. Their 
existence harms the image of the NGO community in Indonesia.26  
Arguably, only a few NGOs are both willing and able to initiate accountability activities 
for anti-corruption purposes in the Reformasi era. According to a list published by the 
Indonesian Society for Transparency (MTI) in 2001, the total number of anti-corruption 
NGOs in Indonesia is 158. Most of the NGOs on the list operate outside Jakarta, and they 
                                                     
25 Rezki Sri Wibowo, Interview with author, Jakarta, August 22, 2007. 
26 Rezki Sri Wibowo, Interview with author, Jakarta, August 22, 2007. 
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express an interest in corruption problems at the local levels. In contrast, Jakarta-based 
NGOs mostly interested in corruption problems at the national level are a minority. It is 
hard to know whether all the NGOs listed are competent agents of accountability, 
because MTI does not explain the selection criteria and assessment methods used in 
making the list. If all the NGOs on that list were competent, they would still represent 
less than one percent of the Ministry of Home Affairs estimates of the total number of 
NGOs.27  
Media organisations have encountered similar problems. During the Reformasi era, 
probably for the purpose of attracting advertising revenue, much of the newly 
established media mainly broadcast entertainment programmes, and showed little 
interest in “hard” issues like corruption and accountability. Of media firms that express 
interest in such topics, some have problems of neutrality and objectivity. In his research, 
Winarno (2003) found that prime shareholders of many media firms in Indonesia were 
political parties or politicians, possibly compromising their neutrality when covering 
corruption cases. 
                                                     
27 No NGOs under Suharto’s rule focused on fighting corruption.   
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Media that dedicate a large part of their news content to the analysis of social and 
political issues are more likely to cover corruption cases and scandals. Coverage of 
corruption-related news, however, is not the same as investigating and exposing corrupt 
officials. Media firms that promote and support investigative reporting on corruption 
scandals are also more likely to be initiators of anti-corruption movements. There have 
been several cases in Latin America in which anti-corruption movements are launched 
by media firms. As noted in Chapter Two, investigative reporting is mainstream 
journalism in Latin America. There were, however, only a few media outlets in Indonesia 
that encouraged journalists to investigate and expose corruption cases. Based on his 
survey, Hanitzsch (2005) argued that only Tempo and a few other national media outlets 
encouraged journalists to investigate corruption scandals. Most media either published 
second-hand information or cited NGO publications. 28  Not surprisingly, such news 
reports were mostly descriptive, and failed to offer any real insight into the problem of 
corruption. Meanwhile, Bagir Manan, chairman of the Press Council in Indonesia, argued 
that Indonesia’s news media put excessive focus on the background of corruption 
suspects, at the expense of discussion of ways to utilise anti-corruption institutions and 
to increase public awareness about corruption eradication.29 Media of this sort can be 
                                                     
28 “Press Falls Short in Corruption Coverage, Experts Say,” Jakarta Globe, August 26, 2010. 
29 “Press Falls Short in Corruption Coverage, Experts Say,” Jakarta Globe, August 26, 2010.  
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a useful tool for NGOs, but are rarely initiators of accountability activities.  
In summary, not all Indonesian NGOs and media in the Reformasi era are competent 
agents of social accountability that combat corruption. This thesis will mainly discuss 
Indonesian NGOs and their anti-corruption/accountability activities on two grounds. 
First, NGOs have led Indonesia’s anti-corruption movements in the Reformasi era. Many 
Indonesian media firms do not initiate accountability activities for the purpose of 
attacking corruption. At the same time, though the NU, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Kadin), and other social organisations have repeatedly announced their 
intention to combat corruption, these declarations have seldom translated into concrete 
action.30 Under these circumstances, only some NGOs have really deemed corruption a 
priority issue (Goodpaster, 2002, p. 23), and have thus become leaders of Indonesia’s 
anti-corruption movements. They have initiated a wide range of activities such as 
demanding that law enforcement agencies investigate corruption cases and punish 
corrupt office holders. Furthermore, they have conducted research and distribute 
findings to the public, and have thus become the main sources of anti-corruption 
                                                     
30 “NU dan Muhammadiyah Tandatangani MoU Antikorupsi,” Kompas, October 14, 2003. 
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knowledge (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 122; Holloway, 2001; Lindsey, 2002).  
The second reason is that NGO activists are more likely to initiate ex-ante and 
simultaneous types of accountability activities than are journalists. The job of journalists 
is to look into corruption cases and expose scandals, rather than to build up effective 
anti-corruption institutions or prevent office holders or politicians from committing 
corruption. In contrast to journalists, NGO activists are more flexible about ways to 
initiate accountability activities for anti-corruption purposes. They can mobilise voters, 
participate in the formulation of policies or decisions, and utilise participatory 
accountability institutions. Such activities allow them to seek ex-ante and simultaneous 
accountability. The next subsection provides a deeper look at Indonesian NGOs that 
demand accountability for corruption in the Reformasi era, particularly those studied in 
this thesis.  
3.2.2 Indonesian anti-corruption NGOs 
As discussed in Chapter One, NGOs visited for this thesis are located in DKI Jakarta. The 
professionalism of these NGOs is reflected in the educational background of their 
activists, most of whom are university graduates; some have even studied overseas. 
Since many of these NGO activists are graduates of law schools, they understand the law 
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and the legal system in Indonesia and how best to utilise legal means to fight against 
official corruption. Judging by their comments over the years regarding basic human 
rights and popular sovereignty, these activists also possess strong rights consciousness 
and a determination to call office holders to account.  
There are also many differences among these NGOs. One very important difference 
relates to resources. Resources affect NGOs’ capacity to carry out accountability 
activities. Financially, most Indonesian NGOs rely heavily on international financial 
institutions and foreign donors. They implement donor organisations’ short-term 
projects in exchange for funding. This suggests that most NGOs seek and apply for 
funding continuously, in order to obtain sufficient funds to sustain their daily operations. 
Some NGOs, however, can obtain funding more easily than others. TII and ICW are two 
examples. According to their leaders, obtaining funding is not a severe challenge for 
them.31 The ability of NGOs to attract funding depends on the reputation which they 
have built over the years and the trust or confidence of donors in their effectiveness.32 
This unavoidably leads to the concentration of funding and donor support among well-
                                                     
31 Rezki Sri Wibowo, Interview with author, Jakarta, August 22, 2007; Danang Widoyoko, interview with 
author, Jakarta, September 3, 2007. 
32 Firliana Purwanti, email communication, February 13, 2008.  
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established NGOs at the expense of new NGOs. The group called berantaS is an example. 
Established in 2001 by several former ICW activists, this NGO could not obtain any 
funding from donor organisations despite the vast experience and knowledge of its 
activists. Its leader blames its demise on the conservatism of donor organisations.33 
Similar complaints also arise during casual talks with activists from other newly 
established NGOs.  
These NGOs also vary in their missions and focuses. TII activists, for instance, have an 
interest in perceived levels of corruption and thus conduct surveys on a regular basis. In 
contrast, ICW specialises in exposing corruption scandals, and also has initiated a variety 
of activities to mobilise victims of corruption. The KRHN focuses on constitutional topics 
and critically examines rulings by the Constitutional Court to determine whether they 
are unfavourable to anti-corruption institutions. PSHK pays close attention to anti-
corruption bills and institutions, checking that government decisions are within the 
boundaries of the law and do not facilitate corrupt activities. Such differences point to 
the variety of Indonesian NGOs’ accountability activities for anti-corruption purposes, 
                                                     
33 Donny Ardyanto, interview with author, Jakarta, August 28,2007. 
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and also highlight the need to put these activities in a broad framework for analysis.  
The third difference among these anti-corruption NGOs lies in their interaction with the 
media. Corruption cases involving prominent political figures and an enormous amount 
of money usually attract media attention. NGOs, such as ICW, that are competent and 
efficient at discovering corruption scandals are thus media favourites. As a result of their 
close relationship with the media, ICW leaders, such as Masduki, have become national 
celebrities.34 Some local NGO activists have even used the names of ICW activists to 
attract media attention.35 In contrast, PSHK, MTI, and NGOs that focus on bills and 
institutions appear to receive far less media attention.  
However, it should be noted that, under certain conditions, media firms may not co-
operate with ICW. ICW activist Ade Irawan complained that their efforts to highlight 
corruption in public schools usually did not receive media attention. This is because most 
media are inclined to cover topics that are more controversial than administrative 
                                                     
34 Even Indonesian migrant workers whom I met in Taiwan knew who Masduki was and on what topics 
he focuses.  
35 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
 136 
 
corruption, he argued. 36  Meanwhile, media reporting sometimes may conflict with 
NGOs’ strategies; one such conflict took place during the 2009 General Election. At that 
time, newspaper offices and television news stations expressed strong interest in the 
blacklists of unfit election candidates and repeatedly urged NGOs to release their lists. 
However, NGOs refused to do so in order to avoid charges of defamation.37 These facts 
point to challenges that Indonesian NGOs, even well-known ones like ICW, may face 
when using the media to enforce accountability of power holders.   
Despite their many differences, NGOs can and do co-operate with each other, joining 
forces in political protests such as the Anti-Rotten-Politician movement in the lead-up to 
the 2004 general election. Taking advantage of their many different areas of 
specialisation, participating NGOs developed a model of division of labour to maximise 
efficiency. For instance, it was well-established NGOs that proposed strategies to prevent 
undesirable candidates from winning elections, and made public announcements. Other 
participating NGOs collected information about candidates’ track records and conveyed 
messages about the objectives of the movement to voters. Another example of NGO 
collaboration is the case of internal reform of the Supreme Court. In that case, NGO 
                                                     
36 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2009. 
37 For more discussion of this, see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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activists invited to join the Reform Team (Tim Pembaruan) affiliated to the Supreme 
Court did not quarrel with other activists who monitored and criticised the reform 
process. Instead, they co-operated and formed an alliance that promoted internal 
reform of the Supreme Court.38 
Jakarta-based NGOs initiated a variety of accountability activities. Unlike the two NGO 
collaboration mentioned above, the CICAK movement of 2009 is an example of how they 
may seek ex-post accountability. The word cicak means “lizard” or “gecko” in English. The 
movement got its name after a senior police officer made an insulting remark about the 
KPK, scornfully referring to them as “house lizards” fighting “crocodiles” (police).39  The 
name CICAK later became an acronym for “Cinta Indonesia, Cinta KPK” (Love Indonesia, 
Love KPK). Launched in 2009 by ICW, TII, and several Jakarta-based NGOs, the purpose 
of the CICAK movement was to save two commissioners of the KPK from being 
imprisoned on charges of extortion and bribery, and to support anti-corruption 
institutions.40 The movement soon received nationwide attention, especially after a 
                                                     
38 For further discussion of this, see Chapter Five of this thesis. 
39 “Cicak Kok Mau Melawan Buaya,” Koran Tempo, July 6, 2009. 
40 “Former Leaders Condemn Efforts to Weaken KPK,” Jakarta Post, July 13, 2009;“Cicak Offers Support 
to Troubled Anti-graft Commission,” Jakarta Post, July 16, 2009.  
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national TV station broadcasted a wiretapped conversation that revealed deliberate 
attempts a police officer to frame the two commissioners by tampering with the 
evidence. As a result of this revelation, more than one million Facebook users 
immediately gave their signatures to online petitions demanding the release of the two 
commissioners.41 Tens of thousands of demonstrators flocked to the streets of central 
Jakarta and asked President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to look into the allegations 
(Beyerle, 2014, pp. 103-105).42 The president responded positively by forming the Team 
of Eight to investigate charges against the two commissioners.43 The team’s findings and 
recommendations led to the resignation of two high-ranking law enforcers and the 
reinstatement of the two commissioners who had been falsely accused. 
The CICAK movement is just one of the success stories of Jakarta-based NGOs’ anti-
corruption activism. NGO activists have shown a strong commitment to exposing many 
corruption scandals and also to discouraging corrupt office holders’ attempts to block 
anti-corruption efforts. A growing number of signs indicate that they now face strong 
                                                     
41  “Indonesians Hit Facebook, Streets to Protest Anti-Graft Arrest,” Bloomberg, November 2, 2009; 
“Indonesia’s Antigraft Facebook ‘Movement’ Reaches One Million,” Jakarta Globe, November 7, 2009. 
42  “Indonesia Fights Corruption with People Power,” BBC News, November 6, 2009r; “Indonesia 
Corruption Claims Rock President,” ABC News, November 25, 2009. 
43 “Besok, Tim Delapan Serahkan Rekomendasi ke Presiden,” Kompas, November 7, 2009. 
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counterattacks, however. In 2009, for example, two ICW activists faced charges of 
defamation, later dropped by the Attorney General’s Office, because they questioned its 
handling of money.44 In 2010, another ICW activist was physically attacked, allegedly for 
investigating the secret bank accounts of several high-ranking police officers.45 This was 
the first time in the Reformasi era that ICW activists were actually attacked, though they 
had frequently received verbal warnings.46 
Jakarta-based NGOs’ anti-corruption activities are significant because activists have 
focused mostly on national issues and expected to give rise to nationwide impacts. At 
the same time, they have aimed at addressing obstacles that have paralysed anti-
corruption institutions, and also at problems which the existing anti-corruption 
institutions have failed to solve. For example, while one cause of corruption in 
Indonesia’s parliaments before 2004 was the failure of voters to hold elected 
representatives accountable, the prime objective of the Anti-Rotten-Politician 
                                                     
44 “ICW Sesalkan Laporan Kejaksaan ke Polisi,” Koran Tempo, January 8, 2009. 
45 “ICW Yakin Kasus Tama Terkait Rekening Gendut,” Koran Tempo, July 16, 2010. 
46 Journalists who cover corruption scandals also face similar threats. A survey by AJI showed that there 
were 39 assault cases and four legal charges against Indonesian journalists in 2005. The number of similar 
cases rose by 18 percent in 2006 (The Alliance of Independent Journalists, 2007, p. 27). The data of the 
Committee to Protect Journalists even show that three Indonesian journalists have died because of 
reporting corruption since 2006. Retrieved on July 20, 2012, from www.cpj.org/killed/asia/indonesia. 
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Movement in the lead-up to the 2004 general election was to mobilise voters not to cast 
ballots for corrupt or otherwise unfit politicians seeking re-election. There are several 
other cases, but few of them have been analysed in the literature on accountability, 
corruption, or NGOs in Indonesia.  
Most such literature focuses on cases at the local level. Rinaldi, Purnomo, and Damayanti 
(2007), for example, gave a comprehensive overview of ten accountability activities in 
five provinces. Davidson (2007) provided a comparative study of local NGOs’ 
accountability activities for anti-corruption purposes in West Sumatra and West 
Kalimantan. Chaniago (2003a, 2003b) analysed accountability activities in West Sumatra, 
South Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, and Yogyakarta Special Region (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 
DIY). These cases illustrated how local NGOs seek ex-post accountability, but made little 
mention of how they seek ex- ante or simultaneous accountability. Moreover, scholars 
question Indonesia NGOs’ capacity to combat corruption. For example, Hadiz (2006, p. 
96) argued that they had problems such as internal organisational deficiencies and 
failure to broaden their social and political constituency, suggesting that Indonesian 
NGOs could not effectively reduce corruption. This gives rise to one question: Were 
Jakarta-based NGOs troubled by those problems when they initiated activities seeking 
ex-ante and simultaneous accountability? Cases analysed in the following three chapters 
can provide answers.  
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In summary, NGOs are critical agents of social accountability in Indonesia, and many of 
them initiated important anti-corruption activities in the first decade of the Reformasi 
era. However, most literature on corruption, accountability, and NGOs in Indonesia 
focuses on local NGOs, making little mention of Jakarta-based NGOs and their efforts to 
seek ex-ante and simultaneous accountability. These two types of accountability 
activities are important because, if successful, they can help prevent corruption from 
happening. As well as asking how Jakarta-based NGOs initiated the two types of 
accountability activities, this thesis also attempts to investigate what challenges they 
encountered and what changes these challenges gave rise to. In accordance with 
interviewees’ suggestions, this thesis selects cases concerning corruption and the 
accountability of elected representatives, non-elected officials, and civil servants. Before 
examining these case studies more deeply, the next section briefly introduces the three 
objects of social accountability in Indonesia that lie at their heart.  
3.3 Objects of Social Accountability 
Government office holders, here distinguished into elected representatives, non-elected 
officials and civil servants, are objects of social accountability discussed in this section. 
These objects vary in the positions they occupy, in authority they hold, in accountability 
mechanisms applying to them, and several other aspects, so holding them to account 
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cannot rely on a single strategy. This section studies the accountability mechanisms that 
apply to Indonesian objects of social accountability and the reasons that some aspects 
of them attract NGOs’ attention.  
3.3.1 Elected representatives 
Elected representatives are political figures who possess political power entrusted to 
them by citizens through elections. Before 2004, not all members of parliament in 
Indonesia were elected representatives. Some parliamentarians at that time were 
appointees of the president.47 After 2004, all members of the People’s Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the Regional People’s Representative 
Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) were chosen by election. At the same 
time, the posts of heads and deputy heads of the executive branch of governments and 
the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) have also been 
open to elections since 2004.48 These changes have led to a dramatic increase in the 
                                                     
47 Military representatives occupied a certain percentage of parliamentary seats before 2004. 
48 The DPD deals only with bills such as those relating to regional autonomy, and the relationship of 
central and local government.  
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number of elected representatives in Indonesia.49   
The legitimacy and representativeness of elected representatives greatly improved in 
the Reformasi era. Elections under Suharto’s rule were not fair, and thus elected 
representatives were not truly the people’s agents. In the Reformasi era, most elections 
have been fair and free (King, 2000a; Sherlock, 2004a, 2004b). Accordingly, all 
Indonesian elected representatives are legitimate representatives of the people.   
The accountability of elected representatives depends on political parties and 
accountability institutions (Strøm, Muller, Bergman, & Nyblade, 2003). Political parties 
are essential to the enforcement of accountability because most elected representatives 
in Indonesia are also members of political parties. The Amendment to the 1945 
Constitution stipulates that participants in parliamentary elections had to be political 
parties (Article 22E). That means that, before 2004, citizens in elections voted for 
political parties, not individual candidates, and the allocation of parliamentary seats is 
contingent upon the total number of ballots that each political party receives from voters. 
                                                     
49 Members of parliament in the Reformasi era are powerful. One reason is that the Amendment to the 
1945 Constitution explicitly stipulates that the President does not have the power to dismiss the People’s 
Representative Council. At the same time, no political parties of incumbent presidents occupied a majority 
of parliamentary seats.  
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Law No. 23 of 2003 on the Presidential Election only allowed political parties which had 
won at least 15 percent of seats in the DPR (or 20 percent of ballots in parliamentary 
elections) to nominate candidates. Similarly, Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Government 
only entitled political parties that had won at least 15 percent of ballots in the regional 
parliamentary elections (or the same percentage of seats in the DPRD) to nominate 
candidates to be local government heads. In other words, except for members of the 
DPD, most Indonesian elected representatives in the Reformasi era have also been 
representatives of political parties. Indonesian political parties in the Reformasi era have 
the power to control incumbent elected representatives. On the basis of Law No. 31 of 
2002 on Political Parties, each political party can suspend its members who serve as 
members of the DPR and the DPRD (Article 8). Incumbent elected representatives, 
particularly those seeking re-election, are especially under the control of their political 
parties because being nominees of their parties is one requirement for taking part in the 
next election.  
Apart from political parties, several accountability institutions can also hold elected 
representatives accountable. Judicial agencies are a traditional accountability institution 
with the power to investigate and summon elected representatives in parliaments 
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without the consent of the heads of the executive branch of governments. 50  Both 
indictments by prosecutors and court judgements influence the positions of elected 
representatives. The Amendment to the 1945 Constitution entitles the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) to suspend from duty the president and/or vice president 
if the courts find them guilty of corruption (Article 7A). Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local 
Government stipulates that the president can temporarily suspend heads of regional 
governments who face corruption charges. The DPRD, the counterpart of the DPR at 
local levels, has the power to suspend heads of regional government whom the courts 
find guilty of corruption (Article 31 and 32). Like judicial agencies, honour councils 
(Dewan Kehormatan) are also traditional accountability institutions with the power to 
hold elected representatives in parliaments accountable. Honour councils are 
permanent institutions affiliated to Indonesian parliaments. They have the authority to 
summon allegedly corrupt members of parliament; conduct investigations into their 
wrongdoing and decide whether to suspend members of parliament found guilty of 
corruption. Honour councils publicise decisions on suspension after the relevant head of 
government confirms it.51  
                                                     
50 Article 203 of Decision of the People’s Representative Council No. 08/ DPR RI/I/2005.2006.  
51 Article 62 of Decision of the People’s Representative Council No. 08/ DPR RI/I/2005.2006.  
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In the Reformasi era, several special accountability institutions were also established to 
combat corruption in both the executive and legislative branches of the government. 
Such institutions include the Public Servants’ Wealth Audit Commission (Komisi 
Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara, KPKPN) and the Joint Team for the 
Eradication of Corruption (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi, TGPTPK). These special accountability institutions add to the pressure of 
accountability that Indonesian elected representatives face.  
Despite the fact that these accountability institutions do operate, numerous scandals 
show that a high percentage of Indonesian elected representatives still engage in 
corruption. Corruption cases in which elected representatives were involved have taken 
place at both national and local levels. Survey respondents frequently select the 
parliament as the most corrupt institution in Indonesia. Corrupt politicians have 
significant negative impacts, including reducing government budgets; offsetting anti-
corruption efforts; and undermining public trust in democratic institutions. Many 
scholars and political observers warn that such negative impacts are corroding 
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Indonesian democracy.52  
In the Reformasi era, Indonesian citizens can use existing accountability institutions to 
try to hold elected representatives accountable and they can also use the media for the 
same purpose. Indonesian media have strong interest in corruption cases involving 
elected representatives, pointing to favourable conditions for the mediatisation strategy. 
Strong media coverage of corruption scandals and the ensuing public discontent can 
exert pressure on accountability institutions to investigate. Meanwhile, people can also 
use the media to affect the reputations of politicians directly.  
Elections also can be an accountability tool that citizens can use to enforce the 
accountability of elected representatives because, as Fearon (1999) argued, an election 
“induces elected officials to do what the voters want” (p. 56). With regard to this, three 
points are worthy of emphasis. First, elections are the only direct accountability tool 
available for Indonesians. Indonesian law does not entitle Indonesian people to recall 
corrupt elected representatives or veto bills through holding a referendum.53 Secondly, 
                                                     
52 For further discussions of corrupt politicians and the problems that follow, see Chapter Four.  
53 Article 52 of Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court.  
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increasing the effectiveness of elections as an accountability tool requires efforts to 
mobilise voters. The basic principle of free and fair elections is “one person, one vote”, 
meaning that an individual or a small group of people on their own cannot block the re-
election of corrupt representatives. Individual citizens who demand accountability of 
elected representatives need to show that they can mobilise “enough” voters to threaten 
candidates’ chances of re-election. Third, success in mobilising voters for the purpose of 
blocking corrupt politicians from being elected has significance for accountability in two 
ways. One is the imposition of punishment for past action: ex-post accountability. The 
other is preventing unfit candidates from gaining political power: ex-ante accountability.  
In summary, there are several channels by which Indonesian people in the Reformasi era 
can hold their elected representatives accountable. Unfortunately, most accountability 
institutions in the Reformasi era have not performed well, creating room for elected 
representatives to evade strict scrutiny as they use the power entrusted to them. In 
order to enforce electoral accountability, several Jakarta-based NGOs launched the Anti-
Rotten-Politician Movement in 2004. The main objective of this movement was to 
prevent unfit representatives from being reelected and to prevent other candidates 
whose track records were poor from winning elections. The movement was an attempt 
to hold elected representatives accountable ex post facto and ex-ante. How did they 
organise the movement? What challenges did they encounter? What changes or 
outcomes did their movement produce? Chapter Four will seek to answer these 
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questions  
3.3.2 Non-elected officials  
Non-elected officials are political figures chosen by parliament or appointed by the 
president with the approval of parliament, meaning that they are accountable to the 
central government or the government agency that appointed them. The term Pejabat 
Negara, literally translated as “state officials”, is similar, but with some important 
differences. According to Law No. 43 of 1999, Pejabat Negara are members of the high-
to-highest national institutions, including the heads of both central and local 
governments and members of parliament at all levels (Asshiddiqie, 2008). Since 2005, 
the heads of central and local governments and members of parliament have all been 
categorised as elected representatives, however. Thus, the term “non-elected officials” 
in this case only refer to ministers, heads of state agencies (such as the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court), and members of task forces formed for specific purposes. Non-
elected officials’ tasks include offering advice, drafting legislation, issuing decrees, and 
enforcing the law. Their work often concerns accountability institutions.  
In the context of the present discussion, “accountability institutions” refer to state 
agencies that that are legally entitled to call office holders to account. As noted already, 
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O’Dnnell (2006) divides them into two types: checking institutions, and appointed 
institutions. Checking institutions are the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
the government. Ideally, these checking accountability institutions should be able to 
monitor and check each other but, under Suharto’s rule, the parliaments and judicial 
agencies could not function effectively due to political interference from the executive 
branch of government or the president and his cronies. It was not until the Reformasi 
era that the two institutions were able to carry out their tasks independently and 
without external interference. 
The main function of appointed accountability institutions is to act as a counterbalance 
to checking accountability institutions. The formal appellation into which appointed 
accountability institutions fall in Indonesia is “non-structural institutions” (Lembaga 
Nonstruktural). By 2009, successive Indonesian governments in the Reformasi era had 
established a total of 92 non-structural institutions. In contrast, the New Order 
government only established two institutions of that kind during its 32 years in power.54 
Fourteen of these 92 non-structural institutions were charged with investigating, 
supervising, and preventing corruption, as well as facilitating anti-corruption efforts 
                                                     
54 “Bentuk Lembaga Nonstruktural Baru, Lembaga Negara Kian Gemuk,” Jawa Pos, December 18, 2008. 
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(such as Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency, and the Information Commission).55 
Of these 14 institutions, ten remain active to this day (see Table 3.2 below).  
Appointed accountability institutions vary in several aspects. The National Police 
Commission, for example, only supervises the police. In contrast, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission monitors all office holders. Not only do they vary in function but 
these institutions also vary in how free they are to carry out their tasks. The Corruption 
Eradication Commission, for example, is an independent institution, and thus it is obliged 
only to abide by the law when exercising the power to combat corruption. In contrast, 
the TGPTPK was affiliated with the Attorney General’s Office, meaning that its 
investigative action required the consent of the Attorney General.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55  The Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK) is crucial because it protects informants in 
corruption scandals. The Information Commission (KI) is essential to corruption reduction because it 
increases the accessibility of information.  
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Table 3.2   
Corruption-Related Appointed Accountability Institutions in Indonesia (1998–2009) 
Institutions (in Indonesian) Institutions (in English) Established in 
Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi 
(TGPTPK)a 
Joint Team for the Eradication of Corruption 2000 
Tim Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi(Timtas Tipikor)a 
Corruption Eradication Team 2005 
Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan 
Penyelenggara Negara 
(KPKPN)b 
Public Servants' Wealth Audit Commission 2000 
Komisi Ombudsman Nasional 
(KON)c 
National Ombudsman Commission 2000 
Pusat Pelaporan dan Analysis 
Transaksi Keuangan(PPATK) 
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre 
2003 
Komisi Kepolisian Nasional National Police Commission 2005 
Komisi Kejaksaan Attorney Commission 2005 
Komisi Yudisial Judicial Commission 2004 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
(KPK) 
Corruption Eradication Commission 2002 
Komisi Informasi Information Commission 2009 
Ombudsman Indonesia Indonesian Ombudsman 2008 
Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi 
dan Korban (LPSK) 
Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency 2008 
Pengadilan Tindak Pidana 
Korupsi 
Corruption Court 2004 
Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan 
Mafia Hukum 
Judicial Mafia Eradication Task Force 2009 
a Dissolved. b Merged. c Title changed. 
 
 
Accountability institutions in Indonesia have been under significant pressure to perform 
well. As they frequently come under fire for lacking professionalism and efficiency, their 
performance may not have met public expectations. As Hadiz (2004b) put it, “[p]resently 
existing institutional frameworks have not allowed public resentment of corruption to 
be translated into practices that penalise the abuse of power by officials for the sake of 
generating private wealth” (p. 212). Besides, several accountability institutions have had 
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their own corruption problems. For instance, corruption is a rampant problem in judicial 
agencies, as attested by the numerous cases of judges caught accepting bribes from 
defendants in exchange for a favourable sentence.56 Accordingly, scholars, NGO activists, 
and political observers frequently question the integrity of Indonesia’s law enforcers’ 
(Reksodiputro, 2002). Apart from problems of capacity and integrity, Indonesian 
accountability institutions, particularly appointed ones, also face the challenges of a lack 
of sufficient resources. Former TGPTPK member Chalid (2001), for example, complained 
that insufficient resources made it extremely difficult for TGPTPK to sustain its daily 
operations. In short, in the Reformasi era several factors impeded Indonesian 
accountability institutions in performing their tasks fully.  
Addressing such obstacles requires effort by non-elected officials. They can help anti-
corruption institutions to have good leaders, for example. Agencies that encounter 
challenges deriving from the lack of clear legally defined grants of power need officials’ 
assistance before relevant draft legislation can be passed in parliament. Institutions that 
have problems like low efficiency and corruption need leaders who can initiate and 
implement reform measures and resist external intervention. State officials are critical 
                                                     
56  “Hakim Ibrahim Divonis Enam Tahun Penjara,” Koran Tempo, August 3, 2010; “Rekening Gendut 
Perwira Polisi,” Koran Tempo, June 21, 2010. 
 154 
 
to these and many other tasks crucial to improving the performance of accountability 
institutions.   
Though the literature reiterates the importance of non-elected officials to accountability 
institutions, it barely discusses how NGOs get officials to make decisions favourable for 
accountability institutions. It can be difficult for NGO activists, journalists, or other social 
actors to pressure non-elected officials because, legally speaking, such officials are 
accountable only to the political figures or government agencies that appoint or elect 
them. Nevertheless, as the literature on accountability shows, on some occasions non-
elected officials may also need to be accountable to non-state actors. Such occasions 
arise when international protocols or laws explicitly stipulate the participation of social 
representatives, or when the government needs non-state actors’ experience or 
professional expertise. In many cases, social actors’ efforts to hold non-elected officials 
accountable help produce policies and legislation that reduces opportunities for the 
misuse of power.  
In the Reformasi era, two changes have been identified as conducive to the participation 
of NGO activists in the formulation of decisions relating to Indonesian accountability 
institutions. The first change is a high level of transparency in the selection of leaders of 
several accountability institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission. This 
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is because relevant laws stipulate that the Selection Board for choosing such leaders shall 
include social representatives, and anyone who meets the requirements can apply to be 
a social representative.57 The second change is the rise of pro-reform officials to political 
power. These pro-reform officials, several of whom came to power during the Reformasi 
era, are more inclined to consider suggestions from civil society. Former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan, and former Attorney General, Abdul Rahman Saleh, 
are two examples of reform-minded officials. 
One thing worthy of note is that, as the literature suggests, social actors in Indonesia 
may not have the willingness or capacity to grasp the opportunity to participate in 
decision making. Due to multiple restrictions under Suharto’s rule, Indonesian NGOs 
have become accustomed to focusing on issues concerning development and opposing 
the government. They have generally had little or no experience of participating in the 
democratic decision-making process (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 120). At the same time, a 
significant number of Indonesian NGO activists still refused to co-operate with 
government officials in order to maintain their independence from external influence 
(Saleh, 2008). Thus, not all Indonesian NGO activists were willing to grasp participation 
                                                     
57 For further discussions on this, see Chapter Five. 
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opportunities as they arose.  
Previous discussion prompts several questions. How did NGO activists persuade or 
compel non-elected officials to compromise in their negotiations about accountability 
institutions? What happened to the NGO community when only a small number of 
activists were invited to participate in the formulation of decisions concerning 
accountability institutions? What were participating activists’ attitudes towards conflicts 
with state officials over ideas and principles? Chapter Five will answer these questions 
by analysing three cases, specifically relating to the Corruption Eradication Commission, 
the Corruption Court and the Supreme Court.  
3.3.3 Civil servants 
Civil servants are government employees who occupy positions in the executive or other 
state institutions; the closest Indonesian translation of the term “civil servants” is 
pegawai negeri sipil (PNS).58 Their jobs include implementing government policies and 
delivering public services. Many of them work in direct contact with ordinary people, but 
                                                     
58 See Law No.43 of 1999 on Civil Service. 
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for the most part they are accountable to their superiors in offices.  
The number of civil servants in Indonesian is huge, and they have been long criticised for 
being inefficient and corrupt. A report released by the Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy (PERC) reveals that the civil service in Indonesia is the second least efficient 
in Asia.59 An inefficient bureaucracy can lead to corrupt practices such as asking for 
bribes in exchange for services, and appropriating public funds for personal use. 
Taufiequrrahman Ruki, former chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission, 
explained that administrative corruption prevails because civil servants’ “salaries are low, 
[and] weaknesses in the system encourage [them] to engage in corruption”. These 
weaknesses include poor supervision, low accountability, insufficient law enforcement, 
and mild sanctions.60  
The Indonesian government has made very little progress in its efforts to reform the civil 
service since the beginning of the Reformasi era in 1998. Only a few government 
agencies initiated their own programmes, and successful cases include the Supreme 
                                                     
59 “Indonesia’s Bureaucracy Among Worst in Asia: Survey,” Jakarta Global, June 2, 2010. 
60 Retrieved on July 20, 2010, from www.depdagri.go.id/news/2006/03/24/mendagri-ada-1100-pejabat-
korup. 
 158 
 
Court and the Ministry of Finance.61  Not until 2010 were there systemic efforts to 
reduce administrative corruption. Examples of these efforts include the establishment 
of the National Bureaucratic Reforms Direction Committee and the release of the Grand 
Design of Bureaucratic Reform 2010–2015.  
Administrative corruption usually has a direct impact on recipients of public service. The 
literature on social accountability suggests that there are three strategies that can be 
used by victims of administrative corruption to call corrupt civil servants to account. 
However, none has worked well in the Reformasi era. Victims of administrative 
corruption find it difficult to use the strategy of mediatisation to hold corrupt civil 
servants accountable, because the media are usually not interested in corruption cases 
involving neither large sums of money nor famous persons. The strategy of social 
mobilisation may also be impractical and ineffective because, in countries where 
administrative corruption is rampant, paying bribes or illegal levies, though common, 
rarely threatens human lives or gives rise to an obvious impression of gross exploitation. 
Corrupt practices by individual civil servants may outrage some people, but such 
                                                     
61 “Boediono Vows Quick Delivery of Reform Road Map,” Jakarta Global, June 15, 2010. 
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discontent and resentment may not be enough to give rise to large-scale mobilisation.  
The strategy of judicialisation is also limited. First, some accountability institutions only 
deal with large-scale corruption cases. The Corruption Eradication Commission, for 
example, only deals with corruption cases in which the amount of money involved 
exceeds 1 billion rupiahs.62 Few administrative corruption cases reach such a threshold. 
Secondly, not all accountability institutions have the authority to impose sanctions. The 
Ombudsman Indonesia, for example, can only summon allegedly corrupt civil servants 
to explain their conduct and then suggest sanctions. It is the civil servants’ superiors who 
have the authority to impose sanctions, but they usually impose administrative sanctions 
like transfer or demotion. Such mild sanctions are unlikely to deter administrative 
corruption.  
Given these obstacles, it is no surprise that many Indonesians feel frustrated when they 
attempt to hold civil servants to account. In this context, the establishment of 
participatory accountability institutions is significant. Participatory accountability 
institutions are organisations specifically established to facilitate people’s participation 
                                                     
62 Article 11 of Law of 2002 on the KPK. 
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in public service delivery. The establishment of participatory accountability mechanisms 
transforms the role of the people from recipients of public service delivery to negotiators 
and monitors within that process. In other words, through participatory accountability 
institutions citizens can seek simultaneous accountability. School committees and 
Education Councils in the Indonesian education sector are examples of such institutions. 
Similar institutions in other sectors have not yet been set up in the Reformasi era.  
Several Jakarta-based NGOs have expressed strong concerns about educational issues 
and have campaigned to reduce corruption in public schools. They treat teachers and 
pupils’ parents as stakeholders in their programmes aimed at removing corruption from 
schools and have mobilised them to monitor civil servants in schools through School 
Committees. What strategies did NGO activists use? Did teachers and pupils’ parents 
respond positively as activists expected them to do? Do relevant laws provide School 
Committees with the power required to exercise accountability effectively? Chapter Six 
answers these questions by analysing activities initiated by the Education Coalition to 
remove corruption from schools.  
3.4 Summary 
Corruption persisted in the first decade of the Reformasi era though there were signs of 
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improvement. Unlike other scholarly works, this thesis attempts to explain that problem 
through exploring NGOs’ experiences in preventing corruption. This chapter has argued 
that NGOs have emerged as important “agents of social accountability” when it comes 
to combatting corruption in post-Suharto Indonesia. They have initiated numerous 
activities to combat corruption, and some of them have attracted scholarly attention. 
Most such activities, however, focus on seeking ex-post accountability: punishing officials 
for their past corrupt misdeeds. For some Jakarta-based NGOs, this is not enough. They 
have also tried to prevent future corruption and have initiated several activities seeking 
ex-ante and simultaneous accountability. This chapter has identified opportunities and 
channels available for NGOs to engage in such activities, and the following three chapters 
will give in-depth analyses, beginning with NGO attempt to target corruption in the 
legislature. 
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4 Corruption, Electoral Accountability, and NGOs: The Anti-
Rotten- Politician Movement 
On 29th December, 2003, hundreds of Indonesians assembled in front of the 
Proclamation Statue (Tugu Proklamasi) located in central Jakarta. They were activists 
from noted NGOs, including ICW, JPPR, Imparsial, AJI, and Demos. Well-known 
intellectuals and politicians such as Nurcholish Madjid, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Andi 
Mallarangeng, and Ali Sadikin also joined the assembly. Despite heavy rain, journalists 
decided to stay because NGO activists would soon be announcing the start of the 
National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement (Gerakan Nasional Tidak Pilih Politisi Busuk, 
GNTPPB). In their speeches, NGO activists gave reasons for initiating such a movement 
and called strongly on the electorate to follow them in rejecting unfit candidates. Print 
and cyber news media widely covered their slogans and claims (Masduki, 2006, p. 220). 
The goal of the movement was to mobilise voters to not vote for “unfit” candidates. In 
order to achieve that goal, NGO activists announced at the start that they would adopt 
the strategy of publicizing blacklists of suspect candidates. Election candidates who were 
suspected of corruption or had already been found guilty of corruption would be 
deemed unfit to be elected. The movement soon took off and became a prominent part 
of the anti-corruption movement initiated by Indonesian civil society. 
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The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was closely modelled on the Blackballing 
Movement in South Korea. Hundreds of South Korean NGOs jointly initiated the 
Blackballing Movement in 2000, which also featured the release and dissemination of 
blacklists. These two movements show that NGOs, besides election monitoring and 
voter education, can also engage in voter mobilisation amid elections. Because activists 
attempted to block certain candidates from winning elections, thereby forcing 
candidates to explain their track records in order to attract votes, both movements were 
clearly seeking ex-ante accountability. At the same time, they were also seeking ex-post 
accountability because blacklisted candidates were mostly incumbent politicians with 
poor track records. The success of these two movements helped tighten electoral 
accountability relationships between elected representatives and constituents, thereby 
reducing political corruption. Despite their similarities, however, only the Blackballing 
Movement in South Korea has attracted scholarly attention. The current literature on 
this movement has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. The 
question of whether similar movements succeed in different contexts is the focus of this 
chapter. If not, the question of why a different outcome is worthy of further exploration. 
Findings of this exploration will help explain why political corruption remain pervasive in 
a given country. This chapter investigates the question by looking into the Anti-Rotten-
Politician Movement in Indonesia.  
The chapter’s findings are as follows: when NGOs initiated the Anti-Rotten-Politician 
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Movement in 2004, only the social context favoured their initiative, and the remaining 
three contextual dimensions were unable to support them. The legacy of past 
authoritarian ruling and the dominance of the political parties’ interests in the reform 
process both made the context unfavourable. Though NGO activists admitted failure, 
there are indications that their initiatives helped build up a consensus on criteria by 
which to evaluate election candidates’ qualifications, a contribution crucial to the 
development of a culture of democratic accountability in Indonesia. Also, NGO efforts to 
change electoral laws and systems removed some institutional obstacles they had 
encountered initially in 2004, thereby improving the institutional context. In other words, 
step by step Indonesian NGOs improved the context in which they were able to enforce 
electoral accountability, rather than just being subject to it. These findings enrich 
scholarly understanding of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia and extend the 
discussion of social accountability. More importantly, they explain why NGO efforts to 
prevent undesirable candidates from being elected failed in 2004. This failure could be 
one reason that political corruption remained rampant in Indonesia.  
These findings are presented in five sections. Section one summarizes findings of the 
present literature on electoral accountability. Section two brings the focus back to 
Indonesia, particularly the period between 1998 and 2004. It discusses Indonesia’s 
elected representatives’ importance to the transition to democracy, corruption and 
accountability problems relating to them and the performance of the then existing 
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accountability institutions. Section three gives a thorough discussion of the 2004 
National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement and follow-up activities, followed by in-depth 
analyses of four contextual factors and challenges encountered by NGOs. The final 
section gives concluding remarks.   
4.1 Electoral Accountability 
Elections are a mechanism by which constituents choose a person or group of people for 
political positions by voting, and delegate those elected to make decisions on behalf of 
the general public for a limited period. In addition to honouring “good” people with 
political authority (Fearon, 1999, pp. 57-58), functions of elections also include 
“legitimiz[ing] the powers of the elected, provid[ing] opportunities for voters to send 
signals to elites regarding the direction of policy and giv[ing] voters the opportunity to 
hold incumbents to account for policy performance” (Hellwig & Samuels, 2008, p. 83). 
Whether and how does the last function work out in transitional democracies?  
Elected representatives in democracies mostly have great power to determine the 
allocation of budgets, enact laws, make policies, or supervise other state institutions and 
their personnel. They are, of course, expected to look after public interests (Fearon, 
1999). However, many of them, as scandals reveal, may fail to meet such an expectation, 
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thereby leading to public distrust in representative bodies, or even in democracy 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2006; Morris & Klesner, 2010). Accordingly, 
approaches to enhance the accountability of elected representatives have drawn wide 
scholarly attention  
Various options are available for citizens in democracies to hold elected representatives 
to account. Between elections, citizens can impose punishments or force elected 
representatives to respond by reporting them to judicial institutions, exposing 
wrongdoings through news media, or mobilising victims to impose pressure. Multiple 
cases can be found in Argentina and other Latin American countries and many of them 
have been deemed by scholars like Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, p. 9) as examples 
demonstrating the enforcement of social accountability. In contrast, activities initiated 
by citizens to hold elected representatives to account through elections have not yet 
received systematic analysis, leading to poor academic understanding of such activities 
(Packel, 2008, p. 1; Rodden, 2004, p. 495). These activities are not the subject of social 
accountability studies (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000a), but are close to the concept 
electoral accountability that Tsai (2012) put forward, that is, “citizens demand incumbent 
elected representatives to take responsibility for their performance through 
elections”(pp. 38-39). Thus, this chapter calls such initiatives electoral accountability 
activities. Relevant scholarly workings are reviewed in the remainder of this section.  
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As the elected representatives’ principals, the electorate is in a legitimate position to 
hold elected representatives to account (Carey, 2009; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Strøm, 
2000). They can enforce accountability by threatening not to vote for incumbents who 
have performed poorly but still seek re-election. Such threat, in theory, is a powerful 
check on incumbent elected representatives (Ackerman, 2005, p. 13; Cheibub & 
Przeworski, 1999; Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999; Schedler, 1999, p. 18). The impact 
of the threat is likely to be great when the electorate makes informed choices, and 
elections are fair and competitive (Blair, 2000; Johnston, 1983; Schlesinger & Meier, 
2007). As Rose-Ackerman (1978) puts it: “combining an informed and concerned 
electorate with a political process that regularly produces closely contested elections 
leads to a world in which corruption is limited by competition” (p. 213). This statement 
implies that the enforcement of electoral accountability is conditioned by several factors, 
many of which have been analysed in the literature on electoral accountability.  
Scholarly works on electoral accountability can be divided into two groups; one focuses 
on obstacles to the enforcement of electoral accountability. Scholars mostly believe that 
elections are not a powerful accountability tool (Burden, 2007, p. 6; Packel, 2008, p. 11). 
Reasons often mentioned include the huge number of candidates, and the mixture of 
numerous issues (Malena, Forster, & Singh, 2004: p. 3). These factors may impede 
constituents from reaching a consensus on reasons for disqualifying specific candidates 
from being elected representatives, thereby hampering the enforcement of electoral 
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accountability.  
Some scholars focus on regulations and institutions. They believe that term limits, the 
candidate nomination process, the electoral system, and other arrangements affect the 
enforcement of electoral accountability (Powell, 2000, pp. 10-13). Term limits concern 
incentives for elected representatives to serve the general public. When laws prohibit 
re-election, elections are not a control mechanism. The incumbents have few incentives 
to perform well, and constituents cannot vote retrospectively (Maravall, 2007; Packel, 
2008, p. 16). On the contrary, if laws allow re-election, incumbents will consider 
constituents’ demands seriously because there always exists a need to secure more 
votes than competitors do. At the same time, constituents can punish the incumbents 
who are suspected of abusing mandates by withdrawing support (Barro, 1973, pp. 27-
32; Ferejohn, 1986, pp. 7-8). In addition, candidate nomination processes that are 
neither open nor participatory also hamper the enforcement of electoral accountability. 
In their studies, Heller (2001, pp. 151-157), and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008, pp. 14-
16) noted that the dominance of a few leaders in candidate nomination processes within 
political parties is quite common. Such dominance narrows candidates’ legitimate base 
for being agents of the electorate, reduces electoral competitiveness, and makes it 
difficult to get access to candidates’ track records and other relevant information, 
thereby affecting constituents’ ability to make judgments (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Finally, 
electoral systems also matter. For example, under the Closed-List Proportional 
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Representation system, constituents only vote for political parties, and seats that parties 
win are allocated in accordance with sequence orders on party lists (Acosta, Joshi, & 
Ramshaw, 2010, p. 8; Carey & Shugart, 1995, p. 417; Mitchell, 2000, p. 341). In other 
words, under such a system there is little likelihood of preventing poorly performing 
candidates from winning re-election, unless constituents decide that poitical parties that 
nominate unfit candidates are disqualified, and therefore withdraw their support.  
Some scholars emphasize constituents’ self-perception of their ability to influence 
government policies, something termed the sense of political efficacy by Campbell, 
Gurin, and Miller (1954, pp. 187-194). They usually assume that such a sense relates to 
much of how constituents behave. Citizens with a low sense of political efficacy tend to 
believe that they cannot participate in governmental decision making and also do not 
much expect that government officials should attend to their demands and needs (Lane, 
1959, pp. 147-162). As a result, they rarely express strong interest in elections, voting, 
and other political activities. The sense of political efficacy is subject to several factors. 
Intelligence, education, experience of interaction with others, and the influence of 
affiliated groups are all possible factors, and there is a positive correlation between each 
of them and the sense of political efficacy among constituents (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990, p. 
376; Easton & Dennis, 1967, p. 38; White, 1968, p. 710). Ainsworth (2000, p. 89) and 
other scholars looked for alternative explanations by analysing environment and 
institutions individuals encounter. Their studies found that surrounding environment 
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(Campbell, 2006, pp. 1-8; Gimpel, Dyck, & Shaw, 2004, p. 343), competition among 
political parties (Hill & Leighley, 1993, p. 1158; Patterson & Caldeira, 1983, p. 675), and 
the election system (Norris, 2004, pp. 81-95) all have effects on the sense of political 
efficacy. In addition, studies also found that the popularity of political talk programmes 
and news programmes help raise the sense of political efficacy among constituents 
(Newhagen, 1994, p. 386; Norris, 1996, p. 479). But it must be added that negative 
campaigning may cause the electorate to be disappointed by elections and the relevant 
democratic institutions, thus lowering the sense of political efficacy (Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994, p. 829). 
Hellwig and Samuels (2008, p. 4) focused on ability of constituents’, and believed that 
two abilities relate to the enforcement of electoral accountability. The first ability 
concerns discerning who bears responsibility, and is subject to factors such as political 
situation. When the heads of the executive departments and most members of 
parliament come from the same political party, not difficult for the electorate to 
distinguish who bear responsibility (Powell, 2000, p. 12). The second ability concerns 
initiating accountability activities. Hellwig and Samuels (2008, p. 4) believe that 
institutional arrangements such as not holding presidential election concurrently with 
parliamentary elections may affect constituents’ ability to initiate accountability 
activities. In contrast to studies that discuss politics and institutions, there are also 
scholars focusing on civil society. For example, in her comments on the enforcement of 
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electoral accountability in Taiwan, Huang (2008, p. 166) criticised local civic groups for 
failing to offer constituents credible evaluation criteria, and blamed them for tenuous 
electoral accountability in Taiwan. 
The second group of studies are empirical, attempting to verify the enforcement of 
electoral accountability in several democracies by using data and figures. Scholars like 
Kiewiet (1983, pp. 1-10) believed that the electorate mostly regards macroeconomic 
conditions as outcomes of government policies. Accordingly, they assume that 
commodity prices, unemployment rate, and other macroeconomic indicators have a 
tight correlation with the total number of votes received by the ruling party and their 
nominees. Some empirical studies support this assumption. In their study of Latin 
American democracies, Chang and Chang (2006) found that commodity prices and other 
macroeconomic indicators affcet the number of votes received by the ruling party in 
parliamentary elections. In their investigation of elections in eight developing countries, 
Pacek and Radcliff (1995, p. 745) noted that economic deterioration led to a remarkable 
decline in how many votes votes the incumbent received, but economic improvement 
did not increase the share of votes. Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) found that from 1968 
to 1992 outcomes of financial policies had remarkable impacts on gubernatorial 
elections and state parliamentary elections, suggesting that US voters considered states’ 
financial conditions when deciding whether to punish elected representatives through 
the ballot box. A study by Markus (1988, p. 137) showed that macroeconomic conditions 
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were crucial to whether the ruling party’s nominee won the presidency. The study by 
Duch and Stevenson (2008) supported the contention that constituents considered 
economic conditions when deciding to reward or punish the executive department of 
the government. In their study of elections in Poland, Shabada and Slomczynski (2011, 
p. 309) found that the deteriorating economy drove voters to support nominees of the 
opposition parties], rather than nominees who are incumbents nominated by the ruling 
party to seek re-election. A similar inclination is evidence in the Ukraine, as a study by 
Slomczynski, Shabad, and Zielinski (2008, p. 91) revealed. The results of empirical 
research led Tsai (2012) to say that "it can be confirmed that constituents indeed call the 
government to account by elections, asking incumbents accountable for their policies" 
(p. 40). 
Clearly, there is a rich literature on electoral accountability. However, the two groups of 
writings have shortcomings. The first group puts excessive focus on obstacles to the 
enforcement of electoral accountability, at the expense of discussion of solutions. The 
second group emphasizes the correlation between macroeconomic conditions and 
election outcomes, but overlooks other factors that may also influence constituents’ 
voting behaviour. Given these shortcomings, it is not surprising that Packel (2008, p. 11) 
argued that scholarly understanding of electoral accountability remains insufficient. This 
thesis suggests that promoters of electoral accountability deserve attention because 
analyses of them can fill the gap in the current literature. Among accountability 
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promoters, NGOs are an appropriate object of study. Some transitional democracies 
witness the activities of such organisations during elections. Examples include PollWatch 
in Thailand and the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections in the Philippines 
(Callahan, 2000: p. 3), which have monitored electoral processes, helping reduce 
electoral malpractice and thereby creating a favourable environment for the 
enforcement of electoral accountability. In contrast, the Coalition Action for General 
Election (CAGE) in South Korea launched the Blackballing Movement, which advocated 
directly punishing unfit incumbents who sought re-election. In a sense, CAGE initiated 
an electoral accountability activity. 
The Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) is a third-wave democracy. When CAGE 
launched the Blackballing Movement in 2000, this country had undergone democratic 
transition for more a decade (Oh, 1999, pp. 74-97). A mixed electoral system was applied 
to the 2000 parliamentary election to elect 273 members to the National Assembly, 227 
members being elected through single-member district (SMDs) and the remaining 46 
under a proportional representation system (Kim, 2000, p. 898). In other words, most 
election candidates depended solely on how many votes they received to win 
parliamentary seats. They thus paid close attention to what impressions had been made 
on the electorate and to constituents’ attitudes and needs (Mitchell, 2000, p. 342), and 
this favoured NGO efforts to block candidates whom activists deemed unfit from winning 
elections. As malpractice by elected members of the National Assembly remained a 
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serious problem, CAGE managed to exact punishment. Publicizing blacklists is one of the 
strategies applied by CAGE. Candidates who had trampled on human rights, engaged in 
corruption, or violated electoral laws were labelled unfit to be members of the National 
Assembly. CAGE publicised blacklists at both the candidate nomination phase and 
campaign phase (Kim, 2001, pp. 396-397). In addition to distributing leaflets, NGOs also 
launched music concerts and street parades to attract the attention of the general public 
and mass media. In the end, the Blackballing Movement received extensive coverage by 
mainstream news media and enthusiastic responses from the general public (Kim, 2006, 
pp. 532-534), as evidenced by hundreds of thousands of participants in concerts and the 
huge amount of money raised (Horowitz & Kim, 2002, p. 542). All activities were co-
ordinated by a group of leaders. As polling day approached, CAGE labelled 22 candidates 
as most problematic and assigned responsibility areas to participant NGOs (Shin, 2003, 
pp. 709-710), demonstrating professionalism and efficiency. The final election results 
showed the success of the Blackballing Movement, not only because around 70 percent 
of blacklisted candidates lost the election, but also because a study by Horowitz and Kim 
(2002, pp. 556-557) verified the contribution of the Blackballing Movement to election 
outcomes. A similar movement launched four years later also succeeded; nearly 74 
percent of blacklisted candidates lost the election (Kim, 2006, p. 527). The success of the 
Blackballing Movement produced several positive impacts on democratisation in South 
Korea, including reducing the dominance of political parties and politicians over the 
electoral processes (Kim, 2006, pp. 534-537). Lee (2001, p. 30) thus praised the 
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Blackballing Movement for leading “a step toward future political maturity” in South 
Korea.  
The Blackballing Movement in South Korea exemplifies the successful enforcement of 
electoral accountability in a transitional democracy, showing multiple significance.63 
First, enforcing electoral accountability attracts NGOs to co-operate with each other. 
Through cooperation, NGOs can form a political force that no political parties and 
politicians underestimate. Second, NGOs’ initiatives need media coverage and public 
support. NGOs can achieve that by techniques like organising activities efficiently, 
maintaining neutrality, and publishing blacklists. NGOs can thus overcome obstacles to 
the enforcement of electoral accountability, such as the inaccessibility of candidate-
related information and a lack of consensus among constituents on candidates’ fitness 
                                                     
63 The success of the Blackballing Movement means negative campaigning does not necessarily impede 
democracy. Negative campaigning refers to means through which election candidates focus on 
competitors’ flaws and make criticisms through advertisements (Lau & Pomper, 2002, p. 48). The purpose 
of using such means is to reduce the number of votes that competitors might lose. Because negative 
campaigning may give rise to demobilisation effects (that is, that criticisms between the candidates may 
reduce voters’ trust in electoral mechanisms and thus reduce their voters’ willingness to cast vote) a 
number of scholars thus argue that negative campaigning may impede the promotion of democracy 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere et al., 1994). With regard to the content of the blacklist, 
South Korean NGOs also engaged in negative campaigning, but the success of their efforts symbolises the 
enforcement of electoral accountability and improves the quality of democracy in South Korea. This 
difference suggests that there is a need to re-examine the definition of negative campaigning and its 
effects on the promotion of democracy.  
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for political positions. Finally, continuing and effective electoral accountability activities 
help overcome shortcomings of electoral politics, thereby improving the quality of 
electoral democracy. 
The success of the Blackballing Movement is inspiring, and one question deserves 
further exploration: Do similar initiatives lead to the same results in a different context? 
If not, why not? What challenges arise? Does the trajectory of electoral accountability 
initiatives vary? To answer these questions requires a study of a different case, and this 
thesis argues that the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement in Indonesia is a suitable object 
of study, because that movement was modelled on the Blackballing Movement in South 
Korea, and also because Indonesia is a third-wave democracy as well. Before looking into 
the case, the next section introduces elected representatives in Indonesia, with a 
particular focus on malpractice problems and performance of then-existing 
accountability institutions. 
4.2 Indonesia’s Elected Representatives  
4.2.1 Indonesia’s elected representatives in the Reformasi era   
During their five-year tenures all Indonesian members of parliament have the power to 
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propose bills, and monitor governmental institutions as well as their personnel. In the 
New Order era, however, this power was thwarted by constant intervention from the 
Suharto administration, which also manipulated parliamentary elections by threatening 
elected representatives and offering them bribes and other material inducements. As a 
result, elections had little substantive meaning, and elected representatives could not 
effectively call the executive to account for its decisions and policies (Haris, 2005, p. 2). 
Accordingly, scholars and critics have called parliaments at all levels under Suharto’s rule 
a rubber stamp (Ziegenhain, 2005). The situation changed significantly as Indonesia 
entered the Reformasi era, especially after the 1999 general election. 
The 1999 general election in Indonesia combined elections to the DPR (national 
parliament) and DPRD (regional parliaments) at all levels. President Habibie held the 
election ahead of time in order to satisfy widespread demands for people’s sovereignty, 
and also to obtain legitimacy for his administration (King, 2003, p. 48).64 Measures such 
                                                     
64 Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, it was the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), 
constituting all DPR members and several appointed representatives of the military and other social 
groups, that had authority over presidential election. Suharto once again won overwhelming support of 
the People’s Consultative Assembly in 1997 and constitutionally his tenure of office should have ended in 
2002. His replacement after he resigned in 1998 would thus have been a legitimate and constitutional 
president until 2002. In order to satisfy widespread demands, however, President Habibie decided to 
advance the date of the general election. He dismissed several People’s Representative Council members 
before the deliberation over election bills. This has been deemed crucial to the successful passage of new 
election bills (King, 2003, p. 222). 
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as lifting bans on political parties, 65  establishing the General Election Commission 
(Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU)66 and maintaining the neutrality of bureaucrats assured 
Indonesians of a fair, free and competitive election in 1999 (Katyasungkana, 2000, p. 260; 
MacIntyre & Ramage, 2008, p. 9). Though some minor flaws remained (Ismanto, Perkasa, 
Kristiadi, Djawamaku, Priyadi, & Sudibyo, 2004), the whole electoral process conformed 
to democratic standards. The election saw a marked reduction in scandals such as 
manipulation of election outcomes and no single party dominated.67 King (2003, p. 224) 
                                                     
65 Law No. 2 of 1999 on Political Parties does not limit the number of officially recognized political parties. 
Controversial provisions such as obeying official ideology also do not appear in that law. As a result, 
hundreds of political parties registered in the 1999 general election and 48 parties conformed to its 
requirements in the end (Reilly, 2007).  
66 The General Election Commission takes responsibility for electoral affairs in the Reformasi era. It is a 
relatively independent institution, because the ratio of representatives of the executive is low. The 
Indonesian Election Council (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia, PPI) and the Monitoring Council (Panitia 
Pengawas, PANWAS) are two affiliated institutions responsible for election activities coordination and 
monitoring respectively. They neither are under the control of the executive (King, 2000). 
67 The absence of equality, freedom, and competiveness was the common feature of elections held 
during the New Order era. The Suharto executive not only forced civil servants to vote for Golkar, but also 
weakened opposition parties by limiting the number of political parties and creating internal conflicts 
(King, 2003, p. 63; Sherlock, 2003, p. 4; Sulistyo, 2002, p. 77). Even nominees of opposition parties were 
subject to inspection by the executive (Haris, 2005, p. 2). As a result, Golkar’s share of votes in elections 
under Suharto was never below 60 percent (Rueland, 2001) and it was able to maintain similar dominance 
in local elections. The bulk of members in parliaments at all levels were loyalists to Suharto’s executive. 
Of the 425-seat 1997 People’s Representative Council, Golkar occupied 275 seats, and its share was close 
to 65 percent (MTI, 1998). This share amounted to 70 percent, if the 75 seats reserved for representatives 
of the military were included. Anderson (1996, pp. 30-31) thus argued that no election held under Suharto 
was able to reflect public opinion. Unsurprisingly, the legislative was unable to fulfill its tasks of monitoring 
the executive during the New Order era (Surbakti, 1999, pp. 68-70; Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 180). The 
political system under the New Order era was called pseudo-democracy (Case, 2002, pp. 6-7; King, 2003, 
p. 5). 
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thus praises the 1999 general election and also argues that Indonesia became an 
electoral democracy. 
Most Indonesian parliamentarians were elected representatives who had gained 
legitimacy after the 1999 general election. 68  They later obtained more powers to 
enforce accountability due to amendments to the 1945 Constitution and the 
decentralization of financial and political power. The amended Constitution provides 
that members of the People’s Representative Council are entitled to ask the 
Constitutional Court to inquire whether the conduct of the president or vice president 
contradicts the law, and also to suggest to the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) that it dismisses the president or vice president if 
proven guilty of corruption69 (Article 7A). Article 7C provides that the president cannot 
disband the People’s Representative Council, relieving parliamentary members’ fears of 
retaliation. Members of the People’s Representative Council have the power to raise 
                                                     
68 During the period 1999–2004, 38 members of national parliament were representatives of the military. 
At the same time, ten percent of members of regional parliaments were military representatives. Those 
representatives were not directly elected by voters, but appointed by the president. 
69 Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution before revision stipulated that president could only be replaced when 
he or she passed away/die, resigned or was unable to fulfill presidential tasks. There were no provisions 
that explicitly stipulated the conditions and process for impeaching incumbent presidents and allowing 
the People’s Representative Council and the People’s Consultative Assembly to balance the power of the 
executive.  
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questions, express opinions, and interrogate government officials, and they enjoy 
immunity when exercising this power (Article 20A). As a result of these amendments, 
members of the People’s Representative Council can now hold the head of the central 
government accountable. 
Similar changes also took place at the local level. In the New Order era, the heads of local 
governments were accountable to the president. Members of regional parliament could 
demand explanations of their actions but lacked the power to dismiss heads of local 
governments. 70  As a result of the decentralization of power in the Reformasi era, 
however, members of regional parliaments were able to hold heads of local governments 
accountable for their conduct and policies.71 Before 2004, Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local 
Government regulated accountability relations between members of regional 
parliaments and heads of local governments. It provided that Regional People’s 
Representative Council members should elect heads of local governments (Article 18)72 
                                                     
70 See Law No. 5 of 1974. 
71 Local autonomy started in 2001. Local governments in Indonesia thereby gained more authority than 
previously and the relationship between the executive and the legislative within local governments 
changed. Under Suharto, local governments were extensions of the central government. The central 
government controlled not only profits from the exploration of natural resources but also personnel 
matters and the development projects of local governments (Simarmata, 2002, p. 2). 
72 Under Suharto, members of local parliaments did not have the authority to elect the heads of local 
governments. It was the president who decided who would occupy those positions. 
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who would be accountable to parliament at the corresponding level and were obliged to 
submit an accountability report before the end of the fiscal year (Article 45). Regional 
parliaments could reject the accountability reports, but no more than twice, after which 
time they could suggest to the president that he dismissed the heads of local 
governments (Article 46). 
In summary, due to a series of reform measures, members of parliament at all levels 
have been important actors in Indonesia’s transition to democracy since the start of the 
Reformasi era. They are no longer rubber stamps, merely endorsing the policies of the 
executive, but a political force with power to check and monitor the executive. In fact, in 
the Reformasi era, Indonesian members of parliament use their power frequently, and, 
as a result, politics has now become parliament-centred.73 Of course, most Indonesians 
expect members of parliament to use their power to hold government institutions and 
personnel accountable on behalf of the people. However, “[t]here is no guarantee, in 
new or transitional democracies or in established ones, that elected leaders will act with 
integrity,” warned Marquette (2004, p. 422). Ensuring that elected representatives act 
with integrity relies on the ability of the people to exert control. But, as will be discussed 
                                                     
73 “Masalah Dana Partai Politik,” Koran Tempo, July 5, 2011. 
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below, Indonesian citizens have had limited capacity to do this.   
4.2.2 Accountability approaches  
Between elections, constituents can normally use state accountability institutions to call 
elected representatives to account for transgressions. Such institutions include the 
police and prosecutors. According to Johnston (1999b, p. 218), traditional law enforcers 
have low enthusiasm for investigating corruption cases because to do so requires lots of 
time and effort. In the Reformasi era, Indonesian policemen and prosecutors have had 
to deal with lengthy and complicated investigation procedures if they wanted to address 
legislative corruption. Law No. 22 of 2003 requires law enforcers to report to the relevant 
state office holders to gain permission before they could summon members of 
parliament over allegations of corruption (Article 106), and to repeat the procedure 
when elected representatives’ status changed from witness to suspect. That provision 
was frequently criticized because the process of obtaining this permission was usually 
lengthy and complicated, allowing politicians or government officials to protect allegedly 
corrupt members of parliament from prosecution by interfering in legal trials. As a result, 
state accountability institutions scarcely investigated graft involving members of 
parliament. 
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Before the establishment of the Corruption Court, the general court heard corruption 
cases. Many elected representatives involved in corruption scandals were acquitted. The 
reasons frequently cited in the court verdicts included that “the courts do not have the 
authority to try that case” or that there was insufficient evidence. Such verdicts 
frequently raise suspicions of bribery or external pressure. As a result, there was a 
widespread impression that the courts were protecting corrupt members of parliament 
(Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 92; Chaniago, 2003a, p. 367). 
Honour councils, which are permanent bodies in parliaments at all levels, can also hold 
elected representatives to account. They receive proposals to punish legislators from 
other members of parliament and have the power to relieve any parliamentarian found 
guilty of corruption. These councils, however, have also been frequently criticized. 
According to LKIS (2006):   
Suggestions of punishments shall be under discussion in the Deliberative Body 
(Badan Musyawarah) and receive approval by voting in general session. There 
shall be initiatives of People’s Representative Council members making formal 
demands for discussing sanctions before submission to the Deliberative 
Body…[S]uch a mechanism involves hundreds of People’s Representative Council 
members. While People’s Representative Council members supplement their 
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incomes by engaging in corruption, predictably such a suggestion of sanctions 
was ignored. Few members dare to disclose corrupt conduct in the People’s 
Representative Council (p. 20). 
This shows why housecleaning within institutions was very difficult, and thus it was no 
surprise that Honour councils had never effectively exercised internal control in 
Indonesia’s parliaments.74   
Besides traditional law enforcement agencies, in the Reformasi era several newly 
established accountability institutions also had the power to hold elected 
representatives to account. 75  Indeed, those institutions were established to 
demonstrate political leaders’ resolution to combat corruption. The Corruption 
Eradication Commission and the Corruption Court have been the most prominent of 
these institutions, but these have been active only since 2004. Before them, three special 
accountability institutions were established for combatting corruption, but multiple 
                                                     
74 “Merevitalisasi Badan Kehormatan DPR,” Retrieved on April 30, 2013, from http://antikorupsi. 
org/id/content/merevitalisasi-badan-kehormatan-dpr.  
75 For more information about these institutions, see Table 3.2. 
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factors prevented them from functioning properly. 
The Public Servants’ Wealth Audit Commission (KPKPN) was the first special 
accountability institution established to reduce corruption. Established in 1999, it was 
an independent institution in charge of the registration and audit of office holders’ 
wealth. It had one subcommission in charge of the investigation into the wealth of 
members of parliament at all levels. The commission only possessed limited power, 
because Law No. 28 of 1999 did not entitle it to punish politicians who refused or delayed 
registration. The commission thus could only pass on evidence of corruption to 
prosecutors for a formal investigation (Article 18). However, complicated investigation 
procedure and external intervention prevented traditional accountability institutions 
from punishing corrupt elected representatives to the full extent of the law. 
The Joint Team for the Eradication of Corruption (TGPTPK) was the second anti-
corruption accountability institution. Its primary function was to co-ordinate the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases that were difficult to prove. It mainly 
focused on investigating and prosecuting corrupt judges (Chalid, 2001). Unlike the Public 
Servants’ Wealth Audit Commission, the TGPTPK was not independent. According to 
Governmental Regulation No. 19 of 2000, it was affiliated with the Attorney General’s 
Office and therefore was expected to obey the Attorney General’s directives (Article 4). 
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The Attorney General had the authority to decide which corruption cases belonged to 
the “difficult to prove” category (Article 15). In brief, the TGPTPK could not operate 
independently. At the same time, judges targeted by the TGPTPK also resisted its efforts. 
A case involving three Supreme Court judges was the best-known example. In this case, 
the TGPTPK charged the three judges with accepting bribes, leading to a petition filed by 
the judges’ lawyers for a judicial review by the Supreme Court to query the TGPTPK’s 
legislative backing. The Supreme Court in the end granted the lawyers’ demands and 
ordered the institution’s dissolution in 2001 (Chalid, 2001). 
The establishment of the National Ombudsman Commission (KON) represented another 
attempt by the Indonesian government to combat corruption. Established in 2000, its 
main tasks were to receive public complaints, clarify issues that people have raised, and 
to make suggestions to the state institutions concerned. Its legislative foundation was 
Presidential Decision No. 44 of 2000. The decision, however, did not equip the body with 
the authority to compel office holders to respond to its inquiries and follow its 
suggestions. At the same time, it did not possess sufficient resources in the early years 
of its operation (Sherlock, 2002, pp. 369-373). As a result, KON was not an accountability 
institution that Indonesians could use to hold elected representatives to account. 
Thus, prior to 2004 few avenues were available to Indonesian citizens who wanted to 
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control elected representatives between elections. Unlike citizens in Taiwan and some 
other democracies that have the right to recall parliamentarians and also to overrule 
decrees and laws by a vote mechanism, the people of Indonesia in the Reformasi era had 
to put up with incompetent and dishonest elected representatives until the end of their 
terms in office, as well as whatever inadequate bills they enacted. 
Corruption 
The absence of effective accountability institutions is one part of the context which may 
explain why Indonesia’s elected representatives engaged in corruption during the period 
1998–2004, but our discussion should start with their motives. Other than the desire to 
accumulate wealth, corruption was also a product of politicians’ need to expend huge 
sums of money to gain nominations and also get elected. The 1999 general election still 
adhered to the Closed-List Proportional Representation system.76 As Mitchell (2000, p. 
341) pointed out, this is one of the most political-party-centred electoral systems, 
because it allows political parties to nominate their own candidates and decide on who 
                                                     
76 The official team appointed by President Habibie once proposed a new electoral system that mixed the 
single-member-district system and proportional representative system. The proposal, however, did not 
receive any support from political parties (King, 2003, pp. 60-63). 
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will have a seat in parliament. Under this system, voters can only cast ballots for political 
parties, which gain seats in parliaments on the basis of their shares of valid ballots. The 
General Election Commission then follows the order in which candidates appear on their 
party’s list and decides on that basis who will obtain a seat in the parliament.77 Because 
of these characteristics, prior to 2004 elected representatives represented the 
constituency as well as his or her political party. However, elected representatives 
usually perceived themselves as agents of political parties because they depended so 
much on the political parties, rather than on constituents, for winning elections. 
Accordingly, they were seldom accountable, or even close, to the people (Haris, 2005, 
pp. 3-4; Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 179). 
In contrast, most elected representatives maintained tight relationships with political 
parties, especially the party leadership. Such relationships, built since the candidate 
nomination phase, frequently involved money. Most Indonesian political parties in the 
Reformasi era were still centralistic, and party leaders typically made key decisions 
behind closed doors (Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 196). Because leaders’ support is critical to a 
                                                     
77 The electoral system is only one of several factors that may influence the accountability of elected 
representatives to voters. Under a candidate-centred electoral system, there is still the likelihood that 
elected representatives will not be accountable to voters because the support of major factions at local 
levels allows them to easily win elections. This chapter thus only emphasizes institutions and discusses 
the influence of electoral system on elected representatives.  
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candidate’s nomination and place on the ballot paper, many competitors opted for 
bribery.78 Party nominees, as a consequence, were often people who had either offered 
higher bribes than their rivals or partisans who were close to party leaders or had the 
backing of their factions (Haris, 2005, p. 11). Such nominees often only concerned 
themselves with their own interests and those of their parties and, once elected, used 
the power entrusted to them to accumulate personal wealth. As Widoyoko (2004), ICW 
coordinator, put it,  
[i]t has become an open secret that corruption and money politics were rife and 
widespread during the recent general elections. It is nearly impossible to 
produce credible leaders in such a corrupt...recruitment system. In fact, such an 
election, where candidates essentially invest [vast] sums of money to people that 
can get them elected, gives birth to corrupt leaders who almost have to be 
involved in corruption to recoup their investment. 
Chaniago (2003a, p. 366) also noted that new politicians “act in a pragmatic and 
opportunistic fashion”, and argued that it is because they arise “out of a formalist and 
                                                     
78 See, for example, “Pilkada Rawan Politik Uang,” Kompas, February 11, 2005. 
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minimalist democratic system”. 
In addition, parliamentarians also faced strong demands from party leaders for offering 
financial support to their parties. According to Mietzner (2008), 
prior to 2005, members of parliament had typically handed around 10 to 20% of 
their salaries to the central boards of their parties but after the state subsidies 
were cut, some party leaders requested up to 40%. Moreover, legislators were 
increasingly asked to cover the costs of party events and financially maintain the 
branch offices in the area in which they were nominated (pp. 240-241). 
These demands increased parliamentarians’ financial burden, further driving them to 
seek external sources of funding. 
One of the features of corruption in legislation is that such corrupt practices usually 
involve several members of parliament. This is because, in parliamentary procedure, 
general consent is required to pass a bill or to appoint officials. As a result, local people 
often refer to corruption in parliaments at all levels as “mutually cooperative corruption” 
(korupsi gotong-royong) (LKIS, 2006). It is thus no surprise to see a huge amount of 
money involved in a single corruption case. Contractors or enterprises that bid for 
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government projects often thus need to spend a lot on bribing parliamentarians (Choi, 
2004; Simarmata, 2002). Corruption in parliaments persisted in the period 1999-2004 
because parliamentarians from major political parties often colluded to share the spoils 
of electoral victory, leaving parliaments’ internal oversight mechanisms ineffective 
(Slater, 2004).  
A second feature is that corruption has mostly taken place within parliamentary 
commissions. Parliamentary commissions are significant because members of 
parliament negotiate within them to settle disputes about budget allocations or 
legislation, suggesting that deliberation and voting in general sessions are just a 
formality (Crouch, 2010, p. 70). Bribery thus prevails within parliamentary commissions. 
Several members of the People’s Representative Council, for example, received bribes in 
exchange for passing laws favourable to the State Oil Extraction Company (Pertamina).79 
All Commission III members allegedly accepted bribes to stop investigating 
transgressions in the Freeport Company scandal case.80 Most of the Commission IX 
                                                     
79 Bribes involved in the Bank Indonesia bribery scandals amounted to 60 billion rupiah. Former Bank 
Indonesia President Burhanuddin Abdullah and Vice-President Aulia Pohan and several other leaders were 
involved in that scandal and many of them were found guilty and sentenced to year-long imprisonment. 
“Officials Jailed for Corruption,” The Straits Times, January 7, 2009; “Indonesia Hands Down Convictions 
in Graft Case,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2009. 
80 “Freeport Bantah Suap Anggota DPR,” Kompas, March 21, 2000.  
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members received bribes from Miranda S. Goeltom in exchange for electing her as Senior 
Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia.81 The Corruption Court sentenced half of them to 
imprisonment in 2011.82 
Similar corruption scandals also took place at local levels. Scandals in Central Kalimantan 
Province, Medan City, and Yogyakarta City, for example, involved regional members of 
parliament accepting bribes in exchange for electing candidates as heads of local 
governments (Choi, 2004; Irwan, 2002, p. 84). In West Sumatra Province, regional 
members of parliament allocated more budgets than necessary for themselves, leading 
to criticisms that they were abusing power for private benefit (Chaniago, 2003a, pp. 344-
345). In DKI Jakarta, members of regional parliament approved governors’ accountability 
reports in exchange for bribes. In 2002, 25 members of the Yogyakarta Municipal 
Parliament jointly asked contractors to offer 42 billion rupiah as kickbacks (LKIS, 2006, 
pp. 23-24). These corruption scandals relate to the extended financial power and 
decision-making authority entrusted to members of regional parliament following 
decentralization. Hadiz (2004a, pp. 711-716) thus argued that the decentralization of 
                                                     
81 “Kasus Traveller Cheque Inilah 26 Politisi Tersangka Baru,” Kompas, September 2, 2010. 
82 “Two More Politicians Jailed in Bank Indonesia Bribery Scandal,” Jakarta Globe, June 20, 2011; “10 
More Jailed but Still Many Loose Ends in Miranda Case,” Jakarta Globe, June 19, 2011.  
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power in Indonesia had made bribery and corruption at local levels more rampant than 
ever. Members of regional parliament not only used state institutions to protect their 
personal welfare, but also strengthened their positions by means of offering bribes to 
law enforcers and intimidating civil servants who refused to co-operate with them. 
Such cases show the variety of ways in which members of parliament can engage in 
corruption. They include supporting or opposing candidates for government positions 
(e.g., The Miranda case), policies (e.g., bribery scandals in Commission IX) or contractors 
(e.g., kickback scandals in Yogyakarta Municipal Parliament), as well as passing 
regulations to legalize abuses (e.g., the case of West Sumatra Provincial Parliament). 
Other examples show that elected representatives can commit corruption by allocating 
more funds than needed to finance specific government projects on infrastructure, 
health care and others, falsifying documents or data, and so on.83 
Impact 
Corrupt elected representatives have a profound impact upon public interests. First, 
                                                     
83 “ICW Temukan Modus Baru Korupsi di DPRD,” Koran Tempo, October 13, 2004. 
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corruption leads to a reduction in funding, resulting in public services that are of poor 
quality or simply unavailable to the people. As Chaniago (2003a) put it,  
One of the most prominent collusive practices is to be found within the allocation 
of regional budgets in certain regions. Corrupt budgets usually include travel 
allowances, dramatic salary increases, extensive provision of private facilities 
such as vehicle credit and allowances for clothing, spectacles, housing, and 
[many others]. [They bring about] corresponding reductions in health, education 
and other public facilities. (p. 366) 
Second, corrupt elected representatives may undermine efforts to reduce corruption. 
Authority over legislation and appointments is crucial to the establishment of anti-
corruption institutions, and such authority is in the hands of the People’s Representative 
Council members. They, however, have showed little effectiveness in enacting laws 
(McLeod, 2005, p. 373; Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 184). As a result, several bills relating to 
corruption remained suspended for a long time. The Draft Law on Witness and Victim 
Protection, for example, had been under deliberation in the People’s Representatives 
Council for four years before its passage in 2006. Many witnesses and whistle-blowers 
have been unwilling to testify against corruption defendants in the courts due to the 
resulting lack of legal protection. In several cases courts have thus found defendants not 
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guilty on the ground of insufficient evidence (Edyyono, 2007). Observers have also 
criticized elected representatives for removing law provisions that were conducive to 
fighting corruption, as well as for not electing candidates capable of leading anti-
corruption institutions.84 The Bill on Corruption Court is an example of the former; the 
selection of the Corruption Eradication Commission members an example of the latter.85 
Furthermore, corrupt elected representatives may lower public trust in democratic 
institutions and organisations (Chang & Chu, 2006). A nationwide survey by the 
Partnership for Governance Reform in 2001, however, showed that more than 70 
percent of respondents deemed the People’s Representative Council the most corrupt 
institution in the country. A similar survey conducted nine years later found that nearly 
80 percent of respondents believed the council to be the most corrupt state institution.86 
Another survey by Formappi showed that more than 90 percent of respondents in 
Jakarta were of the opinion that the People’s Representative Council members did not 
represent the public.87 Results of this sort demonstrate wide public discontent with 
                                                     
84 “Politisi Busuk dan Pembusukan Politik,” Kompas, February 2, 2004.  
85 Chapter Five discusses these two cases.  
86 “Politikus PDI Perjuangan Akui DPR Lembaga Terkorup,” Koran Tempo, February 23, 2011.  
87 “Survei: DPR Belum Mewakili Rakyat,” Koran Tempo, March 23, 2011.  
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elected representatives in the Reformasi era. According to Sherlock (2003), the DPR is 
a focus for idealism and disillusionment, a symbol of achievement for the 
movement for reformasi, a focus for hopes for the future. It [, however,] also 
illustrates the obstacles to democratic participation and why the heady 
enthusiasm of the early post-Soeharto period has evaporated in the heat of 
political reality. The DPR is part of the solution and part of the problem. It is a key 
instrument for bringing about political change and a place where government 
can be held accountable and where its policy decisions can be deliberated upon. 
[It, however, ] retains much of the legacy of a past authoritarian order and has, 
in many ways, become a new conduit for old-style politics of patronage amongst 
the same exclusive circles rather than a means to increase popular participation 
(p. 7). 
Corrupt elected representatives also undermine public trust in political parties. Political 
parties are an inalienable part of electoral democracy, and all elected representatives in 
Indonesia before 2004 were also representatives of their political parties. Corruption 
scandals not only blemish elected representatives’ personal reputation but also ruin the 
image of the political party to which they belong. In the first three years of the Reformasi 
era, most Indonesians doubted the ability of political parties to promote reforms in the 
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public interest (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 232; Tan, 2002, pp. 500-505). A nationwide 
survey, for example, showed that more than 80 percent of respondents considered 
political parties to be corrupt, not accountable to party members and not answerable to 
public demands (Yulianto, 2007). A survey by Transparency International Indonesia (2006) 
showed that most Indonesian respondents saw political parties as the most corrupt 
organisations in Indonesia. Obviously, as Tan (2002) claims, “[political] parties’ 
reputations had taken a battering. A common observation was that the parties ... simply 
expressed interest in the machinations of power, rather than in solving the real problems 
of the people…Indonesians, who from the outset of the transition have been ambivalent 
about political parties, seem to have become less enamoured of the parties over time” 
(pp. 495; 498). 
In summary, prior to 2004, reform efforts led to an election that met democratic 
standards, but did little to ensure that elected representatives met public expectations. 
Entrusted with the power of public office, elected representatives often used that power 
for private gain and political benefit, giving rise to problems such as inadequate 
infrastructure and tardy legislation. As a result, the people lost trust in elected 
representatives and their political organisations and institutions. However, due to 
limitations in accountability institutions, voters had limited ability to punish their 
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legislators, leaving public discontent unaddressed.88 It is thus fair to state that Indonesia 
encountered the crisis of democracy claimed by Kaase and Newton (1995, p. 155). This 
was the context in which Jakarta-based NGO activists took inspiration from the 
Blackballing Movement in South Korea.  
4.3 The 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement and Its 
Aftermath  
Never, never elect them. They engage in corrupt politics 
Never, never elect them. They always seize money for themselves 
Never, never elect them. They rob the nation of welfare 
Never, never elect them. People feel sorrow because of them 
-- poem by noted singer Franky Sahilatua89 
                                                     
88 Public grievances against elected representatives, political parties and parliaments were the main 
causes of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. Movement coordinator Teten Masduki said that, “though 
the 1999 general election was democratic…it was for sure that it was meaningless to improve public lives. 
What occurred were new corrupt figures, and as a result reform efforts put to get rid of crises brought 
about by old regime had not worked out.” “Gerakan Tidak Memilih Politisi Busuk,” retrieved on March 11, 
2011, from http://www.antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=content/view/10,.  
89 Quoted from “Deklarasi Gerakan Tak Pilih Politisi Busuk,” Suara Pembaruan, December 29, 2003. 
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4.3.1 The 2004 Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was launched on 29th December, 2003 by 
a coalition of intellectuals, anti-corruption politicians and activists from several Jakarta-
based NGOs. Former ICW chairman Teten Masduki acted as movement coordinator. NGO 
activists targeted the general election to be held on 5th April of the following year and 
announced that they would publicize a blacklist of candidates they deemed unfit to hold 
office.90 These decisions were made after NGO activists exchanged ideas and discussed 
strategies with participants in the Korean Blackballing Movement.91 By calling on the 
Indonesian public not to vote for “rotten” politicians Indonesian NGOs were actively 
mobilising voters in an election period, rather than simply monitoring elections and 
educating voters.92  
Participating NGO activists decided on four criteria by which to evaluate the fitness of 
                                                     
90 The 2004 general election also included the election for the Regional Representative Council (DPD) 
whose prime functions are to provide input into relations between central and local government, regional 
autonomy and local resources.  
91 Lucky Djani, interview with author, Jakarta, December 26, 2007.  
92 Election monitoring is an activity that Indonesian NGOs usually carry out during election periods. NGOs 
like Cetro and JPPR assigned thousands volunteers to monitor the 2004 general election (Beittinger-Lee, 
2009, p. 121). 
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elected representatives and candidates. In addition to involvement in corruption, the 
criteria were candidates’ involvement in human rights violations, environmental 
pollution, and violence against women.93 NGOs with concerns about one of those four 
criteria were given the task of evaluating the candidates. ICW, for example, checked 
whether they had ever committed corruption; the Indonesia Centre for Environmental 
Law (ICEL) checked whether candidates had been involved in environmental pollution 
incidents. It was the task of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence 
(Kontras) to check whether candidates had ever violated human rights. 94  With 
corruption and human rights being issues that received wide concern and attention from 
Indonesian voters during the 2004 general election (Sebastian, 2004, p. 264), the context 
was favourable for the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. 
Participating NGO activists considered the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement to 
be a nationwide movement. They communicated with local groups by emails or text 
messages. They spread their ideas by attending TV and radio talk shows, distributing CDs 
and holding discussion groups. Movement activists also called their movement a moral 
                                                     
93 Are candidates who favour polygamy also unfit? This question once gave rise to debate, but favouring 
polygamy was in the end not considered a criterion by which to assess candidates’ fitness. “Menakar 
Efektivitas GNTPPB, Refleksi untuk Masa Depan,” Kompas, March 15, 2004. 
94 “Menakar Efektivitas GNTPPB, Refleksi untuk Masa Depan,” Kompas, March 15, 2004. 
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movement, but insisted that it was more active than anti-corruption movements 
initiated by religious groups like NU or Mohammediyah.95 As JPPR coordinator Jerry 
Sumampouw put it, “the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement activists adopted 
several strategies, including offering track records of candidates and publicizing unfit 
candidate lists. Thus, that movement was different from the moral movement initiated 
by religious organisations”.96 
The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement received support from many civil society 
organisations from its foundation. The two biggest Muslim organisations—NU and 
Muhammadiyah—both publicly declared their support for the movement. Student 
groups such as the Indonesian National University Student Movement (Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI) were also actively involved in promoting it.97 
Several distinguished scholars also praised and supported the movement. Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) researcher Indra J. Piliang, for example, 
commended it for showing Indonesian civil society trying to end the domination of 
                                                     
95 See “Kampanye Antipolitisi Busuk Investasi Jangka Panjang,” Koran Tempo, January 18, 2004 
96 Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009. 
97 “Gerakan Massa Menjelang Pemilu Konsolidasi Demokrasi atau Provokasi Politik?” Sinar Harapan, 
February 5, 2004. 
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political parties in politics, and thought the movement would help build awareness that 
constituents are principals to whom members of parliament should be accountable.98 
Like the Blackballing Movement in South Korea, the National Anti-Rotten-Politician 
Movement in Indonesia did not promote an election boycott or non-voting. Widely 
known as Golongan Putih (Golput) in Indonesian, non-voting had started in Indonesia in 
the early 1970s. At that time, intellectuals like Arief Budiman encouraged voters to 
protest against the manipulation of election results by either not casting ballots on 
voting day or invalidating ballots.99 In the Reformasi era, though elections were fair, free, 
and competitive, the late President Wahid and several politicians still endorsed non-
voting (Wahid, 2004, p. xvii). The Indonesian Survey Institution (Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia) chairman, Saiful Mujani, argued that the number of voters who supported 
non-voting increased remarkably in the lead-up to the 2004 general election.100 This 
increase was due to strong resentment about elected representatives’ failures to 
                                                     
98 “Politisi Busuk dan Pembusukan Politik,” Kompas, February 2, 2004.  
99 Means of nullifying ballots include stamping in the wrong place and ticking more than one candidate 
at the same time (Asfar, 2004, p. 3).  
100 “Potensi Golput Tetap Tinggi,” Kompas, June 17, 2008. 
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monitor the executive branch of government (Asfar, 2004, p. 129). 
The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement activists, however, did not deem non-
voting conducive to the improvement of the Indonesian political environment. Relevant 
laws did not stipulate that a low turnout rate would automatically nullify election 
results.101 Agitating for non-voting thus might only lead to a decrease in the number of 
valid ballots, but do little to prevent unresponsive political parties from winning 
parliamentary seats.102 Burhanuddin, JPPR activist, voiced his criticism of non-voting: 
“in the current normal political environment, launching a Non-Voting Movement is like 
building a castle in the air. The authoritarian institutions against which those activists 
struggled no longer exist. The Non-Voting Movement is a political campaign 
accompanied with symbolic meanings, only suitable for fighting against the authoritarian 
regime.”103 
                                                     
101 “Politisi Busuk dan Pembusukan Politik,” Kompas, February 2, 2004.  
102 The turnout rate in elections prior to 2004 was above 90 percent but the rate in the 2004 general 
election was 84 percent (Ismanto, Perkasa, Kristiadi, Djawamaku, Priyadi, & Sudibyo, 2004, p. 123). 
Though the turnout rate declined, it is questionable to attribute such decline to some political leaders’ 
agitation for not non-voting. A survey showed that insufficient voter education was responsible for the 
decline in the rate (Sherlock, 2004b, pp. 7-8).  
103 “Antipasi Gelombang Psang Golput,”Jawa Post, August 16, 2004.  
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The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement activists instead encouraged voters to 
cast ballots. They endeavoured (1) to encourage political parties recruit candidates 
openly, transparently and inclusively; (2) to reduce the likelihood that voters would elect 
bad quality candidates by offering to research and release candidates’ track records; and 
(3) to help voters make rational choices by means of political education (IRE, 2004). In 
the words of Teten Masduki, NGO activists “want to shorten the distance between voters 
and candidates and also to enable voters to control political parties and punish political 
parties or candidates that fail to act as people’s representatives”(IRE, 2004). 
NGOs were accordingly actively involved in both the candidate nomination and 
campaign phase of the electoral cycle. The candidate nomination phase in the 2004 
general election began on 22nd December, 2003. NGOs’ goal during this phase was to 
prevent political parties from nominating candidates they deemed unfit to hold office. 
The campaign phase started after the General Election Commission announced the 
Confirmed Candidate List (Daftar Calon Tetap, DCT) on 5th February, 2004. NGOs’ goal at 
that point was to prevent unfit candidates from winning parliamentary seats. 
Nomination Phase 
NGOs encountered several challenges during the nomination phase, mostly resulting 
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from the closed nomination process run by most parties and the inaccessibility of their 
lists of candidates. The Law on General Elections of 2003 obliged political parties to have 
participatory, democratic, and inclusive candidate nomination mechanisms (Article 67). 
That provision, however, was only normative, because it did not stipulate sanctions 
against parties that failed to have such mechanisms (Crouch, 2010, p. 66). As a 
consequence, the candidate nomination processes in most political parties were neither 
transparent nor democratic.104 The processes were often under the control of a small 
number of party leaders, and thus many nominees were either party leaders’ intimates 
or people who succeeded in buying party leaders off.105 At the same time, the same 
provision did not oblige the General Election Commission to publicize the Temporary 
Candidate List (Daftar Calon Sementara, DCS) submitted by political parties. The General 
Election Committee never publicized the list on its own initiative. It was thus difficult for 
NGOs to know whom political parties wanted to nominate, and accordingly activists 
could not effectively collect the track records of potential candidates. They thus had to 
guess and repeatedly lobbied political parties not to nominate poor-quality 
                                                     
104 “Teten Masduki: Cermati Daftar Calon Tetap!” Koran Tempo, January 19, 2004.  
105 Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009. 
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candidates.106 
Unlike their South Korean counterparts, participating NGOs did not release blacklists at 
the nomination phase. Nevertheless, the likelihood of NGOs releasing blacklists still drew 
wide attention from the media. Journalists repeatedly inquired about party leaders’ 
attitudes towards the movement, rather than merely discussing the content of blacklists 
and feasibility of the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement (Aspinall, 2004). Most 
political parties declared their support for the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
and some of them urged NGOs to release blacklists as quickly as possible.107 Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) chairman, for example, argued that not 
releasing blacklists would give rise to the wrong impression that all candidates were unfit 
to hold office.108 At the same time, the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement also 
faced many criticisms. Akbar Tanjung, then Golkar chairman, for example, argued that 
the purpose of that movement was simply to defame Golkar (Aspinall, 2004). 
                                                     
106 “Gerakan Jangan Pilih Politisi Busuk segera Dideklarasikan,” Koran Tempo, December 23, 2003; “Anti 
Polbus Mainkan Akar Rumput,” Opini Indonesia, June 2, 2008.   
107 “Pemimpin dan Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, January 15, 2004.  
108 “Hidayat Usul Daftar Politikus Busuk Diumumkan,” Koran Tempo, January 15, 2004.  
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Campaign Phase 
The 2004 general election entered the campaign phase after the General Election 
Commission publicized all confirmed candidate lists. Participating NGO activists debated 
whether they should now publicize blacklists because the electoral system was 
unfavourable to their movement. The 2004 general election in Indonesia saw the 
application of the Limited Open-List Proportional Representation system under which 
political parties were still able to dominate the allocation of seats.109 Unlike in the 1999 
general election, which applied the Closed-List Proportional Representation system, 
Indonesian voters could vote for a party and then also vote for one candidate on the 
same party’s list in the 2004 general election. It is the Electoral Dividing Number 
(Bilangan Pembagi Pemilihan, BPP) that determines the allocation of seats. The number 
is calculated by dividing all valid ballots in one election district by the number of seats. 
Political parties whose valid ballots exceed the BPP win seats.110 Seats won by political 
parties belong to nominees whose valid votes exceeded those of the BPP.111 Individual 
                                                     
109 See Article 6 of Law No. 12 of 2003.   
110 See Article 106 of Law No.12 of 2003.  
111 Candidates with more votes than the BPP have priority in obtaining parliamentary seats won by their 
political parties. When there are no candidates with more votes than the BPP, the allocation of 
parliamentary seats is to be based on candidacy order. 
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candidates win the parliamentary seats only if the number of votes that they receive also 
exceed those for the BPP. 
The primary rationale behind the application of the Limited Open-List Proportional 
Representation system was to limit the parties’ power over candidates (Tan 2006 106).112 
It was very difficult for an individual candidates’ votes to exceed those of the BPP, 
however.113 As a consequence, votes for individual candidates had little impact on who 
would actually win parliamentary seats. In other words, under this electoral system, 
candidates depend on their ability to retain a high position on their party’s list, rather 
than on securing the votes of their constituents (Crouch, 2010, p. 64; Hadiwinata, 2006; 
Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 124).114 This characteristic of the Indonesian electoral system also 
meant that it was hard for NGOs to block candidates from winning parliamentary seats 
through voter mobilisation targeting “blacklisted” individual candidates.115 In contrast, 
                                                     
112 The 1999 general election applied the Closed-List Proportional Representation System, under which 
voters decide how many parliamentary seats political parties win, and political parties decide who would 
take the seats won (Ziegenhain, 2008a, p. 124). 
113 Only two candidates relied on their own votes to obtain parliamentary seats won by their parties in 
the 2004 general election.  
114  “Gerakan Tidak Memilih Politisi Busuk,” retrieved from March 11, 2011, from 
http://www.antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=content/view/10.  
115  Debates over the electoral system applied to the 2004 general election had started in 2000 
(Emmerson, 2004, pp. 99-100). Most participants in debates at that time were scholars and 
representatives of political parties. NGOs concerned about election-related issues did not advocate for 
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the single-member-district system gave South Korean voters the ability to turn against 
individual candidates. 
The electoral system compelled NGO activists to consider the necessity of releasing 
blacklists.116 For activists who opposed to it, adopting such a strategy was provocative 
and might lead to severe counterattacks. At the same time, they also feared that local 
social groups might disagree about the content of the blacklists released by Jakarta-
based NGOs. They thus suggested only releasing evaluation criteria.117 Activists who 
were in favour of it believed that publicizing blacklists would help them attract media 
attention. Meanwhile, they also thought it still possible to block unfit candidates from 
winning parliamentary seats under the Limited Open-Listed Proportional Representation 
system.118 In the end, considering the strong public interest in blacklists, as well as the 
necessity of maintaining media and voters’ attention to the movement, NGOs released 
                                                     
specific electoral system. Mostly, activists of those NGOs focused on election monitoring and voter 
education. Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009.  
116 “Menjelang Pengumuman Politisi Busuk, LSM Siapkan Pengacara,” Koran Tempo, January 8, 2004. 
117  “ICW Tak Akan Umumkan Nama-nama Politikus Busuk,” Koran Tempo, January 27, 2004; “ICW: 
Gerakan Anti-politisi Busuk Jangan Elitis,” Koran Tempo, February 4, 2004.  
118 Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009.  
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the first blacklist on 12 March.119 
Table 4.1 
Blacklisted Candidates in the 2004 General Election (by Item) 
Item Number 
Human Rights Violation 26a 
Corruption 25b 
Environmental Pollution 5 
Violence against Women 7 
Total 61c 
a Including HBL Mantiri who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD). 
b Marzuki Darusman had allegedly committed corruption and human rights violation; Theo Syafei had 
allegedly committed corruption and violence against women. c The total number of unfit candidates was 
61, instead of 63, because the overlap caused by the inclusion of both Marzuki Darusman and Theo Syafei 
was excluded. 
This first blacklist contained the names of 61 candidates. Among them, only HBL Mantiri 
was a candidate in the election for the Regional Representative Council.120 The other 60 
named candidates were nominees of political parties in elections to parliaments at all 
levels. Most of them were accused of having engaged in corruption or abused human 
rights (26 and 25 respectively) (Table 4.1). The blacklist was by no means an exhaustive 
list of candidates in the 2004 general election who in the view of NGOs should not be 
elected. According to Jerry Sumampouw, participating NGOs only investigated 
                                                     
119 “61 Politisi Busuk Dipublikasikan,” Republika, Mar 15, 2004; “Gerakan Tidak Memilih Politisi Busuk,” 
retrieved on March 11, 2011, from http://www.antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=content/view/10. 
120 NGO activists thought that HBL Mantiri had been party to acts of violence by the military in East Timor.  
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candidates whom they thought were more likely to gain parliamentary seats.121 Jerry’s 
remark explains why around 70 percent of blacklisted candidates were nominees of the 
three leading political parties (see Table 4.2).122 It also explains why nearly 80 percent 
of blacklisted nominees were placed in either the first or second position on their party 
lists (See Table 4.3). 
Table 4.2 
Blacklisted Candidates in Elections to Parliaments at All Levels (by political party) 
Political Party 
Number 
Blacklisted Candidate Due to Corruption 
Golkar 19 4 
PDIP 13 10 
PPP 10 4 
PAN 5 2 
PKPB 5 1 
PKB 3 2 
PBB 2 1 
PKS 2 0 
Perloper 1 1 
Total 60a 25 
a Excludes HBL Mantiri who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD).  
 
Table 4.3 
Blacklisted Candidates in Elections to Parliaments at All Levels (by candidacy order) 
                                                     
121 Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009.  
122 They were the three major political parties in Indonesia before the 2004 general election. PDI-P’s share 
of votes in the 1999 general election was 33.7 percent; Golkar 22.4 percent; and PPP 10.7 percent.  
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Candidacy Order 
Number 
Blacklisted Candidate Due to Corruption 
First  37 16 
Second 11 4 
Third  3 1 
Others 9 4 
Total 60a 25 
a Excludes HBL Mantiri, who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD) 
where party lists did not apply.  
NGOs distributed the first blacklist through Sosok, a tabloid with a circulation of 200,000. 
The blacklist was also distributed in large cities like Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, 
Yogyakarta, Denpasar, Padang, Surabaya, Bandung, and Mataram. The distribution area 
in DKI Jakarta was the Blok M Mall, a popular shopping site. The second edition of Sosok 
was released on March 24 with more names added to the blacklist, which was 
distributed in similar ways. 
Movement activists were cautious about the strategy of publicizing blacklists. The 
release date and wording of the blacklist, as well as the selection of sources, reflected 
their caution. Not wishing to provoke candidates and their political parties, movement 
activists tried to reduce the risk of a backlash by releasing the blacklist three weeks prior 
to the voting day. Movement activists admitted that the purpose of choosing that date 
 213 
 
was to limit the time available for blacklisted candidates to retaliate.123 The front page 
of Sosok also shows the activists’ cautiousness. The title read: “Are they suitable to be 
elected?” (Layakkah Mereka Dipilih?). Choosing this interrogative sentence not only 
corresponded with activists’ aims to have voters make judgments themselves on the 
fitness of candidates, but also conveyed a less provocative message than an affirmative. 
As to sources of information, NGOs consulted reports of international organisations (e.g., 
Amnesty International) and accountability institutions (e.g., the Human Right 
Committee), credible media reports, and evidence provided by witnesses and whistle 
blowers.124 In so doing, activists could maintain neutrality and refute criticisms that they 
were agitating public distrust and chaos by spreading unfounded rumours.125 
Not surprisingly, the two tabloids prompted counterattacks and criticisms. Blacklisted 
candidates accused movement activists of libelling their character and reputation, and 
most demanded a public apology. 126  The political parties of blacklisted candidates, 
however, did not adopt an official stance on the movement. It is noteworthy that some 
                                                     
123 “ICW Tak Gegabah Umumkan Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, January 14, 2004.  
124 “70 Persen DPR Masuk Kategori Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, January 15, 2004.  
125“GNTPPB Cetak Koran Sendiri Umumkan Politisi Busuk,” retrieved on February 8, 2011, from http:// 
www.kammi.or.id/last/lihat.php?d=materi&do=view&id=490. 
126 “Alvin Lie Akan Gugat Tabloid Sosok, ” Kompas, April 2, 2004. 
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blacklisted candidates’ explanations sounded tenable. Irwan Prayitno, PKS nominee, for 
example, was on the blacklist because he had refused to categorise the Trisakti killings 
as a gross human rights violation.127 This is because Law No. 39 of 1999 provided that 
the term “gross human rights violation” only applied to genocide and systematic 
slaughter. Irwan insisted that he could not succumb to NGOs’ pressure and make a 
judgment contrary to the law.128 Alvin Lie, another blacklisted candidate, made similar 
criticisms.129 The controversies demonstrate the necessity for care over the content of 
blacklists. In the face of these criticisms, NGOs responded only that all participating 
NGOs jointly undertook the responsibility of releasing the Sosok statement. 130  No 
movement activists made formal corrections or apologies regarding any individual in the 
list.  
                                                     
127  On 12th May, 1998, hundreds of Trisakti University students planned to march to the national 
parliament to present their demands for reform. The march became chaotic after police fired at it, leading 
to the death of four students. The shooting gave rise to strong criticisms of the Suharto administration 
and another wave of demonstrations. That led to the president’s resignation a few days later.  
128 “Kontras cs Keluarkan Daftar Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, March 6, 2004.  
129  “GNTPPB Cetak Koran Sendiri, Umumkan Politisi Busuk,” retrieved on March 16, 2004, from 
http://www.kammi.or.id/last/lihat.php?d=materi&do=view&id=490.   
130  “GNTPPB Cetak Koran Sendiri, Umumkan Politisi Busuk,” retrieved on March 16, 2004, from 
http://www.kammi.or.id/last/lihat.php?d=materi&do=view&id=490. 
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Outcomes and Evaluation  
The 2004 general election was seen by the public and the international community as 
fair and open. The number of blacklisted candidates who lost the election was 23, 
making up 37.7 percent of the total number of blacklisted candidates (Table 4.4).131 
Among the 37 blacklisted candidates who had topped their party lists, eight (21.6 
percent) lost because their political parties did not win any seats in the relevant electoral 
district. Among 11 blacklisted candidates who were seconded in the party lists, six (54.5 
percent) lost because their political parties only won one seat in the district (Table 4.5). 
The number of candidates blacklisted for corruption was ten, or 40 percent of the total 
number of candidates on the blacklist.132  
Table 4.4 
Blacklisted Candidates and Election Results 
Result Number Percentage (%) 
Elected 38 62.3 
Failed 23a 37.7 
Total 61 100 
a Includes HBL Mantiri, who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD). 
                                                     
131 “Della Monica Wins Hearts and Minds,” Jakarta Post, December 10, 2004. 
132 The three allegedly corrupt candidates who topped the order of candidates but still won no seats are 
Husni Thamrin, Tarmidi Soehardjo, and Agnita Singadekane Irsal. Saidal Bahauddin and Sofialoh Burlian 
were allegedly corrupt candidates who were placed second in the order but still won no seats in the end.  
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These election results did not surprise NGO activists. All interviewees for this research 
deemed the 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement unsuccessful, though the 
movement coordinator, Masduki (2006, p. 220), believed that the number of undesirable 
politicians was much lower than it could have been. NGO activists blamed the electoral 
system for the election of undesirable politicians and expressed little interest in 
exploring the correlation between the movement and its outcome. As ICW activist Lucky 
Djani put it:  
We were aware that Indonesia’s electoral system was not favourable to the 
success of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. Under it, it was predictable that 
many unfit candidates would successfully win seats in parliaments. It is 
meaningless to explore how many unfit candidates failed to win. In fact, no 
participant NGO activist attempted to do such surveys.133  
 
 
Table 4.5  
Blacklisted Candidates and Election Results (by candidacy order) 
Candidacy Order 
Number 
Percentage (%) 
Blacklisted Candidates Who Failed 
First 37 8 21.6 
                                                     
133 Lucky Djani, interview with author, Canberra, July 14, 2008. 
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Second 11 6 54.5 
Third 3 2 66.7 
Others 9 6 66.7 
Total 60a 22a 36.7 
a Excludes HBL Mantiri, who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD). 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 
Blacklisted Candidates and Election Results (by item) 
Item 
Number 
Percentage (%) 
Blacklisted Candidates Who Failed 
Human Rights Violation 26a 7a 26.9 
Corruption 25 10 40.0 
Environmental Pollution 5 2 40.0 
Violence against Women 7 4 57.1 
Total 61 23 37.7 
a Includes HBL Mantiri, who was a candidate in the election to the Regional Representative Council (DPD). 
The way in which the movement was organised and co-ordinated is another dimension 
worthy of observation. The 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was a 
loosely organised movement with only limited interaction between participating NGOs 
and groups in other areas. The main activities of NGOs included organising symposiums 
and criticising political parties. Data collected for this research shows only intermittent 
activities. Apart from the movement declaration, there were only a few press releases 
or statements under the name of the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement before 
the release of the blacklists. Instead, various individual NGOs released comments or 
blacklists. Due to the shortage of funds, NGOs never launched large-scale activities like 
concerts or street propaganda. Instead they had to settle for small or medium 
advertisement campaigns.  
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The interaction between participating NGOs and civil society groups at the local level 
was also loose. Movement coordinator Teten Masduki stressed that the 2004 National 
Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was open to all. This meant that:  
Each organisation or individual could join that national movement whether or 
not they were already part of the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
network, or only partially accepting that movement and having campaigns under 
another organisation’s banner. That movement was not strictly hierarchical and 
thus was relatively flexible…each area could have their own model of campaign. 
It was unnecessary to follow the model already operating in Jakarta. (IRE 2004)  
In other words, Masduki expected that local groups would initiate activities like the Anti-
Rotten-Politician Movement in all election districts. He did not have any intention of 
placing those activities under the leadership of an individual or a single organisation. As 
a result, the interaction of participating NGOs with other groups was mostly in the 
exchange of information and strategies.134 
                                                     
134 “Sarwono: Gerakan Anti-Politisi Busuk Belum Maksimal,” Gatra, January 27, 2004. 
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In fact, following the declaration that launched the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, 
similar movements soon appeared in other areas, formed by student groups or local 
branches of Jakarta-based NGOs. In Solo, for example, the University Student Executive 
Board (Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa) of the Universitas Sebelas Maret launched its own 
movement against rotten politicians. 135  The Semarang Branch of the Legal Aid 
Foundation (LBH) co-ordinated similar campaigns at Semarang. 136  In Bekasi, a 
movement was organised by the Islamic High School Student Alliance (Aliansi Pemuda 
Pelajar Islam).137 Around 200 civil society organisations endorsed the declaration of the 
National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement (Masduki, 2006, p.200). The targets of the 
local groups and organisations were mainly the elections to the Regional People’s 
Representative Councils.138  
Despite these enthusiastic responses, the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement did 
not receive a great deal of financial support. Without adequate funding to cover 
expenses, the research and publication of candidates’ track records became slow and 
                                                     
135 “Mahasiswa Solo Dirikan Posko Politisi Busuk,” Koran Tempo, February 10, 2004. 
136 “Penting, Gerakan Anti-politisi Busuk,” Kompas, January 7, 2004. 
137 “Pemilih Pemula Menolak Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, February 9, 2004.  
138 “Ratusan Mahasiswa Serukan Jangan Pilih Politikus Busuk,” Koran Tempo, January 5, 2004. 
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cumbersome. 139  Meanwhile, few lawyers, intellectuals, or others with significant 
professional and financial resource joined the movement. NGOs activists thus 
complained that Indonesian intellectuals always lived in their ivory tower (IRE, 2004).  
To sum up, the 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was a loosely organised 
movement with vocal support from the electorate, but it failed to prevent most 
undesirable candidates from winning parliamentary seats. Though its performance was 
very unsatisfactory, the movement still had some impact. As Indra J. Piliang put it, “one 
of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement’s achievements was the widespread usage of 
the term ‘rotten politicians’ in several fields. The National Anti-Rotten-Politician 
Movement was not merely a moral movement, but also a cultural movement. The term 
‘rotten politicians’ has since appeared in several poems, rhymes, songs and social service 
advertisements…cloths, stickers and other media were all used to distribute discourses 
about rotten politicians.”140 Participating NGOs all agreed to label candidates who had 
engaged in corruption, human rights violations, environmental pollution, or violence 
against women as unfit to be elected. The widespread popularity of the term “rotten 
politician” may thus reflect that many Indonesian people also agreed on the definitions 
                                                     
139 “Menakar Efektivitas GNTPPB, Refleksi untuk Masa Depan,” Kompas, March 15, 2004. 
140 “Menakar Efektivitas GNTPPB, Refleksi untuk Masa Depan,” Kompas, March 15, 2004. 
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and claims made by NGOs. Indra’s remarks show that the movement did have some 
success in setting up an agenda. That agenda was that “politicians who have committed 
crimes should not be eligible to be elected representatives.” 
4.3.2 Follow-up activities 
Following the 2004 general election, Masduki hinted that NGOs would initiate follow-up 
activities. As he put it:  
The National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement may not stop after the end of the 
general election. It will continue to appear in the composition of Cabinet, 
elections to heads of local governments or promotion of bureaucrats…in the long 
run, this movement also will support the establishment of a public accountability 
system that can be used to hold figures in political or public positions 
accountable. [The system should allow citizens to] legally recall elected 
representatives and bureaucrats who betray the public as a whole.141  
                                                     
141  “Gerakan Tidak Memilih Politisi Busuk,” retrieved on March 11, 2011, from 
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Masduki expected NGOs not only to launch similar accountability movements in other 
elections, but also to build up broader accountability systems. NGOs’ efforts to create a 
new electoral system in the period 2006–2008 fulfilled Masduki’s second expectation. 
4.3.2.1 Changes to the electoral system 
The Draft Law on Elections applicable to the 2009 general election was under 
deliberation in the People’s Representative Council from 2006. Several NGOs 
participating in the 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement formed a Coalition 
to Improve the Packet of Political Bills (Koalisi untuk Penyempurnaan Paket UU Politik) 
to lobby members of parliament to enact bills that could allow voters to hold candidates 
accountable more effectively. Their demands included a transparent candidate 
nomination process and the adoption of a “Pure” (or Open) Candidate List Proportional 
System (Sistem Pemilu Proporsional dengan Daftar Calon Murni). Such demands were 
aimed at removing the institutional obstacles faced by NGOs in the 2004 general election.  
The demand for a transparent candidate nomination process did give rise to strong 
                                                     
http://www.antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi.?q=content/view/10. 
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opposition, but the demand for an Open-List Proportional System aroused strong 
opposition because it was contrary to the interests of political parties. Under the 
proposed system, candidates with the largest number of individual votes would be 
allocated the seats their political parties won in the election in their district. In other 
words, NGOs suggested removing the role of the party list in deciding which candidate 
would be elected. According to NGOs, there were many advantages to adopting an 
Open-List Proportional System. These included promoting benign competition between 
candidates, promoting a democratic candidate nomination process, and, above all, 
promoting accountability of individual elected representatives to their constituents. At 
that time, major political parties like Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), however, still favoured the 
Limited Open-List Proportional System (Sistem Proporsional dengan Daftar Calon 
Terbuka Terbatas). They nonetheless agreed to lower the threshold an individual 
candidate would need to be elected to 50 percent of the Electoral Dividing Number (the 
number of votes a party needed to win to have one nominee elected). 142  NGOs 
considered the new threshold too high, believing that the dominance of political parties 
                                                     
142 “Caleg yang Lolos ke DPR Bisa Diterima Rakyat,” Retrieved on May 26, 2009, from www.suarakarya-
online.com/news.html?id=193834.  
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in the allocation of parliament seats would remain intact under such a system.  
The People’s Representative Council passed the new Law on Elections on 31st March, 
2008. The law contained clauses stipulating procedures and details to improve 
transparency in the candidate nomination process. The new threshold was fixed at 30 
percent of the Electoral Dividing Number. NGO activists were glad to see the stipulations 
about transparent candidate nomination in the new law. However, they were not 
satisfied with the new threshold. The Coalition to Improve the Packet of Political Bills 
said: 
The Limited Open-List Proportional System does not allow voters to decide 
directly who the elected representatives are. Political parties are still dominant. 
The system will once again blur the relationship between constituents and 
elected representatives. [Thus,] elected representatives will not respond to 
constituents’ expectations and problems, but compete for the interests of the 
political parties. Their election [as people’s agents] are supposed to satisfy the 
expectations of constituents, rather than interests of political parties. Under the 
Limited Open-List Proportional System, the quality of representation predictably 
changes little. Political parties, especially elites in headquarters, will remain 
dominant because of their power over candidacy. Benign competition between 
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candidates will hardly exist. As a consequence, political parties will remain 
oligarchic and centralist.143  
4.3.2.2 Extension of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
Masduki also expected NGO activists to launch campaigns against unfit candidates in 
other elections. The three elections discussed here are the 2004 presidential election, 
the 2007 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election and the 2009 general election. The first two 
were elections of heads of governments. These differed from elections to parliaments in 
the number of candidates standing, the method of casting ballots, the condition for 
winning elections, and in several other respects.   
Table 4.7 
Summaries of Laws Concerning the 2004 Presidential Election and the 2007 Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Election 
 2004 Presidential Election 2007 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 
Legislative 
Backing 
Law No. 23 of 2003 Law No. 30 of 2004 
Nomination 
Requirements  
Nominees of political parties that 
obtained more than 20 percent of valid 
votes in the general election or more 
than 15 percent of seats in the DPR 
Nominees of political parties that 
obtained more than 15 percent of valid 
votes in corresponding parliament 
elections or more than 15 percent of 
                                                     
143 “Reformasi Pemilu 2009 Terhambat : DPR Tidak Percaya dengan Pilihan Rakyat,” press release by 
Koalisi untuk Penyempurnaan Paket UU Politik, January 18, 2008. 
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(Article 5) seats (Article 59) 
Winning 
Condition 
Obtained more than half valid votes and 
had more than 20 percent of the votes in 
more than half the provinces (Article 66) 
Obtained more than half valid votes. If 
none reached the threshold, the 
candidate pair that obtained more than 
25 percent of valid votes and whose 
ballots outnumber rivals would win the 
election (Article 107) 
4.3.2.2.1 The 2004 presidential election 
The 2004 presidential election was the first direct election of a head of the central 
government in Indonesia. 144  Voting day was three months after the 2004 general 
election. The 2004 presidential election applied a two-round majoritarian system, 
meaning that there would be a second round run-off between the two leading 
candidates, in case of no first round winner.145 According to Law No. 23 of 2003, political 
parties still monopolised the right of candidate nomination, as shown in Table 4.7. At the 
same time, no candidates could rely on their political parties alone to win the election. 
This was because it was necessary to win more than half the valid ballots and “the 
complexities inherent in Indonesia’s multiparty system make it difficult for a party to” 
gain such a large amount of votes (Sebastian, 2004, p. 267). Given this, NGOs had 
opportunities to block candidates they deemed unfit from winning the presidency 
                                                     
144 The Amendment to the 1945 Constitution provides that the Indonesian president and vice-president 
are directly elected by citizens, no longer decided by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). 
145 See “2004 Election Have it All: Size and Complexity,” Jakarta Post, February 6, 2004. 
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through voter mobilisation. At the same time, because there were only a small number 
of competitors and all of them were famous politicians, it was also not difficult for them 
to collect the track records of candidates. In short, it was relatively easy for NGOs to try 
to blacklist poor-quality candidates; at least, the institutional context did not throw up 
the same obstacles as in the parliamentary elections.  
Most NGOs participating in the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement also 
expressed concerns about the 2004 presidential election.146 In the third edition of Sosok 
and several other media platforms there was still discussion of candidates’ fitness and 
of the importance of rejecting rotten politicians as candidates for the presidency. It is 
thus tenable to regard NGOs’ activities during the 2004 presidential election period as 
an extension of the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement.  
One month prior to voting day, NGOs publicized what they considered to be the 
requirements for a head of central government: They should (1) have never joined the 
Suharto administration; (2) have never committed corruption; (3) and have the will to 
                                                     
146 Some NGOs departed the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement in the presidential election. Many of those 
NGOs’ leaders even joined candidate pairs’ success teams. Danang Widoyoko, email communication, 
March 29, 2011.  
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promote reform.147 In order to provide voters with in-depth information on election 
candidates, NGOs released the third edition of Sosok which contained candidates’ 
visions, promises, wealth reports, and incidents in which they were involved. There were 
more discussions of incidents and cases involving Megawati Sukarnoputri (nominee of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle and the incumbent) and Wiranto (nominee 
of the Golkar) than of other candidates. These discussions were about the role of 
Megawati’s husband in corruption scandals and the involvement of Wiranto in human 
rights violations in East Timor.148 The third edition of Sosok, unlike the two preceding 
editions, did not contain a blacklist of candidates. Its content, however, explicitly showed 
which candidates and their running mates were viewed most negatively. This change of 
strategy signalled that activists were ready to adopt a safer way to convey their message.  
The election outcome was that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (nominee of the Democratic 
Party) defeated Megawati in the second round run-off. Megawati’s loss of the 
presidential election was by no means an NGO achievement, because the third edition 
of Sosok merely implied her unfitness for the presidency and NGO activists never 
                                                     
147 “Calon Presiden dan Korupsi,” Kompas, June 10, 2004.  
148 “Koran Sosok Kupas Track Record Capres,” Koran Tempo, July 1, 2004.  
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explicitly called on citizens not to vote for her.  
4.3.2.2.2 The 2007 Jakarta gubernatorial election  
The heads of regional governments have been subject to direct election since 2005. The 
first direct DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election was in July, 2007.149  Because of strict 
nomination requirements, only a small number of political parties were eligible to 
nominate candidates in that election. As in the 2004 presidential election, no candidate 
and their running mate could rely solely on their own political party’s mass base to win 
the gubernatorial election.150 In other words, through voter mobilisation, NGO activists 
had an opportunity to block undesirable candidates from leading the DKI Jakarta 
government. In fact, rumours of money politics spread wildly during the campaign.151 
These rumours gave rise to widespread grievances and public distrust in candidates’ 
integrity.152 As a result, discussions of rotten politicians reappeared in various media 
                                                     
149 Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government stipulates that voters directly elect heads of regional 
governments (Article 24). The first direct elections to heads of regional governments were held in June, 
2005 in seven provinces and 159 municipalities and districts.   
150 See Article 59(2) and 107 of the Law on Regional Government. 
151 “Korupsi dan Industrialisasi Pilkada,” Koran Tempo, 23rd November, 2010; “Korupsi dan Wajah Kusam 
Otonomi Daerah,” Koran Tempo, November 25, 2010. 
152 “Pilkada Jakarta: Investigasi Politik Dagang Sapi Cagub Pilkada DKI,” Kompas, June 20, 2007.  
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and platforms. At the same time, there were also voices advocating non-voting and 
allowing independent candidates to run in the elections (Huri, 2006, pp. 187-189).153  
ICW, Cetro and several Jakarta-based NGOs therefore formed the “People’s Clean 
Election Coalition” (Koalisi Rakyat untuk Pilkada Bersih). Activists in the coalition mostly 
monitored elections and exposed scandals. They did not see their activities as an 
extension of the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, nor did they release a 
blacklist of unfit candidates. ICW coordinator Danang explains:  
Many Jakarta-based NGO activists have concerns about issues at the national 
level. The DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was a regional election, and thus 
was not the focus of our concerns... at the same time, there were only two pairs 
of candidates in that election. Calling one pair of candidates unfit would give rise 
to a charge of favouritism for the other. This charge was not true because we 
thought neither of the two pairs of candidates fit at that time.154  
                                                     
153 “Pembatasan Calon Independen Bertentangan: Faisal Basri Beri Kesaksian,” Kompas, June 8, 2007.  
154 Danang Widoyoko, interview with author, Jakarta, August 24, 2007.  
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Danang’s remark shows not only why NGOs did not launch campaigns against 
undesirable candidates in every election but also how activists considered the need to 
release blacklists.   
4.3.2.2.3 The 2009 general election 
The 2009 general election followed Law No. 10 of 2008 on General Elections. This law 
included clauses stipulating that the candidate nomination process would be made 
transparent. Based on the schedule prescribed by law, all political parties had to submit 
their candidate lists to the General Election Commission before 19th August, 2008. The 
commission was required to finish administrative examinations before 8th October and 
publicize the Temporary Candidate List (Daftar Calon Sementara, DCS) through the mass 
media for five days (Article 61). Citizens could then question the candidate’s 
qualifications, and political parties would explain and replace unqualified candidates. 
The commission had authority to adjust where unqualified candidates were placed in 
the party list, if political parties did not replace them (Article 62). These clauses 
compelled political parties and the General Election Commission to open up the 
candidate nomination process to great public scrutiny. NGOs had more opportunities to 
hold political parties accountable for their candidate lists. They could even lobby the 
General Election Commission to change the candidacy order and demote candidates in 
the party list, providing they provide evidence.  
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Several Jakarta-based NGOs re-launched the National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement 
in 2008. Problems like corruption and poor performance still persisted in parliaments at 
all levels.155 The movement coordinator was Jerry Sumampouw, who was also chairman 
of JPPR. The 2009 National Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement differed from its 
predecessor in several aspects. First, the number of participant NGOs and scholars 
decreased. Several NGO leaders and scholars became nominees of political parties and 
were thus unwilling to define their positions toward the Anti-Rotten-Politician 
Movement. For example, Indra J. Piliang, who wrote several articles promoting the 2004 
Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement was nominated by Golkar in West Sumatra Province. 
Second, in the lead-up to the 2009 general election, the movement activists focused on 
the election to the Regional People’s Representatives Councils, unlike their predecessors 
who focused on the Election to the People’s Representatives Council. The rationale 
behind this shift of focus was the consideration that local groups knew more about 
problems at local levels and it was easier to promote the movement in small areas. Third, 
in addition to the original four criteria, movement activists in 2009 also treated 
candidates who had taken or traded in drugs and appropriated others’ property illegally 
as being “rotten”. Additionally, NGOs only sent blacklists to political parties and the 
                                                     
155 “Cabut Ketentuan Izin Pemeriksaan Anggota Dewan dalam RUU Susduk,” retrieved on December 4, 
2008, from http://antikorupsi.org/indo/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13764&p.; 
“Face Off Wajah Korup DPR-RI,” press release, Koalisi Penegak Citra DPR –RI, September 29, 2009. 
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General Election Commission, instead of publicizing them.156 With regard to that change, 
Cetro activist Erika Widyaningsih explains:  
Not publicizing the blacklists was the agreement. Even ICW activists also insisted 
on not publicizing the blacklists because they suffered much from charges by 
blacklisted candidates during the 2004 general election…If we publicize blacklists 
again during the 2009 general election, blacklisted candidates for sure would sue 
us. Not just one, but hundreds of candidates. We would have to appear in courts 
if they sued us, and that would exhaust us. We thus chose a simpler means, that 
is, we provide blacklists, instead of to mass media or the public, to political 
parties and the General Election Commission.157 
Obviously, it was the experience gained from the 2004 National Anti-Rotten-Politician 
Movement that drove NGOs not to publicize blacklists again in the 2009 general election.  
                                                     
156 “ICW Serahkan 30 Nama Politisi Korup dari Golkar,” Milis Jurnalisme, 15th August, 2008; “Gerakan 
Anti-Politisi Busuk Dideklarasikan,” Koran Tempo, May 22, 2008.   
157 Erika Widyaningsih, interview with author, Jakarta, October 6, 2009.  
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NGOs chose to start their activities on 23rd May, 2008—three months prior to the 
deadline for political parties to submit candidate lists. Several political parties welcomed 
the NGOs’ or individuals’ offer of information and track records for their candidates.158 
Several media also covered the submission by NGOs to political parties of blacklists of 
unfit candidates. In the end, political parties like Golkar and the Democratic Party (PD) 
changed their candidate lists in accordance with movement activists’ suggestions.159 
Such a thing had never happened in previous elections. Reforms making the candidate 
nomination process more transparent were essential to that change. The inclusion of the 
relevant clauses in the law on the elections was in turn the result of NGOs’ advocacy. 
Thus, NGOs had benefitted from an accountability mechanism which they had helped to 
build.  
Nevertheless, many candidates with poor records in corruption and other problem areas 
still became nominees of political parties. JPPR found 21 candidates in the Temporary 
Candidate List who were suspected of crimes of various kinds. Eight of the nine 
                                                     
158 “PPP Tunggu Masukan dari Rakyat Soal Politisi Busuk,” Kompas, August 14, 2008; “Tjahjo Kumolo: 
Partai Agar Depak Politisi Busuk,” Antaranews, August 10, 2008. 
159 Erika Widyaningsih, interview with author, Jakarta, October 6, 2009.  
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candidates who had allegedly engaged in corruption were nominees of PDIP.160 Political 
parties also varied in their responses to blacklists compiled by NGOs. According to the 
Law on General Elections of 2008, NGO activists could still block candidates from 
standing by presenting evidence of their wrongdoings to the General Election 
Commission. No laws, however, stipulated that criminal suspects could not be 
candidates in elections. The General Election Commission thus could not change 
blacklisted nominees’ candidacy order in accordance with NGO activists’ suggestions, 
unless they had already been convicted of a criminal offence.  
Table 4.8  
Summaries of Laws Concerning Two Parliamentary Elections 
 2004 2009 
Laws Law No. 12 of 2003 Law No. 10 of 2008 
MK Ruling 22-24/PUU-
VI/2008 
Electoral System 
Limited Open-List 
Proportional 
Representation 
System  
Limited Open-List 
Proportional 
Representation System 
Pure Open Candidate 
List Proportional 
Representation System  
Winning Conditions 
Candidates whose 
votes outnumber the 
Electoral Dividing 
Number obtained 
seats won by political 
parties. If no 
candidates exceeded 
this threshold, those 
at the top of the list 
Candidates whose 
votes exceeded 30 
percent of the 
Electoral Dividing 
Number were eligible 
to obtain seats won 
by political parties. If 
the number of 
eligible candidates 
Candidates whose 
votes outnumbered 
others on the same list 
obtained seats won by 
political parties  
                                                     
160 “Corruption Suspects Listed as Candidates,” Jakarta Post, October 11, 2008. 
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were allocated seats  
(Article 107) 
exceeded the 
number of seats 
won, the seats went 
to candidates at the 
top of the list (Article 
214) 
The 2009 general election entered the campaign phase after the General Election 
Council announced the Confirmed Candidate List. A critical change took place at that 
stage when the Constitutional Court (MK) made a controversial ruling on 23rd December, 
2008 in response to several candidates’ requests for a judicial review of Article 214 of 
Law No. 10 of 2008 on General Elections.161 The clause stipulated that only candidates 
whose personal vote exceeded 30 percent of the number of votes required by their party 
to win a seat could be elected, regardless of candidacy order. Petitioners contended that 
Article 214 was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court accepted the petitioners’ 
claims and ruled Article 214 invalid. In other words, it would be the number of individual 
votes, rather than candidacy order, which determined the allocation of parliamentary 
seats to candidates by their political parties (ANFREL, 2009, pp.32-33).  
                                                     
161 Legally speaking, NGO activists cannot make requests for a judicial review of laws. The Law on the 
Constitutional Court merely entitles citizens who experience damage to their constitutional rights to 
petition for review of the laws in question, suggesting that NGO activists cannot file a petition for review 
unless they themselves are candidates in elections. 
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As shown in Table 4.8, the ruling brought about significant changes to Indonesian 
electoral system, and had a critical impact on the 2009 general election. According to 
Mietzner, it transformed the main axis of competition among political parties into rivalry 
between candidates within the same political parties. Candidates thus emphasized their 
personal charisma and popularity in order to attract voters’ attention.162 As a result, 
there was a remarkable change in the attitude of candidates who had long been 
criticized by scholars and party leaders for their indifference toward election 
campaigns.163 In other words, the ruling changed not only the method of seat allocation 
but also the model of electoral competition.  
The court thus introduced a Pure Open-List Proportional Representation System—the 
very electoral system NGO activists had advocated while the draft law on elections was 
under deliberation. The change in the electoral system, in theory, should have facilitated 
the NGOs’ efforts to prevent undesirable candidates from winning seats in parliament. 
                                                     
162 “The 2009 Elections in Indonesia: Parties and Candidates,” presented by Marcus Mietzner at the South 
East Asia Centre, ANU, Canberra, February 25, 2009.  
163 Elections under the Proportional Representation System feature competition among political parties. 
Candidates thus are likely to be indifferent to election campaign activities. Golkar Chairman Jusuf Kalla on 
one occasion criticized candidates for lacking momentum in campaigns for ballots in the 2009 general 
election. That was why he endorsed the initiative to amend the Law of 2008 on General Elections. “Bukan 
Menerka Bajaj Belok,” Koran Tempo, September 1, 2008. 
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NGO activists, however, did not view the ruling favourably and also did not attempt to 
publicize blacklists afterwards. Movement coordinator Jerry Sumampouw explained: 
“Though I advocated adopting the Pure Candidate List Proportional Representation 
System, I was in an opposition position when the Constitutional Court announced its 
ruling. The electoral system should be confirmed at the start of the election, rather than 
promoted halfway.” He pointed out that the new seat allocation rule might not favour 
good candidates:  
High campaign costs accompany the new seat allocation regulations. Good 
candidates, however, are usually not rich and thus can neither frequently have 
contact with constituents nor introduce themselves through posters or 
advertisements…though [there were changes to the seat allocation rule], we did 
not want to publicize blacklists. [The reason was that t]here were more than 
11,000 candidates participating in the 2009 general election. If we insisted on 
the principle of fairness and equality, we needed to investigate all candidates. 
The number of candidates, however, was too large, and we were not willing to 
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conduct a comprehensive investigation.164  
To sum up, with lessons learned from the 2004 Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, 
Jakarta-based NGOs tried to reform electoral institutions and continued to launch similar 
accountability activities in other elections. Their efforts to reform electoral institutions 
helped make candidate-related information at the nomination phase transparent and 
accessible, creating room to demand ex-ante accountability of elected representatives. 
In addition, the cases discussed above also show what factors NGO activists considered 
when thinking about the blacklisting strategy, suggesting that the decision whether to 
release the blacklists was the outcome of deliberations among NGO activists.  
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Analysis 
The 2004 Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement is not successful, in terms of the number of 
                                                     
164 Jerry Sumampouw, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009.  
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candidates who survived NGO campaigns against them. The discussions above suggest 
that several contextual factors led to this outcome. This thesis follows Peruzzotti (2011) 
in dividing the context into four dimensions—society, culture, the public sphere and 
institutions—and analyse them one by one.   
Social context, according to Peruzzotti (2011), refers to “the emergence of a sector of 
civil society interested in the exercise of social accountability as well as the development 
of a basic social infrastructure to support those new forms of civic engagement”(p. 57). 
Clearly, Indonesia in 2004 had a social context favourable to the exercise of electoral 
accountability, because a group of Jakarta-based NGOs initiated the Anti-Rotten-
Politician Movement and the movement gave rise to imitation outside Jakarta. These 
activities represent the presence of forces within Indonesian society that endeavoured 
to solve the problem of the accountability deficit. They were unwilling to overlook 
elected representatives’ neglect of accountability obligations, but managed to 
strengthen the accountability relation between elected representatives and constituents. 
In contrast, the cultural context in Indonesia in 2004 was not conducive to electoral 
accountability activities. Culture concerns constituents’ attitudes and behaviours, and a 
variety of accountability activities are usually evident under the culture of democratic 
accountability (Peruzzotti, 2011, pp. 56-57). However, the experience of being subjection 
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to authoritarian rule for decades had deprived most Indonesians of an awareness of 
rights, as well as of the courage to make demands (Schwarz, 1994, p. 33). As a 
consequence, Indonesian constituents were mostly reluctant to discuss elections and 
other politics-related matters. Despite a series of reform measures, empowered 
legislative institutions, and fair and open elections, most Indonesian constituents’ still 
show low interest in elections and politics-related issues, as revealed by multiple studies. 
An investigation by the Asia Foundation in 2003, for example, revealed that 65 percent 
of respondents had low interest in politics and 33 percent of them claimed no interest 
at all; 89 percent rarely discussed political issues; 59 percent of them claimed that they 
never discussed politics; and 77 percent were unwilling to be political parties’ election 
nominees (TAF, 2003, pp. 53-68). These figures show Indonesian constituents’ 
indifference to electoral politics during the Reformasi era, suggesting the lack of a sense 
of political efficacy and an awareness of rights within Indonesian society.  
Similarly, Indonesia’s public sphere in 2004 was not sufficiently mature to underpin the 
Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. The “public sphere” refers to “a space within a society” 
which is “independent both of state power and/or corporate influence, within which 
information can freely flow and debate on matters of public, [and] civic concern can 
openly proceed" (Corner, 1995, p. 42). According to Peruzzotti (2011), accountability 
initiatives by people “require a minimum of constitutional guarantees to allow them to 
successfully intervene in the process of agenda setting" and “the presence of 
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independent or watchdog journalism is essential for success” (p. 58). In other words, the 
relevant regulations and news media concerns both reflect the quality of public sphere 
and in these respects, Indonesia’s public sphere before 2004 was still too weak to 
support the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. 
Indonesian constituents had never fully enjoyed freedoms before 1998 because of tight 
control by the Suharto administration (D. T. Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 120; McCargo, 2003, p. 
33). Not until signs of the demise of the Suharto regime appeared in 1997–1998 did 
many civil groups and news media challenge the government and criticise politics (Atkins, 
2002, p. 198; Forrester, 1999, pp. 64-65). Provisions to protect freedoms started to be 
written into constitutional amendments and new laws after Suharto resigned (Kitley, 
2008, pp. 88-89). Such regulatory guarantees of rights favoured the development of civil 
society and the mass media. However, watchdog journalism had not yet been 
mainstream before 2004, as several surveys showed. During the Suharto era, few 
journalists or media companies dared to criticize the government or act like muckrakers. 
Some of them even disliked the radical approaches taken by European and American 
news journalists (Weaver, 1998, pp. 466-467). This inclination had changed little by 2004. 
According to a survey conducted by Hanitzsch (2005, p. 493) at the beginning of this 
century, most Indonesian journalists perceived themselves as neutral and objective 
news disseminators, rather than outspoken watchdogs, partly explaining why thewre 
were no signs of close collaboration media firms when NGOs initiated the Anti-Rotten-
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Politician Movement. To sum up, regulatory reform measures created conditions 
favourable for improving the quality of the Indonesian public sphere. Thus, NGOs were 
able to initiate the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement and attract civil groups at local 
levels to join. Nevertheless, NGOs did not benefit much from the improved public sphere, 
because watchdog journalism had not yet grown strong.  
The institutional context is the final dimension. The electoral system and the statutes 
applied to the 2004 general election contained some flaws that did not favour the 
enforcement of electoral accountability. These were the outcomes of the dominance of 
the political parties’ interests in the reform process; one example can be found in the 
process by which a new electoral bill was deliberated in 1999. To prepare for the 1999 
general election, the Habibie administration proposed a mixed system; that is, 76 
percent of parliamentary seats to be elected through the single-member district 
plurality (SMDP) voting system; and the remainder through the Closed-List Proportional 
Representation system. Proponents of such a system claimed that it would tighten 
relations between elected representatives and constituents and favours small and newly 
formed political parties (King, 2003, pp. 60-61). However, most participant political 
parties preferred the Closed-List Proportional Representation system on the grounds of 
deep concern about the dominance of seats by one or few political parties over others, 
leading to the result that up to 21 political parties had at least one parliament seat. Most 
of these parties chose to apply the proportional representation system to the 2004 
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general election in order to maintain their share in parliamentary politics (Emmerson, 
2004, pp. 99-101). Apparently, political parties dominated the electoral reform process 
before 2004, leading to political party-centred politics that left little room for Indonesian 
constituents to enforce electoral accountability. At the same time, political party-centred 
politics also gave rise to the prioritization by elected representatives of political parties’ 
interests cover onstituents’ needs. Ziegenhain (2008b) thus criticised members of 
parliament during the 1999–2004 term for their lack of knowledge and willingness, 
both being essential to effective legislation. The flaws in the electoral laws are thus not 
surprising.  
To sum up, when NGOs initiated the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement in 2004, only the 
social context favoured their initiative, and the remaining contextual dimensions were 
unable to support them. The legacy of past authoritarian rule and the dominance of 
political parties’ interests in the reform process both led to this unfavourable context. 
Though NGO activists declared their failure, there are signs that their initiatives helped 
build up a consensus on criteria by which to evaluate election candidates’ qualifications, 
a contribution crucial to the development of culture of democratic accountability in 
Indonesia. Also, NGOs’ efforts to change electoral bills and systems improved the 
institutional environment, removing obstacles that they had encountered in 2004. In 
other words, step by step Indonesian NGOs improved the context in which they became 
able to enforce electoral accountability, rather than just being subject to it.  
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Further improvement in contextual conditions will depend on how NGOs deal with the 
three challenges. The first challenge is about strategy. Releasing blacklists is a double-
edged sword: it attracts journalists and constituents, while possibly endangering activists’ 
safety and NGOs’ reputations. Thorough consideration and complete preparation are 
both necessary before the release of blacklists. Both the timing of the release and the 
wording of the article in Sosok reveal how cautious NGO activists were. However, the 
failure to overcome the blacklisted candidates’ arguments shows that NGO activists had 
not prepared themselves well, possibly undermining the organisations’ reputations and 
creating room for counterattacks launched by other blacklisted candidates. Therefore, 
NGOs need to develop a risk-control mechanism if they continue to insist on applying 
the same strategy in the future.  
Another challenge is about mobilisation. NGOs may mobilise civil groups at local levels 
as well as the general public for the purpose of widening the base for their accountability 
initiatives. It is easier to mobilise the former than the latter, because NGOs like Cetro 
already have extensive election monitoring networks. In contrast, to mobilise the general 
public is relatively complex and challenging, because the NGOs that initiated the 
movement are mostly issue-oriented organisations that engage in policy advocacy and 
have no regional chapters, suggesting infrequent interaction with the general public. To 
focus on the mobilisation of the general public is never easy, because of critical questions 
such as resource allocations. NGOs’ responses concern the future development of two 
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contextual conditions, namely, culture and the public sphere. 
The last challenge is institutional reform. The electoral system initially applied to the 
2009 general election was changed because of a ruling by the Constitutional Court, 
suggesting alternative approaches to promoting institutional reforms. However, to apply 
this approach it is necessary that it meet certain conditions. The Constitutional Court Act 
(Article 51) only entitles Indonesian citizens who believe that their constitutional rights 
have been encroached upon existing laws to claim judicial review. This provision suggests 
two options for NGOs. One is to persuade stakeholders to seek judicial review; the other 
is to allow their activists to compete in elections and make the same move. However, 
most NGO activists surveyed for this study explicitly reject these two options, meaning 
that lobbying members of Parliament is the only way for them to promote institutional 
changes. In fact, senior NGO activists such as Asmara Nababan have long advocated 
participation of NGO activists in elections,165 so Indonesian NGOs currently encounter 
a dilemma: to insist on “no involvement in politics” principle, or promoting reforms in a 
proactive and aggressive way. NGOs’ choices affect their future development. 
                                                     
165 Asmara Nababan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008. 
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4.4.2 Postscript 
The 2014 general election offers another opportunity to explore the enforcement of 
electoral accountability in democratising Indonesia. By the time of the 2014 election, 
Indonesia was using a fully open-list system of proportional representation. Law No. 8 
on General Election (UU No. 8 tentang Pemilihan Umum), passed in 2012, stipulates all 
matters about this election. Article 5 specifies the application of the Open Propositional 
System to the 2014 general election, meaning parliamentary seats won by political 
parties unconditionally go to candidates on lists with the highest number of individual 
votes (Article 215). These provisions signify the increase in the importance of the 
personal vote, and a decline in political parties’ leverage over Indonesia’s electoral 
politics, and have given rise to great competition among candidates from the same party, 
and also to the continuance of a trend toward candidate-centred campaigning (Aspinall, 
2014, pp. 548-549; Republika, 2012). The new system, in other words, matched many 
NGO activists’ expectations and hopes because, as discussed in preceding sections, they 
had long advocated adoption of an electoral system that would facilitate their efforts to 
prevent individual candidates they deem unfit from winning parliamentary seats.  
What did NGO activists do to promote electoral accountability under such a favourable 
context? Did they form a coalition and jointly release blacklists in the 2014 general 
election, like what they had done a decade earlier, or did they exercise electoral 
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accountability in even more proactive and aggressive ways?  
The 2014 general election commenced after the General Election Commission 
announced in March 2013 that 12 political parties were eligible for the 2014 general 
election. Among these parties, only the National Democratic Party (Partai Nasional 
Demokrat, Partai NasDem), established in 2011, was new to the Indonesian electorate. 
After the date was fixed, the normal series of electoral activities commenced, including 
nominating of candidates by the parties, proposing of their candidate lists, and so on. 
The General Election Commission was tasked to examine whether candidates and 
candidate lists met the requirements set down by law, and released a Temporary 
Candidate List on June 14, inviting the public to file reports about candidates’ track 
records in the following two weeks (Harera, 2013). In total, the General Election 
Commission received 273 inputs from the public, including reports concerning the status 
of 22 candidates in legal cases (KPU, 2014, p. 64).  
Many of those reports were prepared with NGO assistance. As in preceding elections, 
several Jakarta-based NGOs formed a coalition to collect documents about candidates 
and to assist individual citizens to file reports about them (Harera, 2013). However, this 
coalition did not jointly release blacklists, unlike what NGOs had done in the 2004 
general election, and took no other more proactive moves. Based on the data I collected, 
 249 
 
only ICW, at the nomination phase, released a list of 36 candidates whose commitments 
to combating corruption were questioned by activists. This shared some features with 
the blacklists NGOs released in 2004: a high percentage of those named were 
incumbents seeking re-election (Ninditya, 2013), it included a high ratio of nominees 
from big political parties rather than their counterparts from minor parties (See Table 
4.9), and all the named candidates were running for election at the national level, not in 
regional races. These characteristics is understandable because the time frame available 
for filing reports was limited to two weeks, meaning that NGOs were best able to collect 
data on incumbent politicians whose speeches or actions were better covered by the 
mass media.     
Table 4.9 
ICW’s Named Candidates in the 2014 general election (by political party) 
No. Political Party Number Share (%) 
2 PKB 1 2.8  
3 PKS 4 11.1  
4 PDIP 5 13.9  
5 GOLKAR 9 25.0  
6 Gerindra 3 8.3  
7 PD 10 27.8  
9 PPP 2 5.6  
10 Hanura 1 2.8  
14 PBB 1 2.8  
Total 36 100.0  
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Two other characteristics of the list were also noteworthy. One is that most named 
candidates were corruption suspects. ICW activists claimed that five types of candidates 
should have been disqualified as party nominees: persons (1) who are corruption 
suspects; (2) who are corruption convicts; (3) who have been sanctioned for or proven 
as violating ethics by the DPR Honour Council; (4) who showed hostility to anti-
corruption efforts; and (5) who supported attempts to revise the Law on the KPK or to 
weaken the authority of this anti-corruption agency (Akuntono, 2013). Among these 
items, the “corruption suspects” category was crowded, with 25 named candidates, or 
nearly 70 percent of those on the list (See Table 4.10). However, to label corruption 
suspects as ineligible as candidates contradicts legal provisions. Article 51(1-g) deprives 
particular categories of persons with criminal convictions —those who have been 
sentenced to incarceration for an offense punishable by imprisonment of five years or 
more— of the right to run for election. Accordingly, releasing a blacklist including 
candidates who were merely suspected of committing a crime was unavoidably 
vulnerable to criticisms for unlawfulness and also subjectivity.  
Table 4.10 
ICW’s Named Candidates in the 2014 general election (by item) 
Item Number Share (%) 
Corruption Suspect 25 69.4  
Corruption Convict 1 2.8  
Sanctioned by the Honour Council, DPR 4 11.1  
Hostile to Anti-Corruption Efforts 1 2.8  
Hostile To The KPK 5 13.9  
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Total 36 100.0  
To reduce their vulnerability to such criticism, ICW activists worded their declaration 
cautiously - the second noteworthy characteristic of the 2014 electoral intervention. 
They barely used terms like “rotten politicians” and insisted stated that they were merely 
questioning the named candidates’ commitment to corruption fighting, rather than 
labelling them as corrupt politicians. As Sebastian Salang, Formappi coordinator, notes, 
the press release made no direct accusations, but only conveyed conjecture (Sasmita, 
2013). Such caution had several causes but one was lessons learned from experience. 
ICW activist Emerson admitted that “calling [named candidates] “rotten politicians” [in 
preceding elections] was our mistake. [Accordingly], we made a correction, and after 
that we were very cautious about the release of data and information” (Ninditya, 2013). 
Nevertheless, two named candidates, Ahmad Yani (PPP) and Syarifudin Sudding (Hanura), 
still reported ICW activists to the Criminal Investigation Body of the Police (Ninditya, 
2013). 
Table 4.11 
ICW’s Named Candidates in the 2014 General Election (by Confirmed Candidate List) 
 Number  Percentage (%)  
confirmed as candidates 34 94.4 
substituted by replacements 2 5.6 
Total 36 100.0 
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Before the release of the Confirmed Candidate List by the General Election Commission, 
political parties were asked by the Commission to answer questions about, or offer 
explanations with respect to disputes over, their nominees. Political parties failing to 
make reasonable clarifications would be asked to propose replacements for the 
candidates in question. According to a formal report published by the General Election 
Commission, the Confirmed Candidate List, released on August 22, included nine 
replacements from seven political parties in the 2014 general election (KPU, 2014, p. 64). 
Only two of the nine persons replaced were on ICW’s list of candidates (See Table 4.11). 
The ratio of replacements to named candidates who passed the Commission’s 
examination phase unscathed suggests that ICW’s release of its list had little impact 
during the nomination phase.  
The campaign phase started after the announcement of the Confirmed Candidate List. 
In total, 6608 candidates competed for 560 DPR seats in 77 electoral districts. When the 
election competition became fierce, ICW, JPPR, Cetro and many other NGOs endeavored 
to expose evidence of vote buying and other forms of electoral fraud, as they had done 
in the past (Irawan, Dahlan, Fariz, & Putri, 2014). They made no further release of 
blacklists of undesirable candidates. Even had ICW’s blacklist been known by most voters, 
it seems that the cultural and political context would not have been favourable to the 
exercise of electoral accountability. Case (2005, p. 90) a decade ago stated that “abuses 
and corruption remain secondary to most mass publics in [Indonesia and other 
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Southeast Asian countries].” This tendency, it seems, has changed little after the passage 
of more than a decade. According to Jayadi Hanan, a researcher from the Syaiful Mujani 
Research and Consulting (SMRC), poll results show that Indonesian voters tend to 
prioritise economic and welfare issues, over corruption (Sasmita, 2013).         
Table 4.12 
2014 General Election Outcomes 
Political Party Vote Share (%) Seats Share (%) 
NasDem 8,402,812 6.7 35 6.3 
PKB 11,298,957 9 47 8.4 
PKS 8,480,204 6.8 40 7.1 
PDIP 23,681,471 19 109 19.5 
Golkar 18,432,312 14.8 91 16.3 
Gerindra  14,760,371 11.8 73 13.0 
PD 12,728,913 10.2 61 10.9 
PAN 9,481,621 7.6 49 8.8 
PPP 8,157,488 6.5 39 7.0 
Hanura 6,579,498 5.3 16 2.9 
PBB* 1,825,750 1.5 0 0 
PKPI* 1,143,094 0.9 0 0 
Total 124,972,491 100 560 100.0 
* The two political parties were ineligible for the allocation of seats because their 
shares of ballots did not reach the threshold 3.5% as stipulated in Article 208. 
Note: http://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/952014_ambang_Batas.pdf 
Under the supervision and coordination of the General Election Commission, the 2014 
general election was in general peaceful and free, despite complaints about vote buying 
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and minor violent incidents (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014, pp. 2-3). PDIP, Golkar, and 
Gerindra became the three biggest political parties, with a share of seats at 19.5%, 16.3%, 
and 13.0% respectively. PD, previously the ruling party, encountered a remarkable, 
though unsurprising, loss with its share of votes declining sharply to 10.2%, from 20.9% 
in the preceding election. This decline, as Fukuoka and Thalang (2014, p. 3) put it, reflect 
“public disappointment with the party, particularly regarding its top leadership having 
been implicated in corruption scandals.” This background was also evident in the number 
of PD candidates named by ICW as undesirable. As Table 4.13 shows, both Golkar and 
PD had nine candidates included in ICW’s list. While 11 out of the 34 named candidates 
lost the election, most who dis so (7 out of the 11 or 63.6 percent) were from PD. This 
figure is remarkable, and increases if the two candidates removed from the Confirmed 
Candidate List are included in the calculation. However, because no real action was taken 
by ICW and other NGOs in the campaign phase, the outcome cannot be attributable to 
NGO’s efforts to enhance electoral accountability; presumably these PD candidates losts 
their seats as part of the general decline suffered by that party. 
Table 4.13 
ICW's Named Candidates in the 2014 General Election (by Election Outcome) 
 
Elected Not Elected Total 
Number  Share (%) Number  Share (%) Number Share (%) 
PKB 1 4.3  0 0.0  1 2.9  
PKS 4 17.4  0 0.0  4 11.8  
PDIP 5 21.7  0 0.0  5 14.7  
GOLKAR 7 30.4  2 18.2  9 26.5  
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Gerindra 2 8.7  0 0.0  2 5.9  
PD 2 8.7  7 63.6  9 26.5  
PPP 1 4.3  1 9.1  2 5.9  
Hanura 1 4.3  0 0.0  1 2.9  
PBB 0 0.0  1 9.1  1 2.9  
Total 23 100.0  11 100.0  34 100.0  
This overview highlights the politics of electoral reform. While the role of political parties 
in Indonesia’s electoral politics has been debated by NGOs and politicians since 1998, 
after the 2014 general election, there was renewed public discussion in Indonesia about 
problems like money politics, vote buying, and the victory by many rich candidates who 
lack integrity and credibility. Some critics argued that the electoral system was to blame 
(Supriyanto, 2013). The Interior Minister, Tjahjo Kumolo, for example, criticized the 
application of the Open Proportional System for generating unhealthy conflicts among 
candidates from the same political parties, and thus advocated revision to the Law on 
General Elections (Aivanni, 2016). Such claims did not receive applause from civil society 
groups. Masykurudin Hafidz, the JPPR coordinator, argued that “shortcomings that exist 
in the Open Proportional System should not be addressed with the restoration of the 
closed electoral system” (Aivanni, 2016). The director of the Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu 
dan Demokrasi (Perludem), Titi Anggraini, echoed Masykurudin’s argument by claiming 
that the Open-List System has been the best alternative so far, in that it has led to the 
high participation of voters and also accountability of elected representatives (Aivanni, 
2016). Accordingly, they proposed addressing the problems identified by critics by 
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reducing party leaders’ authority over candidate recruitment and other internal reform 
measures. Many party politicians, in contrast, have advocated returning to the closed-
list system. Clearly, ongoing debate over the electoral system means that the Indonesia’s 
candidate-centred electoral system might change in the future. 
Future examination of the outcome of these debates and Indonesia’s electoral reform 
process may enrich the literature on politics of electoral reforms in transitional 
democracies. Based on thorough analyses of electoral reforms in France and other 
established democracies, Renwick finds that voters and reform activists there can have 
real power over electoral reform, but adds that the cause of electoral reform does not 
readily ignite fervour among ordinary voters, and in order to gain credibility as a serious 
issue it must gain support from leading political figures (Renwick, 2011, p. 16). While this 
finding suggests that civil society groups and networks can build alliances with reform-
minded politicians to promote electoral reforms in established democracies, the 
influence of such forces in transitional contexts is less clear. Political parties and 
politicians have long occupied dominant positions in steering Indonesia’s post-Suharto 
electoral politics; the trend toward a candidate-centred electoral system, however, 
implies strong influence by civil society forces. 
The overview of recent events above also draws attention to NGO activists’ choices of 
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strategies. After NGOs released the first blacklist of candidates in the 2004 general 
election, the number of NGOs that have released such lists has gradually declined. NGOs 
that have done so have been very cautious about technical details, such as the wordings 
of their statements and release date. What has driven this trend? One obvious 
explanation is that the NGOs concerned have learned lessons from their past 
experiences. However, if, as the quotation from Emerson mentioned above shows, they 
have become increasingly cautious about possible threats in response to this strategy – 
despite the adoption of an open-list electoral system that in fact should advantage them 
in pursuing it – this means that Indonesian NGOs have followed a trajectory of electoral 
accountability enforcement that is different from the one developed by their South 
Korean counterparts. If the reason is that NGO activists had prioritised institution 
building over mobilization of constituents, it suggests changes to Indonesian NGOs’ 
accountability strategies under democratisation. Whichever explanation is correct, they 
both suggest that this topic would be deserving of future comparative study. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Third-wave democracies mostly introduce competitive elections at the beginning of their 
transition (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 331). These elections affect whether constituents in 
transitional democracies continue to lend their support to democratic measures (Svolik, 
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2013, p. 685). Widespread grievances against democratisation and representative 
institutions are likely to arise when these elections fail constituents, eventually leading 
to the stagnation of democratic progress, or even to the restoration of authoritarian rule. 
Indonesia is encountering such difficulties, as evidenced by low public trust in 
parliaments and elected representatives, and pessimism about the country’s future are 
revealed in a number of scholarly writings (Hadiz, 2005, p. 51; Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 
253). Pessimists identify the dominance of oligarchy in the newly reorganised power 
structure and point out how political brokers plunder the national interest through 
violence, bribery, and by other means. This causes many scholars to worry about the 
demise of Indonesia’s democracy. 
On the other hand, scholars like Mietzner (2012, p. 211) and Chalmers and Setiyono 
(2012, pp. 94-95) emphasize the role that civil society plays in democratisation ation, 
and argue that active civil society is the reason that there is still optimism about 
Indonesia’s democracy. This chapter echoes their arguments and looks into Indonesia’s 
Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. The movement represents a force within Indonesian 
society that has proactively promoted electoral accountability. NGOs did more than 
advocate reforms or monitor elections. They released blacklists, and that put pressure 
on political parties and their nominees; they lobbied for changes in electoral laws, and 
which made the institutional context more favourable to the enforcement of electoral 
accountability than ever; they also disseminated information, which not only rendered 
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candidates’ track records more accessible than ever but turned the slogan “say no to 
rotten politicians” into a campaign agenda. These initiatives indicate that the powerful 
vested interests could no longer unilaterally decide Indonesia’s electoral democracy; 
local civil society organisations were countering their control of the democratisation 
process. In the light of this, the future of Indonesia’s democracy is not entirely pessimistic. 
Findings of this chapter further explain why political corruption remains pervasive during 
the Reformasi era. While some scholars treat the presence of oligarchy and also its 
dominance in local politics as the main cause of the continuing corruption problem, this 
chapter offers a different explanation. NGOs endeavoured to turn elections into an 
effective accountability tool, but encountered challenges originating from the electoral 
regulations and constituents’ attitudes, suggesting that the context did not facilitate 
NGO-led accountability actions aimed at strengthening electoral accountability 
relationship between Indonesian constituents and their elected representatives. 
Changes brought about by NGO initiatives were evident in the election discourse, as well 
as in the electoral laws that NGOs lobbied for between elections. These changes have 
improved Indonesia’s context for the enforcement of electoral accountability; in theory, 
once the relationship has been strengthened, they could reduce political corruption.  
This chapter’s findings also help extend discussions of social accountability. The term 
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“electoral accountability” has not received wide discussion in the literature on social 
accountability. However, as accountability agents emphasized by scholars of social 
accountability, NGOs should not overlook the importance of elections as an 
accountability tool, as evidenced by cases in South Korea and Indonesia. Because 
scholarly understanding of electoral accountability remains slight, this chapter identifies 
several noteworthy points. First, there is an alternative trajectory of the enforcement of 
electoral accountability in transitional democracies. While South Korea’s Blackballing 
Movement succeeded at its first trial and continued to exert influence over the 
development of local electoral politics, similar initiatives in Indonesia’s context did not 
reach the same outcomes. At that time, not all contextual conditions lent support to the 
Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement. Nevertheless, Indonesian NGOs did not flinch, but 
instead they turned to improving the institutions and other contextual conditions, 
promoting the enforcement of electoral accountability in a roundabout and sustainable 
way. This experience has prompted two considerations. First, the enforcement of 
electoral accountability in transitional democracies has at least two possible trajectories. 
Second, analysing electoral accountability initiatives by constituents should not focus 
merely on campaign periods and election results. Efforts to promote the enforcement of 
electoral accountability between elections also deserve attention.  
Furthermore, some obstacles to the enforcement of electoral accountability can be 
overcome. For example, the strategy of publishing a blacklist helps to overcome such 
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limitations as the coexistence of multiple issues or voters’ inability to distinguish who 
should be held accountable. Regulatory or institutional restrictions can be changed by 
NGOs exerting influence over legislation or issuing demands for judicial review. Finally, 
the enforcement of electoral accountability is not only subject to cost and other 
macroeconomic factors. In both South Korea and Indonesia, involvement in graft and the 
evasion of human rights are criteria by which NGOs have evaluated candidates’ 
qualifications, suggesting the need to look beyond macroeconomic factors.  
Electoral accountability has regard to a country’s quality of democracy and its future 
development, but academic understanding of this is still inadequate. The experience of 
Indonesia’s Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement can supplement the current literature, but 
it must be noted that it is only one case in a particular country. The academia still needs 
more case studies to enrich our understanding of electoral accountability in transitional 
democracies.      
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5 NGOs and Accountability Institutions: The Study of Three 
Indonesian Cases 
Accountability institutions—state institutions holding legally endowed authority to 
monitor office holders, investigate maladministration and impose punishment upon 
wrongdoers (O’Donnell, 2006, p. 337; Schmitter, 1999)—play an important role in 
preventing corruption. This is because functioning accountability institutions are likely 
to discourage government office holders from committing corruption. The executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the government all have tasks of accountability 
enforcement. O’Donnell (2006) calls this category “balancing institutions”, and 
differentiates them from appointed accountability institutions formed to deal with 
particular problems. ICAC in Hong Kong and the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia) in Indonesia are examples of appointed 
accountability institutions.  
The ideal is for all accountability institutions to function properly and independently, 
though of course there is often a gap between the ideal and reality. Many countries have 
seen balancing accountability institutions fail due to external intervention. Appointed 
accountability institutions may fail to carry out their tasks because they lack the 
resources necessary for daily operation or the power needed for accountability 
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enforcement (Grau, 2006). Even accountability institutions that possess sufficient 
resources and power may remain paper tigers if their leaders are unwilling to exercise 
that power. In short, multiple factors may weaken accountability institutions.  
It is thus essential to make accountability institutions function properly and 
independently. Scholars who believe in the effects of democratic measures on the 
reduction of corruption treat enhancing accountability institutions as a critical strategy. 
The present literature on improvement in accountability institutions mostly focuses on 
decision makers within the government, like politicians and non-elected officials, 
because they hold the authority over budget allocation, legislation and other affairs that 
much affect the performance of these institutions. But, as Fritzen (2005) argues, those 
decision makers “may face weak, or even negative, incentives” (p. 79) to support anti-
corruption initiatives. Accordingly, pressure from outside actors is often needed to 
ensure that decision makers promise to support accountability institutions, particularly 
ones that are formed to address corruption, and also that they keep promises when 
making decisions concerning these institutions (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Kpundeh, 1998; 
Kpundeh & Dininio, 2006).   
This chapter focuses on NGOs and explores their efforts to ensure decision makers 
commit to supporting accountability institutions. In countries like Indonesia, Argentina, 
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and Mexico, a growing number of NGOs in recent times have expressed strong concerns 
about the performance of accountability institutions, precisely because NGOs have 
increasingly adopted the tactic of using such institutions to enforce accountability 
(Calvancanti, 2006; Houtzager & Joshi, 2008; Lemos-Nelson & Zaverucha, 2006; 
Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006; Smulovitz, 2006). NGOs can pressure accountability 
institutions to perform their tasks effectively through approaches like exerting public 
pressure on them, filing petitions and such like. Most literature discusses these sorts of 
tactics. This research, however, explores efforts by NGOs in actually helping 
accountability institutions to gain the power and resource that they need to carry out 
their tasks, and to remove the obstacles that impede their work. Because most changes 
to accountability institutions involve political decisions, NGOs unavoidably have contact 
with both elected and non-elected officials.  
This chapter focuses on non-elected officials within government because they are 
essential to the cases discussed here. As explained in Chapter One, in every democracy 
non-elected officials are appointed, selected, or promoted by elected representatives to 
lead government agencies or working groups that are established to address specific 
problems. Given their positions and tasks, it is reasonable to expect that such officials 
will generally be knowledgeable about government regulations and have rich experience 
in communication. Formally, non-elected officials are accountable to their elected 
superiors and thus do not have a formal obligation to listen to suggestions put forward 
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by NGOs. However, recent decades have witnessed a worldwide trend of increasing 
interaction between NGOs and governments (Najam, 2000, p. 375). This trend arises 
because of the increasing complexity and diversity of the world we live in (Kooiman, 
1993, p. 35); the confluence of a number of trends including third-party government that 
are altering the shape of public sectors worldwide (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004, pp. 9-10), 
and also the need to address problems left by excessive reliance on market-oriented 
measures to improve government governance (Rhodes, 1999). The intensifying 
interaction between NGOs and government officials is also evident in the formulation 
and implementation of government policies and decisions. NGO participation receives 
wide praise from scholars who advocate concepts like public–private partnerships, new 
governance, or network governance (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Bogason & 
Musso, 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Reuben, 2004, p. 199; Salamon, 2002; Torfing, 
2005).  
NGOs’ participation in policy making can take several forms, including offering assistance, 
giving suggestions, or imposing pressure. In some cases, NGO activists are formally 
invited to join a decision making process and thus hold legally endowed power to hold 
to account non-elected officials who share decision-making power with them. The ideal 
scenario is that these activists co-operate with other activists attempting to exert control 
over non-elected officials from outside the government. In some cases, NGO activists 
may even co-operate with government officials so that the content and the 
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implementation of decisions complies with their expectations. These activities involve 
efforts to enforce accountability during the designing and implementation of policy and 
thus fit in the type of simultaneous accountability. 
Table 5.1 
The Four-C’s Model of NGO-Government Relations 
  Goals (Ends) 
Preferred 
Strategies 
(Means) 
 Similar Dissimilar 
Similar Cooperation Co-option 
Dissimilar Complementary Confrontation 
Note. From “The Four-C’s of Third Sector- Government Relations: Cooperation, Confrontation, 
Complementarity, and Co-optation,” by Najam, A., 2000, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10(4), 
p. 383. Copyright 2000 by the John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
There has been a growing body of literature on NGO—government relations since the 
1990s. Many of it explores the merits, as well as the potential shortcomings, of such 
relations and their impacts (Bogason & Musso, 2006; McCargo, 2005; Papadopoulos, 
2003; Sørensena & Torfing, 2003; Torfing, 2005). Some categorise such relations into 
different types (Coston, 1998; Seibel, 1992). Clark (1991) and Fisher (1998) have 
explored NGO-government relations from the perspectives of one of the two sides. 
Najam (2000) argued in turn that “the final shape of the relations is a function of 
decisions made by government as well as NGOs” (p. 383), and thus there is the need to 
look “at the perspective of both NGOs and government in any given relationship” (p. 
390). Assuming that NGO activists or government officials consider goals and preferred 
strategies in making decisions, he constructs the “Four-C’s” Model (see Table 5.1). The 
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Four-C’s refers to four different types of possible relations—cooperation, confrontation, 
complementarity, and co-option—that can occur when NGOs and the government 
interact. Table 5.2 presents Najam’s elucidation of the four possible relations.  
Table 5.2 
Elucidation of the Four-C’s 
Cooperation 
A cooperative relationship is likely when, on a given issue, government 
agencies and nongovernmental organisations not only share similar policy 
goals but also prefer similar strategies for achieving them. 
Confrontation 
 
A confrontational relationship is likely when governmental agencies and 
nongovernmental organisations consider each other’s goals and strategies to 
be antithetical to their own—essentially, total divergence of preferred ends 
as well as means. 
Complementarity 
 
A complementary relationship is likely when governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations share similar goals but prefer different 
strategies. Essentially, they have divergent strategies but convergent goals 
Co-optation 
 
A co-optive relationship is likely when governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations share similar strategies but prefer different goals. Such 
situations, based on divergent goals but convergent strategies, are often 
transitory. 
Note. Adapted from “The Four-C’s of Third Sector- Government Relations: Cooperation, Confrontation, 
Complementarity, and Co-optation,” by Najam, A., 2000, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10(4), 
p. 384-389. Copyright 2000 by the John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
Najam’s work (2000) offers a conceptual framework for understanding NGO-government 
relations. His premise is that government—NGOs relations are necessarily complex. He 
says: 
The NGO sector is certainly not monolithic, and neither is the government. On 
any given issue, different agencies and actors within the same government can 
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nurture different types of relationships with a given NGO, and vice versa. This is 
why in the very same polity one is liable to find various types of NGO–
government relations…The same NGO may have a confrontational relationship 
with one state agency and a cooperative one with another. Similarly, different 
NGOs are likely to have different relationships with the same agency…Implicit in 
the construction of the model is the notion that NGO–government relations are 
best understood at the level of particular issues and organisations, instead of as 
generalizations at the level of societies, nations, or continents. (pp. 390-391)  
Several questions arise from Najam’s warning against generalizing NGO—government 
relations. Do NGOs vary in attitudes toward cooperation with the government? How do 
NGOs that differ in their relations with government interact? If only a few NGOs co-
operate with the government, what impact can they have on government policy and 
decisions? These questions are essential to further understanding of NGO—government 
relations, but have rarely been addressed by the current literature. This research will fill 
the gap by analysing three cases that involve Jakarta-based NGOs in a democratising 
context.  
The three cases relate to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Corruption 
Court (Pengadilan Tipikor) and the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) respectively. The 
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Corruption Eradication Commission and the Corruption Court can both be defined as 
appointed accountability institutions. They were established to supplement and 
complement “balancing accountability institutions” that had failed to reduce corruption 
effectively. The Supreme Court, by contrast, was a balancing accountability institution 
par excellence—for decades it had been Indonesia’s apex court and in the Reformasi era 
it took on the task of reforming Indonesia’s entire judicial system. In the case of the KPK, 
this research focuses on NGO activists and their interaction with non-elected officials 
when participating in the selection of KPK commissioners. With regard to the Corruption 
Court, this research observes activists’ interactions with officials when taking part in the 
preparation of statutory source of the court. Regarding the Supreme Court, this research 
observes activists’ participation in the formulation and implementation of the blueprint 
for judicial reform. The criteria used to select these cases include their significance to 
the development of accountability institutions and the level of concern that Jakarta-
based NGOs expressed about them.  
The findings of this research are as follow, Several Jakarta-based NGOs, aware of the 
importance of accountability institutions to the reduction of corruption, tried hard to 
influence and monitor non-elected officials’ decisions concerning the institutions named 
above. All activists interviewed for this research were positive about the invitations and 
opportunities that they had to participate directly in decision making, implying a great 
degree of flexibility in how their accountability activities were organised. At the same 
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time, favourable mechanisms and reform-minded officials offered NGO activists 
opportunities to exert control over the formulation and implementation of decisions 
concerning accountability institutions. Given that Jakarta-based NGOs had significant 
positive effects in the three cases, it is fair to state that they contributed to the 
prevention of corruption. Nevertheless, this research also points out that, under some 
conditions, the participation of NGO activists in the formulation and implementation of 
decisions might also have a negative impact.  
This chapter starts with a brief review of Indonesia’s accountability institutions, 
particularly ones that concern the reduction of corruption, in the Reformasi era, 
followed by explorations of cases. The chapter concludes by summarizing its major 
contributions to the literature on social actors’ accountability activities, and also to 
literature on the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia.  
5.1 Indonesia’s Accountability Institutions in the Reformasi Era 
Indonesia had long lacked the effective checks and balances that are needed in a 
functioning democracy. The country ended its war against the Netherlands in 1949 and 
formally won its independence. For much of the ensuing period its executive 
government was in a superior position. Especially under Suharto (1967–1998), the 
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executive dominated other state institutions. Legislative and judicial institutions not only 
lacked the power to supervise the executive but also had their own internal problems, 
including malfeasance and corruption (Srinivasan, 2002, p. 112; Stockmann, 2009 p. 57; 
Ziegenhain, 2008a). 
After Suharto resigned in 1998, a priority in the Reformasi period was to strengthen the 
legislative branch of government (Ramage, 2007). Fair and open elections improved the 
legitimacy of legislature. Amendments to the 1945 Constitution gave the People’s 
Representative Council authority to hold the president and vice-president accountable; 
regional parliaments were likewise strengthened vis-à-vis heads of local governments. 
Legislatures were no longer rubber stamps that merely endorsed decisions by the 
executive.  
Parliaments in democracies are supposed to monitor the executive government, and 
there is plenty of evidence showing that Indonesia’s members of parliament in the 
Reformasi era have made frequent use of the power entrusted to them to do so 
(Ziegenhain, 2008a). Equally, many cases show that many parliamentarians misuse their 
power in exchange for pecuniary or political gain (Lembaga Kajian Islam Dan Sosial, 2006). 
Many government officials who should have been called to account for corrupt 
behaviour were thus able to evade punishment by offering bribes to parliamentary 
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members (Chaniago, 2003a; Choi, 2004). 
Indonesian judicial institutions in the Reformasi era also fail to function optimally. 
Corruption is a criminal offence. It is the task of prosecutors and police to investigate 
allegations of corruption, but judges make judgments on corruption cases. On the 
surface, the process of law enforcement in Indonesia seems to be operating effectively, 
but a closer look reveals that it is plagued by many problems, including the lack of 
efficiency, professionalism and independence (Widjaja, 2003, p. 414). A New York Times 
journalist thus claims: “in Indonesia, justice is malleable”.166 
The integrity of many judicial officers is also highly dubious (Reksodiputro, 2002). 
Indonesians widely believe in the existence of a “judicial mafia” (mafia peradilan) 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 5). If former Supreme Court Junior Chief Asikin 
Kusumah Atmadja’s criticisms were not exaggerated, this “judicial mafia” include at least 
half of all judges (Lembaga Independensi Peradilan Indonesia, 2002, p. 4). Various 
scandals show that prosecutors and police are far from being immune to corruption.167 
                                                     
166 “In Indonesia, Justice is Malleable,” New York Times, January 5, 2010.   
167 “Legal Experts Tell President to Fire AGO Prosecutors,” Jakarta Post, June 24, 2008. 
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One survey shows that the interaction with police and judges of more than half of 
business people involved bribes (Transparency International Indonesia, 2006, pp. 18-19). 
Corrupt officers threaten the fairness and credibility of judicial institutions (Reksodiputro, 
2002, p. 33), hinder judicial institutions from improving themselves, and intimidate 
honest and upright law enforcement officials.
168
 As a result, many law enforcers consider 
receiving bribes a “normal interchange or perquisite or simply the way things [are] done" 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. iii). The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
(PERC) has accordingly argued that Indonesia’s “whole legal system is in desperate need 
of an overhaul”.169 
These problems suggest an obvious conclusion. Judicial and legislative institutions in the 
Reformasi era have not acted as competent accountability institutions. They are even a 
big part of the problem of accountability failure in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, 
Indonesians still have little trust in or respect for the country’s judicial and legislative 
institutions. The 2004 Global Corruption Barometer report found that most Indonesian 
                                                     
168 Hasil Hertanto, interview with author, Jakarta, January 14, 2008.  
169 “Corruption Sustained by Political Ties,” Jakarta Post, June 4, 2002. 
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respondents deemed judicial and legislative institutions to be the most corrupt state 
institutions (Transparency International, 2004, p. 18).170 People often believe that court 
judges demand or accept bribes in exchange for a favourable judgment or legal outcome. 
Several laws have also come under criticisms for blatantly benefiting certain 
conglomerates.   
Reform promotion is necessary in that context. There are two approaches to promoting 
reforms. One approach is to initiate internal reforms within existing accountability 
institutions. Several state institutions in Indonesia have already carried out reform 
measures alone. The Supreme Court, for example, released the blueprint for the first 
time in 2003; this lists areas that require reform, and the steps to achieve it. The court 
also set up a reform team (tim pembaruan) to co-ordinate and assess reform efforts. The 
Attorney General’s office accepted external audit for the first time in 2000 (Asian 
Development Bank, 2000). The Attorney General also narrowed the room for 
prosecutors’ discretion, in order to reduce the likelihood of prosecutors protecting 
                                                     
170  The Global Corruption Barometer reports reflect the perceptions of local residents, unlike the 
Corruption Perception Index reports which reflect the perceptions of businessmen, analysts, and other 
professionals.   
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corruption suspects (Saleh, 2008).  
Another approach is to establish appointed accountability institutions to supervise and 
supplement traditional accountability institutions. More than ten new accountability 
institutions were established to combat corruption or enforce accountability in the 
period 1998–2009 (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2). The Joint Team for the Eradication of 
Corruption, the Public Servants’ Wealth Audit Commission, the Corruption Eradication 
Commission, the Corruption Court, and Corruption Eradication Team are responsible for 
reducing corruption. The Information Commission, the Witnesses and Victims Protection 
Agency, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, and the 
National Ombudsman Commission offered assistance. The task of the Judicial 
Commission, the Attorney Commission, and the Police Commission was to put law 
enforcers under close scrutiny and so improve their performance.   
The common objective of the two approaches is to ensure a system of checks and 
balances. This research selects one balancing institution (namely, the Supreme Court) 
and two appointed institutions (namely, the Corruption Eradication Commission and the 
Corruption Court) as objects of case studies. Criteria used to select these three 
institutions include their importance to the reduction of corruption in Indonesia and 
relevance to the primary objective of this research. The three institutions differ in several 
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aspects, so this research only selects one phase of reform in each. The phases selected 
were critical to the development of these accountability institutions. The focus is on 
Indonesian NGOs’ efforts to help these accountability institutions function better.  
5.2 Corruption Eradication Commission 
5.2.1 The most powerful anti-corruption institution in Indonesia 
The Corruption Eradication Commission was the fourth accountability institution 
specially established to combat corruption in the Reformasi period.171 Its establishment 
was critical. The three previous accountability institutions were all plagued with 
problems such as a lack of authority and inadequate funding.172 Adi Andojo Soetjipto, a 
famous anti-corruption figure who once led the TGPTPK, criticised the three institutions 
for failing to combat corruption effectively. Like many others, he advocated establishing 
                                                     
171 “Pemerintah Diminta Terbuka Soal Panitia Seleksi Pimpinan KPK,” detikNews, April 26, 2007. 
172 Take TGPTPK for example. It, was not an independent law enforcement agency, but was affiliated 
with the Attorney General’s Office. It thus lacked independence and also did not have the power required 
to conduct investigation. Its statutory source was Governmental Regulation No. 19 0f 2000. According to 
Law No. 10 of 2004, government regulations cannot contradict laws and the 1945 Constitution. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the Team should be dissolved because the regulations contradicted Law No. 31 
of 1999 on Corruption Eradication. 
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a replacement institution that would have real authority to carry out its tasks 
independently.173  
Most NGO activists agreed with Adi. The NGO Coalition for Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Koalisi Ornop untuk Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) consisted of ICW, LeiP 
and several other Jakarta-based NGOs. A joint statement released by the coalition on 
February 15, 2000 read, “the prime cause [of corruption] is the absence of capacity and 
willingness of law enforcement institutions to fight corruption. People, especially those 
who benefit from effective and fair corruption fighting efforts, thus long for the 
establishment of a Corruption Eradication Commission that is independent, professional 
and accountable”. 174  Some NGO activists even called the Corruption Eradication 
Commission the “last hope” for combatting corruption in Indonesia.175  
The Corruption Eradication Commission has a statutory basis that dates back to 2002.176 
                                                     
173 “House Launches Debate on Anticorruption Body,” Jakarta Post, December 4, 2001. 
174 “Pembahasan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Harus Terbuka dan Partisipatif,” Koalisi Ornop untuk 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi press release, February 15, 2002.  
175 “Pemerintah Diminta Terbuka Soal Panitia Seleksi Pimpinan KPK,” detikNews, April 26, 2007. 
176 Bivitri Susanti, interview with author, Jakarta, October 5, 2007. 
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According to Law No. 30 of 2002, the Corruption Eradication Commission is an 
independent state institution (Article 3). Its tasks include coordinating anti-corruption 
measures, scrutinizing state institutions, investigating and preventing corruption (Article 
6). It has the power to take over corruption cases that police and prosecutors cannot 
handle (Article 9). It can also wiretap corruption suspects, and ask relevant authorities 
to freeze suspects’ bank accounts and suspend them temporarily from duty (Article 12). 
Those and other clauses endow the Corruption Eradication Commission with the power 
to investigate and prosecute corruption cases effectively. Indeed, it has more power than 
prosecutors and police do (Butt, 2011, p. 382). Many observers maintain that such 
powers are essential in the context of the Reformasi era. As National Commission on 
Human Rights (KOMNASHAM) commissioner Achmad Ali put it, “[m]any doubt that the 
commission’s tasks will overlap with the tasks carried out by the police and prosecutors. 
[I, however, think that] the need for the commission simply indicates the failure of these 
two institutions.”177  
The possession and execution of power are two different things, of course. Only people 
with a high level of professionalism, integrity, and a strong commitment and 
                                                     
177 “New Anticorruption Commission Hailed,” Jakarta Post, December 5, 2002. 
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determination to fight corruption will effectively use even wide powers to carry out their 
tasks. Fortunately, a professional recruitment mechanism was introduced to ensure that 
investigators, prosecutors, and staff of the Corruption Eradication Commission met all 
those criteria (Bolongaita, 2010, pp. 15-17). But leadership is also critical. The body’s 
first-term commissioners not only had to build up their institution but also faced high 
expectations that they would demonstrate quickly its effectiveness and efficiency in 
fighting corruption. Law No.30 of 2002 also established a Selection Board to recommend 
qualified commissioners. The executive government was empowered to form the 
Selection Board, composed of representatives from both society and government 
(Article 30). Its tasks included accepting applications, reviewing the qualifications of 
applicants, and ensuring that the whole selection process was transparent and open 
(Article 31). The Selection Board would make a shortlist of candidates, from which the 
People’s Representative Council would pick five candidates to be commissioners.  
The selection phase is obviously crucial. If candidates recommended by the Selection 
Board were upright, professional and willing to combat corruption, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission could be a very effective body. NGO activists concerned with 
the fight against corruption understood how important the selection phase was, and 
became deeply involved in the selection of KPK leaders. 
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5.2.2 Involvement of NGO activists  
More often than not, NGOs monitor the selection of accountability institution leaders, 
rather than participating in the decision-making process. However, Law No. 30 of 2002 
provided that the Selection Board could consist of representatives from both society and 
government, creating room for NGOs to participate in the selection of KPK leaders. More 
importantly, Romly Atmasasmita the academic who presided over the Selection Board, 
offered some NGO activists opportunities to be deeply involved in the whole selection 
phase.178  
5.2.2.1 Within the selection board  
The first selection of commissioners of the Corruption Eradication Commission began on 
September 21, 2003. A professor specialising in criminal law, Romly was at that time the 
head of the General Law Administration Division, Justice and Human Rights Ministry. He 
had forged a close relationship with NGOs concerned with corruption and judicial 
                                                     
178 Romly’s output includes two books relevant to corruption problems. He once chaired the Indonesian 
Society of Criminology and Criminal Law (Masyarakat Hukum Pidana dan Kriminologi Indonesia).  
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reform.179 He appointed six community representatives as Selection Board members, 
including Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) founder, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and 
TII General Secretary, Todung Mulya Lubis. The six, together with eight government 
representatives, made up the Selection Board.  
Romly also invited several NGO activists to join the Technical Team affiliated with the 
Selection Board. The participants were activists of the Indonesia Transparency Society 
(MTI) and TII. They agreed to join the Technical Team because there was only limited 
time available for the selection, and they expected the Corruption Eradication 
Commission to begin operation soon (Transparency International Indonesia, 2003). They 
offered technical assistance, such as designing selection mechanisms and examining the 
qualifications of applicants. Such work was significant because all Selection Board 
members had concurrent posts and therefore could not deal with the detailed work of 
selection.180 Effectively, it was the Technical Team that ran the Selection Board.  
                                                     
179 Romly frequently participated in workshops held by NGOs. He was a member of the task force that 
NGOs formed to draft the Law on the Corruption Court.  
180  Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009; Todung Mulya Lubis, 
interview with author, Jakarta, October 12, 2009; Anung Karyadi, interview with author, Jakarta, 
November 6, 2007. 
 282 
 
Unlike members of the Technical Team, Buyung and Todung were entitled to cast votes 
on the Board. They were both famous legal scholars and practising lawyers before joining 
the Selection Board, and they were invited to join in recognition of their professionalism 
and their prominent public reputations. They perceived themselves, however, as 
representatives of NGOs, and saw their participation as promoting citizen’s rights. As 
Todung put it:  
The law on the KPK stipulates that the Selection Board shall include 
representatives from society. The president and government should abide by 
that law. I had worked on fighting corruption for a long time, since the Suharto 
era. People and government officials knew me. At the same time, I also 
contributed to the Law on the KPK. Thus, when there was a need to form the 
Selection Board, the Justice and Human Rights Ministry invited me. I was happy 
to do so. [Regarding my role], I am a professional as well as an NGO activist. Most 
people, however, think that I am the latter. I also think my role in the Selection 
Board was more like an NGO activist, rather than a professional.181 
                                                     
181 Todung Mulya Lubis, interview with author, Jakarta, October 12, 2009. 
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The prime task of the Selection Board is to pick applicants competent to lead the 
Corruption Eradication Commission. Technical Team members recalled that most 
applicants were job seekers. Many did not have suitable qualifications and knew little 
about anti-corruption measures.182 Most qualified applicants were incumbent or retired 
law enforcers, prosecutors, police, and judges. While several NGOs openly objected to 
such applicants leading the Corruption Eradication Commission, Buyung and Todung 
took the opposite position. Buyung, who was himself a prosecutor early in his career 
before he established YLBHI, in the early 1950s explained:  
I know some NGOs are very anti-police and anti-prosecutors. I [, however,] do 
not agree with that opinion. We should be open to everybody, even police and 
prosecutors. We never limit opportunities to the police and prosecutors because 
we should be open [on democratic lines], not arbitrary, anti-police or anti-
military. That is NGOs’ position, and I disagree with them. Look! You should not 
generalise that all police are corrupt or all prosecutors were corrupt. I was a 
prosecutor for 15 years. Why did you accept me? I know that many colleagues 
were honest, but they rarely stood up. They were silent because they were afraid. 
                                                     
182 Anung Karyadi, interview with author, Jakarta, November 6, 2007. 
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In the police, of course, it is still the same. In the police court, there are still many 
clean people. We should be open-minded. Generalization is not fair. If you 
support people [who are against state institutions], they will go too far [and 
create a] stateless society. That is a problem. I prefer that we fight against the 
wrong, but to good people we should be friendly and give them ideas in order to 
push them forward. Not generalizations! In this way, we will be more effective, 
rather than by making enemies.183 
The formulation of the decision on the shortlist was the last step for the Board. Relevant 
discussions within the Selection Board were not open. Many people feared that the 
governmental representatives who constituted the majority would manipulate the 
selection process against the public interest. This concern is to be expected, because 
there were cases that ended with poor choices (Grimes, 2008; Olken, 2007; Veron, 
Williams, Corbridge, & Srivastava, 2006). However, because it was a consensus-based 
decision-making process, governmental representatives could not in fact dominate the 
formulation of decisions.184 At the same time, according to Buyung, all governmental 
representatives were actually neutral, and did not attempt to manipulate the Selection 
                                                     
183 Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009. 
184 Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009. 
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Board. He said:   
No forces dared to interfere in the selection of the KPK commissioners in 2003, 
even the minister and the president. People were afraid that the [Selection] 
Board would choose applicants that the President preferred. In fact, we came 
there with our brains blank, and we came together and prayed to God [that we 
would pick] the best [candidates]. None of us knew who we were going to choose. 
Our minds were a blank and that was the way we started. I was happy to see that 
government people [in the Selection Board] were both very open-minded and 
reluctant to have any people close to the president. From that reaction, we came 
to see that people were very honest.185 
5.2.2.2 Outside the selection board 
Unlike the few NGO activists who were invited to join the Selection Board, most Jakarta-
based NGO activists participated in the selection of KPK leaders in other capacities. Some 
were applicants, including Bambang Widjojanto (YLBHI), Amien Sunaryadi (MTI), and 
                                                     
185 Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009. 
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Erry Riayana Hardjapamekas (TII). Bambang was a famous human rights lawyer who had 
many times confronted the Suharto administration in the New Order era. With regard to 
his reasons for filing an application, Bambang explained:  
In the Reformasi era, we believed that we have the space, and we could make 
the space bigger in order to push our idealism and make civil society strong, not 
only from the outside, but also from the inside. Yes! We join state institutions, 
but [the purpose] is to criticise [from within]. The KPK is an opportunity.186 
Table 5.3 
Applicants Supported by NGOs 
Name Note 
Marsilam Simanjuntak  Legal Consultant 
Bambang Widjojanto  Member of Ethical Board of ICW/Lawyer 
Iskandar Sonhaji  Member of Ethical Board of ICW/Lawyer 
Amin Sunaryadi Member of MTI 
Erry Riayana Hardjapamekas  Member of TII 
Note. Adapted from Anung Karyadi, personal communication, August 8, 2007. 
Most NGO activists, however, participated in the capacity of monitors and lobbyists. 
While compiling applicants’ track records and scrutinizing the selection process, activists 
                                                     
186 Bambang Widjojanto, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2009.  
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also lobbied for applicants they supported. Table 5.3 lists applicants NGOs supported at 
that time. Bambang was most favoured. They, however, understood that Bambang was 
too controversial to be accepted by most Selection Board members (he did become a 
commissioner much later, in 2011). They thus managed to help the remaining four 
applicants win recommendations.187  
NGO activists saw these strategies as important because they helped reduce political 
intervention. Nevertheless, some saw this lobbying as interference. In response to this 
criticism, ICW activist Adnan Topan Hosodo explained, “You can say that [we were trying 
to interfere]. The difference is that we could guarantee the integrity of the person and 
the visions of the people we recommended. Political parties and political elites may not 
be able to do so. There were various kinds of interests in the KPK. We have to minimise 
the possibility [that pro-corruption interests would dominate the institution].”188  
Many NGOs did not like the idea of law enforcement officials leading the Corruption 
                                                     
187 Adnan Topan Hosodo, interview with author, Jakarta, January 11, 2008.   
188 Adnan Topan Hosodo, interview with author, Jakarta, October 8, 2009.  
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Eradication Commission. ICW chairman Danang Widoyoko pointed out:  
We did not support applicants from conventional law enforcement agencies to 
lead the KPK because we doubted that they would monitor agencies where they 
once served, not to mention imposing serious sanctions on them. At the same 
time, as you know, law enforcement agencies in Indonesia are corrupt. How can 
we entrust a new and powerful institution to people who are already 
accustomed to corruption?189  
Danang’s remarks encapsulate the distrust most NGO activists felt toward traditional law 
enforcers; his views obviously differed from Buyung who joined the Selection Board. 
Such differences, however, did not give rise to conflict among NGO activists, according 
to the data collected for this research.  
5.2.2.3 Selection results  
The whole selection process took nearly 60 working days. The Selection Board publicised 
                                                     
189 Danang Widoyoko, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
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its shortlist on 6th December, 2003 (see Table 5.4). Buyung judged all ten candidates as 
competent to lead the Corruption Eradication Commission.190 Of the five applicants 
supported by NGOs, only Bambang was not on the shortlist. Nevertheless, he still praised 
the selection process for being the most fair and transparent in the Reformasi era.191 
Table 5.4 
Ten Candidates Recommended by the Selection Board in 2003 
Supporters Name Notes 
NGOs 
Amen Sunaryadi (42)a Member of MTI 
Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas (24) a Member of TII 
Iskandar Sonhadji SH Lawyer 
Marsilam Simandjuntak Legal Consultant 
None 
Chairul Imam Prosecutor 
Momo Kelana MSi Police Officer 
Moh. Yamin SH. Prosecutor 
H. Syahruddin Rasul SH (39) a Officer of the Minister of Finance 
Tauifiqurrahman Ruki (43) a Police Officer 
Tumpak Hatorangan Panggabean (26) a Prosecutor 
Note. Adapted from Anung Karyadi, personal communication, August 8, 2007. 
a Elected as Corruption Eradication Commission commissioner; figures in parentheses show the number 
of votes they received 
Commission II of the DPR (People’s Representative Council), in charge of legal and 
internal affairs, then had the power to make the final decision. All the candidates were 
interviewed by a team of 18 members of parliament. Later, all 44 members of 
                                                     
190 Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009. 
191 Bambang Widjojanto, interview with author, Jakarta, October 24, 2009. 
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Commission II voted on the final decision. The result was that the retired police officer 
Tauifiqurrahman Ruki won the KPK chairmanship. Commission II also selected two 
candidates supported by NGOs—Amien and Erry—to be vice chairmen.  
The election of Amien and Erry was significant, in that NGO activists, in addition to 
exposing scandals and launching protests, now had a new way to combat corruption: 
joining law enforcement agencies. It is noteworthy, however, that all law enforcers must 
obey codes of conduct. Such codes include not leaking information on cases under 
investigation (such as names of suspects and evidence collected), and not intervening in 
judicial processes. As Amien Sunaryadi points out,  
Joining KPK is against NGO activists’ principle of maintaining independence 
because, once you become a law enforcer, you have to follow the rules, code of 
conduct, technical procedure and line of command. Whoever becomes the 
commissioner is OK, but once an activist joins law enforcement agencies he or 
she has to cut their relationship [with their original organisations]. If activists still 
work like activists [such as freely sharing information with others] after they 
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serve in law enforcement agencies, they might be breaking the law.192  
Even so, once they joined the KPK, activists could still function as a bridge linking the 
Commission and NGOs, in certain limited respects. Several suggestions put forward by 
NGO activists were under deliberation within the Corruption Eradication Commission. 
Erry said:  
I have encouraged NGOs to contact the KPK since the start. There were varied 
fields in which both can co-operate, and I could be the bridge. In fact, NGOs had 
many good suggestions. I collected them and proposed them. Now many 
suggestions of NGOs have become programmes or decisions of the KPK.193 
To sum up, Jakarta-based NGOs were deeply involved in the selection of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission leadership. Not only the Selection Board but also the Technical 
Team affiliated to it had the participation of NGO activists. At the same time, there were 
also NGO activists advocating selecting specific applicants whom they considered 
                                                     
192 Amien Sunaryadi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 9, 2009. 
193 Erry Riayana Hardjapamekas, interview with author, Jakarta, January 3, 2008. 
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competent to head the Corruption Eradication Commission. Though their roles differed, 
NGO activists worked closely and formed a force to oversee the whole selection process 
from both within and outside the Selection Board. Other factors, including the fact that 
government representatives maintained neutrality, that pro-reform officials offered 
invitations and that the decision-making process followed the principle of consensus, 
were also conducive to producing an outcome that met NGOs’ expectations. The 
selection of the Corruption Eradication Commission leadership is therefore a good 
example of the exercise of simultaneous accountability by NGOs through deep 
involvement in decision making. The two NGO activists elected as commissioners 
functioned as a bridge between the Corruption Eradication Commission and NGOs. 
Though they were required to follow the KPK’s code of conduct, they could also reflect 
the concerns of NGOs. KPK thus became an accountability institution that was 
responsive to social demands.  
5.3 Corruption Court  
5.3.1 A Special court maintaining a high conviction rate 
The Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pengadilan Tipikor) is a special 
court structurally affiliated with the Central Jakarta District Court. Its establishment was 
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a response to grievances about the general courts. Chalid (2001), a former TGPTPK 
member, considered the general courts “to be the most dangerous threat to anti-
corruption efforts” (p. 24) in Indonesia. This was because they frequently made 
controversial judgments that either acquitted corruption defendants or failed to 
prosecute them to the full extent of the law. Critics believed that bribery had a lot to do 
with these outcomes.   
There had been demands for the establishment of a special Corruption Court since the 
start of the Reformasi era. Not until the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission 
was passed in 2002 did the court have a statutory basis (Butt, 2012a). Presidential 
Decision No. 59 of 2004 stipulates its composition. The Corruption Court came into 
operation in 2004, and only hears corruption cases that have been prosecuted by the 
Corruption Eradication Commission.194  
The Corruption Court performed better than the general courts. Based on a survey by 
ICW, the Corruption Court acquitted no corruption defendants in the period 2005–2008. 
In contrast, the general courts acquitted nearly 40 percent of corruption defendants in 
                                                     
194 For more details about the formation of the Corruption Court, see Presidential Decision No. 59 of 
2004.  
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the same period.195 In terms of content of sanctions, the Corruption Court was also 
more punitive than the general courts.196 This outcome prompted praise, because the 
court effectively warned corruption suspects prosecuted by the Corruption Eradication 
Commission that they would receive severe punishment.197 The Corruption Court was 
thus an excellent partner for the Corruption Eradication Commission, and won 
community support.198  
Several factors led to this outcome. In particular, the recruitment of ad hoc judges was 
essential. Ad hoc judges are non-career judges whom the Supreme Court recruits to 
handle certain cases that require a high level of experience and knowledge.199 This kind 
                                                     
195  Romly Atmasasmita warns against the problem of “rule by the press”. He worries that the 
phenomenon will harm rights of defendants to receive indiscriminative treatment in courts. “Idealisme 
Pengadilan Tipikor Dan Kelembagaan Anti Korupsi,” Retrieved on September 2, 2009, from 
http://korup5170.wordpress.com./opiniartikel-pakar-hukum/idealis.  
196 “Persekongkolan Usia Pensiun Hakim Agung,” Koran Sindo, September 23, 2008.  
197 “Idealisme Pengadilan Tipikor Dan Kelembagaan Anti Korupsi,” Retrieved on August 31, 2009, from 
http://korup5170.wordpress.com/opiniartikel-pakar-hukum/idealis.; “Idealisme Pengadilan Tipikor Dan 
Kelembagaan Anti Korupsi,” Retrieved on September 2, 2009, from 
http://korup5170.wordpress.com/opiniartikel-pakar-hukum/idealis.  
198 “Jajak Pendapat Kompas; Kegalauan dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi,” Kompas, February 19, 2007. 
199 Regarding NGO activists’ attitudes, see “Pengadilan Tipikor Sebagai Jiwa Pemberantasan Korupsi: 
Kewenangan Pengadilan Tipikor dan Konsepsi Hakim Adhoc” 1st Press Roundtable/KRHN/180908, 
Retrieved on September 1, 2009, from 
http://reformasihukum.org/file/kajian/Pengadilan%20Tipikor%20sebagai%20jiwa%20pemberantasan 
 295 
 
of ad hoc recruitment was necessary in the Reformasi era, precisely because public trust 
in career judges was low and only judges with particular knowledge and skills were able 
to hear corruption cases.200 All first-term ad hoc judges in Corruption Court were upright 
and professional, according to NGOs.201  
The composition of the panel of judges in the court allowed ad hoc judges to dominate 
the formulation of court judgments. Law No. 30 of 2002 explicitly stipulated that the 
panel of judges would include both ad hoc and career judges, but that the former must 
outnumber the latter (Article 58, 59, 60). 202  NGO activists attributed the court’s 
extraordinary conviction rate to the relevant clauses in Law No. 30 of 2002. As KRHN 
                                                     
%20korupsi.pdf.  
200  “Pengadilan Tipikor Sebagai Jiwa Pemberantasan Korupsi: Kewenangan Pengadilan Tipikor dan 
Konsepsi Hakim Adhoc” 1st Press Roundtable/KRHN/180908, Retrieved on September 1, 2009, from 
http://reformasihukum.org/file/kajian/Pengadilan%20Tipikor%20sebagai%20jiwa%20pemberantasan%2
0korupsi.pdf. 
201 “Panitia Seleksi Hanya Pilih Sembilan Hakim Ad Hoc Korupsi,” Kompas, June 22, 2004; “Pengadilan 
Tipikor Sebagai Jiwa Pemberantasan Korupsi: Kewenangan Pengadilan Tipikor dan Konsepsi Hakim 
Adhoc,” 1st Press Roundtable/KRHN/180908, Retrieved on September 1, 2009, from 
http://reformasihukum.org/file/kajian/Pengadilan%20Tipikor%20sebagai%20jiwa%20pemberantasan%2
0korupsi.pdf. 
202 The Corruption Court is not the only special court that has ad hoc judges. Other special courts such as 
Human Rights Court and the Commercial Court also have ad hoc judges. 
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activist Kandi put it:  
There are no ad hoc judges in district courts, but the Corruption Court has ad hoc 
judges. District courts acquitted many corrupt people, but none of the accused 
in corruption cases heard by the Corruption Court was free to leave the courts. 
If career judges outnumbered ad hoc judges, the performance of the Corruption 
Court might not be as good as we see now. It is clear that ad hoc judges and the 
provision allowing them to outnumber career judges were crucial factors 
contributing to this difference.203 
The Corruption Court, however, faced two major challenges in 2006. The first originated 
from a ruling of the Constitution Court.204 The Constitution Court ruled that Article 53 
of Law No. 30 of 2002 was unconstitutional, and that the Corruption Court would require 
its own statutory source before 19th December, 2009. Otherwise, it would be dissolved 
                                                     
203 Kandi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 28, 2009.  
204 Petitioners included nine General Election Commission (KPU) members who were also corruption 
suspects. Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution requires all judicial agencies to have their own laws as 
statutory sources. They thus argued that applying Law No. 30 of 2002 to establish both the Corruption 
Eradication Commission and the Corruption Court was unconstitutional. Petitioners also claimed that they 
faced discrimination because their cases were heard by the Corruption Court, not general courts, and 
argued that this treatment contradicted Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution that protected Indonesian 
citizens from discrimination. The Constitutional Court, however, did not grant this aspect of the petition.   
 297 
 
(Masyarat Transparensi Indonesia, 2007, pp. 37-66).205 The second arose after the DPR 
ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2006.206 Law No. 31 of 
1999 on Corruption Eradication thus needed to be revised in order to incorporate the 
principles and ideas stipulated in the Convention.207 It was feared that the revision might 
influence the operation of the court because it contained clauses stipulating the 
principles, criteria, and methods concerning investigation and prosecution of corruption 
suspects and sanctions.  
NGO activists were greatly concerned that the revised laws would result in the 
dissolution of the Corruption Court and the dismissal of ad hoc judges. NGOs made many 
efforts during this period to ensure that the Court of Corruption would remain 
independent and effective. They did so by trying to affect the process of preparing a new 
                                                     
205 This ruling gave rise to strong criticisms, because it allowed the unconstitutional article to remain 
active for three years. On this criticism, Maruarar Siahaan, Constitutional Court judge, explained that the 
ruling was a response to the understanding that corruption in Indonesia was an extraordinary crime and 
that there were strong demands to eradicate it. This explanation was praised by NGO activist leaders like 
Agung Herdarto and Bambang Widjajanto. However, Adnan Buyung Nasution argued that constitutionally 
all unconstitutional articles or laws should be abolished immediately. For more discussion, see “MK Beri 
Batas Waktu Tiga Tahun Pemerintah-DPR Harus Buat UU Pengadilan Tipikor,” Kompas, December 20, 
2006 and Masyarakat Transparensi Indonesia (2007 pp. 37-66).   
206 “UU Tipikor Mengalami Perubahan,” Suara Karya, November 15, 2006. 
207 Law No. 21 of 2001 is a revision of Law No. 31 of 1999.  
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law.  
5.3.2 Activities of NGOs  
Several Jakarta-based NGOs expressed strong concern that the continued existence of 
the Corruption Court might be threatened. ICW, PSHK and many others thus formed the 
Coalition to Save Corruption Eradication (Koalisi Penyelamat Pemberantasan Korupsi) in 
order to defend the Corruption Court.  
NGOs were able to exert influence at both the preparation phase of the new draft bill 
and the discussion phase. According to Law No. 10 of 2004, both the President and the 
DPR have the right to propose draft laws (Article 18 and 19). The President assigns 
ministers concerned with the relevant area of policy to discuss the draft with members 
of parliament (Article 20 and 21). Ordinary people also have the right to offer suggestions 
at both the draft preparation and discussion phases, by means of either oral or written 
statements (Article 53).  
The new bill was prepared in a period in which the possibility for community members 
to influence policy was gradually improving, both because the attitudes of government 
officials had changed and because the capacity of NGO activists had greatly improved. 
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Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan) advisor Dadang Trisasongko, for 
example, pointed out:  
[In the initial phase of the Reformasi era], it was not easy [for NGOs] to influence 
legislation because prejudice existed in both the government and society. Things 
changed, however, after frequent contact and talks. I think it has become easy 
for many government officials, especially subordinates to ministers, to have 
discussions with outsiders. This is partly because ICW and some other NGOs have 
already built a reputation. At the same time, [the official preparation team] did 
not have alternatives because they sometimes distrusted the university experts 
whom they consulted. Many have problems of integrity. [Accordingly,] now many 
government officials are open to discussions with NGOs and inclined to combine 
viewpoints from different parts.208  
The enactment of the Law on the Corruption Court and the revision of the Law on 
Corruption Eradication both illustrate Dadang’s point.  
                                                     
208 Dadang Trisasongko, interview with author, Jakarta, February 14, 2008. 
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5.3.2.1 The Law on the Corruption Court 
NGOs demonstrated enthusiasm for this law from the beginning. Their first step was the 
formation of a Draft Law Preparation Team which consisted of NGO activists and several 
officials like Romly Atmasasmita, Amien Sunaryadi and others.209 Their initial goal was to 
draft an NGO-version Draft Law on the Corruption Court. However, this goal was 
superseded after the Minister of Justice and Human Rights delegated Romly to lead the 
official Draft Law Preparation Team. NGO activists thus shifted their focus to the 
formulation of the government’s own version of the draft Law. 
Romly did not invite NGO activists to join the official Draft Law Preparation Team. The 
discussions within that team were not open to public participation, but Romly offered to 
make relevant information available to the public.210 NGOs activists were thus aware of 
the progress of drafting and of issues under debate. They could take quick action to lobby 
against provisions that might hinder anti-graft activities. The official Draft Law 
Preparation Team incorporated many suggestions made by NGOs into the final law draft. 
                                                     
209 “RUU Tipikor Tandingan Dibuat; Peradi Persoalkan Pertemuan Hakim Ad Hoc dan KPK,” Kompas, 
February 15, 2007. 
210 Kandi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 28, 2009.  
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According to Dadang Trisasongko, nearly 90 percent of the draft originated from the 
suggestions of NGOs.211  
Nevertheless, the draft still contained several controversial clauses (see Table 5.5). One 
such clause stipulated the establishment of a Corruption Court in regions where activists 
believed they would be more vulnerable to intervention. In spite of such worries, 
activists interviewed for this research did not strongly oppose this clause, probably 
because they also expected a Corruption Court in the regions to bring changes to local 
areas. By comparison, another clause relating to the composition of the judging panel 
was strongly criticised (Butt, 2011, pp. 389-390). All interviewees for this research 
maintained their support for the previous ratio under which ad hoc judges outnumbered 
career judges. The Draft Law on the Corruption Court, however, stipulated that it was 
the chairmen of district courts and the Supreme Court Chief Justice who would decide 
on the ratio in each regional court.212 This clause gave rise to intense criticisms. Zainal 
Arifin Muchtar, researcher at Gajah Mada University, argued that “[The provision is] 
risky… if chairmen of district courts can decide on the composition of the judging panel 
                                                     
211 Dadang Trisasongko, interview with author, Jakarta, February 14, 2008. 
212 I could not interview Romly and ask him to explain why this controversial clause was included in the 
draft law, because he was jailed for corruption during my fieldwork period. 
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of the Court [for Corruption]… they will choose judges who lack the skills required to 
hear corruption cases. They are subject to influence. That would weaken our anti-
corruption efforts. It is the most dangerous clause in the draft law.”213  
Table 5.5  
Summaries of Controversies about the Law on Corruption Court 
Controversy Law No.30 of 2000 NGOs’ Claims Law No.46 of 2009  
Corruption Court 
at Regional Level 
N/A Unnecessary 
Each province is to have its 
own Corruption Court and 
the establishment of such 
courts will be finished two 
years after this law is 
enacted (Article 35) 
Composition of 
Judging Panel 
Judging panel consists of 
two career judges and 
three ad hoc judges 
(Article 58,59 and 60) 
Provisions should 
explicitly stipulate 
that ad hoc judges 
should outnumber 
career judges 
District Court chiefs can 
decide on the composition 
of the judge panel (Article 
26)  
When the bill was under deliberation in the DPR, NGOs activists still acted as lobbyists 
during that phase, but they faced more challenges than they had in the preceding phase. 
This was because the DPR’s productivity was notoriously low. 214  At the same time, 
                                                     
213 “Guest Speaker’s Forum: Corruptors Buy Time to Delay Corruption Court Law,” Jakarta Post, October 
20, 2008.  
214 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sent the draft to the People’s Representatives Council in August 
2008, 16 months before the deadline. The deliberations, however, were slow. This was because members 
of parliament were busy with their election campaigns. The general election was held in April 2009. At the 
same time, there were nearly 40 bills that required deliberation. “Graft Bill Committee Questioned,” 
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several members of parliament were themselves corruption defendants. 215 
Unsurprisingly, the bill came under severe criticism at the deliberation phase. While 
many NGO activists complained that it might weaken the Corruption Court, many 
members of parliament criticised the same bill for offering too much power to the court. 
NGOs attempted to exert influence by utilizing formal channels such as public hearings 
and forums, as well as by using personal relations with individual members of 
parliament.216 Eventually, the DPR passed the Law on the Corruption Court, after 16 
months of deliberation. The Corruption Court thus continued to exist, but NGOs failed 
to prevent the establishment of regional courts, and the chairmen of district courts 
would now have the authority to decide on the composition of judging panel in each 
case.  
5.3.2.2 Revision to the law on corruption eradication 
The Minister of Justice and Human Rights also formed a team to revise the Law on 
                                                     
Jakarta Post, September 9, 2008; “House May Throw in The Towel in Corruption Fight,” Jakarta Post, June 
22, 2009. 
215 “Menghitung Mundur Pengadilan Tipikor,” press release, Koalisi Penyelamat Pemberantasan Korupsi, 
Jakarta, May 19, 2009.  
216 Kandi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 28, 2009. 
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Corruption Eradication, and appointed Professor Andi Hamzah to lead that team. Andi 
was also an expert specialising in criminal law, but his ideas and suggestions were often 
against the KPK and the Corruption Court. Andi considered corruption in Indonesia a 
common problem, and thus argued that the general courts should hear all corruption 
cases. He questioned ad hoc judges’ ability to hear corruption cases, and thus suggested 
ending their recruitment.217 He also considered the Corruption Eradication Commission 
a “superbody” and suggested revoking its prosecutorial function.218 Those suggestions 
and arguments were obviously contrary to the expectations of NGO activists.219 
Nevertheless, Andi still invited Emerson Yuntho, an Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) 
activist, to join his team. Interviewees for this research shared the idea that such an offer 
was aimed at winning NGOs’ endorsement for moves to downgrade the KPK. ICW is an 
advocacy-type NGO whose activists prefer not to work for agencies or organisations they 
                                                     
217 “Dalam Draf RUU, Eksistensi Hakim ‘Ad Hoc’ Tipikor Akan Dihilangkan,” Kompas, February 1, 2007; 
“RUU Tipikor Tandingan Dibuat; Peradi Persoalkan Pertemuan Hakim Ad Hoc dan KPK,” Kompas, February 
15, 2007. 
218  “KPK Dinilai Terlalu Superbodi,” Retrieved on April 23, 2012, from 
htt://www.komisiyudisial.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&vie.  
219“RUU Tipikor: LSM Bentuk Tim untuk Susun RUU Tandingan,” Retrieved on September 1, 2009, from 
http://www.hukumonline.com/print.asp?id=16252&cl=Berita.  
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monitor. Emerson, however, accepted the offer with approval from ICW leadership.220 
Regarding this, Danang Widoyoko, ICW coordinator, explains: 
We can participate in government and sometimes participation is good. I can be 
a member of formal teams or committees. [However], we keep our 
independence and do only what we want. For us, [joining the Draft Law 
Preparation Team does not go against the principle of independence.] Our 
principle is to be free to attend and also free to quit. Thus, when I work in a 
formal team, I still think I am an outsider. When there is disagreement, we just 
quit.221  
Obviously ICW activists subscribed to the principle of conditional participation, so they 
would only participate in official programmes if there were no contradiction with the 
goals and ideals of their organisation. They have always refused to compromise, and 
would sooner resign than endorse government policies or decisions that they believe 
                                                     
220 ICW activists preferred not to work for organisations or state institutions that they monitored. Danang 
Widoyoko, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009.  
221 Danang Widoyoko, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
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contradict their goals.   
Most of the preparation team members were in favour of Andi’s ideas. They were 
inclined towards clauses which “explicitly remove the KPK’s prosecutorial function and 
reduce the penalties for some corruption offenses” (Butt, 2011, p. 390). Emerson soon 
realised this and the fact that, after years of reform, little had changed. He accordingly 
chose to quit halfway through the revision process. Regarding the disagreement, Danang 
said: 
Other Draft Law Preparation Team members did not want the Corruption 
Eradication Commission to keep its authority over the prosecution, and instead 
wanted only to leave it with authority over investigation. They also wanted to 
make corruption no longer an extraordinary crime. If corruption was not an 
extraordinary crime, there would be no need for the Corruption Eradication 
Commission. They also wanted to dissolve the Corruption Court and dismiss ad 
hoc judges. Of course, we did not agree with them. Thus, we asked Emerson to 
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quit, and designed our own draft.222 
Many other NGOs also opposed the ideas and views of the preparation team.223 The 
public seemed to side with NGOs. A public opinion poll survey, conducted by Kompas, 
showed that most respondents perceived that career judges remained subject to 
political and material interests. They thus agreed that it was essential for the Corruption 
Court and ad hoc judges to remain.224  
The draft bill submitted by the preparation team did not explicitly contradict public 
expectations. There were no clauses actually revoking the prosecutorial function of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission, dissolving the Corruption Court or dismissing ad hoc 
judges.225 These results represented a symbolic victory for NGO activists. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the draft remains suspended in the DPR, due to the backlash by NGOs 
                                                     
222 Danang Widoyoko, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
223 “Menghitung Mundur Pengadilan Tipikor,” press release, Koalisi Penyelamat Pemberantasan Korupsi, 
Jakarta, May 19, 2009. 
224 “Jajak Pendapat Kompas; Kegalauan dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi,” Kompas, February 19, 2007.  
225 NGO activists criticise the fact that the draft does not directly entitle the Corruption Eradication 
Commission to prosecute corruption suspects. Such an ambiguity is likely to give rise to controversies and 
debates in the future.   
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and KPK leaders against efforts to weaken the commission (Butt, 2011, p. 390).  
To sum up, this case is an example of demands for simultaneous accountability by NGOs 
outside decision-making circles. In this case, NGO activists either lacked opportunities to 
join the preparation team or declined such an offer on the grounds of conflict with 
government officials over the status of the Corruption Court. Nevertheless, the 
outcomes were satisfactory, because the Law on the Corruption Court was enacted 
before the deadline and the draft revision to the Law on Corruption Eradication did not 
include clauses unfavourable to the Corruption Court. Nevertheless, NGO activists deem 
Law on the Corruption Court worrying because it entitles chairmen of district courts to 
decide on the composition of judging panel, creating room for corruption suspects to 
affect court verdicts. Two points demonstrated here also deserve attention. First, even 
advocacy NGO activists were willing to work with government officials, suggesting the 
need for further exploration of the interaction between the two and the impacts of this 
interaction in the study of corruption and social accountability. Second, government 
official could assist NGOs in exercising accountability through offer of key information, 
suggesting the importance of having a close look at the exercise of accountability by 
NGOs outside decision-making circles.  
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5.4 Supreme Court  
5.4.1 An Accountability institution that pioneered in internal reform 
Except for the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial institution 
in Indonesia, maintaining and supervising the whole court system according to the One-
Roof (satu atap) System policy. The 1999 Law on Basic Provisions on Judicial 
Authority stipulates the transference of authority over finance, personnel matters, and 
the fundamental structure of general and special courts from the executive branch of 
the government to the Supreme Court (Article 11) (Pompe, 2005, pp. 5-6).226 Since 1999 
the Supreme Court has not only had responsibility over most courts in the land, it has 
also tried to initiate judicial reform.  
The Supreme Court faced two major problems. One was poor internal management 
(Bjornlund, Liddle, & King, 2008, pp. 10-11). Another problem was corruption. A leader 
of the Supreme Court claimed that that half the court judges in Indonesia were corrupt 
(Lembaga Independensi Peradilan, 2002 p. 4), and numerous cases have shown that 
                                                     
226 See Law No. 14 of 1970.   
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Supreme Court justices were no exception (Chalid, 2001). PSHK activist Iman also 
claimed that “bribing judges happens every day and is a common rule”.227 Public opinion 
polls also show low public trust in the courts and judges. According to the 2008 Bribe 
Payer Index, the average score given by respondents to the courts in Indonesia was 3.8 
on a scale of 0 to 10.228 The score was only slightly lower than those for parliaments, 
the police and customs officers who have long been notorious for rampant corruption 
(Transparency International, 2008).  
The Supreme Court started by initiating internal reform projects, a move that accorded 
with public expectations because many people blamed high-ranking judges for the 
rampant corruption they saw in Indonesia (The Asian Foundation, 2001, p. 50). The 
recruitment in 2000 of non-career justices (justices who had never served as judges prior 
to their recruitment229) was essential to the success of that initiative (Assegaf, 2007, p. 
11). According to Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, at least 15 years’ working 
experience in the legal field is the only requirement that non-career justices have to 
                                                     
227 Imam Nasima, interview with author, Jakarta, October 15, 2009. 
228 0 means that bribery in this institutions is extremely common; 10 means bribery is unknown there. 
229 Law No. 5 of 2004 stipulates that career judges who are eligible for participating in selection of 
Supreme Court justice should have at least 20 years’ experience in working in courts, including at least 
three years in appellate courts. 
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meet. Most non-career justices in the Supreme Court have thus been practising lawyers 
or legal consultants prior to their recruitment. 230  The retirement of several senior 
justices in 2000 created 16 vacancies in the Supreme Court. Eventually, nine non-career 
justices and seven career justices filled the vacancies.231 Among them were Bagir Manan 
and Abdul Rahman Saleh, who initiated internal reform projects in the Supreme Court.  
Bagir and Abdul were both non-career justices. Bagir worked as a professor of law before 
he assumed office as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He prioritised strengthening 
internal supervision, and nominated Abdul to be the deputy chief (ketua muda) of the 
court that led the Supervision Division (Badan Pengawasan) and reform projects.232 
Bagir and Abdul undertook several pioneering actions, such as acknowledging that the 
courts have serious corruption problems and offering reform-related information to the 
media of their own accord, both things that previous justices had never done (Assegaf, 
                                                     
230 Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court has clauses explicitly stipulating the selection of justices. 
Law No. 5 of 2004 replaces that act.   
231 “Bagir Manan dan Janji Pembersihan Itu...,” Kompas, November 16, 2005.  
232 Bagir Manan was not the first non-career justice to assume the position of Supreme Court Chief 
Justice. Oemar Seno Adji, the Supreme Court Chief Justice in 1974–1982, was also a non-career justice. 
Bagir won re-election in 2006, and retired in 2008 because he had reached the retirement age. “Bagir 
Manan, Ketua MA 2006–2011,” Kompas, May 2, 2006; “Prof Dr Bagir Manan,” Kompas, May, 2001.  
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2007, pp. 22-23).  
Among all the reform measures, the formulation of the blueprint and the establishment 
of the reform team were of significance and received the most attention. The blueprint, 
released in 2003, was a plan for internal reform of the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court saw the goal as creating a judicial system that could offer legal services of high 
quality, accessible and inexpensive, as well as building the supremacy of law (Mahkamah 
Agung Republik Indonesia, 2003 pp. 1-2). 233  The blueprint collected various 
respondents’ suggestions and the results of several investigations. It revealed a number 
of practical problems facing the Supreme Court, including a low level of professionalism 
among judges and flawed internal accountability mechanisms. The blueprint discussed 
problems in the areas of human resources, case management, information management, 
the transparency and accountability of the court, the supervision and discipline of judges 
and other issues. The blueprint set down detailed reform plans designed to solve these 
problems. The tasks of the reform team were to assess the progress of reforms 
                                                     
233 The blueprint addressed only problems of the Supreme Court. This was because, according to Law No. 
14 of 1970 on Judicial Authority Fundamental Regulations, the Supreme Court oversaw only its own 
organisation, administration, and finance, not those of the general, military courts or other special courts. 
Since the introduction of the One-Roof system, the Supreme Court now holds the authority to handle 
affairs related to the organisation, administration and finance of all district and appeal courts. The 
Supreme Court is now putting together a new blueprint to address problems in all courts. 
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periodically and ensure that reforms were on the right track.  
Though the formulation of the blueprint and the operation of the reform team were 
formally internal to the Supreme Court, data collected for this research show the deep 
involvement of several Jakarta-based NGOs in both matters. This involvement suggests 
there was frequent interaction between participating NGO activists and officials within 
the Supreme Court. This experience was unusual for Indonesian NGOs, because they had 
previously rarely participated in internal reform projects within governmental agencies 
like the Ministry of Finance. The participants were mostly activists from research-type 
NGOs such as LeiP, PSHK, MaPPI and ICEL.234 Their members believed that court reform 
should be a priority in the Reformasi era (Widjaja, 2003, p. 428), and focused their 
activities accordingly.   
5.4.2 Participation of NGOs 
5.4.2.1 Blueprint formulation phase 
                                                     
234  Many research-type NGO activists perceive themselves as researchers, rather than activists. Aria 
Suyudi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 15, 2009.  
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The formulation of the blueprint was achieved by Bagir Manan while he chaired the 
Supreme Court. The blueprint, as mentioned above, contained a collection of 
suggestions for the internal reform of the court. A high percentage of the suggestions 
came from LeiP. The interaction of LeiP and other NGO activists with the Supreme Court 
leadership had started with the recruitment of non-career justices in 2000. Thanks to 
the support of the court leadership, NGO activists were able to participate in the 
formulation of the blueprint.   
The recruitment of non-career judges in 2000 drew the attention of ICW, AJI and several 
other Jakarta-based NGOs. They formed the Working Group for Monitoring Prospective 
Supreme Court Justices (Kelompok Kerja Pemantau Calon Hakim Agung) whose objective 
was to have the recruitment process done in a transparent manner. They adopted 
several strategies to exert their influence on members of parliament who had the right 
to select the judges. Their strategies included publicizing candidates’ track records, 
monitoring the selection phase, and mobilizing people to send mail to 
parliamentarians.235 Both Bagir and Abdul were favourites with NGO activists at that 
time.236 They and three other candidates passed the selection process, constituting the 
                                                     
235 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
236 Abdul is a senior NGO activist. He chaired the Legal Aid Institute-Jakarta (LBH Jakarta) in the early 
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majority of the nine non-career justices recruited (Widjaja, 2003, p. 429).237 A majority 
of justices then later elected Bagir to lead the Supreme Court, and Bagir in turn 
appointed Abdul to operate the reform projects.  
Under the leadership of Bagir and Abdul, NGOs truly “got access to the Supreme 
Court”.238 Bagir and Abdul invited several NGO activists to participate in the discussions 
on the formulation of the blueprint.239 Participating NGO activists could communicate 
with the leadership, though they were not members of the blueprint Formulation Team. 
Such a direct channel of communication was essential because these internal reform 
projects were purely initiatives of several Supreme Court justices. LeiP chairwoman Dian 
said: 
We can say that internal reform at that time was [an initiative of some elites]. 
                                                     
1980s. “Pokja Pemantau Calon Hakim Agung: Hanya 12 Calon Hakim Agung yang Layak,” Kompas, July 21, 
2000.   
237 The candidates selected were Bagir Manan, Laica Marzuki, Valerine Kierkoff, Artidjo Alkostar, and 
Abdul Rahman Saleh.  
238 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
239 Aria Suyudi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 15, 2009; Bivitri Susanti, interview with author, 
Jakarta, October 15, 2007. 
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Not many justices personally have visions. Even [toward] the reform process the 
reluctance was enormous. Transparency, for example, was a highly sensitive 
issue then. Many Supreme Court personnel and justices did not want to publish 
and share court decisions, on the grounds that they were not public information. 
[At the same time], I think it was difficult to work with career judges who had 
been there for more than ten years and court personnel who had also been there 
since the New Order era. We had conflicts of ideas more with [career justices] 
than with new justices who had just come up after the Reformasi era. 
[Accordingly, on critical and sensitive issues,] there was a tendency that we only 
discussed [things] with the pro-reform leaders. We used our close relationship 
and also their commitment to reform.240  
At the same time, the Supreme Court leadership used NGOs to help facilitate the court’s 
relations with donor organisations. At that time, donor organisations like the Asia 
Foundation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had 
projects promoting judicial reform in Indonesia, which explains why they showed keen 
interest in the content and formulation of the blueprint and wished to sponsor relevant 
                                                     
240 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
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activities. The Supreme Court leadership, however, refused to contact donor 
organisations directly, because they feared being seen as encouraging foreign 
intervention in one of Indonesia’s core institutions. NGOs thus became channels through 
which the Supreme Court and donor organisations communicated. Dian Rositawati said:   
The relationship between donors, state institutions and NGOs [is] a triangle. At 
that time, there was so much funding that was ready to be given to the Supreme 
Court to conduct some projects, but donors did not have intimate relationships 
with the court. So donors used NGOs to facilitate the relationship between 
donors and court institutions. Bagir Manan, Supreme Court Chief Justice then, 
did not want to get direct funding from donors, because he was afraid of their 
intervention. He also anticipated negative public perception if the Supreme 
Court managed foreign funding. [As a result,] it was NGOs that received the 
funding, and they created cooperation projects with the courts. The Supreme 
Court thus did not touch the funding at all. It was NGOs that managed and used 
it.241  
                                                     
241 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
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NGOs obviously played a vital role during the blueprint formulation phase. They acted 
not only as a bridge connecting the Supreme Court and donor organisations, but also as 
a source of advice. The Supreme Court’s leaders accepted most suggestions put forward 
by NGOs. Dian Rositawati even saw the blueprint as the “NGOs’ proposal, because the 
Supreme Court leadership accepted most of the NGOs ideas”.242 The blueprint received 
high praise from many observers who deemed it a practical reform plan, and 
consequently many donor organisations now consult it before they propose cooperation 
with the courts.243  
5.4.2.2 Reform team phase 
The establishment of the reform team was aimed at implementing reform measures set 
out in the blueprint and to evaluate the progress of these measures. Bagir ordered the 
formation of the team in 2004, and appointed Abdul Raman Saleh as its leader. Bagir 
also invited several NGO activists to join the team. Participants include Aria Suyudi 
                                                     
242 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
243 The blueprint is a “menu” that donor organisations consult when they design cooperation plans. Thus, 
it is unlikely that several donors would finance the same projects simultaneously. Wiwiek Awiati, interview 
with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009. 
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(PSHK), Meissy Sabardiah (MaPPI), Mas Achmad Santosa (ICEL) and Wiwiek Awiati (ICEL). 
The reform team was not affiliated to any division of the Supreme Court but was instead 
directly accountable to the leadership. A steering team (tim pengarah), consisting of the 
Chief Justice and two Deputy Chief Justices, nominally led the reform team. In practice, 
the Deputy Chief who headed the programme technical team (tim teknis program) took 
charge of coordination. Participating NGO activists belonged to the united technical 
team (tim teknis pendamping) and programme assistance team (tim asistensi program). 
Their tasks included scrutinizing the progress of reform plans, offering suggestions and 
coordinating reform efforts. The reform team was not a permanent agency, but 
participating NGO activists were full-time employees and had titles like advisors, 
assistants or reform promoters.  
The reform team was the channel through which the Supreme Court could have 
dialogues with civil society, donor organisations, and the executive and parliaments. It 
facilitated communication, transformed criticisms into language that the Supreme Court 
personnel could accept, and informed the court personnel of the obstacles the reform 
team encountered. Such tasks were essential because critics usually blamed the slow 
progress of reform projects on lack of commitment to reforms and the various obstacles 
created by the “judicial mafia”. Reform team members found such criticisms unjustified. 
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Meissy, for example, argued that it was not always reasonable to blame poor output on 
leaders’ lack of will to reform. The problem was often a result of the poor capacity of 
Supreme Court personnel.244  
Several aspects of the NGO activists’ participation are worthy of further discussion. One 
is their relations and interaction with their counterparts who were monitoring the 
implementation of reform measures from outside the Supreme Court. In general, NGO 
activists participating in the reform team still thought of themselves as critics, apparently 
believing that few substantial differences existed between them and their counterparts. 
Meissy said:   
Whether [inside or outside the Supreme Court], activists still engage in reform. 
Both are extremely significant in the reform process. Just like supply and demand. 
I think my participation is just a matter of location, meaning it is about whether 
I locate myself inside the court, or outside the court. Personally, I had the passion. 
If someone thinks that it is more idealistic or beneficial to be outsiders, to create 
discussion, to raise awareness from the outside, this is fine. This is the role they 
                                                     
244 Meissy Sabardiah, interview with author, Jakarta, October 19, 2009. 
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choose. People who want to work side by side with the court and see what 
people do there, that is also a choice. I cannot say it should be either or. We need 
both. People cannot assess their work objectively…People who think they know 
everything and can do things by themselves [usually go nowhere]. The Supreme 
Court recruited representatives from the public because they needed the 
outsiders’ perspectives. If they wanted to get yes-men, they could have hired 
someone else.245  
There were, however, slight differences between the two groups of activists, especially 
in how analysing and criticising the reform process. NGO activists participating in the 
reform team usually chose mild and indirect ways to convey their criticisms. In contrast, 
NGO activists who monitored the reform process from the outside were more likely to 
choose more direct means to embarrass power holders. Dian Rositawati explained: 
ICW is highly critical of the Supreme Court. [Its activists] can be like this because 
they do not have a close relationship like [activists of] LeiP [have] with the 
Supreme Court. Because we choose to participate in its internal reform projects, 
                                                     
245 Meissy Sabardiah, interview with author, Jakarta, October 19, 2009. 
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we have to limit the approaches we use as critics of the Supreme Court. We 
would give recommendations to the Supreme Court, rather than making them 
public, because that would harm our relations with the Supreme Court. I think 
most NGOs know what kinds of role they have. Sometimes, we try to raise our 
voices when we think the remarks of justices, or even the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, are incorrect. We give our comments to friends in ICW and MaPPI. They 
will distribute our ideas. That is the role we play, giving statements or something, 
but not directly or publicly.246 
The participation of Meissy and other NGO activists in the reform team did not give rise 
to conflicts within Indonesian civil society. ICW and other advocacy-type NGOs also 
supported their participation in the internal reform programmes of the Supreme Court. 
Teten Masduki, for example, said that the common enemy of all NGOs concerned about 
judicial reform was a judicial system that lacked the desire to complete reforms. 
Differences in approach thus only meant a division of labour, which proved quite 
favourable to the promotion of reform (Widjaja, 2003, p. 431). KRHN activist Kandi said: 
                                                     
246 Dian Rositawati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 20, 2009. 
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Some activists have the opportunity to participate in the formulation of decisions 
directly. I say “OK, please” when other activists ask my opinion of their joining 
state institutions. Joining state agencies, in my opinion, is a part of the strategy, 
and has nothing to do with the independence of NGOs. Activists need each other. 
When a conflict of opinion between activists and officials in state institutions 
arises, it is the activists outside institutions who initiate campaigns. The functions 
of activists [participating in state institutions] are to offer information.247  
It is also worth discussing how participating NGOs activists carried out reform measures. 
Data collected for this research show that they tended to rely on specific leaders of the 
Supreme Court (such as the Chief Justice) to promote reforms, particularly when they 
encountered obstacles.248 They were thus significantly advantaged by the entry into the 
leadership of the court or reform-minded individuals at an early stage. 
The Supreme Court has not deviated from the path set down in the blueprint and has 
instead achieved concrete reform results, thanks to the tireless efforts of the reform 
                                                     
247 Kandi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 28, 2009. 
248 Wiwiek Awiati, interview with author, Jakarta, October 29, 2009. 
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team. As a consequence, the Supreme Court has turned into a traditional accountability 
institution that could also boast considerable reform progress. PSHK activist Imam 
Nasima claimed:  
The Supreme Court is the most transparent government institution in Indonesia. 
The Supreme Court Chief Justice issued [Decision of the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice No. 144/KMA/SKNIII on Information Openness in 2007,] one year before 
the enactment of the Law on Public Information. According to that decree, the 
Supreme Court will update information about decisions and rulings regularly [on 
its webpage] and publicise the progress of cases in justices’ hands. In terms of 
transparency, the Attorney General Office and the police are left far behind.249 
Nevertheless, the participation of NGO activists in the internal reform project gave rise 
to an unexpected conflict within the Supreme Court. As mentioned, the blueprint was 
the result of collaboration between NGOs and several pro-reform leaders of the court. 
Most of the court’s personnel were not deeply involved in its formulation. Most of them 
therefore felt that they had been sidelined by their own institution. According to Aria 
                                                     
249 Imam Nasima, interview with author, Jakarta, October 15, 2009. 
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Suyudi, they were “reluctant to implement reform projects and became an obstacle to 
the implementation of reform programmes”.250 As a result, the rate of accomplishment 
of reform projects had reached only 50 percent by 2009, which was far behind 
schedule.251 As a result, efforts were made to include most Supreme Court personnel in 
the formulation of the second blueprint (Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, 2010). 
These efforts were aimed at preventing similar problems from recurring.252  
To sum up, the example of the Supreme Court is an example of the exercise of 
simultaneous accountability by NGOs through cooperation with leaders of state 
institutions. No laws oblige these leaders to involve NGO activists in promoting reform. 
The opportunities for co-operation arose from trust built up in the selection of non-
career judges, the need for linking the communication between donor organisations and 
the Supreme Court, and positive attitudes among NGO activists toward opportunities for 
co-operation. NGOs assisted the Supreme Court in formulating a feasible reform 
programme and kept reform measures on the right track. Supreme Court leaders 
assisted NGO activists in addressing resistance from court staff, and other obstacles to 
                                                     
250 Aria Suyudi, interview with author, Jakarta, October 15, 2009. 
251 Meissy Sabardiah, interview with author, Jakarta, October 19, 2009. 
252 Meissy Sabardiah, interview with author, Jakarta, October 19, 2009. 
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the exercise of accountability. Because of this close co-operation, the Supreme Court is 
now arguably a law enforcement agency inherited from the New Order period that has 
succeeded in reforming itself extensively. However, this close co-operation between 
NGOs and Supreme Court leaders resulted in many court staff lacking a sense of 
ownership over the reform. These personnel arguably slowed the progress of reform. 
5.5 Discussion  
5.5.1 Analysis 
The successful curbing of corruption relies greatly on accountability institutions; this is 
why efforts to strengthen such institutions have been visible in Indonesia and several 
other transitional democracies. Since the start of the Reformasi Era, Indonesia has seen 
reform efforts directed at strengthening existing balancing accountability institutions 
and at establishing appointed institutions aimed to address specific problems. While 
scholarly works mostly emphasize accountability institutions’ authority, organizational 
frameworks, personnel, and independence, the focus in this chapter is on another crucial 
aspect: the involvement of NGO activists in the formulation of the main decisions 
concerning such accountability institutions. This aspect has not yet received much 
scholarly analysis but is arguably essential to the performance of accountability 
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institutions. Through interviewing key persons and reviewing relevant data, this chapter 
has explored the demand side of accountability, with a focus on obstacles and 
opportunities Jakarta-based NGO activists encountered, as well as the impact they had. 
The findings can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, NGO activists interviewed for this research mostly claimed to have deep 
involvement in the three cases studied, as exemplified by the KPK case where NGO 
activists participated in different capacities and also the Supreme Court case where NGO 
activists play crucial roles in the formulation and implementation of the Blueprint. Given 
the fact that before 1998 little room was available for Indonesian NGOs and other civil 
society groups to exert leverage over policy formulation (Hadiwinata, 2003: 42), their 
deep involvement in these processes certainly show some improvement in openness of 
the policy formulation process during the Reformasi Era.  
However, a further look into the cases suggests that such participation was poorly 
institutionalised. No statutory provisions specify the inclusion of social representatives 
in formal decision making or policy formulation, except in the KPK case. In the case of 
the KPK,there are provisions obliging government officials to invite social representatives 
to join the Selection Board. However, the provisions in question do not specify the 
requirements such social representatives need to meet, the ratio they would occupy in 
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the board, and other matters that may influence the selection process. In other words, 
government officials still have the final say, meaning NGO involvement in accountability 
institution-related decision formulation is large dependent on the discretion of the 
officials in question, and vulnerable to personnel changes. Further statutory 
improvements would be required to generate sustained involvement by NGOs in the 
policy-making process.   
In such a poorly-institutionalized context, aggressive moves by NGO activists may create 
opportunities to widen their participation in decision formulation. In the case of the 
Supreme Court, the selection of Bagir and Abdul as justices was underpinned by NGOs’ 
lobbying efforts, and it was the two justices who facilitated NGO activists’ participation 
in the formulation and implementation of the Blueprint. In the KPK case, Erry was one 
of the NGOs’ preferred applicants, and he was the person who brought NGOs’ anti-
corruption ideas into internal discussion within the agency. While such instances suggest 
the value of a strategy of exerting influence over the selection of the leaders of 
accountability institutions, limitations on the applicability of such a strategy should be 
noted. In particular, the strategy has little effect in cases where the president directly 
appoints the leaders, rather than opening leadership selection to competition. 
How did Jakarta-based NGOs become so deeply involved in decision making in such a 
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poorly institutionalised context? A deeper look at participants’ attitudes may offer an 
explanation. Unwillingness or pessimism on either side may make such collaboration fail. 
Fortunately, the three cases studied all involved positive collaboration, and this is the 
second finding of this chapter. On the part of government officials, a general inclination 
worldwide, as Arroyo and Sirker (2005, p. 27) note, is reluctance to have citizens or civic 
groups involved in formulating decisions, due to concerns over efficiency and complaints 
about partiality. However Indonesia’s government officials in the three cases studied all 
demonstrated open attitudes towards NGO participation; even when the activists were 
from advocacy NGOs and held contrasting stances on the issues in question. This 
openness was thus remarkable, and must largely be attributable to strong public 
expectation, given the poor performance of anti-corruption agencies established before 
the KPK.  
On the part of NGO activists, interviewees in this research all showed a willingness to 
participate in the formulation of policies concerning accountability institutions, contrary 
to remarks by Beittinger-Lee (2009: 120) and Saleh (2008: 424-430). However, they 
differed in terms of the opportunities they gained, and also in the responses they offered 
when their ideas conflicted with those of government officials. Ackerman (2005: 22) 
believes that government officials are likely to offer opportunities to persons with similar 
backgrounds and shared ideas, and this seems to hold in the three cases studied. Take 
Adnan Buyung Nasution and Todung Muly Lubis, for example: both were legal 
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professionals familiar with anti-corruption issues, similar to Romly, who was in charge of 
the Selection Board. However, it shall be noted that in the Corruption Court case, an ICW 
activist joined the official drafting team, although he differed widely with the team 
leaders on issues like the seriousness of the corruption problem in Indonesia and on 
whether the Corruption Court should exist. This case suggests that government officials 
may have other considerations while selecting NGO activists to join decision-making 
processes, with caterering to social expectations being one such consideration.  
NGO activists also differ in their responses when they had conflicting ideas with 
government officials. Emerson’s quitting from the official drafting team in the case of the 
Corruption Court reveals that some Indonesian NGOs may adhere to the conditional 
participation principle, differing from activists who believe in the effects of initiating 
reforms from within, as observed in the Supreme Court case. Such differences, however, 
did not lead to enmity within the NGO community. On the contrary, NGO activists 
cooperated with each other, eventually forming a force capable of sustaining pressure 
for accountability.  
What then can we say about how these activists took advantage of the opportunities 
they had to influence policy making (Tu and Peng 2008, p. 126)? Table 5.6 presents a 
summary of NGO-government relations in the three cases studied, following the “four-
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C’s” model Najam develops. In both the KPK case and the Supreme Court case, NGO 
activists developed cooperative relations with government officials who had the same 
goals and adopted similar strategies. Such relations were complementary when they 
shared goals but used different means to reach those goals. In the Corruption Court case, 
the relations between government officials and NGO activists initially involved 
cooptation but quickly switched to being confrontational after the NGO activist 
withdrew, due to conflicts on several matters. 
Table 5.6 
NGO-Government Relations in the Three Cases Studied 
Phase KPK Corruption Court Supreme Court 
Formulation 
Cooperation 
/Complementarity 
Co-optation 
/Confrontation 
Cooperation 
/Complementarity 
Implementation 
 
Cooperation 
/Complementarity 
n/a 
Cooperation 
/Complementarity 
Finally, NGOs reached their goals in cases which feature their deep involvement, though 
one adverse effect can be noted. Table 5.7 presents a summary of NGO goals in the three 
cases studied. In the KPK case, NGOs had deep involvement in the whole selection 
process and reached their prime goal (helping the Selection Board select the best 
applicants) and their secondary goal (helping their preferred applicants to be selected) 
in the end. NGOs also had deep involvement in the Supreme Court case. They 
successfully incorporated their reform proposals into the Blueprint and had several 
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reform projects carried out as they expected. In contrast, NGOs did not have deep 
involvement in the Corruption Court case, leading to limited leverage over relevant 
provisions. Though actions by NGOs rescued the Corruption Court from dissolution, the 
two drafts still contains controversial provisions that may weaken this specialised court. 
Table 5.7 
NGO Goals in the Three Cases Studied 
Case KPK 
Corruption Court 
Supreme Court 
Law on 
Corruption 
Court 
Law on 
Corruption 
Eradication 
Primary 
goal 
Having the 
best 
applicants 
selected  
Finishing 
legislation 
before the 
deadline 
Securing 
KPK and  
Corruption 
Court  
Incorporating NGOs’ 
reform proposals  
into the Blueprint 
Secondary 
goal 
Having 
applicants 
NGO 
recommended 
selected  
Securing ad 
hoc judges 
Finishing 
legislation 
Ensuring successful 
implementation of 
reform projects  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court case suggests that some adverse effects may arise 
from the participation of NGO activists in the internal reform projects. As mentioned, 
the blueprint was the result of collaboration between NGOs and several pro-reform 
leaders of the court, with the result that many of the court’s personnel felt sidelined 
within their own institution. Their silent boycott delayed the implementation of reform, 
an unexpected impact originating from NGOs’ deep involvement in decision formulation. 
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These findings expand the present understanding of policy-making accountability. 
Policies, as Cochran and Malone (2005, p. 1) understand them, are “government 
decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern”. Following this 
understanding, policies include decisions on leadership selection, statute formulation, 
and design of reform projects concerned with accountability institutions. If the decision-
making process is transparent, open and subject to public monitoring, little room will be 
left for external intervention, enabling accountability institutions to acquire resources, 
power, and the support they require to fulfil their duties. In contrast, when the policy 
making process is closed and void of meaningful monitoring accountability institutions 
are likely to be paper tigers. Given this, policy-making accountability deserves scholarly 
attention. Following Pollitt’s (2003, p. 89) understanding, policy-making accountability 
in this thesis is understood as a relation between government policy makers, most of 
whom are appointed officials and high-ranking bureaucrats, and citizens whose rights 
and welfare are potentially affected by the policies concerned. As an organized and 
issue-centred force within the society, NGOs’ experience in holding policymakers to 
account on decisions related to accountability institutions show the opportunities for, 
and obstacles to, policy-making accountability in a democratising context.  
Policy formulation formally includes three phases, namely, agenda setting, policy 
formulation, and policy implementation (Patten, 2000, p. 226), and in each government 
officials play a major role. In representative democracies, government officials are 
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entrusted with authority by elected officials to design and make policies, with a tendency 
for such authority to increase (Dunn, 1999, p. 297). According to the principle of 
uniformity between authority and responsibility, government officials are legally obliged 
to explain to elected representatives about action they take and take responsibility for 
outcomes (Strøm, 2000), leading to a perception that they do not need to be 
accountable to the public (Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2007, pp. 5-6). Such policy-making 
accountability linking government officials to elected representatives is typical of 
established democracies, and the relevant scholarly literature mostly surrounds the 
questions of what institutions are involved (Easton, 1957, pp. 383-384; Nordlinger, 1981; 
Skocpol, 1985, p. 9) and how to analyze the relationship of accountability concerned 
(Albaek, 1995; deLeon, 1995, p. 898; Doron, 1992a, 1992b; Durning, 1993, p. 297; 
Fischer, 1993, pp. 166-167; Hajer, 2003, p. 189; Kaplan, 1986; MacRae, 1976; Torgerson, 
1986; Wagle, 2000; Weimer, 1992, 1998).  
However, because many countries still encounter democratic deficits that make citizens 
suffer as a result of policy flaws, scholars like Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) emphasize 
that citizens also have the right to demand accountability of government officials for the 
policies they formulate and implement. McComas (2001, p. 135) argues that citizens 
have the rights to have policies reflect their interests; Dryzek (2002, p. 34) and Cohen 
(1989, p. 20) advocate public participation in negotiation over policies, with the belief 
that such involvement affects the legitimacy of policies. Obviously, some scholars have 
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moved away from discussing the typical nexus of policy-making accountability, but 
instead emphasize citizens’ roles and their rights to hold government officials to account. 
This viewpoint echoes studies that focus on participatory policy-making. There have long 
been voices advocating public participation in policy-making (Chung, Grogan, & Mosley, 
2012, p. 1653; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004, p. 55), with advocates stressing that participation 
can help demonstrate different policy options’ potential influences (Wagle, 2000, p. 213), 
enable policies to match public needs (Kim, 2011, p. 84), and accelerate trust building 
(Hajer, 2003, p. 184). 
As well as in advanced democracies (Bayley & French, 2008, p. 196), institutional 
arrangements for participatory policy-making are also visible in several transitional 
democracies. In South Korea, for example, a variety of laws and institutional 
arrangement were created to protect citizens’ rights to participate in policy formulation 
(Kim, 2011, pp. 87-88); in Brazil, participatory budgeting arrangements have long been 
noted (Melo, 2009, pp. 20-22). In China, local governments have also experimented with 
methods to facilitate citizen participation in policy making, though this country is far 
from democratic in any sense (Xiaojun & Ge, 2016). These initiatives have attracted the 
attention of scholars who differ widely in their research foci. Some scholars emphasize 
issues like the openness of policy-making process (Papadopoulos & Warin, 2007, pp. 
450-451), collaboration models of community participation (Wagle, 2000, pp. 216-218), 
and the utilization of technology (Rios Insua, Kersten, Rios, & Grima, 2008, p. 161); 
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others explore ways to incorporate public opinions into government policy formulation 
(Mizrahi & Vigoda-Gadot, 2009, p. 410).  
By analysing three Indonesian cases, this chapter has shown that NGO activists could 
have profound participation in the formulation of key decisions concerning 
accountability institutions, even in a poorly institutionalized context. Their success 
occurred because Jakarta-based NGO activists held open attitudes toward involvement 
in policy development. Accordingly, they were able not only to scrutinise the formulation 
of policies but also to cooperate with reform-minded and receptive officials to build 
policy networks that could have significant influence on key decisions. They achieved 
several of their goals, as the table above shows. However, the Supreme Court case also 
reveals that NGO activists’ exercise of policy-making accountability, on occasion, may 
lead to unexpected conflicts within accountability institutions. Moreover, a poorly 
institutionalized context is still a cause for concern, because it may prevent NGOs, and 
also the policy networks they form with receptive government officials, from having 
ongoing influence on policies. 
5.5.2 Postscript   
5.5.2.1 The KPK 
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The KPK has drawn wide scholarly attention since it started operating in 2004. Such 
literature has stressed the role of NGOs as external monitors and defenders of the 
institution. Their role as a guardian of the anti-corruption agency has been noted 
especially with regard to conflicts between the KPK and other law enforcement agencies 
notably the police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Polri). Such conflicts have 
occurred since the establishment of KPK, due to concerns about overlapping authority 
and moves by the KPK to investigate senior police officers. They erupted in 2009. In 
September that year, two KPK commissioners–Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad 
Rianto—were arrested on charges of extortion and bribery. Both denied the charges and 
argued that there must be a conspiracy behind them. Many citizens and civil groups 
sided with the two suspects, especially after a wiretapped conversation suggesting the 
a plot was aired on TV. Under several NGOs’ coordination, thousands of citizens blocked 
streets in several cities across the archipelago to demonstrate their support for the two 
suspects. The support campaign on the Facebook platform also attracted more than one 
million supporters in a short period.  
In addition, the Antasari Azhar case also showed that securing the KPK from internal 
decay was an urgent priority. Antasari was selected to succeed Taufiequrachman Ruki as 
chairperson of the KPK. Before he was selected, Antasari was a prosecutor who was 
notorious for his poor track record. For example, it was alleged he was involved in the 
escape of Hutomo Mandala Putra, President Suharto's youngest son, from detention in 
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2000. Accordingly, few NGOs endorsed his appointment as KPK head. However, signs of 
intervention in the selection had been evident since the beginning. For example, Todung 
Mulya Lubis claimed that there was a conspiracy behind his removal from the Selection 
Board, and believed the aim was to influence the selection process.253 Though NGO 
activists repeatedly questioned his integrity (Baskoro, 2007), Antasari was still 
recommended by the Selection Board, and in turn won overwhelming endorsement in 
the DPR Commission III on legal affairs. Unsurprisingly, Antasari soon proved ineligible 
to head KPK because he masterminded the murder of a business person over a triangular 
love affair in 2009 (Luebke, 2010, pp. 86-88).  
Intervention in the selection of KPK commissioners was predictable on the ground that 
KPK had successfully demonstrated its capacity to combat corruption. Given this, the 
selection of leaderships of anti-corruption agencies requires keen attention from NGO 
activists, and scholars alike. If NGO activists are open to participation decision-making 
on such matters, then the key question becomes the institutionalisation of policy-making 
accountability, and the focus can be on statutory provisions that specify the number of 
social representatives in the Selection Board or voting mechanisms (resorting to 
                                                     
253 Todung Mulya Lubis, interview with author, Jakarta, October 12, 2009. 
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consensus rule or majority rule while disagreement arises) within the board.  
5.5.2.2 Corruption Courts 
The Corruption Court cannot be dissolved as a result of the enactment of Law 46 of 2009. 
However, this law contains at least three provisions that might prevent this specialised 
court from performing as expected (See Table 5.8). Article 3, by creating a much larger 
number of courts, creates vacancies that cannot be easily filled in Indonesia’s present 
context. As Butt and Schütte (2014, p. 610) state, “the pool of qualified ad hoc judges 
appears to be small, especially in outer provinces,” leading to “a shortage of ad hoc 
judges”. Another is Article 5 that obliges the Corruption Court to hear cases presented 
by general prosecutors who have long been notorious for poor integrity and investigation 
skills, suggesting the quality of indictments are less likely to be of good quality. The most 
controversial provision is Article 26 (3) because it “allows chairpersons of general courts 
that have [courts for corruption] to determine the composition of the bench for 
corruption trials on a case by case basis [, and these] chairpersons are inevitably career 
judges” (Butt & Schütte, 2014, pp. 609-610). Given the shortage of ad hoc judges and 
the factt that the composition of judge panels is decided by career judges, the influence 
of ad hoc judges over court judgements is much reduced.  
Table 5.8  
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Controversial Provisions in Law 46 of 2009 
Article Content 
3 
The Corruption Court is located in the capital of every district/city. The 
Corruption Court has jurisdiction over the same area as its corresponding 
district court.  
5 
The Corruption Court is the sole court with jurisdiction to examine, hear and 
decide corruption cases 
26 
(1) Corruption cases are to be examined, heard and decided by a panel of 
three or five judges, comprising [a ratio of] career Judges and Ad hoc 
Judges.  
(2) If the panel referred to in Article 26(1) comprises five judges, the ratio is 
to be three to two. If the panel comprises three judges, the ratio is two to 
one.  
(3) The Chairperson of the court hearing the case or, depending on the 
stage of proceedings and in the interests of each case, the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, determines the number of judges on the panel and its 
composition 
Note. From “Law No 46 of 2009 on the Corruption Court,” Butt, S., 2009. Australian 
Journal of Asian Law, 11(2), pp. 308-317. Copyright 2009 by Federation Press Pty 
Limited 
Not surprisingly, several problems that had never occurred in the Corruption Court 
during the 2004–2009 period began to occur after 2011. In 2012 four ad hoc judges—
three from the Semarang Corruption Court (Central Java) and one from the Pontianak 
Corruption Court (West Kalimantan) —were arrested on charges of bribery (Schütte & 
Butt, 2013, p. 3). Such graft is one sign of the difficulties in recruiting qualified ad hoc 
judges. Meanwhile, the courts’ acquittal rate has also increased dramatically. Butt (2012) 
argues that acquittals “are not always a bad thing” because defendants “are supposed 
to enjoy the presumption of innocence”. However, in Indonesia where many law 
enforcers’ integrity and professionalism remain questionable, the rise in the acquittal 
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rate is likely to mean that more wrongdoers are able to evade punishment.  
To tackle these problems NGOs would need to be able to monitor the recruitment of ad 
hoc judges in Corruption Courts at the local level and monitor the performance of such 
courts. Neither would be easy, given endless attempts by members of parliament to 
weaken anti-corruption agencies and due to the limited human resources available to 
NGOs. NGO activists would need to cooperate with other social groups at the local level 
to engage in such monitoring and to mobilize public grievances against attempts to 
weaken the courts. 
5.5.2.3 Supreme Court 
After the release of the Blueprint, the Supreme Court received wide praise for its efforts 
to improve the accessibility of documents and data. For example, Sebastiaan Pompe, a 
legal scholar from the Netherlands, praised the Supreme Court for its transparency, on 
the ground that it had published tens of thousands of court judgments online (Cholil, 
2012). According to a report released by the Central Information Commission in 2011, 
the Supreme Court was the most transparent state law enforcement agency. The 
Supreme Court was ranked sixth in the same report if all public institutions in the country 
were included in the comparison. However, criticisms of the Court also continued. Some 
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high-profile cases show that “the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, remains 
politically subservient” (Tahyar, 2012, pp. 125-137). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has 
also been strongly criticized for holding “a poor record of disciplining its own members 
and lower court judges” (Tahyar, 2012, p. 153).  
The conflicting impression reveals that, though a series of reform measures helped 
improve the Supreme Court’ performance, some problems remained unsolved. The 
making of the Blueprint for Judicial Reform 2010-2035 (Cetak Biru Pembaruan Peradilan 
2010-2035) signalled commitment to continuing reforms on the part of senior judges. 
Unlike its predecessor, the second blueprint was mostly designed under the leadership 
of Bagir Manan (2001-2009) but implemented by his successors, namely Harifin A. 
Tumpa (2009-2012) and Muhammad Hatta Ali (2012-). Presumably, many things 
changed along with these leadership rotation, including opportunities for NGO activists 
to participate in the implementation of reform plans. Several questions would thus arise 
and could be addressed through further fieldwork. Did NGO activists still enjoy strong 
support from these successors to Bagir Manan? Did they maintain deep involvement in 
the implementation of reform projects in the Court? What happen to the silent boycott 
problem that activists had previously encountered? 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Functioning accountability institutions are essential to preventing corruption because 
they discourage government office holders from engaging in corruption. Many 
Indonesian accountability institutions in the early Reformasi era failed to function as 
expected, however, resulting in strong demands from civil society groups, scholars and 
donor organisations for the establishment of specialised anti-corruption agencies and 
reform projects aimed to improve the judiciary. Not surprisingly, the three accountability 
institutions studied in this chapter soon became objects of research, with analysts 
focusing on topics like how best to assess their performance, institutional design, 
personnel arrangements and resource allocation. The existing literature has identified 
some design flaws that may have contributed to the three accountability institutions’ 
failures in performing their tasks; it is argued in this thesis that such flaws may be 
outcomes of poor policy making, and that accountability in the policy making process 
itself has not yet received sufficient analysis. Given that Indonesia was a transitional 
democracy with vigorous civil society groups at the time these institutions were created, 
this chapter has paid attention to the demand side of accountability, with an interest in 
how NGO activists enforced accountability vis-à-vis the three bodies.  
This chapter has analysed Jakarta-based NGO activities aimed at holding government 
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officials to account for the formulation or implementation of decisions concerning three 
accountability institutions. It finds that NGO activities were initiated in a favourable 
context. Many government officials were willing to consult NGO activists or to invite 
them to participate in the formulation or implementation of decisions concerning 
accountability institutions. At the same time, there were no quarrels between NGOs with 
opportunities to participate and those without about activists taking part in such a 
process. Accordingly, NGO activists were able to carry out a whole range of activities 
(such as offering criticisms or bringing pressure to bear) to hold officials accountable. 
Besides monitoring the decision-making process from the outside, they demonstrated a 
willingness to be involved in making decisions and to grasp the opportunity to scrutinise 
government officials from within. Both external monitoring and internal scrutiny sought 
to achieve simultaneous accountability. Given positive outcomes in the three cases, it is 
fair to conclude that Jakarta-based NGOs succeeded in securing and strengthening 
accountability institutions through demanding accountability of government officials.  
Findings of this chapter also demonstrate the presence of the low institutionalisation 
problem that may constrain NGOs from sustainably enforcing accountability and exerting 
leverage in the policy formulation process. Accordingly, it is argued in this thesis that 
improving institutionalisation of such involvement deserves reformists’ attention and 
efforts. In addition to suggestions put forward in preceding sections, the advice by 
Ranjani K Murthy and Barbara Klugman shows a similar direction. They argue  
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participation-contracts between civil society and governments…are needed 
which spell out that different parts will have equal say in setting broad priorities, 
formulating specific policies and monitoring implementation. These should spell 
out the institutionalised structures (beyond the duration of the project) that 
would be established or strengthened for promoting such participation… [and 
also] processes that need to be put in place (Murthy and Klugman 2004, p. i84). 
These findings may enrich scholarly understanding of social actors’ accountability 
activities because the present literature on the subject says little about NGOs’ efforts to 
strengthen accountability institutions. Of the literature collected for this research, many 
works discuss the participation of NGOs in the formulation and implementation of 
policies, but they focus mostly on cases relating to education, medical treatment, and 
social assistance (Chakrabarti, 2008; Dowbor, 2008; Gómez-Jauregui, 2008; Houtzager, 
2008; Houtzager & Acharya, 2008; Houtzager & Joshi, 2008; Jara, 2008; Jayal, 2008; Joshi, 
2008; Mehtta, 2008; Pande, 2008). This research shows that NGO activists can also play 
a significant role in policy making on accountability institutions and can be quite 
proactive in strengthening them by holding government officials accountable for their 
decisions  
These research findings may expand scholarly understanding of the anti-corruption 
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movement led by Jakarta-based NGOs in the Reformasi era. There has been a small, but 
growing, body of literature discussing Indonesia’s anti-corruption institutions and of 
efforts by Indonesian NGOs to use them for anti-corruption purposes (Butt, 2012a, 
2012b; Butt & Lindsey, 2011; Chalid, 2001; Lindsey, 2002; Schütte, 2008, 2011; Schütte, 
2012; Setiyono & McLeod, 2010). However, it barely mentions NGOs’ efforts to 
strengthen accountability institutions. This research shows that several Jakarta-based 
NGOs were effective guardians of Indonesia’s key anti-corruption institutions and key 
promoters of critical reform measures. 
The findings of this chapter may also supplement the existing literature on policy-making 
accountability. Susan Rose-Ackerman (2007, pp. 31-32; 44) criticized emerging 
democracies for low policy-making accountability, blaming it for the fact that policies in 
such countries often do not reflect the interests and needs of the public. Accordingly, 
she suggested strengthening policy-making accountability should be a top reform 
agenda in transitional democracies (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 6), with the goal being to 
build sustainable democracy (Rose-Ackerman, 2007, p. 31). Rose-Ackerman’s 
observations are correct in a general sense, but the findings in this chapter compel the 
author to add that the quality of policy-making accountability in transitional 
democracies will depend greatly on the policy issues on which the researcher focuses. 
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6 School Committees and the Prevention of Corruption in Schools 
Having discussed the accountability of elected representatives and non-elected officials 
in the preceding two chapters, this thesis now turns to discuss civil servants. The Civil 
Service is responsible for putting central government plans into action. Civil servants are, 
of course, expected to adhere to policies and regulations and to deliver services in an 
impartial and professional manner. Their working environment, however, can often 
prevent them from adhering to this code of conduct (Lipsky, 2010). Furthermore, civil 
servants are often expected to be flexible in the delivery of services to the public. 
Accordingly, in practice civil servants use their discretion, and the services they deliver 
are therefore not always in compliance with legal or policy provisions (Lipsky, 2010, p. 
15). The misuse of discretion in exchange for personal gain by low-ranking civil servants 
is generally considered petty corruption, because it occurs at a small scale and often 
involves modest sums. Although the individual amounts of money involved may not be 
great, the cumulative impact of these low-level and small-scale corrupt practices should 
not be underestimated.  
Corruption committed by civil servants directly affects the everyday lives of ordinary 
people. When civil servants ask for a bribe in exchange for services that ought to be free, 
ordinary people, especially the poor, have to shoulder increased administrative and 
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financial costs. When civil servants misappropriate subsidies and funds intended for 
infrastructure or services, it is the people who must bear the outcomes in low-quality 
infrastructure and loss of public services.  
One way to reduce administrative corruption, as Klitgaard (1988) suggests, is to hold civil 
servants accountable. There has been a rich body of literature on official institutions and 
mechanisms through which civil servants are held accountable to their superiors. By 
comparison, a smaller body of literature explores the question of how recipients of 
public services can themselves also hold civil servants to account. However, strong 
advocacy for the enforcement of accountability by such recipients has arisen in recent 
decades. For example, the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference Declaration 
states: “[T]he rules of the corruption game [will not] change unless people are willing to 
stand up and demand integrity”.254 In line with this statement, this thesis explores the 
accountability relations between education service providers in schools and citizens who 
have a stake in schools free of corruption. The former refers to teaching and 
administrative staff in schools; the latter, to pupils and their parents. The reasons for 
doing so are twofold. First, teaching and administrative staff in schools constitutes a 
                                                     
254 Retrieved on August 26, 2015, from http://14iacc.org/about/declaration/.  
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majority of civil servants in Indonesia, suggesting that they are reflective of government 
functionaries as a whole. Secondly, the right to education has been widely recognised as 
a basic human right, and is believed to be essential to individual development (Knight, 
1995), implying that these stakeholders are likely to seek accountability from education 
service providers. Effective public oversight will, in theory, cause civil servants to worry 
deeply about what might happen when they abuse their discretion in delivering services, 
and so help to prevent administrative corruption.   
Certain conditions favour public oversight over civil servants. Cases in Uganda and India 
suggest that accessibility of information is particularly important, because those affected 
can demand accountability from civil servants once they learn more about their legal 
entitlements and the losses that administrative corruption causes them (Goetz & Jenkins, 
2001; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Pande, 2008; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, 2005). 
Administrative corruption prevailed in both Uganda and India in the 1990s, but initiatives 
were taken aimed at addressing it by enhancing accessibility of information. In Uganda, 
civil servants and politicians in local government captured nearly 90 percent of grants 
during the period 1991–1995. The central government subsequently initiated 
newspaper campaigns to make citizens aware of educational subsidies and their 
entitlement to these grants. Informed citizens soon expressed concern about the flow of 
subsidies and demanded explanations from civil servants. Such concerns created social 
pressure and, as a result, the percentage of subsidies misappropriated dropped to 18 
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percent in 2001 (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). In India, governments have been long 
notorious for administrative corruption (Bussell, 2012; Oldenburg, 1987; Wadea, 1982). 
Information relating to government projects and funds before the 1990s was neither 
transparent nor accessible, and participatory accountability institutions were lacking as 
well. However, by holding public hearings and other strategies, local NGO activists 
succeeded in distributing information, raising awareness that ordinary people were 
victims of administrative corruption, and mobilizing stakeholders to demand 
accountability (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999). As a result, the 
percentage of funds misappropriated by civil servants declined. Eventually, the central 
government enacted a Law on Rights to Information, and a dialogic relationship between 
the accountable and the accounting actors was put in place (Pande, 2008). 
In addition to access to information, participatory accountability institutions are also 
conducive to public oversight, as the experience of Chicago in the United States suggests. 
Chicago was once notorious for the poor quality and performance of its public schools. 
The establishment of Local School Councils (LSCs) was part of efforts by the state 
congress to address the problem. The LSCs it established were participatory 
accountability institutions consisting of community representatives and with power over 
school budgets, approval of school improvement projects, theevaluation of principals’ 
performance, and the renewal of principals’ contracts (Fung, 2001, p. 77; Fung & Wright, 
2001; Gamage & Zajda, 2009). While residents showed enthusiasm for participating in 
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such institutions, they also used them to call civil servants to account effectively, and 
thereby improved the quality of public schools (Ryan, Bryn, Lopez, Williams, Hall, & 
Lippescu, 1997).  
As for the institutional environment, the Indonesian context at the present time is 
broadly favourable for public oversight over civil servants in the education sector. This is 
because there is legislation (such as Law No. 14 on Public Information Disclosure) that 
entitles individual citizens to access data and documents kept by government 
functionaries, and there are also institutions (such as School Committees and Education 
Councils) that facilitate public oversight. However, Law No. 14 on Public Information 
Disclosure took effect only in 2010, suggesting that the institutional environment before 
then was less favourable than at the present day. Nevertheless, some case studies show 
that School Committees seem to have performed effectively.  
As institutions established to make school management conform to democratic 
standards, school committees are widely expected to exert control over teaching and 
administrative staff in schools. Based on his study conducted in 2007 in Ngada Regency, 
East Nusa Tenggara Province, Bandur (2008) argued that school committees there were 
successful oversight institutions. More than 80 percent of his respondents perceived the 
quality of decision-making processes in schools to be good; a similar percentage of 
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respondents thought themselves empowered to participate in discussions on issues 
relevant to school affairs, including school budgets and selection of principals. 
Accordingly, he argued:  
the presence of school [committees] in schools has resulted in creating 
participatory decision-making…In turn, it leads to higher participation of parents 
and wider community through their representatives on the school [committees], 
leading [them] to feel ownership of the decisions, take responsibility, and be 
committed to the actual implementation of the decisions. (Bandur, 2012, p. 324)  
In other words, residents in Ngada Regency succeeded in enforcing simultaneous 
accountability through school committees. 
Bandur’s arguments are soundly based because he used both qualitative and 
quantitative data to support his arguments. Rather than challenging the credibility of his 
data, this research raises questions about the applicability of his findings to other 
administrative areas in Indonesia. The reasons are twofold. First, his arguments run 
counter to the viewpoints and data that I collected while conducting fieldwork in DKI 
Jakarta in 2007. Second, the literature suggests that both law and regulations lacking 
clarity and unbalanced relations between recipients and providers of public services 
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have long existed in Indonesia (Bell, 2001; Dwiyanto et al., 2006; Wie, 2002). The two 
reasons suggest the need to examine how school committees in other administrative 
areas operated and fulfilled their tasks.  
To explore these issues, this chapter analyses statutory sources of School Committees 
and several Jakarta-based NGOs’ experiences in mobilizing education stakeholders to 
exercise control over teaching and administrative staff in schools through School 
Committees. This research argues that, in the period 2003–2010, citizens in DKI Jakarta 
were hesitant and also not sufficiently empowered by relevant regulations to exercise 
scrutiny over civil servants in schools through School Committees. As a result, School 
Committees in DKI Jakarta and surrounding areas were not effective oversight bodies in 
either primary or secondary schools, and school staff could evade accountability to 
education stakeholders. Thus, it is no surprise that corruption in schools persisted in DKI 
Jakarta. These research findings fill a gap in the study of social accountability, which 
rarely discusses NGO efforts to mobilise ordinary citizens to exercise simultaneous 
accountability, and add to the study of persisting corruption in the public services in 
democratising Indonesia, which lacks a thorough understanding of corruption victims’ 
unwillingness to combat corruption directly.  
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section gives an overview of the 
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Indonesian education sector and the problem of corruption in schools, while the second 
section reviews legislation concerning School Committees. The third section analyses 
efforts by a NGO alliance called the Education Coalition to mobilise ordinary people to 
exert control over civil servants in schools through School Committees. Section Four 
concludes with discussions of the findings and their implications. 
6.1 Civil Servants and Corruption in Indonesian Schools 
6.1.1 Corruption in schools: causes and impact 
The education sector in Indonesia is sizeable. There are more than 1,500,000 teachers 
who are also civil servants. These teachers make up more than 30 percent of the total 
number of bureaucrats across Indonesia. The education sector encompasses more than 
30 million people, inclusive of students and civil servants. 
To maintain high-quality, efficient education service delivery is never easy. Most agree 
that it is the government’s responsibility to offer such services (Ramesh & Asher, 2000, 
p. 119), but the Suharto administration treated education mostly as a tool by which to 
instil obedience in the people (Dananjaya, 2005; Tilaar, 2000). It never allocated more 
than 10 percent of the national budget to the education sector (Ramesh & Asher, 2000 
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Table 5.3 & 5.4). As a result, the education sector already had problems of poor quality 
of teaching and ill-maintained infrastructure before the Reformasi era. 
Citizens in the New Order era had few options for participating in educational affairs. 
They could join the Parents’ Association for School Support (Badan Pembantu 
Penyelenggara Pendidikan, BP3) to understand educational activities in schools. They 
could discuss national education policies with officials if the President invited them to 
join the National Education Review Board (Thomas, 1990, p. 15), though, of course, only 
a very small number ever had this privilege. Participants, however, only had the 
functions of offering technical assistants and donations; they had no entitlement to 
oversee the implementation of education policies and education service delivery. 
As a result, there were widely expressed grievances about the education sector in the 
Reformasi era. CSIS researcher Legowo (2004) was typical. He said:  
Education in Indonesia is…too poor to offer a clear future for the society. This can 
be seen from the fact that criticisms of and complaints about Indonesian 
education policies, service and practices from the society appear every day. 
National Education now has created injustice. Few citizens had ever heard praise 
of Indonesian education policies, practices and service (pp. 43-44). 
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Corruption is one factor leading to public discontent with education services delivery. 
There are two main kinds of corrupt practices in the education sector. One is collusion 
between school principals and government officials. The other is corrupt conduct by 
individual civil servants. Corrupt conduct in schools includes misappropriation of 
scholarships or subsidies, chasing of illegal levies in exchange for services already 
financed by the government, and demands for kickbacks from textbook publishers and 
construction contractors. Such practices give rise not only to high costs for education 
services but also to poor educational equipment and infrastructure. The poor thus either 
discontinue schooling early or pay for poor-quality services. 
Not surprisingly, many Indonesians perceive corruption in the education sector as 
rampant. A survey by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia in 2001 
(Kemitraan, 2001) shows that 53 percent of Indonesian interviewees thought that 
corruption was a serious problem in the education sector and 24 percent of respondents 
had been asked in person for bribes by civil servants in the sector.  
Corruption in schools takes several forms, including the misappropriation of funds, the 
embezzlement of grants, the leaking of information to contractors in exchange for 
tendering pay-offs and several others (Hardjono & Teggemann, 2003). The most 
common is when teachers or staff demand that parents pay for items or activities which 
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the governments has already financed and which should thus be offered for free 
(Widoyoko, 2007). Such practices, termed illegal levies locally, are unilateral, in the words 
of Rosenbloom (1993), because there are no direct transfers of benefits between civil 
servants and pupils’ parents. Charging illegal levies for theoretically free services 
prevailed in the New Order era (Bray, 1996, p. 20), but has persisted since. Schools may 
vary in how much money they levy illegally (Rosser, Joshi, & Edwin, 2011), but school 
construction and books are the most common items that are charged for (Irawan, 
Sunaryanto, Hendry, and Diani, 2006, p. 60). 
1.2.1 Causes 
There are several reasons that civil servants in schools engage in corruption. We can start 
from their motives. Much literature shows that civil servants often do so because their 
salaries are low (Dwivedi, 1967; Leys, 1965; Rijckeghem & Weder, 1997; Tella & 
Schargrodsky, 2003). Though the central government has taken measures to raise their 
salary levels, many civil servants in Indonesia still face financial difficulties (Filmer & 
Lindauer, 2001; World Bank, 2003a, p. 95), and teachers are not exceptions. In primary 
and secondary schools, 64 percent of teachers have civil servant status, and in 2005 they 
earned roughly 800,000 rupiahs per month—slightly less than workers in the 
construction industry. Teachers with civil servant status are better off than their 
counterparts without such a status—honorary or adjunct teachers. Such low salaries 
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cannot cover daily needs in DKI Jakarta and other big cities, where in the same year the 
average monthly living expenses for a family was about two million rupiahs. 255 
Unsurprisingly, nearly 20 percent of teachers in Indonesia hold more than one job. 
Teachers who do not have concurrent jobs only have two other options: either maintain 
a very simple life, or impose illegal levies to increase their income. Tanzi (1998, p. 572) 
suggests that the perception that losing a low-paying job if they are caught engaging in 
corruption will cost them little may encourage civil servants to act illicitly. In this regard, 
committing corruption is a rational act. 
Civil servants willing to engage in corruption will search for opportunities. There are 
plenty in Indonesian schools in the Reformasi era. As a result of attempts to improve 
education quality, primary and secondary schools have obtained substantial new funds 
from governments and other donors. For example, the School Operation Assistance 
Programme (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) which the Indonesian government 
initiated in 2005 at a cost of two billion U.S. dollars annually was intended to reduce 
schooling expenses of ordinary, especially poor, families. The World Bank, one principal 
                                                     
255 I randomly asked taxi drivers, teachers and NGO activists about monthly living expenses in DKI Jakarta 
during my fieldwork period. Most of them replied that they at least needed two million rupiahs to cover 
daily needs.  
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donor in Indonesia, provided approximately 2.4 billion U.S. dollars to improve the quality 
of education in Indonesia. Schools thus have much higher budgets, consisting both of 
government subsidies and parents’ contributions, than they did before 1998 (Irawan, 
Eriyanto, Djani, & Sunaryanto, 2004, pp. 110-122).  
Information about how such funds are managed should be open, transparent and 
accessible. However, such information is often barely available, as a result of several 
factors. The World Bank (2012, pp. 68-81) criticizes programmes for being poorly 
publicised and having inadequate implementation; NGO activists criticise civil servants 
in schools for deliberately keeping the management of funds secret (Widoyoko, Djani, 
Irawan, Sunaryanto, & Hendry, 2006). If information about school funds is inaccessible, 
conditions are favourable for school staff wanting to divert them for private use.  
Control mechanisms constitute the last line of defence against corruption in schools. 
Indonesia has various such mechanisms in the Reformasi era. Internal control 
mechanisms in the education sector include inspectors with the power to investigate 
and correct the behaviour of school staff, and the Supervision Bureaus (Bawasda) of local 
governments. However, a number of problems weaken these mechanisms, including 
unclear divisions of responsibility (Baines & Ehrmann, 2006, p. 241); collusion and 
connivance between them and the schools they investigate (Rosser, Joshi, & Edwin, 2011, 
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p. 25); and the perception that corruption in schools is merely petty (Baines & Ehrmann, 
2006, p. 228). Civil servants in schools are also under the surveillance of the National 
Ombudsman Commission and other external monitoring institutions. The absence of 
powers of investigation, insufficient financial support from the central government, and 
various other factors, however, limit the extent to which these institutions can hold civil 
servants in the education sector accountable (M. Crouch, 2008; Sherlock, 2002; Sujata, 
Surachman, Sampul, & Juwono, 2003).   
1.2.2 Impact 
Palmier (1983, p. 209) argues: “corruption will be most prevalent when salaries are low, 
opportunities great, and policing weak”. Given that these three conditions coexist in 
Indonesian schools in the Reformasi era, it is no surprise to see widespread corruption 
in schools.  
The impact of corruption in schools can be serious. A high drop-out rate, a problem in 
Indonesia (Suryadarma, Suryahadi, & Sumarto, 2006, p. 21), is connected to corruption 
in schools. According to a survey by the World Bank in 2007, nearly half of Indonesian 
citizens earned less than 19,000 rupiahs (approximately two U.S. dollars under the then 
exchange rate) per day, suggesting that they earned less than seven million rupiah 
 362 
 
(US$700) per year, an amount that makes it difficult to cover daily expenditures and 
education-related expenses. A survey in 2006 showed that households in Indonesia on 
average spent 4,012,500 rupiah on education annually (Irawan, Sunaryanto, Hendry, and 
Djani, 2006), nearly 60 percent of average annual income. This simple fact explains why 
many students in Indonesia discontinue schooling. In fact, family education expenditure 
should not be so high, because various laws explicitly prohibit civil servants in schools 
from asking parents to pay for textbooks, renovating school buildings, and similar 
purposes. Such payments, widespread though they are, are illegal levies, and on average 
cost families with school-age children in DKI Jakarta 1,445,516 rupiahs per year (Irawan, 
Sunaryanto, Hendry, and Djani, 2006, Table 18b). This amounts to 36 percent of average 
family expenditure in DKI Jakarta on education (see Table 6.5), an amount that flows 
directly into the pockets of corrupt school staff (Irawan, Sunaryanto, Hendry, and Djani, 
2006, pp. 62-63). It is expected that reducing this rate of illegal levies would allow many 
students to continue schooling.  
Table 6.5 
Legal Levies vs. Illegal Levies 
Category Amount (rupiahs) Percentage (%) 
Legal Levies 2,566,984 64.0 
Illegal Levies 1,445,516 36.0 
Total 4,012,500 100.0 
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Corruption in schools may also undermine social values. This impact is far-reaching, 
though hard to measure, because students spend considerable time in schools and build 
up their value system through listening to and observing their teachers there. Corruption 
in schools is thus likely to instil negative values such as dishonesty into Indonesia’s next 
generation. As Chapman (2005) puts it:  
The real damage to a society occurs when entire generations of youth are 
miseducated—by example—to believe that personal success comes not through 
merit and hard work but through favouritism, bribery, and fraud. Widespread 
petty corruption breaks the link between personal effort and anticipation of 
reward. This, in turn, limits economic and social development well beyond the 
immediate corruption. Such lessons have the potential to undermine civil society 
well into the future. (p. 66) 
In sum, corruption in schools is a problem worthy of attention. Its impacts are huge, and 
its causes are various. Solutions can start from removing the root causes. Raising the 
salaries of civil servants in schools is one option, and wages have indeed risen 
significantly. However, no one can guarantee that corruption in schools will automatically 
end as school staff salaries rise. It is thus best to combine salary increases with other 
measures, such as efforts to increase the accessibility of information about school funds 
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and to strengthen oversight mechanisms in schools. However, who should be 
responsible for this? Devarajan and Reinikka (2003, p. 50) suggest that the potential 
victims of corruption in schools should take the lead. In the context of Indonesia, such 
victims include at least teachers and parents. However, teachers and parents in 
Indonesia rarely participated in management of school affairs before Reformasi. 
Establishment of School Committees after 2002 was an important effort to reverse that 
situation.  
6.2 School Committees 
6.2.1 Background 
School Committees are a by-product of the School-Based Management (SBM) policy that 
was introduced in 2000. The objective of that policy was to turn schools into financially 
independent and autonomous educational institutions, based on the principle that 
“school personnel presumably know more about local educational problems than 
national officials, and…have an incentive to lobby for more resources and to innovate” 
(E. M. King & Guerra, 2005, p. 179). The SBM policy accordingly offers principals more 
power over school management than preceding arrangements and encourages people 
who have concerns about education to participate in school affairs actively and directly 
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(Sumintono, 2009, p. 47). The policy was not the first attempt by the Indonesian 
government to increase public participation in educational affairs. For example, as far 
back to the 1950s, the central government had formed the Associations of Parents and 
Teachers (Persatuan Orang Tua Murid dan Guru, POMG). The Suharto administration 
later replaced them with the Parents’ Association for School Support (BP3). Both 
institutions aimed to enhance public participation in educational management (Bjork, 
2005, p. 124). Their participation made little difference, however, because they had 
neither the power nor the capacity to initiate changes and resolve problems (Bandur, 
2012, p. 316; Bjork, 2000; J. Cohen, 2000). In the Reformasi era, along with the trend of 
decentralization, the Ministry of Education once again tried to promote involvement by 
teachers and parents in decision-making processes in schools, and did so by establishing 
school committees. 
Anti-corruption activists hope that school committees will act as effective oversight 
institutions in schools. Meeting this expectation was a challenge in the Indonesian 
context, because the Suharto government prevented ordinary people from exerting 
oversight. That administration emphasised values like obedience and harmony, and 
managed to ensure that most citizens obeyed the rules by intimidation and outright 
repression (B. R. O’ G. Anderson, 1983; M. R. Lane, 2009). As a result, before the 
Reformasi era, most Indonesians had been accustomed to not voicing grievances about 
government policies or performance. Unaccustomed to negotiating with civil servants or 
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government officials, they were unable to exercise effective oversight over their 
behaviour (Masduki, 2006, p. 209, 221). Even after the New Order era ended, many 
Indonesians remained unwilling or unable to exert oversight (Masduki, 2006).  
Similar tendencies were also evident inside the government, in part because of 
recruitment requirements. Before Reformasi, the backgrounds of people who wanted to 
be civil servants were investigated closely, and those with critical political views were 
seldom admitted. After they had passed the exams, civil servants were expected to 
respect their superiors and obey directives. Moreover, civil servants under Suharto could 
not form unions, but instead had to join the Civil Servants Corps (Korps Pegawai Republik 
Indonesia, KORPRI). This organisation was not autonomous, and one of its tasks was to 
support Golkar—the electoral machine of the Suharto administration. Because of these 
requirements and limitations, civil servants under Suharto tended toward blind 
obedience (Dwiyanto et al., 2006, pp. 57-58; Legowo, 1999, p. 90). 
Bjork’s observations demonstrate that those features were also evident in schools 
throughout Indonesia. Bjork conducted fieldwork in 1997, and his goals were to explore 
teachers’ attitudes toward education and their relations with pupils and their parents in 
Indonesian schools. His research findings thus reflect dynamics in Indonesian schools 
during the New Order era. According to Bjork (2005), many teachers in Indonesia 
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“conceived of themselves as public servants first and foremost” (pp. 94), and “were often 
treated as children who should be seen but not heard” (p. 99). Teachers who raised 
questions were usually “considered a “radical” by her colleagues” (Bjork, 2005, pp. 99). 
In this context, “obedience rather than initiative was rewarded,” stressed Bjork (2005, p. 
110). 
Of all groups, we would expect that the parents of schoolchildren would be most likely 
to express concerns about educational and school affairs. Bjork, however, found that 
most Indonesian parents of children in schools made donations but seldom held officials 
in schools accountable for the use of funds. They rarely participated in discussions about 
school affairs, let alone exerted oversight. He said:  
There was a clear consensus that parents were valued for the financial and 
material contributions they made—but such donations did not earn them any 
influence over school management, practice, or curricula. The existence of 
parents’ associations (BP3) appeared to belie the pervious statement. Parents 
and teachers referred to these bodies, which exist in virtually every Indonesian 
school, as if they were actively functioning, influential groups of parents. In 
actuality, the primary function of BP3s in the schools I studied was to raise funds 
to support school activities. Teachers and administrators depended on these 
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contributions, which in theory were voluntary, to subsidise educational 
programmes, materials, and special events. It would have been quite challenging 
for most schools to operate without BP3 support. The individuals who made 
financial contributions, however, did not regularly meet to discuss school-related 
issues (Bjork, 2005, p. 124) 
Meanwhile, school staff rarely interacted with parents. Bjork (2005)said: 
Indonesian schools have not traditionally invited or responded to the input of 
everyday citizens…like most public institutions, schools have operated with a 
sense of independence from their surrounding communities. There are no 
institutionalised mechanisms for facilitating school—home communication. 
Parent—teacher conferences are not written into school calendars. School 
festivals are usually closed to the community, and teachers do not invite parents 
to campus to observe classes. Institutional practices as well as the tacit signals 
communicated to parents underline the idea that education of Indonesia’s youth 
should be entrusted to teachers, and that parents should not interfere in that 
process. This division between schools and communities solidified over time, and 
is now an accepted feature of most of the schools I visited. (pp. 123-124) 
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Bjork’s remarks suggest that relations were highly unbalanced in Indonesian schools 
before the Reformasi era. Teachers, as low-ranking civil servants, were obedient to 
principals and other superiors, and not accountable to others. Parents and other 
education stakeholders made donations to schools but rarely even interacted with 
school staff. What could parents and teachers do if they found, or suspected, corruption 
in schools? They mostly acquiesced to or tolerated corrupt acts, suggested Widoyoko 
(2007). Not only did they lack channels of redress but many also sympathised with school 
staff whose incomes were not sufficient to maintain basic living standards. Tanzi (1994) 
put it: “low wages always invite corruption and at times lead society to condone acts of 
corruption” (pp. 16-17). 
This indicates some challenges in having school committees as effective oversight bodies 
in schools. The next subsection gives an in-depth analysis of legislation concerning the 
authority of school committees. 
6.2.2 Authority of school committees 
Education Ministerial Decree No. 44 of 2002 is the statutory source of school committees. 
The decree, consisting of four clauses (see Table 6.6) and two appendices, stipulates that 
school committees are established by the initiative of community members, education 
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units and/or local governments (Article 1[2]). It also stipulates that school committees 
are independent oversight institutions that monitor civil servants in schools on behalf of 
the public. Several subsequent decrees and laws also contain clauses relevant to school 
committees and stipulate committees’ power over the revision of curriculum, 
nomination of candidates for the position of principals, and other matters (see Table 6.6). 
To ensure their proper implementation, legal instruments should convey clear and 
precise messages. Regulations relevant to school committees, however, fail to meet 
those requirements, argued Bambang Sumintono. His criticisms centres on Education 
Ministerial Decree No. 44. He criticizes it for offering no clear explanations about school 
committees’ “functions, tasks, role and authority, not even about who are the intended 
clients,” and this absence “can be taken to mean that there is no clear legal standing for 
the parties who are involved” (Sumintono, 2009, p. 48). He also complains that the 
decree does not specify who is responsible for, and can be involved in, establishing 
school committees. This lack of specification may lead to a legitimacy problem and to 
tension between communities and local governments (Sumintono, 2009, p. 49). 
Meanwhile, he criticised use of the phrase “can use” (dapat menggunakan) in that 
decree, because such a usage makes the decree a “hesitant regulation” and suggests 
that following that decree and its appendixes is not compulsory (Sumintono, 2009, p. 
50). Because of these shortcomings, Sumintono (2009, p. 51) suggests that school 
committees are likely to encounter problems such as varied, even contradictory, 
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interpretations of the same articles, and confusion when they are put into operation. 
Among these shortcomings, the absence of clear delineation of authority deserves 
particular concerns, because authority is essential to the effectiveness of oversight 
institutions. What sort of authority encourages school committees to hold school 
officials to account? The Chicago experience suggests that authority over evaluation of 
principals’ performances and school budgeting are key (Fung & Wright, 2001; Gamage & 
Zajda, 2009). With such authority, LSCs can hold school principals accountable for the 
allocation of grants, the implementation of projects, the maintenance of school buildings, 
and such like. 
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Table 6.6 
Summaries of Legal Regulations concerning School Committees 
Laws No. Content 
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1 
(1) In each district is formed an Education Council, as an initiative from the community 
and/or the district government. 
(2) In each education institution or group of education institutions is formed a School 
Committee as an initiative from the society, educational institution and/or the district 
government. 
2 
The formation of the Education Council and School Committee can use the guidelines for 
the formation of Education Councils and School Committees as attached in Appendix I 
and II of this decree. 
3 
 
Under this decree, then the decree of Ministry of Education and Culture No 0293/U/1993 
of 1993 regarding the formation of Board of Education Assistance is abolished. 
4 This decree is effective on the date stipulated. 
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38 
Primary and secondary schools co-operate with school committees to develop an 
educational curriculum, under the co-ordination and oversight of the Education Bureau 
of Local Government.   
56 
The central and local governments, education councils and school committees raise the 
quality of education by means of offering advice, exerting oversight and others.  
66 School committees can oversee the implementation of education services. 
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7 
(1) Education Bureau Directorial General lists vacancies for principals in accordance with 
his authority; 
(2) In order to ensure the objectivity, Advisory Team of Principal Appointment can be 
formed; 
(3) Advisory Team of Principal Appointment consists of members of the school 
committee concerned, local government officials, relevant school superintendents, and 
Education Bureau Directorial General; 
(4) Advisory Team of Principal Appointment is established by Governor or Regent/Mayor 
in accordance with their authority. 
8 
The principal appointment and assignment mechanism is as follows: 
a. School superintendents, together with school committees, recommend to the 
Education Bureau Directorial General qualified candidates for principals;  
b. Education Bureau Directorial General makes the selection; 
c. Based on the selection result, Education Bureau Directorial General recommends  
Advisory Team of Principal Appointment candidates who are competent and eligible for 
the position, with a copy to Governor or Regent/ Mayor; 
d. Advisory Team of Principal Appointment later holds a meeting in order to assess 
candidates recommended; 
d. Advisory Team of Principal Appointment chairman makes the proposal to  Governor 
or Regent / Mayor who holds the authority to make appointment; 
e. Governor or Regent / Mayor makes final decisions in accordance with his authority. 
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By comparison, Indonesia’s school committees are not powerful oversight institutions. 
Education Ministerial Decree No. 44 of 2002 does not offer a clear explanation of the 
authority vested in school committees; subsequent resolutions also fail to do so. 
Education Ministerial Decree No. 162 of 2003 on the Appointment of Principals, for 
example, offers school committees only a minor role in appointing school principals. 
Such an arrangement per se is not necessarily a problem. However, in Indonesia’s context, 
a number of factors are likely to make the appointments problematic, including 
widespread bribery at the appointment stage and the low integrity of superintendents. 
In addition, subsequent regulations do not offer school committees authority over 
assessment of school principals’ performance.  
Furthermore, subsequent regulations also do not provide school committees with the 
authority to make information transparent and accessible. Educational Ministerial 
Decrees No. 44 and No. 45 both stipulate that school committees can discuss school 
budgets with school officials and give advice, in order to create a transparent, 
responsible, and democratic environment in schools. However, no regulations offer 
school committees authority to impose sanctions on officials who obstruct their 
participation and oversight in the selection of contractors and other activities related to 
school financial affairs (Davison et al. 2004 p. 4).  
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Several scholars and activists are of the opinion that these problems are the outcomes 
of a culture of closed decision making. For example, Irawan, Aunaryanto, Hendry and 
Djani (2006) complained that “education policy making process within the Ministry of 
Education was neither participatory, open, nor accountable” (p. 38). They believed that 
it was this closed decision making that made Indonesians know little about critical 
education policies like the SBM (Irawan, Aunaryanto, Hendry and Djani, 2006, pp. 38). 
Policy makers’ attitudes revealed low trust in the capacity and willingness of teachers 
and parents to exert oversight in schools, adds Sumintono (2009, p. 64).  
In summary, according to legislation, school committees should be participatory 
accountability institutions in schools that facilitate stakeholders’ participation in, and 
exertion of control over, school management. They were not clearly vested with the 
authority to call civil servants at schools accountable, however. The absence of authority 
is discouraging because education stakeholders in Indonesia had been alienated from 
school management for a long time and thus would need clear guidelines. What did 
NGOs do to address these limitations? 
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6.3 Education Coalition 
6.3.1 The education sector in Indonesia: an overview 
The Indonesian Constitution entitles every citizen to receive education. Indonesia’s 
current term of compulsory education is nine years, meaning that all Indonesian school-
age children must attend primary schools (SD) for six years, and then junior high schools 
(SMP) for another three years. Students who continue studies can choose between 
senior high schools (SMA) or vocational schools (SMK). This pathway is similar to those 
in many countries. It is noteworthy that Indonesia also has Islamic religious schools 
(Madrasah) (Table 6.1). Such schools are private and, unlike ordinary schools, are under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Chen, 2011, p. 7). The ratio of Islamic 
religious schools to ordinary schools is 1:9. In the 2009—2010 school year, more than 36 
million students attended primary and secondary schools, with 87 percent enrolled in 
public schools (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.1 
Types of Schools in Indonesia  
Type Ordinary School Madrasah 
Compulsory 
SD MI 
SMP MT 
Non-compulsory SMA SMK MA MAK 
Note. SD = Sekolah Dasar; SMP = Sekolah Menengah Pertama; SMA = Sekolah Menengah Atas; SMK = 
Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan; MI = Madrasah Ibtidaiyah; MT = Madrasah Tsanawiyah; MA = Madrasah 
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Aliyah; MAK = Madrasah Aliyah Keagmaan. 
Education service providers are teachers, principals, and school administrative staff, of 
which teachers form the majority. In the 2009—2010 school year, more than two million 
teachers worked in primary and secondary schools, 64 percent of whom had civil servant 
status (Table 6.3). The ratio of teachers with civil servant status to other civil servants is 
roughly 1:2 (Table 6.4). This high percentage suggests that schools can be representative 
of the whole bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the shortcomings of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy as a whole are also evident in schools.  
 
 
Table 6.2 
Public Schools vs. Private Schools (Primary and Secondary Level) 
Type Number Percentage (%) 
Public School 31,676,393 86.9 
Private School 4,759,214 13.1 
Total 36,435,607 100.0 
 
Note. Adapted on September 8, 2013, from http://pdsp.kemdikbud.go.id/.  
 
 
 
Table 6.3 
Types of Teachers (Primary and Secondary Schools) 
Type Number Percentage (%) 
Teachers with civil servant status 1,450,073 64.0 
Teachers without civil servant status 814,859 36.0 
Total 2,264,932 100.0 
 
Note. Adapted on September 8, 2013, from http://pdsp.kemdikbud.go.id/. 
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Table 6.4 
Teachers with Civil Servant Status vs. Other Civil Servants  
Type Number Percentage (%) 
Teachers with civil servant status a 1,450,073 31.3 
Civil servants 3,187,926 68.7 
Total 4,637,999 100.0 
 
Note. Adapted on September 8, 2013, from http://pdsp.kemdikbud.go.id/.  
a Primary and Secondary Schools only 
Civil servants in Indonesia have long been criticised for inefficiency, lack of professional 
competence, laziness, and corruption, despite a series of reform measures.256 In the late 
1960s, President Suharto implemented a number of bureaucratic reforms which 
succeeded in enhancing civil servants’ capacity to implement policies and attitudes 
toward discipline (Emmerson, 1978, p. 90), but failed to resolve shortcomings such as 
lack of creativity (Legowo, 1999, p. 90). Though there has been a new series of reform 
efforts since 1998, most reforms have focused on politics and the economy, not on 
administration (Ramage, 2007). As a result, a culture of corruption persists, and civil 
                                                     
256 Indonesians usually call civil servants Pegawai Negeri Sipil (PNS), and differentiate them from other 
government employees whose tasks are to maintain social order and national security. According to the 
Law No. 43 of 1999 on the Civil Service, government employees are citizens who are competent, recruited 
to fill positions in the administration, and other state institutions and paid by the government (Article 1). 
Government employees, therefore, include civil servants, the military and police. This chapter discusses 
only civil servants: bureaucratic functionaries who have regular contact with the people in the delivery 
and administration of public services and government functions. 
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servants with poor competence still dominate Indonesia’s bureaucracy (McLeod, 2008). 
Many civil servants still perceive themselves to be the personal servants of their 
superiors (Dwiyanto et al., 2006, pp. 57-58). Civil servants with this sort of mindset 
readily assume obedience to their superiors’ directives to be necessary, while the 
efficient delivery of public service is nonessential. 
Civil servants in schools have also been long criticised for these shortcomings. Teacher 
inadequacies mentioned in the literature include poor education levels and teaching 
abilities (Irawan, Sunaryanto, Hendry, & Djani, 2006; Zulfikar, 2009), frequent absence 
from class, and an unwillingness to enhance teaching quality (Toyamah et al., 2010; 
Usman, Akhmadi, & Suryadarma, 2007), as well as blind obedience to orders and 
reluctance to initiate change (Bjork, 2005). Corruption in schools allegedly remains 
rampant. One survey shows that more than half of respondents viewed corruption in 
Indonesia’s education sector as a severe problem, and nearly a quarter of respondents 
admitted to having faced demands for bribes from civil servants in that sector (Kemitraan, 
2001). Based on the 2006 Global Corruption Barometer, local respondents consider the 
education sector as corrupt as the military and only slightly less corrupt than the taxation 
authorities (Transparency International, 2006). Given that the military and the taxation 
authorities are allegedly the most corrupt institutions in Indonesia, such survey results 
demonstrate how negative the education sector is in respondents’ minds. While other 
problems such as poorly maintained school buildings and teaching equipment also exist 
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(BPS-Statistics, Bappenas, & UNDP, 2004), the key point is that education services which 
the students in Indonesia receive are quite poor.  
Not surprisingly, the poor education quality in the state system satisfies few Indonesians. 
As Legowo (2004, pp. 43-44) puts it, “education in Indonesia, regardless of types, extents 
or scopes, is insufficient to inspire the community. The fact that there are public 
criticisms and complaints about education-related policies, management and service 
reflects this…rare (or even no) praise for Indonesia’s education-related policies, 
management and services.”  
6.3.2 Introduction 
The Education Coalition (Koalisi Pendidikan) consisted of several Jakarta-based NGOs 
and associations, with ICW, the Federation of Indonesian Independent Teachers 
(Federasi Guru Independen Indonesia, FGII), the Indonesian Consumer’s Foundation 
(Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia, YLKI) as its core members. They started co-
operating because of shared concerns about the National Examination (Ujian Nasional, 
UN) policy in 2003. Following the enactment of Law No. 20 of 2003 on the Education 
System, some NGOs started to express their concerns about problems in the whole 
education sector. Rather than trying to influence the formulation of policies, these NGOs 
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were pushing the government to carry out education policies in accordance with the law 
(Ichwanuddin, Perdana, & Fitri, 2006, p. 51). 
The Education Coalition, founded in 2003, is in essence a forum. It has a secretariat in 
charge of activity co-ordination but lacks a hierarchical framework. Participating NGOs 
meet once a month, discussing educational problems, potential solutions and other 
matters and making decisions collectively (Ichwanuddin, Perdana, & Fitri, 2006, p. 51, 
53). Among participating NGOs, it is the ICW that maintains the operation of the coalition 
and co-ordinates its activities. 
As already discussed, ICW is an advocacy-type NGO. It is highly proficient at exposing 
corruption scandals, which explains its nationwide reputation. Disclosing scandals, 
however, is only one of its numerous accountability activities. As discussed in Chapter 
Four and Five, ICW activists mobilised voters and participated in the formulation of 
decisions relating to the reform of accountability institutions such as the KPK. The 
present chapter discusses its efforts in mobilizing stakeholders to reduce corruption in 
schools. The Public Service Monitoring Division of ICW took charge of such activities, 
focusing on the education sector because its activists believed that corruption in 
education sector is highly destructive. According to the division co-ordinator, Ade Irawan: 
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The education sector… [is] significant because [it] influences the development of 
Indonesian human resources. Indonesia is rich in natural resources. I think 
Indonesia’s future much relies on human resources, [and] good education will 
help Indonesia to develop. Some basic things like incompetent teachers and 
unsuitable textbooks, however, make current education full of problems. Many 
of them are attributable to corruption and ICW thereby has an interest in 
combatting corruption in the education sector. If corruption in the education 
sector decreases, those basic things [that ruin human resources in Indonesia] will 
also decrease.257 
ICW activities aimed at reducing corruption in the education sector were supported by 
a donor, the Belgium-based 11.11.11., which offered the ICW around 669 million rupiah 
to finance projects initiated by the Public Service Monitoring Division in the period 2003–
2008.258 This donor organisation is flexible with most project contents and proposed 
uses of funds, and thus ICW could initiate whatever activities its activists believed would 
                                                     
257 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2009.  
258 ICW was established in 1998 and its focuses in the following four years were building its reputation. It 
relied solely] on activists’ donations and voluntary labour contributions during that period. Thus, it could 
not carry out large programmes before 2003. Teten Masduki, interview with author, Jakarta, February 21, 
2008.  
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be most effective.259 
All activists in the Public Service Monitoring Division had been teachers before joining 
ICW, and shared the opinion that the low participation of stakeholders in school 
management was a prime cause of rampant corruption in schools (Ichwanuddin, 
Perdana, & Fitri, 2006, p. 53). They thus tried to increase teachers and parents’ 
participation for the purpose of combatting corruption in schools. Co-operation with 
parents makes sense, because it is they who pay tuition fees and illegal levies. They are 
recipients of education services. In contrast, co-operation with teachers is potentially 
more controversial, because most teachers are civil servants, and many also engage in 
the very corruption that ICW seeks to oppose. Nevertheless, ICW activists still treat 
teachers as corruption victims. Ade Irawan put it: 
It is school principals, not teachers, who dominate school operations, in the 
current educational environment. Thus, we consider teachers as crucial partners 
in campaigns against corruption in the education sector. The reason is that 
teachers are victims of corruption, as well as potential partners contributing to 
                                                     
259 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008.   
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corruption reduction and improvement of education260. 
All activists interviewed for this research agreed with Irawan on the need to facilitate co-
operation between teachers and parents. According to Education Coalition activist 
Jimmy Paat:  
Parents and teachers should co-operate…We expect them to discuss school 
budgets together…There are funds from the [government], and they can 
negotiate on the usage of those funds…Negotiation enables participants to know 
how school budgets are allocated and for what purposes. Such negotiation may 
be easier in schools than in other institutions because there are not many people 
involved.261 
The Education Coalition works with other NGOs in order to expand the anti-corruption 
network (Masduki, 2006, p. 213). It frequently co-operates with the Indonesian Forum 
for Budget Transparency (FITRA). FITRA is proficient at collecting and analysing data in 
                                                     
260 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008. 
261 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
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government budgets, and it thus serves as a source of information for the Education 
Coalition. At the same time, the coalition also co-operates with local NGOs or social 
groups that have strong concerns about educational issues at the local level. Its local 
partners include the Tangerang Teachers’ Union (Serikat Guru Tangerang, SGT), Garut 
Teachers’ Union (Serikat Guru Garut, SGG), and Garut Governance Watch (G2W).262 
Despite its experience and extensive network, the Teachers’ Association of the Republic 
of Indonesia (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, PGRI) is not a key partner of ICW.263 
The Education Coalition is not active in many areas. Its prime activity areas are DKI 
Jakarta and the nearby Tangerang City and Garut District. The coalition has yet to extend 
its activities to other areas, due to its limited resources. It has developed initial co-
operation with NGOs in Medan City, North Sumatra Province, but co-operation in other 
areas is still under development.264 
The Education Coalition is concerned about all issues related to education. It campaigns 
                                                     
262 The Education Coalition activists care about education quality, and thus also pay attention to issues 
such as national examinations. Ade Irawan, communication with author by email, October 23, 2008. 
263 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
264 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
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to improve national examinations, increase the education budgets; implement 
compulsory education and so on. This chapter, however, only discusses its efforts to stop 
corruption in schools.  
6.3.3 Challenges 
The Education Coalition faces multiple challenges, including stakeholders’ lack of 
negotiation experience, flaws in relevant acts and decrees, the public’s sympathy for civil 
servants who engage in corruption, and the nature of power relations in schools. In 
addition, several specific challenges are worthy of attention.  
First, data about school budgets is often inaccessible in schools. The Law on Public 
Information Openness, passed in 2008, took effect in 2010,265 and until it came into 
force the public lacked the authority to demand access to information about school 
budgets.266 Until 2010, civil servants in schools mostly kept such information secret and 
                                                     
265  According to this law, public information is a tool with which to optimise public monitoring of 
organisations of the state or other public agencies, a term that applies to schools. Details are listed in 
Undang-undang Republic Indonesia Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Public.  
266 “Transparansi Anggaran Pendidikan dan Peran Komite Sekolah,”Kompas, July 19, 2004. 
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faced no legal sanctions for doing so.267 At the same time, the Ministry of Education also 
seldom took the initiative to publicise details of education funds allocated to schools. 
Collecting documents proving corruption in schools was never going to be easy in such 
circumstances.268 
Second, the media usually shows little interest in corruption in schools. The Education 
Coalition, like most NGOs, relies on media (print as well as electronic) to propagate its 
anti-corruption campaigns. Cases or stories relevant to corruption in schools, however, 
are often not considered sufficiently interesting to attract journalists.269 Masduki (2006) 
explained:  
The media tend to direct much of their focus to corruption cases involving 
important personages or enormous sums of money. However, this can lead to a 
tendency to ignore graft cases that do not involve important public figures or 
large amounts of public money. Thus, corruption that impacts directly on 
                                                     
267 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008.  
268 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008. 
269 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2010. 
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people’s quality of life such as graft, in the health and education sectors, normally 
fails to attract the attention it deserves. (p. 217)  
This suggests that there are only limited options available for the Education Coalition to 
campaign against corruption in schools.  
Third, the impact of corruption in schools is widely underestimated. A survey by 
Transparency International in 2004 showed that respondents perceived corruption in 
administrative branches of the Indonesian government as being less widespread than 
that in political branches (Transparency International, 2004, Table 15). Education 
Coalition activists knew that getting the public to take corruption in schools seriously is 
a challenge. Ade Irawan explained: “[t]o explain to the public that corruption in schools 
directly influences their lives [is a challenge, because] the impact deriving from 
corruption in schools is usually only visible a couple of years after it happens.”270 
Several methods were available for activists to address these challenges. They could 
advocate amending flawed laws, or propose new ones to empower school committees 
                                                     
270 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2010.  
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to be more effective oversight institutions in schools. However, observation of their 
activities shows that the Education Coalition activists did not in fact give much attention 
to the regulatory framework. Instead, they tried to mobilise parents and teachers to take 
action. With regard to this method, Johnston and Kpundeh have some suggestions. They 
argue that NGOs “cannot just urge citizens to act. They need leadership, protection and 
an organisational base. They need to know about each other—literally, that they are not 
alone” (Johnston & Kpundeh, 2005, p. 151). These suggestions mean that NGO activists 
need to do several things: demonstrate leadership in combatting corruption in schools; 
publically condemn corrupt officials in schools; offer protection to whistle blowers; and 
unite education stakeholders who express strong concerns about corruption in schools. 
The next section discusses what Education Coalition tried to do to meet these goals. 
6.3.4 Activities  
6.3.4.1 Leadership 
Activists managed to show leadership in combatting corruption in schools, and they 
started by making the Education Coalition known to people who cared about problems 
in the education sector. To achieve that goal, they did not limit their focus to corruption 
in schools, but frequently commented upon other problems, such as insufficient budget 
allocations for the education sector. Activists also offered suggestions and solutions from 
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the perspectives of education service recipients. For example, in an article entitled the 
Education Map: The Version of Education Coalition, activists advocated increasing the 
accessibility of data in schools, publicizing policies and plans through mass media and 
various other steps to increase transparency and accountability. 271  Journalists from 
Tempo, Kompas and other news media frequently cited their comments and criticisms. 
These references and reports helped the Education Coalition to gain celebrity. 
Table 6.7 
Summaries of Survey Reports by ICW 
Years Areas Method Purposes 
 
2003–2004 
 
Jakarta 
Citizen 
Report 
Card 
To evaluate the implementation of the new School Based 
Management (MBS)system 
2004–2005 
Jakarta, 
Garut, 
Solo, 
Semarang, 
Kupang 
 
Citizen 
Report 
Card 
To analyse parents’ evaluation of school education quality 
and their participation in school operations. 
2005 
Jakarta, 
Garut, 
Semarang, 
Kupang 
 
Interview 
To evaluate the implementation of the School Operational 
Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) programme 
and to know whether parents were involved in the 
management of BOS funds 
 
 
2006–2007 
Jakarta, 
Tangerang, 
Garut,  
Padang, 
Banjarmasin 
Interview 
To evaluate the implementation of the nine-year compulsory 
education programme, and to analyze education 
expenditure undertaken by parents 
 Jakarta,  Citizen To evaluate public understanding of primary school services 
                                                     
271 “Peta Pendidikan Versi Koalisi Pendidikan,” Republika, November 19, 2004. 
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2008 
Garut, 
Solo 
Report 
Card 
Note. Retrieved on April 1, 2012, from http://www.antikorupsi.org/. 
In order to develop their knowledge of corruption in schools, activists also conducted 
investigations. They conducted both qualitative analyses of interview material and 
quantitative surveys. Their findings thus reflected how well respondents understood 
school committees, how much they participated in them, and what the most common 
forms of corruption in schools were. Investigation results were presented in the form of 
either books or reports. Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 show survey reports and books related 
to corruption in schools which were published by ICW in the period 2003–2008.272 
Activists distributed investigation findings in several ways. A creative means was to 
publicly deliver their findings to the relevant accountability institutions. These handovers 
were newsworthy, not only because both activists and officials would show up and 
discuss their findings, but also because they symbolised the government’s formal 
reception of complaints from civil society. Once officials received reports, they would 
                                                     
272 The two tables show that focuses of investigation by the Education Coalition were prime education 
issues at the time of investigation. The Education Coalition, for example, investigated the implementation 
condition and the level of participation of children, parents, and teachers soon after the School Operation 
Assistance programme started in 2005. Similar investigation activities were conducted every year in the 
period 2003–2008, thanks to support from the Belgium-based 11.11.11.. 
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face continuing demands by NGO activists for responses and solutions. In addition, 
activists also disseminated the results of their investigation by holding symposiums, 
aiming to attract people concerned about education problems and to encourage 
networking among them.273 
 
Table 6.8 
Summaries of Publications of ICW 
Year Book Title (in Indonesian) Books Title (In English) 
2004 
Mendagangkan  Sekolah : Studi 
Kebijakan Manajemen Berbasis 
Sekolah (MBS) di DKI Jakarta 
 
Trading schools: Studies of School-Based 
Management Policy in DKI Jakarta 
2006 
Saatnya Warga Melawan Korupsi : 
Citizen Report Card (CRC) untuk 
Pendidikan 
 
It Is the Time for Citizens to Fight Corruption: 
Citizen Report Card for Education 
2007 
Buruk Wajah Pendidikan Dasar : 
Riset Kepuasan Warga Atas 
Pelayanan Pendidikan Dasar di 
Jakarta, Garutdan Solo 
 
The Ugly Face of Primary Education: Research into 
Public Satisfaction with Primary Education Service 
in Jakarta, Garut and Solo 
2008 
Penyiasatan Anggaran Pendidikan 
20% 
 
Investigation into Education Budget 
Note. Retrieved on April 1, 2012, from http://www.antikorupsi.org/. 
6.3.4.2 Offering protection 
                                                     
273 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2010.  
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The Education Coalition was also willing to offer protection against threats or violence. 
On occasion, civil servants charged with graft would respond by making threats, or even 
physical attacks. The Education Coalition adopted several methods to offer protection, 
including keeping information about whistle blowers anonymous, pressuring the 
authorities concerned (such as the Education Bureau) to investigate, and offering legal 
assistance.  
6.3.4.3 Organising 
The Education Coalition also puts efforts into organising. Because holding civil servants 
to account requires, not just courage, but also knowledge and skills, the coalition ran 
many training programmes for people who lodged complaints, attended symposiums or 
offered data in relation to graft.274  Activists trained people on collecting evidence, 
analysing data, consulting references or regulations, and writing reports.  
The Education Coalition also tried to recruit participants in their activities against 
corruption in schools. It entrusted individual volunteers to implement these tasks. Table 
                                                     
274 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2010. 
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6.9 lists some information about the volunteers, including their names, areas of activity, 
and the schools they focused on. These volunteers received subsidies from the coalition 
only to cover their primary activity expenses. All such volunteers were parents of 
schoolchildren who lived in their activity areas or in places adjacent to them, and so were 
familiar with the dynamics of local schools. They frequently visited schools and looked 
for opportunities to hold talk with other parents and teachers. Through these volunteers, 
the Education Coalition disseminated information about corruption in schools, 
encouraged better understanding of this problem and increased the number of 
participants in its anti-corruption activities. Though a promising approach, the Education 
Coalition had agents only in DKI Jakarta, as a result of its limited resources. 
Table 6.9 
Education Coalition’s Agents  
Name Areas Schools Covered 
Jumono East Jakarta SMPN 213 Klender 
SMPN 139 Standar Nasional Klender 
SDN 19 Malaka Jaya 
SDN 06 Malaka Jaya 
SDN 02 Klender 
Sahuri Central Jakarta SDN 03 Mangga Dua 
SDN 01 Mangga Dua 
Manaf North Jakarta SDN 04 Tulang Bawang 
SDN Warakas 
SDN 01/02 
Yusuf West Jakarta MIN petukangan 
SDN 01 Petukangan Selatan 
SDN 05 Petukangan Selatam 
SDN 010 JembatanTiga 
Note. Retrieved from Ade Irawan, email communication, February3, 2008. 
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In order to strengthen its organisational base, the Education Coalition also offered 
assistance to people form alliances or unions. The Alliance of Parents Caring about 
Transparency in the Education Budget (Aliansi Orangtua Peduli Transparensi Dana 
Pendidikan, Auditan) is an example. Its establishment was assisted by ICW activists. Even 
after its establishment, it still relied heavily on ICW financially, even though it was 
technically an independent organisation. It shared the office of the Public Service 
Monitoring Division of the ICW because its activists were parents who worked weekdays 
and lacked funds. As to teachers, the Education Coalition encouraged them to form 
unions on their own, further extending the battlefront against corruption in schools.  
6.3.5 Intended outcomes and new challenges 
These activities against corruption in schools did bring about some changes. First, media 
coverage increased. Numerous published reports covered Education Coalition activist’s 
comments and observations about problems in the sector. Ade Irawan explained: 
“Before the start of the school term or the inauguration of critical educational policies, 
many news reports come out that are relevant to education problems. Media frequently 
cite our remarks blaming corruption in schools for problems like the high drop-out rate 
and low-quality education services. This sort of thing was not obvious a couple years 
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ago.”275 Increased media coverage raised the capacity of the Education Coalition to set 
the agenda in relation to education problems, helping it to demonstrate leadership in 
combatting corruption in schools.  
Second, symposiums attracted many enthusiastic participants. Based on activists’ 
observations, most participants in symposiums were teachers, while parents were in a 
minority.276 In the two symposiums I attended, participants crowded meeting rooms, 
joined group discussions enthusiastically, and showed no hesitation in expressing their 
opinions.277  Some participants lived in distant districts, suggesting that they had to 
spend hours on public transport to attend these events, but were willing to do so in order 
to learn about problems in the education sector and share their experiences with people 
who had experienced similar challenges. A teacher in one symposium explained: 
I took the train to Jakarta soon after I finished class. I need to take the last train 
back home after this meeting because I have to teach tomorrow morning. This 
                                                     
275 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, October 14, 2010. 
276 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
277 One symposium was held in the local activity centre at Tangerang City; another in Jakarta State 
University. 
 396 
 
meeting is, however, worth my time. Here, I receive information about legal 
entitlements, subsidies from the governments, among other things. At my school, 
it is impossible to learn about these things. School principals always hide 
something. I want to know why the quality of school buildings is always poor and 
how school budgets are being spent. [Surprisingly,] many participants here have 
had a similar experience.278 
His remarks show the success of the Education Coalition in initiating activities against 
corruption in schools, as well as in uniting stakeholders.  
Third, the number of people seeking the assistance of the Education Coalition increased. 
There was a dramatic increase in the numbers of complaints that ICW received (see Table 
6.10). The total number of the complaints might not look huge, but they exceeded those 
relating to accountability institutions. In contrast, among 885 complaints received by the 
National Ombudsman Commission in 2007, for example, only eight complaints were 
about problems within the education sector (Komisi Ombudsman Nasional, 2008, p. 112). 
ICW received 133 complaints related to corruption in the education sector in that same 
                                                     
278 Anonymous interviewee, interview with author, Jakarta, August 16, 2007. 
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year, showing that the Education Coalition had become a focus for complaints about 
corruption in schools and thus indicating success in both leadership and in offering 
protection to whistle blowers.  
Table 6.10 
Complaints Received by ICW (2004–2007) 
Year From Jakarta From Outside Jakarta Total 
2004 5 20 25 
2005 11 32 43 
2006 16 36 52 
2007 24 109 133 
Total 56 197 253 
Note. Retrieved from Ade Irawan, email communication, November 11, 2007. 
ICW reviewed all the complaints it received before deciding whether to use them to try 
to hold the authority concerned accountable. At the beginning, activists analysed, 
categorised and verified the complaints. If these proved justified, they passed them 
publicly to the authority concerned and tried to track the official response. Several 
corruption scandals, such as those in SDN IKIP, SDN 03 Mangga, and SDLB Bulus ended 
in all the corrupt civil servants involved being subject to administrative punishments.279 
                                                     
279 Ade Irawan, email communication with author, February 3, 2008. “Kejati Segera Sidik Korupsi di SDN 
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However, activists also encountered some challenges in this sector. First, many 
stakeholders’ understanding of school committees was insufficient or even incorrect, as 
revealed by a series of surveys conducted by ICW. For example, one survey conducted in 
2004 showed that a high percentage (37.6 percent) of local respondents in DKI Jakarta 
had never ever heard of school committees (see Table 6.11). Considering that 
information flows quickly in the capital and there had been advertisements in 
newspapers for years, such a percentage was surprisingly high. Furthermore, nearly 60 
percent of respondents thought that school committees and the Parents’ Association for 
School Support (BP3) were the same thing (Table 6.12). 280  More than half the 
respondents thought that school principals held the power to decide how many 
members school committees should have and who could fill vacancies in them.  
Activists urged the Ministry of Education to take responsibility in correcting stakeholders’ 
misunderstandings of school committees. Irawan, Eriyanto, Djani, & Sunaryanto (2004) 
noted that the Indonesian government had advertised the School-Based Management 
policy in all television stations since 2000, but complained that the advertisements did 
                                                     
IKIP Jakarta,” Koran Tempo, January 13, 2005. 
280 The difference between BP3 and school committees rests in independence. BP3 was a part of the 
schools, but school committees are supposed to be fully independent (Irawan, Eriyanto, Djani, & 
Sunaryanto, 2004). 
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not explain the concept clearly. They put it:  
They only reflected the government's desire to raise funds from the public. 
Advertisements suggested that participation equates sponsoring damaged 
schools with making donations. Such content made the public afraid and 
reluctant to participate in the management of school affairs. Teachers learned 
what the School-Based Management is from briefings from principals and 
newspapers. However, many teachers only know about, rather than 
understanding, the School-Based Management, because such briefings were 
brief and did not involve the participation of all teachers. (pp. 81) 
Table 6.11 
Public Awareness of School Committees 
Question Teachers (%) Parents (%) 
Have Heard of school committees  92.2  58.8 
Never Heard of school committees 6.8 37.6 
No Response 1.0 3.6 
Total 100 100 
Note. Adapted from Mendagankan Sekolah: Studi Kebijakan Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah (MBS) di DKI 
Jakarta (p. 91). By Irawan, A., Eriyanto, Djani, L., & Sunaryanto, A., 2004. Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption 
Watch. Copyright 2004 by the Indonesia Corruption Watch.  
  
 
 
Table 6.12 
Public Understanding of School Committees  
Question 
Teachers who said yes (%) Parents who said yes (%) 
Aug / 2003 Feb / 2004 Aug /2003 Feb / 2004 
Question 1: Are school committees:  
the same as BP3? 58.5 58.6 59.0 59.9 
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different from BP3? 34.8 35.4 27.0 25.7 
No response 6.7 5.9 13.9 14.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Question 2: Are school committees: 
autonomous? 39.0 31.4 38.0 43.3 
organised by school? 61.0 68.6 62.0 56.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Question 3: Is the number of school committee members:  
up to nine? 47.6 23.5 36.7 30.0 
decided by schools? 52.4 76.5 63.3 70.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note. BP3= Badan Pembantu Penyelenggara Pendidikan. Adapted from Mendagankan Sekolah: Studi 
Kebijakan Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah (MBS) di DKI Jakarta (pp. 91-93). By Irawan, A., Eriyanto, Djani, L., 
& Sunaryanto, A., 2004. Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch. Copyright 2004 by the Indonesia Corruption 
Watch.  
The implications of poor public knowledge were twofold. First, stakeholders who lacked 
understanding about school management would continue to pay bribes or to acquiesce 
in graft as previously, rather than using school committees to enhance the accountability 
of civil servants in schools. Deininger and Mpuga (2004, p. 13) show that knowledge of 
how to report irregular practices is critical to stakeholders’ actions and attitudes toward 
administrative corruption. Second, poor public knowledge allowed many school 
principals to manipulate the new committees by appointing relatives or friends.281 Such 
school committees could hardly be effective oversight institutions in schools.  
                                                     
281 “Kenapa Komite Sekolah Tak Berdaya?,” Kompas, July 23, 2010; “Sekolah ‘Alergi’ dengan Orangtua 
Kritis,” Kompas, July 23, 2010. 
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Third, teachers in DKI Jakarta showed less enthusiasm for forming unions or 
accountability activities than did their counterparts in other administrative areas. 
Several teacher unions were formed with the Education Coalition’ assistance. There 
were also some cases where teachers made strong attempts to carry out oversight in 
their own schools. However, most cases took place in administrative areas outside DKI 
Jakarta.282 Activists felt that teachers in the capital were hesitant about forming unions 
or taking direct means to demand accountability in schools. Considering that NGOs 
initiated lots of activities in the capital and teachers there exceed counterparts in other 
administrative areas in number, such an outcome was unsatisfactory.283 
Fourth, parents showed comparatively little enthusiasm for the Education Coalition’s 
calls to take action against corruption in schools.284 Auditan was the sole NGO in the 
country consisting of parents wanting to end corruption in schools. Of course, some 
individual parents also demanded accountability in the allocation of school budgets, but 
their number was not remarkable.285 Activists believed that parents’ worry about school 
                                                     
282 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009; Agus Sugandi, (G2W activist), interview 
with author, Jakarta, October 25, 2007. 
283 Jimmy Paat, interview with author, Jakarta, October 21, 2009. 
284 Jumomo, (Auditan activist), interview with author, Universitas Negari Jakarta, November 8, 2007. 
285 “Komnas PA: Hak Anak Jangan Dilanggar,” Kompas, June 8, 2010. 
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staff’s retaliation was the main cause of low participation. According to Auditan activist 
Jumono: 
We have not succeeded in changing the unbalanced power relationship between 
school principals and school committees. This is because there have not been 
enough parents who dare to challenge school principals. Many parents are 
willing to attend street demonstrations or file complaints. However, they will 
rarely directly question and challenge school principals. This is because they fear 
that the school principals and teachers whom they question or challenge will 
retaliate by bullying their children.286 
Jumono’s remarks supplement current explanations of reasons that the public might 
hesitate to take action to combat corruption. Johnston (2005, p. xii) has proposed a free-
rider explanation: people usually deem combatting corruption as public goods and 
thereby choose to wait, instead of taking action. Jumono’s remarks suggest that more 
altruistic considerations, and fear of retaliation, can also be important. 
                                                     
286 Jumomo, interview with author, Universitas Negari Jakarta, November 8, 2007. 
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Fifth, Irawan argued that stakeholders have relied on NGOs to expose corruption in 
schools.287 Practices such as filing complaints to NGOs or joining NGO-organised street 
demonstrations reflected stakeholders’ reliance on NGOs. Even if such actions showed a 
decline of public toleration for corruption in schools, they barely helped to achieve NGOs’ 
goals of preventing corruption by getting stakeholders to exert oversight at both the 
decision-making and implementation stages. Reliance on NGOs, with their limited 
resources, would not do much to prevent corruption in schools from taking place, given 
the scale of the problem.  
In summary, according to NGOs activists’ observations, education stakeholders in DKI 
Jakarta had not been able to utilise school committees effectively to exert oversight over 
school staff, despite a variety of activities initiated by NGOs. Causes of this outcome 
include poor knowledge of school committees among education stakeholders, fear of 
retaliation, and reliance on NGOs, suggesting a need to develop comprehensive 
strategies in the near future.  
                                                     
287 Ade Irawan, interview with author, Jakarta, February 5, 2008. 
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Analysis 
School Committees are a participatory accountability institution that accords with ideas 
associated with the notion of the ‘New Public Service’, a type of public administration 
practice Robert B. Denhardt and Janet Vinzant Denhardt have advocated since 2000. 
New Public Service consists of “a set of ideas about the role of public administration in 
the governance system that places citizens at the centre” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, 
p. 550). Proponents of the concept argue that “the government belongs to its citizens” 
and thus civil servants “should focus on their responsibility to serve and empower 
citizens as they manage public organizations and implement public policy” (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000, p. 549). Such citizen-centred ideas make New Public Service 
distinguishable from Old Public Administration that emphasises accountability of civil 
servants to democratically elected political leaders, and also from New Public 
Management that stresses how the government steers the society (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000, p. 554).288 Bowman and his colleagues believe that the emergence of 
                                                     
288 Traditionally, it is elected political leaders who make public policies, and civil servants are demanded 
to implement policies effectively and also to account for performance to those leaders (R. B. Denhardt & 
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the New Public Service paradigm reflects changes in how governments operate. They 
state:   
Today vertical hierarchy is giving way to horizontal “networks," bureaucracies are 
diminishing, and shared leadership structures are emerging. The public interest 
is identified and pursued as a collaborative process based on dialogue with 
relevant stakeholders. The discretion of empowered administrative officials is 
present, but limited, and they remain accountable to the citizens via elected 
political leaders and administrative oversight. Employee job boundaries are 
flexible and skill sets are versatile. The transition from the old to the new style of 
providing services has altered the role of the public sector, emphasizing 
                                                     
Denhardt, 2001, p. 391). However, such model of administration has been long under criticisms for  
ignoring citizens’ demands, hostility toward innovation, and several shortcomings (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992, pp. 11-12). Several reform ideas were thus proposed in the 1980s, and some of them are labelled 
as New Public Management, due to shared beliefs in the market. Proponents of New Public Management 
argue that the government ought to be run like enterprises; that citizens shall be treated like customers; 
and that government officials shall endeavor to create incentives or mechanisms. Examples of New Public 
Management-like reform measures can be found not only in Australia, New Zealand, United States, and 
some other advanced democracies, but also in transitional democracies in Latin America or Southeast Asia 
(Samaratunge, Alam, & Teicher, 2008; Turner, 2002). In spite of remarkable impacts, New Public 
Management school is still not immune from criticisms. Such criticisms include tensions between the 
emphasis on decentralization and the need for coordination in the public sector (Peters & Savoie, 1996); 
vague roles and relationships of the executive and legislative branches (Carroll & Lynn, 1996); and 
undermining fairness, justice and other democratic values (McCabe & Vinzant, 1999). 
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collaboration and enablement rather than hierarchy and control (Bowman, West, 
Berman, & Wart, 2004, p. 11)  
New Public Service is now believed to have “become increasingly evident in public 
administration scholarship and practice” (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015, p. 664). The 
discussion in this chapter suggests that even Indonesia was following this global trend, 
at least in the field of school management. 
To have New Public Service ideas fully realized proponents expect both citizens and civil 
servants to meet certain requirements. Citizens are expected to focus on “common good 
and the long-term consequences to the community,” rather than private and short-term 
interest (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2001, p. 397). Civil servants are expected to prioritise 
the creation of a collective, shared notion of the public interest over other administrative 
affairs, to help citizens articulate and meet shared interests, and to build up a 
relationship of trust and collaboration with citizens (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2001, pp. 
398-399). Regarding accountability, civil servants are expected to be accountable to 
citizens for whether their actions conform to the law, community values, political norms, 
professional standards, and citizen interests. However, the existing literature has not yet 
included in-depth discussion on how such accountability can be enforced. Indonesia’s 
School Committees are an example that can be used to fill such gap, being participatory 
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accountability institutions the Indonesian government established to tackle problems in 
the education sector, in particular at elementary and secondary schools. Analysing such 
institutions can help enrich scholarly understanding of the limitations on, and 
opportunities for, achieving the ideas of the New Public Service paradigm in a 
democratising context. 
Two aspects of School Committee were analysed in this chapter. Concerning institutional 
design, the analysis focused on legally stipulated authority, organisational composition, 
and functions that NGO activists expected the Committees to have. Regarding 
participation of stakeholders, the focus was on the level of involvement by community 
members and also the reasons for their participation. The chapter concludes that the 
performance of School Committee fell far short of NGO activists’ expectations. School 
personnel had long been criticised for concealing key data concerning the operation of 
their schools, ignoring parents’ right to access such data, and failing to build trust with 
stakeholders. On the part of stakeholders, many of them, as observed by NGO activists, 
did not demand accountability, suggesting that they placed little emphasis on the long-
term public interest. In addition to problems of policy socialisation, the causes of these 
outcomes may include the incompleteness of supporting measures for participatory 
accountability, and also the absence of democratic awareness that could underpin the 
enforcement of accountability. 
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6.4.2 Postscript 
Conditions in Indonesia after 2008 have looked more advantageous to the exercise of 
accountability by school stakeholders than they were during the 2003–2008 period, due 
to some changes in mindset and practices by interested parties and the establishment 
of new accountability institutions. The former was observable in several areas where 
NGOs carried out pilot projects and experimented with new strategies. Such 
experimentation is a reflection of flaws in strategies taken during the period 2003–2008. 
In that period, activists from the ICW-led Education Coalition attempted to expose 
problems like poor public understanding of school committees by conducting surveys, 
with an expectation that survey outcomes would have the effect of driving all 
stakeholders to exercise accountability. NGO efforts led to a clear understanding of 
problems within Indonesia’s education sector, but not to significant changes in 
accountability relations at schools. This outcome drove activists to think about 
alternatives. As ICW activist Febri puts it:  
We later realized that [Citizen Report Card] CRC research was merely a 
downstream instrument [, and] there will be no changes if we just persist in it. 
We, therefore, adopt upstream [alternatives; that is,] planning strategies and 
managing school finance in a participatory manner (Wisudo, Irawan, & Fadjar, 
2011, p. 20).   
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ICW, with Garut Governance Watch (G2W) and other local partners, launched the 
Participatory School Budgeting Movement (Gerakan APBS Partisipatif) after 2008. 
Activists believed that “a robust and harmonious relationship between the school, 
school committee, and citizens [is] the key to solving various problems [schools now 
encounter]” (Rosadi, Fajar, & Rustandi, 2011, p. 78).They expected that the formulation 
of decisions, including decisions concerned with budgets, within schools would be 
entirely open to stakeholders’ oversight, and also that all stakeholders would work 
together to bargain with government officials for budgets and funds (Wisudo, 2011b, pp. 
103-104). The Garut Regency, West Java Province, and the Tangerang Regency, Banten 
Province, were chosen to be sites of these pilot projects, for reasons of geographical 
proximity, knowledge of local conditions, and history of collaboration with local NGOs. 
Activists targeted ten schools in each regency, with an expectation that the 20 schools 
would exemplify how Participatory School Budgeting could work if practised properly 
(Wisudo et al., 2011, p. 19).  
The activists began the Participatory School Budgeting Movement by extending their 
existing networks. They initiated several new activities, including arranging courses 
about organic farming, in the light of the fact that most parents in pilot areas were 
farmers (Wisudo, 2011b, p. 96). Meanwhile, activists also assisted schools to apply to 
local governments or domestic firms for funds to renovate damaged buildings (Wisudo, 
2011b, pp. 103-104). These activities, though seemingly unrelated to the goal of 
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combating corruption in schools, could broaden the networks that activists deemed 
essential to the Participatory School Budgeting Movement. To mobilise stakeholders, 
NGOs released survey outcomes, organised meetings, and offered training for all 
participants (Fajar, 2011, p. 34). These mobilisation efforts were widely supported by 
teachers and parents who had previously attended NGO symposiums, meaning NGOs’ 
past efforts had started bearing fruit. 
NGO activists encountered several obstacles soon after they began this experimentation. 
For example, few residents in the pilot areas were accustomed to being involved in 
school affairs, they also encountered prejudices and suspicion on the part of participants 
(Wisudo, 2011a, p. 49; Wisudo, 2011b, p. 96). Activists also noticed variation among 
targeted schools in several aspects. For example, in the Hanjuang 3 Public Elementary 
School all affairs were under the control of the school principal and specific School 
Committee members and the level of satisfaction with the education delivered in the 
school was high, unlike in the bulk of the schools where there were strong complaints 
about school principals’ dominance over school affairs (Rosadi et al., 2011, p. 86). 
Activists also noted strong resistance from civil servants beyond schools. For example, a 
local activist in Garut complained that officers at the Regional Technical Implementation 
Unit (Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah, UPTD) always insisted on accountability of school 
budgeting to regional governments and bureaus, rather than to parents and other 
stakeholders (Wisudo, 2011b, p. 101;106). It is believed that anxieties about the loss of 
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benefits under Participatory School Budgeting motivated such resistance. 
Notwithstanding such challenges, NGO efforts to promote Participatory School 
Budgeting had some achievements. A high ratio (nine out of ten) of targeted schools 
were selected for grants from the national government to rebuild damaged buildings, 
implying that NGO assistance was crucial to the selection, and this increased ICW’s and 
local partners’ reputation as promoters of Participatory School Budgeting (Wisudo, 
2011b, p. 104). As several activists note, attitudes of stakeholders in targeted schools 
toward the Participatory School Budgeting Movement and the NGOs changed after this 
achievement (Fajar, 2011, pp. 39-41). Many teachers and parents now felt proud to be a 
part of the Participatory School Budgeting Movement, and activists believed that they 
had built mutual trust and friendship between them and residents (Wisudo, 2011b, p. 
95; 97). Furthermore, in some of these cases stakeholders took the initiative to 
themselves demand transparency in school affairs, suggesting NGO activists no longer 
overwhelmingly constituted the core of the force pushing for accountability in the pilot 
project areas. The schools which satisfied such demands for transparency soon gained 
public trust, and accordingly attracted more stakeholders than ever to participate in 
school management (Wisudo, 2011a, p. 50). In short, a benign cycle incrementally took 
hold. 
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Three years of efforts in these pilot projects had led to the formulation of a clear 
mechanism for Participatory School Budgeting. Such a mechanism runs as follows. First, 
outcomes of surveys, conducted to collect information about pupils’ expectations and 
teachers’ needs, are reported to school committees for deliberation. Next, a plenary 
meeting attended by all parents decides on the issues submitted by the School 
Committee and, finally, detailed reports on the implementation of these resolutions are 
posted on schools’ bulletin boards in the next school year (Wisudo, 2011a, pp. 49-50). 
Such mechanisms have persist in the pilot project schools even though the actors 
involved have changed, activists note. According to activists’ evaluations, Participatory 
School Budgeting in three targeted schools had been fully implemented by 2011, and in 
the remainder, at least some improvements in participation and transparency were 
observable (Wisudo, 2011b, pp. 105-106). Given the fact that the NGOs offered similar 
assistance in all the schools, activists believed the variation resulted in differences in 
stakeholders’ attitudes and actions (Rosadi et al., 2011, p. 90). Overall, these 
experiments had reached expected outcomes, helping targeted schools to reduce 
problems like teacher absenteeism, and attracting more school-age children. 
Meanwhile, the institutional context also improved after Law No. 14 of 2008 on 
Disclosure of Public Information (UU Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 tentang Keterbukaan 
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Informasi Publik), enacted in 2008, came completely into force in August 2011.289 This 
statute specifies that all public information should be open and accessible to Indonesian 
citizens and legal entities (Article 2(1)); and that all public bodies (badan publik), defined 
in this law as entities whose works are concerned with state administration and funded 
by the government, and non-government organisations funded by either the community 
or foreign sources (Article 1(3)), must provide relevant information in a quick and 
straightforward manner (Article 2(3)), and in comprehensible language (Article 10(2)). 
Given that no previous statutes had entitled Indonesian citizens to access such 
information, Law No. 14 of 2008 is certainly a legally significant advance (Butt, 2013, p. 
114). According to it, schools are public bodies legally obliged to respond to every 
citizen’s demands for data concerning school management. 
Law No. 14 of 2008 contains provisions aimed to facilitate the disclosure of public 
information, though these provisions and their implementation have been criticised in 
certain regards (Putro & Berenschot, 2014; Sakapurnama & Safitri, 2012, pp. 76-77). 
                                                     
289 Like several other laws mentioned in this thesis, the passage of Law No. 14 of 2008 on Disclosure of 
Public Information was also much attributable to local NGOs’ efforts. The Indonesian Centre for 
Environmental Law (ICEL) and 23 other local NGOs in 2000 jointly formed the Coalition for Freedom of 
Information, with the aim to lobby for the enactment of this law. Though the draft was submitted to the 
parliament in 2002, there had been no deliberation on it until 2005. During the following two years, NGOs 
made suggestions concerning provisions, many of them were included in provisions in the end (Butt, 2013, 
p. 116). 
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Article 24 and 60 specify the establishment of a Central Information Commission (Komisi 
Informasi Pusat) in Jakarta and an Information Commission in each provincial capital. 
Meanwhile, the Law also requires public bodies to appoint information officers in charge 
of responding to citizens’ requests for information (Article 13). Concerning dispute 
settlement, the statute stipulates that the Central Information Commission can mediate 
or adjudicate on disputes(Article 38(2) and 42), and, if the Commission’s decisions do 
not satisfy the parties concerned, they can appeal to relevant courts (Article 4(4)). Civil 
servants and officials who tamper with public information will be fined up to Rp 5 million, 
and they will be fined much more if found guilty of destroying or removing public 
information (Article 52 and 53). Such penalties are heavy in the eyes of Indonesia’s civil 
servants because most of them earn less than Rp 10 million per month, explaining why 
Butt (2013, p. 129) believes “penalties may ultimately have a deterrent effect where they 
apply to individual information officers.”  
Law No. 14 of 2008 has improved Indonesia’s institutional context, creating a more 
favourable context for the exercise of accountability by stakeholders in schools. In 2011, 
together with the United States and six other countries, Indonesia initiated the Open 
Government Partnership (OGP) program to provide citizens further access to 
government data (Fung, 2013, pp. 184-185), again demonstrating the Indonesian 
government’ commitment to improving people’s access to public information. 
 415 
 
Information Commissions eventually became operative after years of development, far 
behind schedule (Butt, 2013, pp. 124-125). By mid-2016 there were 35 Information 
Commissions across the archipelago, in addition to the Central Information Commission. 
Among these Commissions, 30 were at the provincial level, four at the Regency level and 
one at the municipal level. 290  In the two provinces where NGOs engaged in the 
Participatory School Budgeting Movement, Information Commissions have been 
established. A study of 40 decisions by the Central Information Commission and eight 
appeals against Information Commission decisions heard by administrative courts shows 
such institutions generally performed in favour of information seekers. Simon Butt states: 
Disputes which come before the Information Commission and the Indonesian 
courts were…almost always being decided in favour of the person seeking the 
information. In other words, public bodies are usually compelled to disclose 
information that they would rather keep within their own ranks…Indonesia’s 
reforms in [the area of disclosure of public information] have, on the whole, thus 
                                                     
290 Southeast Sulawesi Province, East Nusa Tenggara Province, Special Region of West Papua, and North 
Maluku Province had not yet established information commissions at the time of writing. The four 
information commissions at the regency level are located at Bangkalan (East Java Province), Sumenep 
(East Java Province), Cirebon (West Java Province), and Tolitoli (Central Sulawesi Province). The only 
municipal information commission is located at Cirebon City (West Java Province). 
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far been largely successful  
How has the Information Commission structure been used to improve transparency in 
schools? At the time of writing few news reports are available to offer a concrete answer. 
Based on limited news reports collected it was clear that the prime institution making 
use of the Commissions are ICW and its partners, which also act as complaint collectors. 
A case about alleged graft in five Jakarta junior high schools is an example. In that case, 
ICW acted a complaint centre as well as the agent making use of the accountability 
institution in question. ICW activists, based on complaints received, in 2011 made a 
request to the Central Information Commission for solving disputes over access to data 
concerning School Operational Assistance (BOS). The Commission granted the request, 
but principals of the five schools in question still refused to follow the Commission’s 
decisions (Kompas, 2011). To enforce the decision, ICW activists submitted petitions to 
corresponding courts, one of the dispute settlement mechanisms stipulated in the law 
(Sobri, 2012). In this case, stakeholders merely acted as complaint makers, and there is 
no indication of deeper involvement in the process. If this instance is typical, NGO 
activists still have a long way to go before creating fully inclusive and open schools.  
The discussion above reveals the presence of grounds for optimism about the 
enforcement of accountability by Indonesian stakeholders in schools. Signs like 
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willingness on the part of teachers and parents in pilot areas to demand accountability 
on their own initiative and even to have deep involvement in school management 
underpin such optimism. Moreover, to further promote the Participatory School 
Budgeting Movement, NGOs have taken its activities to provinces beyond Banten and 
West Java, and also advocated by-laws to protect residents' entitlements to access 
information kept by school personnel (Wisudo, 2011b, p. 107). However, it should be 
noted that the pilot project was carried out in areas of limited geographic scope, and 
that there has not yet been any comprehensive study of the resolution of disputes over 
access to information kept by schools. Accordingly, several questions about the 
enforcement of participatory accountability in Indonesia after 2008 remain unanswered, 
suggesting a direction for future studies.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Corruption in schools is by no means petty crime, maintain Education Coalition activists. 
It undermines social values, leads to poorly maintained school infrastructure and robs 
poor students of rights to education and a decent future. School committees which the 
Indonesian government ordered established in 2003 for the purpose of widening 
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involvement of stakeholders in school management were widely expected by NGO 
activists to resolve this problem. As participatory accountability institutions, school 
committees help prevent corruption in schools, provided that they are vested with the 
power to exert control over school staff, and their members are able, and also willing, to 
use this power to demand accountability. However, based on analyses of legal sources 
and NGO activists’ observations about the attitudes and activities of stakeholders in DKI 
Jakarta and nearby areas, school committees barely met these two requirements. This 
finding suggests that, in the period 2003–2008, school committees did little to prevent 
administrative corruption in schools, partly explaining why corruption in the civil service 
persisted in democratising Indonesia. Causes of this include flaws in the legislation, poor 
public knowledge of school committees, education stakeholders’ excessive reliance on 
NGOs, and parents’ fear of retaliation, meaning that neither the institutional nor the 
cultural context favoured NGO-led accountability actions aimed at preventing 
administrative corruption in schools.  
The findings of this chapter add to scholarly understanding of the NGO–led Indonesian 
anti-corruption movement in the Reformasi era. They show that Jakarta-based NGOs 
combat corruption in schools in a proactive fashion, but several institutional and cultural 
factors obstructed their efforts. Various investigations have shown that many citizens 
misunderstood the function and composition of school committees, inhibiting 
participation in them. But people who did accurately understand them quickly found 
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that school committees lacked “teeth”, because such institutions were not vested with 
the power to exercise control over school staff. This understanding, together with other 
factors such as fear of retaliation, discouraged many education stakeholders from 
utilizing school committees to call school staff to account. Instead, they left stakeholders 
dependant on NGOs to exert control, a tendency that went against NGO activists’ 
expectations of not combatting corruption in schools alone.  
Law No. 14 of 2008 made the context after 2008 appear favourable for the exercise of 
control by education stakeholders over school staff. This law entitles citizens to ask all 
public institutions (badan publik), inclusive of schools, to give them access to public 
information (Article 17). All public institutions are now required by law to offer requested 
materials within seven days (Article 22). Violators will be subject to legal sanctions 
(Article 51-57). In a few cases, the right to public information has been successfully 
enforced. For instance, in 2012, the Central Information Commission ordered five junior 
high schools in Jakarta to publicise information relating to the School Operation 
Assistance Programme (BOS) in the period 2007–2009. Unlike the situation before 2008, 
there are now rights both to information and school committees. A future task for the 
Education Coalition will be to ensure that both advantages complement each other. 
The findings expand the discussions on social accountability. The literature on that 
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subject mentions factors that can affect how well mobilization strategies work, including 
the type of controversy that triggers mobilization (Lemos-Nelson & Zaverucha, 2006; 
Peruzzoti & Smulovitz, 2006), and the vulnerability of office holders to public oversight 
(Behrend, 2006). There has been little discussion of ordinary people’s fear of exerting 
control, however. Such fear may derive from concerns about negative impacts of 
accountability activities. The findings may also enrich the study of NGOs’ efforts to 
combat corruption. The current literature on that subject mostly discusses how NGOs 
expose scandals and impose pressure upon office holders or accountability institutions, 
rarely mentioning NGOs’ efforts to mobilise ordinary people for the purpose of 
preventing corruption. NGOs by themselves cannot end corruption, especially when it is 
deeply entrenched in a bureaucratic system and supported by social norms. This chapter 
explains how NGOs can try to mobilise ordinary people, and the great challenges they 
may encounter in doing so. 
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7 Conclusion 
Why is rampant corruption so common in democratising countries? Explanations from 
the present literature emphasise factors like political will, institutional design, and 
penalties for corruption practices, paying little attention to efforts by citizens to enforce 
accountability. In order to fill this gap in the literature, this thesis has focused on citizens 
and their activities, with the belief that citizens in countries undergoing democratisation 
can help tackle corruption in a proactive manner. 
This thesis has made the concept of accountability central to its discussion because there 
is a tight correlation between corruption and accountability. The literature on 
accountability offers useful guidance for understanding the anti-corruption activities of 
varied kinds. This thesis also has focused on accountability activities initiated by NGOs 
to tackle corruption. Since NGOs are formed by citizens voluntarily for specific purposes 
and are capable, financially and technically, of mobilizing citizens and initiating other 
accountability activities, it is fair to expect that NGOs’ anti-corruption experiences will 
point to the opportunities and obstacles that citizens encounter when trying to promote 
accountability so as to reduce corruption. Furthermore, this research has explored how 
NGOs have tried to enforce ex-ante and simultaneous accountability, unlike most 
literature on accountability and corruption that has focused on NGO activities aimed at 
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calling government office holders and politicians accountable for corrupt conduct 
already committed. Following remarks by Walter Little and Daniel Kaufmann, this thesis 
argues that citizen-initiated activities aimed at demanding ex-ante and simultaneous 
accountability can play an important role in the reduction in corruption.  
As a transitional democracy where corruption persists, Indonesia provides an 
opportunity to explore citizen initiatives aimed at preventing corruption. It is widely 
accepted that corruption threatens this country’s fledgling democracy because it 
contradicts openness and other democratic values and ruins public trust in democratic 
institutions. Corruption remains severe, though various reform measures aimed at 
tackling it were initiated by the Indonesian government in the first decade of the 
Reformasi era. As a result, public discontent about corruption has remained strong, and 
several local NGOs were formed to enforce accountability. This thesis has focused on 
Jakarta-based NGOs. The main rationale for this is that many of them were extremely 
proactive in leading the anti-corruption movement in the Reformasi era. Thus, it is hoped 
that lessons learned from Jakarta-based NGOs’ anti-corruption activities in the period 
1998–2008 can broaden understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that 
Indonesian citizens may encounter while engaging in efforts to prevent corruption in a 
democratic context. In order to explore how Jakarta-based NGOs tried to promote ex-
ante and simultaneous accountability in the first decade of the Reformasi era, I carried 
out fieldwork in 2007 and 2008. Most of the data used for this thesis comes from 
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interviews conducted in this period. The cases discussed in the thesis were selected in 
accordance with suggestions put forward by NGO activists themselves. To bring the 
material up to date, I have added postscripts to each substantive chapter, but the 
material in these postcripts was compiled without the benefit of fieldwork. These 
sections thus end with pointers toward supplementary or future research. 
This thesis was set out in seven chapters. Chapter One set out the research objectives, 
elucidated fundamental concepts, put forward research questions and explained 
research methods, limitations, and contributions. Chapter Two reviewed the literature 
on the association between democracy and corruption, and also on NGO activities aimed 
at enforcing accountability and combatting corruption. The review showed that scholars 
widely believe corruption harms democracy and that some suggest citizen-initiated 
actions can help reduce corruption. However, the literature on NGO-led accountability 
actions mostly focuses on their ex-post accountability activities. At the same time, the 
literature on anti-corruption NGOs mostly discusses their efforts to make power holders 
within governments accountable for corrupt conduct by such means as exposing 
scandals and bringing other external pressure to bear. Such literature helps little to 
explain what NGOs can do to prevent corruption. Several possibilities were identified for 
exploration in the third section, including NGO activities aimed at seeking electoral 
accountability, efforts by NGOs to strengthen policy-making accountability on issues 
concerned with accountability institutions as well as activities designed to mobilise 
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ordinary people to exert scrutiny over civil servants through participatory accountability 
institutions.  
Chapter Three focused attention back on Indonesia, particularly during the Reformasi 
era. It discussed in turn the Indonesian context, the agents of social accountability, and 
the objects of their accountability activities. It noted that in the first decade of the 
Reformasi era there were a plethora of activities designed to strengthen accountability. 
Members of parliament used their new powers to enhance political accountability; 
several state institutions pursued internal reforms in order to strengthen administrative 
accountability; newly-built accountability institutions like the Corruption Eradication 
Commission exerted control over public agencies. At the same time, numerous NGOs 
also tried to attack corruption and enhance accountability. These local NGOs and their 
accountability activities have begun to attract scholarly attention, but some of their 
activities, especially ones concerned with corrupt prevention, have not yet been 
analysed in depth.  
Chapter Four explored Jakarta-based NGOs’ electoral accountability activities that have 
the effects of promoting ex-ante accountability. It revealed that, though corruption 
engaged in by members of parliament gave rise to widespread discontent prior to 2004, 
citizens could not effectively hold their elected representatives accountable through 
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existing accountability institutions or mechanisms. In this context, several Jakarta-based 
NGOs launched the Anti-Rotten-Politician Movement, aiming to prevent candidates 
whom they believed were unfit to hold offices from winning parliamentary seats in the 
2004 general election. If successful, the movement would not only have punished 
corrupt politicians who sought re-election but would also have prevented undesirable 
candidates from obtaining power, reducing the likelihood that corruption in parliaments 
would still persist. However, factors like the party-centred electoral system impeded 
NGOs’ attempts to prevent all blacklisted candidates from winning parliamentary seats, 
suggesting that the Indonesian context prior to 2005 did not facilitate citizens’ efforts to 
prevent corruption in parliaments. Nevertheless, lessons learned from the movement 
helped NGO activists to identify flaws in the electoral system, leading to the initiation of 
follow-up activities aimed at making the electoral system and legislation favourable to 
the exercise of electoral accountability. A noteworthy point is that no proactive moves 
were taken by NGOs to enhance electoral accountability in the 2014 general election, 
despite the presence of a candidate-centred electoral system facilitating such efforts. As 
a result, tackling graft involving elected representatives appears to be a distant goal.   
Chapter Five explored efforts by Jakarta-based NGOs to exercise policy-making 
accountability in cases concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission and two other 
state accountability institutions. Such efforts are essential to corruption prevention 
because such simultaneous accountability practices help accountability institutions to 
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function optimally, discouraging power holders within the government from engaging in 
corruption. This chapter found that Jakarta-based NGO activities were initiated in a 
favourable context. Many government officials were willing to consult NGO activists or 
to invite them to participate in the formulation or implementation of decisions 
concerning accountability institutions. Meanwhile, all activists interviewed for this 
research viewed as positive the opportunities which activists had to participate directly 
in the process to design and implement these institutions, implying considerable degree 
of flexibility in how accountability activities were organised. NGOs’ accountability 
activities led to positive outcomes in the three cases, meaning that they contributed to 
corruption prevention through securing and strengthening accountability institutions. 
However, the situation after 2008 seems less favourable than ever. Challenges stemming 
from leadership rotation, political intervention, and other factors cast doubt over the 
ability of NGOs to keep enforcing policy-making accountability. To address those 
challenges requires NGOs to maintain keen attention to decisions concerned with 
accountability institutions and also to adjust their strategies to the changing political 
situation. 
Chapter Six explored efforts by Jakarta-based NGOs to mobilise ordinary people to exert 
control over school staff and teachers through participatory accountability institutions. 
It found that, in the period 2003–2008, school committees in DKI Jakarta and 
surrounding areas were not effective oversight bodies, meaning that citizens who had a 
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stake in corruption-free schools failed to exercise simultaneous accountability, and in 
turn could not prevent corruption in school. The reasons for this ineffectiveness include 
a lack of the power needed to enhance the accountability of civil servants in schools, 
poor understanding by stakeholders of their functions, and excessive reliance on NGOs 
to combat corruption in schools, rather than a direct demand for accountability. 
Conditions in Indonesia after 2008 look more advantageous to the exercise of 
accountability by stakeholders in schools, due to the establishment of new accountability 
institutions and NGO experimentation with new mobilisation approaches. Despite 
grounds for optimism about the enforcement of participatory accountability, further 
exploration is needed to have better understanding of actual developments on the 
ground. Overall, this chapter contributes to the study of social accountability, a field 
where the outcomes of mobilization strategies are rarely discussed, and also to the study 
of corruption, which lacks a thorough understanding of the unwillingness of victims of 
corruption to combat corruption themselves.  
This thesis concludes that several Jakarta-based NGOs strove to fight corruption in a 
proactive fashion, but not all aspects of the Reformasi context were in their favour. The 
Reformasi context favoured their actions aimed at strengthening the accountability of 
non-elected officials in regard to decisions about accountability institutions, partly 
explaining why some anti-corruption agencies (e.g. the Corruption Eradication 
Commission) were powerful and enjoyed strong public support. At the same time, 
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however, the context did not favour NGO actions aimed at enhancing the accountability 
of elected representatives and civil servants, reflecting the shortcomings of government 
reform measures as well as Indonesian citizens’ lack of willingness to demand 
accountability from politicians and the civil service. The poor exercise of electoral 
accountability and participatory accountability, in turn, reduced the prospects of 
combatting corruption in Indonesia. Elected representatives who were themselves not 
subject to serious electoral accountability were in turn legally entitled to monitor 
accountability institutions which were primarily tasked to tackle political corruption. At 
the same time, participatory accountability institutions that failed to perform as 
reformists expected could not compensate for anti-corruption agencies’ limited ability 
to tackle administrative corruption. As a result, the first decade of the Reformasi era was 
marked by the paradoxical coexistence of strong accountability institutions and rampant 
political and administrative corruption. Given this, promoting electoral accountability 
and participatory accountability was a matter of urgent necessity, and NGOs’ ability to 
exercise influence in these fields will affect whether corruption remains pervasive in the 
future. 
Ideally, NGOs would have made sustained progress in exercising the three types of 
accountability activities after the main fieldwork for this thesis was concluded in 2008. 
Postscripts added to three chapters point to some favourable conditions, including 
continuing attention paid by NGO activists to corruption-related issues, an improved 
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institutional context (e.g. a candidate-centred electoral system and the establishment of 
Information Commissions), and willingness of citizens to demand accountability of civil 
servants, as proven in NGO pilot projects where activists experimented with new 
strategies in the education field. However, numerous challenges impeded significant 
progress. While NGO activists endeavoured to enforce policy-making accountability, 
factors like external intervention in decision-making concerning accountability 
institutions (e.g. the selection of Antasari to head the KPK) and leadership rotation (e.g. 
the second Supreme Court Blueprint was made under the leadership of Bagir Manan but 
implemented by his successor) lessened their leverage. NGOs thus needed to have keen 
attention to what was happening with accountability institutions and sustain their 
efforts to ensure their effective functioning. Meanwhile, improvements in electoral 
accountability seemed unlikely due to factors like most NGO activists’ inclination to avoid 
“aggressive” strategies (e.g. releasing blacklists), and little change to voters’ tendencies 
to disregard corruption when making their electoral choices. Regarding participatory 
accountability, though NGO efforts to mobilise stakeholders in schools had brought 
about some positive effects, this happened only in a few pilot areas. Overall, it is fair to 
state that NGOs have still not managed to effectively exercise ex-ante and simultaneous 
accountability, and have therefore not been able to prevent corruption from happening. 
Indonesia’s experience suggests that to effectively tackle corruption countries should 
enact reform measures that favour the exercise of accountability by civil society, in 
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particular activities aimed to enhance ex-ante and simultaneous accountability, rather 
than merely emphasising checks and balances among government institutions and 
actions aimed to call power holders to account for past misdeeds. By emphasising these 
aspects, this thesis has offered a different explanation for the persistence of corruption 
in a democratising context. Present works on corruption in such contexts mostly 
discusses the conditions that favour the abuse of power for personal benefit, such as 
opportunities arising from the changing socio-political environment under 
democratisation, or partial reform measures. Some works may mention the roles of 
citizens and civil society, but they rarely give in-depth analyses of accountability actions 
aimed at preventing corruption from happening. This gap leads to several interesting 
questions. This thesis offers an explanation from NGO activists’ perspectives by analysing 
cases in democratising Indonesia and examining NGO-led accountability actions aimed 
at preventing corruption. It reveals that civil society organisations may combat 
corruption in a proactive fashion and enjoy a favourable context during democratisation. 
The existence of contextual factors impeding NGO-led accountability actions indicates 
room for further improvement in both the cultural and institutional setting, and that is 
one reason for the persistence of corruption in transitional democracies. Since Jakarta-
based NGOs now endeavour to remove obstacles to their anti-corruption efforts, they 
are playing a prominent role in developing the sound systems of accountability which 
Chalmers and Setiyono (2012, p. 77) believe that emerging democracies need.  
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It is hoped that findings of this research will enrich scholarly understanding of efforts by 
NGOs to prevent corruption. This topic is itself a minor part of the large body of work on 
corruption. This body of work draws scholars’ attention away from even more usual 
subjects, like the causes of corruption, its impact, and official anti-corruption agencies, 
but it in turn puts excessive focus on NGOs’ activities that aim to hold corrupt politicians 
and office holders accountable for misconduct they have already committed. In other 
words, the present literature leaves the impression that NGOs focus on punishment but 
do little to prevent corruption. Against that impression, this research shows that NGOs 
can be proactive in trying to promote preventive measures. In Indonesia, they tried to 
mobilise voters to block corrupt candidates from winning parliamentary seats, to 
influence the formulation and implementation of decisions concerning key state 
accountability institutions, and to mobilise ordinary people to exert control over civil 
servants in schools through participatory accountability institutions. This research also 
points out challenges that NGOs may encounter while carrying out such tasks. 
Challenges may derive from the system (such as a party-centric electoral system), flaws 
in statutes (such as Law No. 20 of 2003 on the National Education System), the attitudes 
of officials (such as Andi Hamzah, in the case study of the Corruption Court), the 
mindsets of ordinary people (such as parents, in the case study of school committees), 
and so on. It is hoped that the experiences of Jakarta-based NGOs in addressing such 
challenges point toward new research direction.  
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This research expands scholarly understanding of Indonesia’s anti-corruption movement 
in the Reformasi era. There has been a small, but growing, body of literature on that 
subject, most of which focuses on NGOs’ growth, internal problems and also their efforts 
to expose corruption scandals (Abidin & Rukmini, 2004; Chaniago, 2003a, 2003b; 
Davidson, 2007; Hikam, 1999a, 1999b; Khoirullah, 2004; Lindsey, 2002; Setiyono & 
McLeod, 2010; Sinaga, 2004; Widjaja, 2003; Zainal, 2004). The present literature rarely 
notices the wide range of activities that NGOs initiated for the purpose of preventing 
corruptions, and the difficult trade-offs and problems encountered when engaging in the 
government’s own anti-corruption efforts. This thesis fills these gaps by examining 
Jakarta-based NGOs’ anti-corruption experiences.   
This research also extends the study of social accountability. The vast literature on 
accountability has little to say about NGOs. Existing works on social accountability draw 
scholars’ attention away from subjects like formal accountability institutions. However, 
it puts excessive focus on NGOs’ ex-post accountability activities and has little to say 
about the other two types: ex-ante and simultaneous accountability. This research has 
argued that several NGO activities aimed at preventing corruption can be categorised as 
demanding ex-ante and simultaneous accountability, and has drawn attention to 
numerous contextual factors that may be favourable to such efforts, the challenges that 
NGOs may encounter, and efforts NGOs can take to create an environment conducive to 
the enforcement of social accountability.  
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It is hoped that this thesis will be followed by a study of efforts by NGOs to enforce ex-
ante and simultaneous accountability for anti-corruption purpose. Future research 
should be conducted in a comparative fashion; by so doing it will contribute to a richer 
understanding of NGOs’ activities to enforce accountability and to combat corruption 
than we have at the present time. 
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